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produced the condition of unsafety, and it was held liable for injuries to a pedestrian falling thereon, although it had previously removed the ice on the same day.

a. Time for removal.

A municipal corporation is entitled to a reasonable time after notice, within which to remove an obstruction of snow or ice.

United States.-Smith v. Chicago (1889) 38 Fed. 388.

Colorado.-Boulder v. Niles (1886) 9 Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632.

Connecticut.-Hartford v. Talcott (1881) 48 Conn. 532, 40 Am. Rep. 189.

Iowa.-Cosner v. Centerville (1894) 90 Iowa, 33, 57 N. W. 636.

Massachusetts.-Stanton v. Salem (1888) 145 Mass. 476, 14 N. E. 519.

Missouri.-Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Asso. (1901) 161 Mo. 523, 53 L.R.A. 805, 61 S. W. 859; Armstrong v. Monett (1921) Mo., 228 S. W. 771; Barr v. Fairfax (1911) 156 Mo. App. 295, 137 S. W. 631.

V. Butte

Montana. Townsend (1910) 41 Mont. 410, 109 Pac. 969; McEnaney v. Butte (1911) 43 Mont. 526, 117 Pac. 893.

Nebraska. Foxworthy v. Hastings (1888) 25 Neb. 133, 41 N. W. 132.

New York. Todd v. Troy (1875) 61 N. Y. 506; Taylor v. Yonkers (1887) 105 N. Y. 202, 59 Am. Rep. 492, 11 N. E. 642; Kinney v. Troy (1888) 108 N. Y. 567, 15 N. E. 726; Kaveny v. Troy (1888) 108 N. Y. 571, 15 N. E. 726; Harrington v. Buffalo (1890) 121 N. Y. 147, 24 N. E. 186; Berger v. New York (1901) 65 App. Div. 394, 73 N. Y. Supp. 74; Crawford v. New York (1902) 68 App. Div. 107, 74 N. Y. Supp. 261; Foley v. New York (1904) 95 App. Div. 374, 88 N. Y. Supp. 690; Kortlang v. Mt. Vernon (1908) 129 App. Div. 535, 114 N. Y. Supp. 252; Brennan v. New York (1909) 130 App. Div. 267, 114 N. Y. Supp. 578, affirmed without opinion in (1910) 197 N. Y. 544, 91 N. E. 1110; Owen v. New York (1910) 141 App. Div. 217, 126 N. Y. Supp. 38; Ballard v. Hamburg (1911) 143 App. Div. 719, 128 N. Y. Supp. 325; Adelson v. New York (1913) 156 App. Div. 115, 141 N. Y. Supp. 96; Kaiser

v. New York (1918) 184 App. Div. 866, 172 N. Y. Supp. 626; De Boulet v. New York (1920) 192 App. Div. 359, 182 N. Y. Supp. 697; Kleng v. Buffalo (1893) 72 Hun, 541, 25 N. Y. Supp. 445; Keane v. Waterford (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 340, affirmed in (1891) 130 N. Y. 188, 29 N. E. 130; O'Connor v. New York (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 502.

North Carolina.-Cresler v. Asheville (1904) 134 N. C. 311, 46 S. E. 738. Pennsylvania.-Green v. Hollidaysburg (1912) 236 Pa. 430, 84 Atl. 785; Wenlock v. Philadelphia (1907) 18 Pa. Dist. R. 229; Scott v. Scranton (1898) 5 Lack. Leg. News, 73.

Washington. - Bull V. Spokane (1907) 46 Wash. 237, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1105, 89 Pac. 555.

Canada. Touhey v. Medicine Hat (1913) 5 Alberta L. R. 116, 23 West. L. R. 880, 10 D. L. R. 691, affirming (1912) Alberta, 7 D. L. R. 759; Ince v. Toronto (1900) 27 Ont. App. Rep. 410, affirmed in (1901) 31 Can. S. C. 323.

And it is not guilty of negligence if, observing that the work of removing snow from the walks is being generally done by them, it awaits for a reasonable period the action of its citizens. Hawkins v. New York (1900) 54 App. Div. 258, 66 N. Y. Supp. 623.

Where damages were claimed for injuries sustained by reason of an icy sidewalk in front of a hotel, the floor of the piazza of which projected over the sidewalk 4 feet, the eaves of the piazza roof projecting 8 or 10 inches. further, the sidewalk from the floor of the piazza being entirely covered with ice which was thickest near the piazza and formed a ridge, and the evidence showed that the ridge was formed through the treading down of snow which had fallen four days prior to the accident, and was glazed over by the rain or by the drip from the piazza, and was hard to remove, the court held that the defendant could wait a reasonable time for the hotel owner to remove the ridge, and the duty to remove it did not attach until that reasonable time had elapsed. Keane v. Waterford (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 340, affirmed in (1891) 130 N. Y. 188, 29 N. E. 130.

And in Foley v. New York (1904) 95 App. Div. 374, 88 N. Y. Supp. 690, where a heavy snowfall occurred on a certain day, and after four days of almost continuous freezing weather there was another snowfall, which was also followed by cold weather, it was held that the city could not be found guilty of negligence because of its failure to remove the snow which fell during the last storm, so as to hold it liable to one who was injured by falling on the sidewalk within less than forty-eight hours after it ceased, since it had a right not only to rely for a reasonable time upon the assumption that the property owner would remove it, but also to wait a reasonable time for the temperature to moderate; nor could the city be held liable for not removing the snow of the first storm, since, between the two storms, the temperature was continually below the freezing point, and, even conceding that the city was guilty in not removing the snow which fell during the first storm, it would not aid the plaintiff, since there was no evidence in the record which justified a finding that the snow which fell and the ice which formed at this time were concurring causes of the accident, and, unless that fact could be established, plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

What constitutes a reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. Thus, where the cause of the accident was ice which had formed from thawed snow the night before, the court held that the defendant was not liable, although snow had fallen some weeks previously, and had not been entirely removed from the sidewalk. Harrington v. Buffalo (1890) 121 N. Y. 147, 24 N. E. 186.

And it was held in Swan v. Indiana (1914) 242 Pa. £96, 89 Atl. 664, that a municipality was not liable for the fall of a pedestrian on a walk from which the snow had not been removed, where it appeared that, on the day before the accident, the snow had been turned into slush, and on the night before it had frozen, and that this condition had existed but a few hours before the accident.

And in Blakeley v. Troy (1879) 18 Hun (N. Y.) 167, it was held that a city is not liable for an injury caused by a fall on ice which formed on a sidewalk during the night, and was not removed at the time of the accident, about 1 o'clock P. M. of the following day, although the water, which came from springs and melting snow, was permitted to flow along an alley onto the sidewalk, where the alley was a private way over which the city had no control.

Nor is a municipality liable for accidents occasioned by ice which suddenly is formed by sleet or rain, which freezes before it can reasonably be removed, or by snow which has been packed down under the same circumstances. Jackson V. Grand Forks (1912) 24 N. D. 601, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 75, 140 N. W. 718.

And, where a street in a city becomes unsafe by the sudden freezing at night of the snow and slush thereon, the city is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian, occurring about noon the following day, by slipping on a sidewalk. Vonkey v. St. Louis (1909) 219 Mo. 37, 117 S. W. 733.

A city is not liable for personal injuries arising out of a fall upon an icy sidewalk, where it appears that the walk was covered by a snowstorm six days before the accident, and again by a heavy fall four days later, and that the snow from the last storm, which stopped less than twenty-six hours before the accident, was packed down by pedestrians continually walking upon it, although the loose snow was taken off, and that an effort was made to clear off the sidewalk, but that it snowed and froze again and again previous to the accident. Herlihy v. New York (1917) 165 N. Y. Supp. 644.

And, where forty-eight hours only had elapsed between the snowfall and the time the plaintiff fell upon the ice and snow, the court held that a reasonable time had not elapsed presumptively to charge the defendant with negligence. O'Connor v. New York (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 502.

And a city will not be held liable for the presence on the sidewalk of ice

upon which a person slipped and was injured, where the accident took place a little more than two days after the rain which caused the ice had ceased. Zunz v. New York (1907) 103 N. Y. Supp. 222.

So, in Wynne v. Albany (1891) 39 N. Y. S. R. 603, where snow had fallen three days prior to the accident, the weather being very cold, and the ridge of ice on which plaintiff fell was such as would be caused by the packing of moist snow, the court held the city not liable for negligence.

Nor is a city liable for an injury, where the icy condition of the sidewalk was caused by melting snow on an adjoining lot, and had existed only three or four days before the accident caused thereby, during which time the temperature was such as to cause both thawing and freezing each day. Kortlang v. Mt. Vernon (1908) 129 App. Div. 535, 114 N. Y. Supp. 252.

Where the plaintiff, while carefully walking on an icy sidewalk, slipped and fell, the evidence showing that for days previous the walk had become rounded and ridgy along the center by reason of ice and snow suffered to remain there, that the day prior to the accident snow and sleet 2 or 4 inches in depth fell, covering this and other streets with a hard crust, and that none of the ice was removed, the court held that the plaintiff fell upon new ice, and that the defendant was not liable; and the question as to the old ice contributing to the injury, so as to charge the defendant with negligence, not being before the jury, they were not at liberty to pass upon it. Johnson v. Glens Falls (1891) 41 N. Y. S. R. 820, 16 N. Y. Supp. 585, following Taylor v. Yonkers (1887) 105 N. Y. 202, 59 Am. Rep. 492, 11 N. E. 642.

And, where a sidewalk in front of a store, which was one of the chief business places in the city, was 20 feet wide, and level, and perfect in its construction, and was lighted by electric lights in the usual manner, and there was upon the sidewalk an accumulation of ice and snow extending along its center for a considerable distance, being from 1 to 4 or 5

inches in thickness, and 2 to 7 feet in width, sloping gradually to either side, and the accumulation was rough and uneven on top, and had been allowed to remain for several days, but the conditions were such that, immediately preceding the accident, the sidewalks were unavoidably icy and slippery, and the city had sprinkled the walk with sawdust and ashes in the morning, and again immediately preceding the time of the accident, the city was not negligent in allowing the walk to remain in that condition. Rogers v. Rome (1904) 96 App. Div. 427, 89 N. Y. Supp. 130.

And a city is not liable for injuries to a person resulting from falling on a sidewalk because of snow and ice thereon, where there had been snow and ice on the sidewalk for two weeks, and the temperature was uniformly below the freezing point, except for portions of three days, when it snowed and rained, and the sidewalks of the city were partly covered with ice during that time, and these conditions were general throughout the city, the weather conditions being such that the city was not obliged to remove the snow and ice from the sidewalks. Cupp v. Elmira (1908) 126 App. Div. 539, 110 N. Y. Supp. 742.

But a city is shown to have reasonable time, where it appears that the sidewalk has been in a dangerous condition for weeks, to the actual knowledge of the city engineer, and nothing was done to remedy it, either by carrying away the snow and ice, or by covering it with sand or ashes, or by any other means which would render it less dangerous. Touhey v. Medicine Hat (1913) 5 Alberta L. R. 116, 23 West. L. R. 880, 10 D. L. Rep. 691, affirming (1912) Alberta,, 7 D. L. Rep. 759.

And it was held in Larson v. New York (1911) 145 App. Div. 619, 130 N. Y. Supp. 257, where the city, though having ample time and opportunity, failed to remove snow from a walk which a later storm covered with ice, that it was liable because of its failure to remove the first snow.

And in Hodges v. Waterloo (1899) 109 Iowa, 444, 80 N. W. 523, a city was

held liable for the fall of a pedestrian on a walk because of snow and ice thereon which it had had an opportunity to remove, although it was made more dangerous by a recent fall of sleet, where the accident would not have happened but for the uneven condition, due to the older snow and ice.

And the defendant's request for a peremptory instruction was held in Albritton v. Kansas City (1916) 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S. W. 239, to have been properly refused, where it appeared that heavy snow had fallen about a week before the injury, and had not been removed from the sidewalk at the place of the accident, and that the pedestrian travel had beaten down a pathway about 18 inches wide, and, with the aid of alternate freezing and thawing, the path had been converted into ice at the place in question, and this condition had continued for three or four days.

The absence of all efforts, during the five days from a fall of snow to the time of the accident, to render a sidewalk in the business center safe for public travel, save for the partial removal of the fallen snow by tenants of the adjoining property, constitutes negligence on the part of the city, so as to render it liable for injuries to a pedestrian from falling on the ice formed by the freezing of the melted surface of the tracked-down snow. Lucy v. Norwich (1919) 93 Conn. 545, 106 Atl. 762.

And a city is liable for injury to a pedestrian falling on an icy sidewalk, where a heavy fall of snow five or six days before the accident was not removed from the walk, and the snow was packed down by travel and rough ice had formed on top of it. Williams v. New York (1915) 214 N. Y. 259, 108 N. E. 448.

And where the facts showed that the plaintiff, using ordinary care, sustained injury by reason of the formation of snow and ice left upon a sidewalk in general use; that the other side of the street was under reconstruction and not used; that a solid coat of ice from 1 to 3 inches thick, uneven and irregular, but smooth and

slippery in places, and very dangerous, had existed for a week prior to the accident, without any attempt to clear it off or to remove the slipperiness; that a bank of snow some few feet high was piled upon the outer side of the walk, so that plaintiff could not step off the walk, the court held the defendant liable. Dooley v. Meriden (1876) 44 Conn. 117, 26 Am. Rep. 433.

And in Penor v. Glens Falls (1910) 138 App. Div. 671, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1072, it was held error to enter a nonsuit, where the evidence showed that a heavy fall of snow was not removed from the walk until two days after the storm, and a ridge 4 or 5 inches high had formed in the center as the result of tramping, and at the time of the accident this condition had existed for seventeen days.

A city is liable for the fall of a pedestrian on an icy sidewalk, where, at the place of the injury, the snow had not been removed for a month or more, and pedestrians had made a narrow pathway along the middle of the sidewalk, which, under the natural alternations of thawing and freezing, had formed into a rough, uneven, slanting, and slippery coating of ice and compressed snow. Jackson v. Kansas City (1914) 181 Mo. App. 178, 167 S. W. 1150.

And a municipal corporation which permits a ridge of ice 4 inches wide and from 2 to 5 inches high to remain across a sidewalk for a month, upon which a person slips and falls after it is covered with snow, is liable in damages for the injuries sustained. Moore v. Philadelphia (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 194.

And in Quarles v. Kansas City (1909) 138 Mo. App. 45, 119 S. W. 1019, the city was held liable where the dangerous condition of the sidewalk at the point where the accident occurred had been permitted to continue for five weeks.

A city may be held liable in an action for damages, where the evidence of at least some of the witnesses, which is believed by the jury, shows that a portion of a sidewalk has remained covered with ice and snow during the whole winter, and such ice

and snow had been allowed to thaw and freeze and accumulate during such time, and no effort has been made by the city, either to remove it or to cause the same to be removed, or to sprinkle it with sand or other substances in order to render it less dangerous. Jackson V. Grand Forks (1912) 24 N. D. 601, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 75, 140 N. W. 718.

And an objection to an instruction that it fixed a liability upon the defendant city for injury caused by snow on a sidewalk, without reference to whether the city had had a reasonable time within which to remove the snow, is cured by another instruction that the city was not negligent, if snow had fallen so short a time before the accident that with ordinary care. it could not have been removed in time to have avoided the injury. Robinson v. Cedar Rapids (1897) 100 Iowa, 662, 69 N. W. 1064, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 43.

And where the defect was ice on the sidewalk, which was increased by rain falling and freezing shortly before the accident, which caused all the sidewalks in the city to be icy, the court held that the question was one of reasonableness as to lapse of time in which the danger could be removed, and excluded evidence showing that steps were actually being taken to remedy the same. Payne v. Lowell (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 147.

b. Right to await thaw.

A city may, in some cases, without negligence, await a thaw in order to remove the snow and ice. Myers v. Beacon (1919) 189 App. Div. 117, 178 N. Y. Supp. 294.

And when cold follows a melting of snow, causing a film of ice upon the sidewalks which it is practically impossible to remove, the municipality may, without being guilty of negligence, wait for a change of temperature to remedy the condition. Beirness v. Missouri Valley (1913) 162 Iowa, 720, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 218, 144 N. W. 628.

And where a fall of rain is suddenly followed by severe cold, by reason of which the snow or ice is frozen to the

sidewalk, so that it is practically impossible to remove it until a thaw comes, the municipality is not negligent in awaiting a thaw. Staley v. New York (1899) 37 App. Div. 598, 56 N. Y. Supp. 237, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 690; Betts v. Gloversville (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 331, 8 N. Y. Supp. 795.

And a city cannot be charged with negligence in not causing the removal of ice on a sidewalk, formed as the result of a storm or the melting of snow, where there is no evidence that the same had been softened by a thaw for a sufficient length of time prior to the injury in question, to charge the city with negligence in not causing its removal. Berger v. New York (1901) 65 App. Div. 394, 73 N. Y. Supp. 74.

And the fact that children were accustomed to slide on an icy sidewalk does not create such an artificial cause of a dangerous condition as will take the case out of the operation of the rule that, where it is practically impossible to remove ice from a sidewalk until a thaw comes which remedies the evil, the municipality is not negligent in awaiting that result. Buck v. Glens Falls (1896) 4 App. Div. 323, 38 N. Y. Supp. 582.

And in Hatch v. Elmira (1911) 142 App. Div. 174, 126 N. Y. Supp. 863, the court stated that a municipality is responsible for a defective condition of a sidewalk by reason of snow and ice, only where the dangercus ridges are allowed to remain after the weather has reasonably permitted their removal.

c. Impracticability or expense of removal.

The performance of the duty of a municipality to remove snow and ice from the sidewalks, when it arises, does not require the city to remove dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, unless they are removable by the employment of ordinary and reasonable means and effort. DeBoulet v. New York (1920) 192 App. Div. 359, 182 N. Y. Supp. 697.

And so a city will not be held liable for the icy condition of a sidewalk, where the weather conditions render it impracticable to remove the snow and ice. Cupp v. Elmira (1908) 126 App. Div. 539, 110 N. Y. Supp. 742.

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