Pease, Conway Nat. Bank v. (N. H.). Peck v. Mackowsky (Conn.) .1068 199 I.) 487 .1063 Ch.) 689 (Del. 961 246 307 Peckham, East Shore Land Co. v. (R. 935 87 Ridgley v. Walker (N. J. Sup.). .1060 Ringwood Co. v. West Milford Tp. (N. J.) 867 Robbins, Lenfest v. (Me.). .1133 Roberts Cotton Oil Co., Lutz v. (Del. Super.) Rhode Island Co., Murray v. (R. I.). 1 385 245 Riccio v. People's R. Co. (Del. Super.) 604 Rice v. Murphy (Me.)... 842 ... Richardson v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Me.)..1005 Ricker, Woodsville Guaranty Sav. Bank v. (Vt.) Richmond v. Read (R. I.). 387 Riddlemoser Co. of Baltimore City, Mancuso v. (Md.).. .1051 861 601 State v. Di Benedetto (N. J. Sup.). 521 Town of Wolcott v. Stickles (Conn.). 572 State v. Fitzsimmons (Del. Gen. Sess.).. 223 Townsend v. Crow (Md.) 660 State v. Fitzsimmons (Del. Gen. Sess.). 598 Townsend v. Crow (Md.) 661 State v. Gross (N. H.).. State v. Hill (Del. Gen. Sess.). 533 Township of Rayburn, Kammerdiener v. 221 (Pa.) 464 824 Township of West Milford, Ringwood Co. v. (N. J.)... 867 State v. Jankowski (N. J. Sup.). 311 State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. (Del. 540 Travelers' Ins. Co., Richardson v. (Me.)...1005 618 State v. Keen (Del. Gen. Sess.) 600 Trustees of Ministerial Fund in First Parish in Gorham in Cumberland County, Inhabitants of Gorham v. (Me.)... Trustees of Seventh Baptist Church v. Andrew & Thomas (Md.) 290 452 Whitehouse v. Durrell (Me.). .1134 Wachsmith v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (Pa.) 755 Whittington v. Hall (Md.). 163 326 Wahle, State v. (N. J. Sup.). 300 Wakefield v. Chevalier (Conn.). 973 Waldron, New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. W. H. & F. W. Cane, Murphy v. (N. J.) 854 1093 (Md.) 709 Waldstein, Wolcott v. (N. J. Ch.). .1135 Wilderness Poultry Farm, Wilson v. (N. J. Sup.) 517 William B. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co. (N. J.)....... 930 Walker, Kates v. (N. J. Sup.). 301 Williams, Jacobs v. (Conn.). 202 THE ATLANTIC REPORTER VOLUME 82 MURRAY v. RHODE ISLAND CO. 1912.) said: "Yes; when I saw her falling off, I realized the car was going." There was (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Feb. 2, no further corroboration of the plaintiff's statement that the car was still when she stood up to get off. CARRIERS (8346*)—INJURIES TO PASSENGERS In an action for injuries to a street car passenger while attempting to alight, evidence held not to support a finding that the car slowed down and was coming to a stop when the passenger started to alight and was thrown from the car by a sudden jerk. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, De Dig. 346.*] Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; George T. Brown, Judge. Action by Margaret Murray against the Rhode Island Company. There was a verdict for plaintiff for $1,500. The trial court refused a new trial, and defendant brings exceptions. Sustained. Washington R. Prescott and Edward H. Ziegler, for plaintiff. Joseph C. Sweeney and G. Frederick Frost, for defendant. The trial judge, in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, said: "The testimony strongly preponderates to the effect that she left the car while it was in motion. If her right to recover turned upon her leaving the car while it was in motion, the verdict could not be sustained." He said, however: "The place where her key was picked up in the morning indicates pretty well where she went off the car. As she sat about middle of the car, the rear end of the car, when she went off, must have been about at the white post, corner of Whitmarsh street, where she desired to alight. According to the conductor's testimony, the car was then 'merely crawling' and 'coming to a stop.' The jury was warranted from the evidence in finding that she went off the car at that point. It cannot be said as a matter of law that she PER CURIAM. was guilty of negligence in leaving the car The plaintiff testified in these circumstances. She testified that that she stood up when the car started from Peace street, and signaled to the conductor the car started with a sudden jerk just as to let her off at Whitmarsh street; that she she was stepping onto the sidewalk. The sat down until the car came to a full stop, conductor testified that at this white post, when she arose, and, stepping out by two after the two men left the car, he struck the people who were seated at her right, was bell to go ahead. If the car had slowed stepping on the running board, just in the down to a mere crawl, and was coming to a act of stepping onto the sidewalk, when the stop, and two passengers had left it, before car started with a sudden jerk and threw the conductor gave the signal to go ahead, her onto the sidewalk. Her sister, who was he should have ascertained whether some with her, but who, not having reached her other passenger was also in the act of leavdestination, remained on the car, corrobo-ing the car before signaling for the car to go rated the plaintiff as to the signal and her sitting down again. As to the plaintiff's leaving the car, this witness testified: "I was sure the car stopped, and she stood up to get out." She said that she took no notice of her getting out past two people in the seat; that then she did not see her until she saw her falling off to the sidewalk; that she did not hear any signal given to start after the car stopped for the plaintiff to get off; that, when she saw her falling off, the car was going. In answer to a question she ahead. This he did not do. It is probable from the evidence that the plaintiff, attempting to alight before the car stopped, was thrown by the sudden starting up of the car upon the conductor's signal, and the jury was warranted in so finding." The theory that the car had slowed down to a mere crawl and was coming to a stop when the plaintiff started to alight is not supported by the testimony of any of the witnesses for the plaintiff. Upon an examination of the testimony of the other wit For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 82 A.-1 nesses, we find a general agreement that the car was not slowing down when the plaintiff arose to get off; that the slowing down had taken place before; and that the car was not only in motion at that time, but that it was proceeding at a considerable rate of speed. Witnesses testify variously that it was going quite fast; that it was going at a moderate speed; that it was proceeding at not a very quick rate of speed, but was under quite a little headway; that it was in fairly rapid motion, and gaining in speed. We do not, therefore, find in the evidence, either of witnesses for the plaintiff or for the defendant, any support for the theory that the plaintiff was thrown by the sudden starting up of the car while it was merely crawling and coming to a stop. We think that the evidence as to the place where the plaintiff's key was found the next morning cannot avail to overcome the evidence that the plaintiff fell off the car further along toward Princeton avenue. The key might well bound somewhat from the place where it struck in falling, and might easily have been moved from the place where it fell by contact with the feet of travelers upon the sidewalk. The finding of the key near the place where the plaintiff said she fell from the car was an incident to be considered, but we do not think it can be regarded as conclusive. In our opinion the verdict failed to do justice between the parties. The motion for a new trial should have been granted. The defendant's exception to the decision of the superior court denying its motion for a new trial is sustained. The defendant takes nothing by its other exceptions. The case is remitted to the superior court for a new trial. TURNER et al v. TURNER. PER CURIAM. We think that justice requires a revision of this case. The prayer of the petitioners for leave to appeal, in order to contest, not only the residence of the testator at the time of his decease, but also his testamentary capacity and freedom from improper influence at the time of the execution of his will, supported by the affidavits filed with the petition, makes it evident that there are bona fide issues for determination between the parties interested. We are of the opinion that the petitioners had no opportunity to appeal from the decree of the probate court admitting said will to probate through lack of knowledge of the existence of said decree, and upon due consideration of the circumstances we find that they were prevented by mistake from filing their claim of appeal in due time. The petition is granted, on condition that a claim of appeal shall be filed in the probate court within 20 days, and that the same shall be prosecuted according to law. (85 Vt. 340) WOODSVILLE GUARANTY SAVINGS BANK v. RICKER et al. (Supreme Court of Vermont. Caledonia. Jan. 8, 1912.) LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (§ 148*)-ACKNOWLEDGMENT-SUFFICIENCY. demands for payment, wrote that the bankWhere a surety on a note in response to ruptcy case of one of the principals had not yet been settled, and for him to get all he could out of them, and that he, the surety, would be home in two weeks, and then see the payee, the letters were a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to stop the running of the limitations. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 597-603; Dec. Dig. § 148.*] Exceptions from Caledonia County Court; Fred M. Butler, Judge. Action by the Woodsville Guaranty Sayings Bank against B. M. Ricker and another. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Jan. 22, There was a verdict for plaintiff, and the first-named defendant excepted. Affirmed. This action is assumpsit on the promissory note hereinafter described. Pleas, general issue, and that the cause of action did not accrue within six years before the bringing of the suit. Replication, that the cause of action did accrue within six years. Defendant Blanchard also pleaded the statute of limitations, and during the progress of the trial, on motion of plaintiff, the suit was ordered discontinued as to this defendant, to which no exception was taken. Defendant Petition by George Turner and others to Ricker testified that he signed the note. The file a claim of appeal. Granted. Gardner, Pirce & Thornley (William W. Moss, of counsel), for petitioners. Sheffield, Levy & Harvey and Charles H. Koehne, Jr., for respondent. note was dated August 21, 1901, for $1,000, payable 12 months after date to the order of the Woodsville National Bank, and signed by B. F. Ricker, J. W. Blanchard, and the defendant B. M. Ricker. It appeared that defendant Ricker had none of the proceeds of the |