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"would change the entire energy picture," according to a panel of experts cochaired by Dr. John Foster, Chairman of the DOD's Science Board (1978).

As a result of a series of experiments with compact models of aneutronic fusion reactors, our research consortium is now only 3 years away from proving once and for all that a nonradioactive-fuel, nonproliferating, aneutronic fusion energy reactor is feasible.

Aneutronic fusion research involves a modest fixed cost. Because the devices are small, the cost of an experiment is in the $3-5 million range, and the cost of an entire scientific test is in the $30 million/3 years range. The system consists of two parts: injector (Figure 2B) and self-collider reactor (Figure 2A). Proof of principle can be tested on a time scale of 3 years (Figure 4—Diagram of Progress). If successful, this new fusion reactor could become commercially available 5-10 years thereafter, depending on plant size.

DOE cannot afford not to pursue the new laboratory measurements coupled to the Air Force-supported computer simulations indicating the feasibility of fusion reactors burning nonradioactive-fuels—(mixture of nonradioactive helium-3 and deuterium, as opposed to that of radioactive tritium and deuterium).

A series of investigations, carried out in the period 1988–1992, by over 200 scientists worldwide reported in over 100 scientific papers and technical reports and in six international conferences — indicate a high probability, if not certainty, that an entirely novel class of fusion reactors is possible. Known as self-colliders, they are based on an adaptation and miniaturization of the technologies of accelerators and colliders.

Nonradioactive fuels in self-colliders can have self-sustained burn, i.e. be "ignited," contrary to previous beliefs and emit less than 1% energy in neutron radiation. These results, obtained from the USAF supercomputer simulations in 1989, were declassified in August 1992.

Status of research in nonradioactive fuel fusion

The research on helium-3 fusion has progressed to the point that only one more laboratory test may be sufficient to demonstrate net energy production (DEP). Advanced Physics Corporation (APC), the lead company of the consortium S.A.F.E., has developed the "self-collider" to this point with $28 million (1992 dollars), 91% of which is private money invested over 20 years and 9% USAF (1985–1988); UCI has spent $10 million/10 years. The scientific principles have been validated in four laboratory models. Self-collider has met 9 out of 10 requirements for an economically, environmentally and societally acceptable power source; (see table below).

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The only requirement not met by the self-collider technology is the fuel density. To accomplish this, S.A.F.E. is seeking funds of $30 million over a period of 3 years from US-DOE matched by private sources. The entire 5-year program using 6 different methods proposed by APC to DOE is $50 million/5 years.

3. MANDATED BY THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 WHICH CALLS FOR "BROAD BASED FUSION PROGRAM:"

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CREATE NEW OFFICE OF ALTERNATE FUSION ENERGY OF DOE
AND

SUPPORT ONLY THOSE FUSION ENERGY PROGRAMS THAT
HAVE AT LEAST 20% FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION FROM THE
INDUSTRY.

When the Wright Brothers, after their first flight, went to the then-US Secretary of War for funding, they were told: "The government is not funding heavier-than-air flying machines. Only the balloons and zeppelins because they are easier to develop." So, they went to France and the first funding for development of the airplane in the USA came from the French government. We, too, were told by DOE that they are funding only the "easiest" to build radioactive reactor. We, too, got our first funding from Japan, Switzerland and the Middle East; and in the USA, from the Air Force, not DOE. Why?

For the past 30 years, the US DOE has systematically refused to fund any research on nonradioactive-fuel fusion as a matter of policy. Its support has been narrowed to one type of fuel and one type of reactor. This is in clear violation of the letter of the law and congressional intent as set forth in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-486 of 10/24/92). The first fusion goal mandated by the Law is "a broad based fusion energy program." The law also gives

priority to environmentally clean energy technologies and to programs in which private industry participates 20% or more.

The current DOE radioactive fuel program has reserved only $500,000 out of the $340 million, or 0.1%, of the Magnetic Fusion Energy Budget for alternate fusion energy options. Nonradioactive fuel fusion research would be a small part of this 0.1%.

The DOE's "mainline" fusion program, Tokamak, began in 1970, and the "demo" date is set for 2025. This implies a virtual exclusion of new ideas and of nonradioactive-fuel based systems for 60 years. This means that creative new thinking of three generations of American inventors will be stifled by the monopoly of an outmoded, ecologically unacceptable Cold War inspired technology.

Both fission and fusion are too large and too nationally important to be left to chance. We have a national interest in maximizing their potential. What we must do now in fusion is ensure that the potential growth points (small reactors, nonradioactive-fuel fusion) survive until a new management is put in place. The goal is not to preserve the past, but to develop a new plan based on profiting from both what we have learned and what we have done wrong in the past 30 years.

To achieve this

The Department of Energy must be instructed to maintain the existing in potential growth areas even at the cost of cutting back long-existing programs. DOE must be encouraged to form a new management team for its nuclear programs, with a compelling vision of the future and little need to justify the past, i.e. a management without political baggage.

An institution can never be made to compete with itself—which would be the case if this program is administered by the present Office of Fusion Energy of DOE. To facilitate the development of such law-mandated, fusion ecotechnology effort, the Congress should direct the Department of Energy to split the present Office of Fusion Energy into:

OFFICE OF NONRADIOACTIVE-FUEL FUSION ENERGY; and
OFFICE OF RADIOACTIVE-FUEL FUSION ENERGY (ITER); and
that separate budgets be sought for the two offices, with the goal that,
over the next three years, at least 50% of the fusion budget be allocated
for nonradioactive fuel fusion.

In order to stimulate research in nonradioactive-fuel fusion and to take advantage of the great opportunity it presents without delay, we propose that greater consideration be given to

• Compact reactor concepts that could be tested in go-no-go experiments on the usual physics research time scale of 3-5 years, and

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No fusion research program be supported unless it has financial participation from the industry sector of at least 20%.

***

It had become increasingly clear that the problems associated with tritium based fusion would be nearly insurmountable in a commercial device. Power plants burning deuterium-tritium fuel would necessarily be large, radioactive, highly toxic (beryllium), highly flammable (lithium), complex, and because of low power density, very expensive per unit of electricity generated. Tokamak could be made marginally economical only if it breeds and sells plutonium— which is incompatible with the US nonproliferation policy.

In spite of these facts, the fusion program has changed little since the 1960's, even though many of the assumptions that appeared reasonable at the time have been found, in the course of 30 years, to be invalid. The goal became not to develop a commerically-viable, environmentally benign fusion-powered electric source, but rather to prove that the original decision to build a DT-burning tokamak reactor was the only possible decision.

THE WORLD IS CHANGING AT SUCH A RATE THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD NOT TO EXAMINE THE CHANGES, TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEM, AND SEE WHERE NATIONAL INTEREST LIES.

IF AN IMPORTANT UNIVERSAL POWER GENERATOR CANNOT BE DEVELOPED IN ONE COUNTRY LIKE THE UNITED STATES, IT CANNOT BE DEVELOPED AT ALL.

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Fig. 1 Measurements on ultra-hot ions in the Princeton Tokamak TFTR reject the theory that fusion reactors must be very large, which is the basic assumption of the DOE fusion program and the root of its multibillion dollar

cost.

The measured points (vertical bars) are nearest to the upper curve which means that the ultra-hot fuel behaves "classically," this, in turn, means that the reactor can be small. The data points are incompatible with the "very large" and "reactor enormous” curves [Heidbrink et al, Physics of Fluids, B-2, 4 (1990)].

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