recalling the fact that the project of a treaty of perpetual friendship between France and the United States proposed last June was drafted in such a way as to limit strictly the mutual undertakings which it contained to those relations in law resulting from intercourse between the two signatory States alone. Within such limits an absolutely unconditional agreement might be entered into, since that agreement would not expose the signatories, as would a multilateral treaty, to juridical difficulties resulting from the respective positions of various Powers with regard to one another, and since furthermore, as regards two countries like France and the United States morally united as they are by ties of time-honored friendship, other contractual engagements concluded by one or the other Power could never constitute in fact anything but purely theoretical obstacles.

In order to attain the result which Your Excellency has in view, you have considered it preferable to adhere to the conception of a multilateral treaty, and you have deemed it necessary to insist that even in the multilateral form the proposed treaty should include an unconditional pledge. If Your Excellency really believes that greater chances of success may be found in this formula in spite of the consequences which it involves, especially the necessity of attaining a treaty world-wide in its scope, the French Government would hesitate to discuss longer the question of its adherence to a plan which the American Government originated and for which it is responsible. Without in any way losing sight of its international obligations, both as a member of the League of Nations and as a party to the Treaties of Locarno or treaties guaranteeing neutrality, France, for the purpose of finding a common basis for initial negotiations, is wholly disposed, after a new examination of the proposals formulated by Your Excellency, to suggest immediately to the German, British, Italian and Japanese Governments that they join in seeking, in the spirit and in the letter of the last American note, any adjustments which in the last analysis may be forthcoming with respect to the possibility of reconciling previous obligations with the terms of the contemplated new treaty. The French Government notes at once with satisfaction that while advocating the conclusion among the Governments specifically mentioned of a treaty binding the signatories not to resort to war, the Government of the United States. admits the participation in that treaty of all the other Governments of the world. This conception accords with a reservation actually necessary for obtaining a real instrument for the establishment of peace by means of a formal engagement among all Powers among whom political controversies may arise. Such an engagement would in fact involve the risk of exposing the signatories to dangers and misunderstandings unless based upon the complete equality in the application of the treaty among themselves of all the States with respect to other

States and not only upon the equality of certain States among them. The treaty contemplated could not operate in respect of one Power which is a party thereto unless the other States exposed to the possibility of grave controversies with that party were also signatories thereof.

At the same time it is clear that in order not to turn an instrument of progress and peace into a means of oppression, if one of the Signatory States should fail to keep its word, the other Signatories should be released from their engagement with respect to the offending state. On this second point, as on the first, the French Government believes itself fully in accord with the Government of the United States.

My Government likewise gathers from the declarations which Your Excellency was good enough to make to me on the first of last March, the assurance that the renunciation of war, thus proclaimed, would not deprive the Signatories of the right of legitimate defense. Such an interpretation tends to dissipate apprehensions, and the French Government is happy to note it.

If such is the attitude of the American Government on these three fundamental points, and if it is clearly understood in a general way that the obligations of the new pact should not be substituted for, or prejudice in any way, previous obligations contained in international instruments such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Agreements or treaties guaranteeing neutrality whose character and scope can not be modified thereby, then the differences of opinion which have appeared in the course of previous phases of the negotiation have to do more with words than with the reality of the problem facing the two Governments today.

Hence, in accordance with the proposal contained in your note of January 11, which you kindly renewed in your note of the 27th of February, the French Government would be prepared forthwith to join with the Government of the United States in submitting for the consideration of the Governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, the correspondence exchanged between France and the United States since June, 1927, and in proposing at the same time for the assent of the four Governments, a draft agreement essentially corresponding in purpose to the original proposal of M. Briand, in the multipartite form desired by the United States with the changes of wording made necessary by the new concept; the Signatory Powers of such an instrument, while not prejudicing their rights of legitimate defense within the framework of existing treaties, should make a solemn declaration condemning recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, or in other words as a means of carrying out their own spontaneous, independent policy.

They would specifically undertake, among themselves to refrain from any attack or invasion, and never to seek the settlement of any difference or conflict of whatsoever nature or origin which might arise between them save by pacific means. It would, however, be clearly understood that an obligation could only exist for the Signatories in the event that the engagement were contracted by all States, that is to say, that the treaty, open to the accession of all powers, would only come into force after having received universal acceptance, unless the powers having signed this treaty or acceded thereto should agree upon its coming into force, despite certain abstentions. Finally, in case one of the contracting powers should happen to contravene the treaty, the other contracting powers would be automatically relieved, with respect to that power, of the obligations contained in the treaty.

It is in this form, it would seem, that the negotiation of a plan for a multilateral pact such as conceived by the American Government could be pursued with the greatest chances of success. Your Excellency may be assured, in any case, in the conduct of this negotiation of the most sincere and most complete collaboration of my Government which is always ready to associate itself without ambiguity or reservation, with any solemn and formal undertaking tending to ensure, strengthen or extend the effective solidarity of the Nations in the cause of peace.

In responding to these ideas, whose happy inspiration cannot be gainsaid, France would feel confident that she was continuing the work to which she has never ceased to apply herself in her foreign policy, and, faithful to her previous international engagements of that nature, that she was contributing nobly, as Your Excellency has said, in "promoting the great ideal of peace which the League itself has so closely at heart". Pray accept [etc.]

711.5112France/262

CLAUDEL

The Ambassador in France (Herrick) to the Secretary of State No. 8494

PARIS, April 3, 1928. [Received April 13.] SIR: I have the honor to report that the general reaction here to M. Briand's last peace pact note has been very favorable.

A limited section of public opinion still appears to feel that the proposed pact in its present form is absolutely in contradiction with the League of Nations, and there is a disposition in some quarters to contend that the reservations set forth by M. Briand amount after all to limiting the condemnation of war to wars of aggression

in other words, if the other signatories are to be released in case the pact is violated, who is to decide upon or define the violator?but on the whole there is no undue tendency to argue or criticize.

Sentiment is practically unanimous as to M. Briand's reply being effective both tactically and substantially, and as to France having gone as far as she or any other nation could go along the path of conciliation while taking into account her contractual obligations.

Likewise, attention is called with emphasis and approbation to the passage of the note stating that the French Government would not feel justified in discussing longer "its adhesion to a project the responsibility, as well as the conception, of which pertains to the American Government itself." Coupled with this idea of our moral responsibility for the proposal in its present form-which undoubtedly will continue to be popular here for sometime—is, I think, a growing realization of the possibilities with respect to our eventual moral obligation in case of a violation of the pact. As has been reported in previous despatches, the Socialist Oeuvre has consistently set forth this view; it would appear to be growing increasingly widespread and bids fair to become the main consideration in the new phase of negotiations which has now been opened.

This is perhaps the most appropriate place to report to the Department that in its comment on M. Briand's note, the Journal des Débats revives the confusion concerning the two Havana resolutions attendant upon the publication of our note of February 27. This paper states that the preamble to the resolution of February 18 condemning war as an instrument of national policy was omitted from the Final Act of the Conference as signed, a copy of which, containing the full text of the resolutions adopted, it claimed reached Paris on March 29 and was in its hands. The Department will undoubtedly be interested in reading the whole article which is herewith transmitted.18 As the Department is aware, this Embassy is not yet in receipt of any such document or final report nor, I find upon inquiry, is the Cuban Legation here. It should, however, be borne in mind that the French journalists attending the Latin Press Conference at Havana have been drifting back into Paris for the last few days.

I should appreciate having the Department's instructions in the premises definitively clearing up this confusion."

I have [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

GEORGE A. GORDON First Secretary of Embassy

18 Excerpt from Journal des Débats, Mar. 31, 1928, not printed.

19 See the Department's instruction No. 2774, May 25, to the Ambassador in France, p. 71.

711.5112France/243: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain

(Houghton) 20

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1928—1 p. m.

79. I am convinced that it is important that without further delay we submit to the British, German, Italian, and Japanese Governments, for the consideration and comment of those Governments, the correspondence which has been exchanged between this Government and that of France in regard to an anti-war treaty so that preliminary discussions may be undertaken for purpose of reaching a general agreement.

To this end I sent for the French Ambassador today and asked him informally to make inquiry for me from the French Government as follows: 21

"In view of the exceedingly full and frank statement of the French position contained in your note of March 30, and of the position of the United States as expressed in its notes, and with the definite understanding that neither France nor the United States stands committed to any formula, but that both sincerely desire to cooperate with each other and with other Powers for the purpose of determining the possibility of reaching a general agreement on a form of treaty renouncing war, may I understand that the French Government is now agreeable to the submission of the entire correspondence in the first instance to the four Powers mentioned in my notes of January 11 and February 27 for their consideration and comment ?" 22

Above is for your information and discreet use.

KELLOGG

711.5112France/248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Herrick)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1928–5 p. m.

23

101. Department's 100, April 9, 4 p. m.24 Following is text of note to British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments and text of draft treaty to be transmitted therewith.25 Please repeat immediately to London, Berlin and Rome. Note begins:

"The same telegram was sent to the Embassies in France (No. 97), Germany (No. 33), Japan (No. 34), and Italy (No. 35).

Quoted portion not paraphrased.

"On April 7 the French Ambassador made an affirmative answer to the Secretary's inquiry.

The same telegram was sent to the Ambassador in Japan as Department's No. 39.

"Not printed.

25

The note and draft treaty were delivered to the respective Foreign Offices on April 13.

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