the desires of the majority of the States, and whatever feeling of insecurity still remains, undoubtedly the German delegation, aided by or aiding the Russians, will press for an immediate second reading of the convention. The efforts of these delegations will be strengthened in the minds of the other delegates by the insistence in the Assembly on the part of all the small powers for further efforts to reach prompt and tangible results on the disarmament question. The resultant of these two forces may well take the form of a perfunctory meeting of the Preparatory Commission which will from time to time and on varied excuses resolve itself into meetings of the Security Committee; it must be constantly borne in mind that aside from the American delegation, all the members of the Preparatory Commission are also members of the Security Committee, with the exception of the Russians, who act as observers when the Security Committee is sitting. I turn now to the more important question of what the attitude of the American delegation should be in the event that the debate becomes more than perfunctory. As I said in the preceding paragraph, the technical phase of the Preparatory Commission is ended, and the views of the various governments are pretty thoroughly known. If we have no concessions to make, no modification of the position previously taken by us, it would seem clear that we have no chance of contributing in a constructive manner to the labors of the Commission. In this connection I venture to recall to the Department the difficulties attendant upon our making our position as to control and organization in the proposed draft disarmament convention so clearly known at the third session, that we were able to escape from the concentrated convergent movement to hold us up to world public opinion as the chief obstructionist necessarily rendering the labors of the Commission abortive. I am referring specifically to the situation which culminated, so fortunately for us, in Mr. Gibson's speech of April 13 last and the reception accorded it by the rest of the Commission— a reception which, as the Department will recall, was only brought about after very arduous preparation outside of the conference room. Although we weathered that storm, the various delegations still have it in mind that on a fundamental point we were the leaders in taking a position which rendered agreement on any draft convention vastly more difficult. If in the forthcoming stage of the Commission we must adopt a similar uncompromising attitude on various points both of substance and of procedure, we shall lay ourselves peculiarly open 5 * For draft texts drawn up to serve as a basis for discussion at the second reading, see League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series IV (C.310.M.109.1927.IX), p. 383. See telegram No. 234, Apr. 13, 1927, 1 p. m., from Geneva, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. I, p. 200. to a natural attempt of the other delegations to shift onto us the onus of their, as well as our, failure to reach agreement. It therefore now becomes necessary to examine in some detail the record of the third session, and see on what points the Government may find it possible to offer some concession. Without now going into detail on the various questions which were raised in the first reading of the third session, I submit for your consideration a possible procedure which might enable us to escape the reproach of obstructionism and at the same time retain for ourselves an active participation in those problems of primary importance to us. You may care to consider the advisability of allowing the delegation to state at some early stage in the proceedings that the American Government has given careful thought to the manner in which it could best be helpful in securing an accord which will be of real benefit; that we believe our army is so small and is reduced to such a point that any plan adopted would leave us a considerable margin beyond our present strength; that therefore unless our views are asked for or unless unforeseen circumstances arise, we propose, subject to the limitations expressed in Mr. Gibson's speech of April 13th on the subject of control, to abstain from debate on questions affecting the army in the hope that those nations with large armies will be able to work out for themselves some satisfactory basis of limitation; that our Government will then give most sympathetic consideration to the question of whether we can fall in with this plan, and in view of the already reduced army of the United States we hope and believe that our participation will be practicable. We have thus left to the military powers the solution of the question which primarily concerns them, as we believe that it can be most readily and effectively handled by them. On the other hand, we believe that as regards naval problems the greatest hope lies in having them handled by nations possessing large navies, and we suggest that the same procedure of courteous abstention on the part of non-navy powers which we propose to follow relative to armies might also carry the restriction of navies to a successful conclusion. If the Department thinks well of this general policy in principle, I should be glad to submit more detailed suggestions. However, there is one point of substance which is so immediately important that I believe it should be submitted now, in order that the Department may have the longest possible time in which to give it consideration. Our attitude as to the limitation of navies may bring us into a position. where we stand alone against the entire Conference. Recollection of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament this summer brings clearly to my mind the fact that the Japanese delegation was ready and anxious to fall in with practically any plan which would enable them to maintain roughly the 3-5 ratio and at the same time not spend another dollar on building; furthermore, the British building program appeared from behind every proposal the British made; they came back again and again with what they called proposals, and in each case when the non-essentials were stripped away the framework of the building program emerged unchanged. This would seem to show that the British are at present laying more emphasis on the necessity for the maintenance of this program that [than] they are on limitation by tonnage, a state of mind in which they are not far removed from the final compromise proposal offered by Paul Boncour toward the end of the first reading (see pages 225 et seq.). It would not be any great jump for the British to accept the Boncour proposal as a basis for discussion in the next session, and it requires even less a stretch of the imagination to believe that the Japanese would acquiesce therein. Such a situation would leave us absolutely alone if we maintain rigidly our present thesis. I am convinced of the essential soundness of our stand in regard to methods of naval limitation; it is in fact the only one which I believe will constitute a reasonable limitation in which we can regard the building programs of other nations without misgiving. It is to be borne in mind, however, that if the British abandon the stand which they took by our side during the work of the earlier sessions of the Preparatory Commission, and the Japanese take similar steps from different motives, we may readily find ourselves in an entirely isolated and distinctly uncomfortable position, regardless of the merits of our program. I feel that this situation may very readily arise, and that it is desirable that the Department give its most serious consideration at this early date to the course which should be followed by our representative at the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission; that it should consider whether there is any method by which our position can be maintained without laying us open to the charge of obstruction and without standing inconclusively for a lost cause. I confess that this seems almost impossible of achievement, and that it may be necessary for the Department, in view of the broader issues involved, to consider whether there is any measure of concession which can be made in return for a reciprocal concession which will secure the results we seek without jeopardizing our essential principles or compromising the position which we will probably have to maintain in the conference which will be called in 1931. I have [etc.] HUGH R. WILSON * i. e., League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series IV. 500.A15/642: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State BERNE, February 16, 1928-2 p. m. 12. Secretariat announces officially provisional agenda for Preparatory Commission, March 15th, as follows: 1. Progress of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security; 2. Russian resolution; and 3. Progress of the work of the Preparatory Commission. Under point 3 will [be] full discussion of whether or not the second reading of draft of convention is to take place this session. Gibson notified." WILSON 500.A15/645: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Tuck) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, February 25, 1928—10 a. m. 8 Department's February 24, 2 p. m. The following is a brief summary of the draft convention of immediate and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation. Draft convention which begins with a brief preamble contains 5 chapters and 63 articles briefly summarized below: " 9 Chapter 1. Effectives of armed forces. This chapter contains principles of disarmament relating to effectives. Article 1 reads textually as follows: "All military units and formations as well as [the effectives of the] land, sea and air forces, whether of the home country or of its oversea possessions, shall be disbanded within 4 years as from entry into force of the present convention and shall not in future be allowed in any way whether open or secret. Disbandment [of the] effectives shall be done in four successive stages: (a) In the first year as from entry into force of the present convention to [sic] one-half effectives in service whether officials, officers or other ranks shall be disbanded and (b) In the following year[s] remaining effectives in equal parts." 'Hugh Gibson, Ambassador in Belgium. The Acting Secretary of State instructed Mr. Gibson by telegram on Feb. 6, 1928, 1 p. m., to proceed to Geneva as head of the American representation at the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Commission (file No. 500.A15P43/193a). Not printed. Bracketed corrections in arts. 1, 58, and 68 taken from text as printed in League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series VI, pp. 325, 336, and 337. Remainder chapter 1 develops in detail proposal to [sic] put forward by the Soviet delegation at the Fourth Preparatory Commission appearing in pages 16 and 17 provisional minutes first meeting. Chapter 2. Material. Contains provisions regarding destruction material land, naval, air, armaments, fortifications, bases and military industries. As regards naval armaments it provides for destruction capital ships, convoys, aircraft carriers, submarines. It allows use of disarmed war vessels as merchant vessels. All other smaller naval vessels including coast guard ships to be disarmed. Disarmament of military air forces involves destruction heavy aircraft, otherwise military aeroplanes when disarmed can be used by civil organizations. Chapter 3. Organization of protection on land and at sea. Protection on land provides that establishment of police forces or militia must be maintained within present limits for period of 4 years. Protection at sea provides for organization of maritime police service and for this purpose waters of the globe are divided into 16 zones. Zones that would affect United States are number 7 (northwestern section of the Atlantic Ocean) and number 7 [14?] (northeastern section of the Pacific Ocean). Chapter 4. Control. First article of this chapter provides that within 3 months of the coming into effect of the convention there shall be organized a permanent international commission of control, committees of control in each of the contracting states and local commissions. Functions, composition and duties of these bodies described in detail. Paragraph [Chapter] 5 contains suggestions for conclusion of supplementary conventions and indicates procedure for ratifying conventions and settling questions arising out of violations. Articles 58 and 60 are quoted verbatim. Article 58. Within one year of the coming into effect of the convention all the contracting powers shall enact legislation providing that a breach of any of the stipulations of the convention shall be regarded as a great [grave] offense against the state. At the same time all acts of national or international importance which are contrary to the above-mentioned clauses shall be repealed or amended. Article 60. In the case of a direct breach of the present convention by one of the contracting powers [states], an extraordinary assembly of the representatives of contracting powers [states] participating in present convention [shall be summoned as expeditiously as possible] by the Permanent International Commission of Control to decide upon steps to be taken. Steps to be taken [the steps taken] to exercise pressure must not be of a military character. All disputes between States shall be settled by the Permanent International Commission of Control. TUCK |