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And proof tending to show that, in violation of a city ordinance requiring owners or occupants to remove, before 9 o'clock in the morning, all snow and ice which may have fallen upon the sidewalk in front of their premises, an accumulation of snow and ice at least 9 inches in thickness has been permitted to remain upon the sidewalk in question, at the point where the accident happened, charges the city with notice thereof. McPherson v. Buffalo (1897) 13 App. Div. 502, 43 N. Y. Supp. 658, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 490.

And notice of the condition of the walk was held to have been shown in Fortin v. Easthampton (1887) 145 Mass. 196, 13 N. E. 599, where it appeared that the ice was in substantially the same condition at the time of the accident that it was when formed immediately after a storm of snow and rain which occurred some time before the injury, and there was evidence of notice of the defect by reason of the patrol of the police.

And the existence of the dangerous condition of the walk for two weeks was held in Ryan v. Chicago (1913) 181 Ill. App. 642, to justify a finding by the jury of constructive notice to the city.

And an instruction as to constructive notice, to the effect that, where the condition of the walk has existed long enough to give a presumption of notice to the authorities of the city that the condition exists, then the city has such notice, as a matter of law, because officials passing up and down the streets must see their condition, and policemen passing on their beats must also see the same, is not open to the objection that such language was a positive direction to the jury that the city officials passing along the streets were bound to know the condition of the sidewalks, since that is precisely the measure of their duty, if the defect has existed for such a length of time that with proper care and inspection they should have known the dangerous condition. Llewellyn v. Wilkes-Barre (1916) 254 Pa. 196, 98 Atl. 886, 14 N. C. C. A. 113.

But constructive notice of the icy

condition of the sidewalk cannot be imputed to a borough, where, on the day before the accident, the snow on the walk had been turned into slush, and on the night before it had frozen, the dangerous condition having existed but a few hours before the accident. Swan v. Indiana (1914) 242 Pa. 596, 89 Atl. 664.

And a city is not liable for injuries resulting from the fall of a pedestrian by reason of an accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk, where the accident occurred within a day of the accumulation, and there is no evidence of actual notice to the city that there was a dangerous accumulation of snow and ice upon the walk. Owen v. New York (1910) 141 App. Div. 217, 126 N. Y. Supp. 38.

Where forty-eight hours only had elapsed between a snowfall and the time the plaintiff fell upon the ice and snow, the court held that a reasonable time had not elapsed to charge the city with constructive notice of the slippery condition of the walk. O'Connor v. New York (1890) 29 N. Y. S. R. 502.

And likewise, in Hawkins v. New York (1900) 54 App. Div. 258, 66 N. Y. Supp. 623, it was held that a period of less than forty-eight hours between the last intermittent snowfall, and an accident due to a slippery sidewalk caused thereby, was not sufficient to constitute constructive notice of the defective condition of the sidewalk, so as to make the city liable for such accident.

A city is not liable for injuries sustained by one who slipped upon a walk covered with ice, due to the fall of water from a hydrant in the yard of a citizen, where the walk had been in such condition but three days, and the city had no notice of the defect, which was covered by a recent fall of snow. Corey v. Ann Arbor (1900) 124 Mich. 134, 82 N. W. 804.

And where, in an action against a municipality for injuries from a fall on an icy sidewalk on Wednesday morning, it is shown that on the preceding Sunday and Monday there had been a fall of snow, and that between Sunday and Tuesday evening there had been a slight thaw, and on Tues

day night an additional snowfall of about inch, there is nothing to warrant a jury in the conclusion that a small spot of ice on the walk covered with snow, had existed for such time as would charge the city with notice of it. Beirness v. Missouri Valley (1913) 162 Iowa, 720, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 218, 144 N. W. 628.

Where a very recent coating of ice or sleet covers a prior accumulation of snow or ice, it has been held that, in the absence of any showing that the injury was produced by the condition of the sidewalk prior to the last storm, the municipality is not liable. Cases upholding this proposition are Durr v. Green Island (1893) 71 Hun, 260, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1014, and Foley v. New York (1904) 95 App. Div. 374, 88 N. Y. Supp. 690.

A case holding likewise is O'Keefe v. New York (1898) 29 App. Div. 524, 51 N. Y. Supp. 710, where, however, the ice which was the cause of the injury did not seem to be rough and uneven. But see Templin v. Boone (1905) 127 Iowa, 91, 102 N. W. 789, supra.

The mere fact that there was snow on a certain date, and none after another given date, the court held, was not sufficient proof that ice on the sidewalk on the latter date was caused by the previous fall, so as to charge the defendant with negligence. Foley v. Troy (1887) 45 Hun (N. Y.) 396.

And where a defect is produced by some known permanent cause which would naturally create the defect, other than an accumulation of ice, the existence of such cause may properly be considered by the jury in determining whether the officers of the town or city might have had notice of the defect by the exercise of proper care and diligence. Olson v. Worcester (1886) 142 Mass. 536, 8 N. E. 441. d. Knowledge of officers or employees as notice.

Where, according to the usual custom of the city, the patrolman on the beat reported the nonremoval of the accumulations on the sidewalk, on each day for a week prior to the accident, to the inspector, who, according to custom and duty, should have

reported the same to the police headquarters, when the matter would have been handed over to the attorney for investigation, the court held the city chargeable with notice. Twogood v. New York (1886) 102 N. Y. 216, 6 N. E. 275.

And in Muncie v. Hey (1905) 164 Ind. 570, 74 N. E. 250, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 51, it appeared that a pedestrian fell and injured himself upon a sheet of ice extending across the sidewalk in an oval shape, 6 feet wide, 5 inches thick in the center, and tapering to thin edges, formed from water collected upon the roof of an overhanging and projecting conductor; that the ice had formed and remained upon the walk for two or three days prior to the injury; that it was hidden by a slight covering of snow, and that the projecting conductor had been in use for four months. It was held that if the city's civil engineer, while acting as city commissioner, directed the property owner so to arrange the water conductor as to cast the collected water upon the sidewalk, and that condition continued through four months prior to the injury, the city was chargeable with .the knowledge that in case of rain or melting snow, followed by freezing weather, ice would be formed on the walk in such a manner as to render its ordinary use dangerous.

And the city was held liable in Abbott v. Springfield (1919) - Mo. App. —, 210 S. W. 443, where one person, walking along a single beaten path on an uncleaned sidewalk, in order to pass another, stepped out of the path onto a ridge of ice, covered with snow, which had been formed from the freezing of water running out of a leaky down spout alongside an abutting building, and fell, and the down spout had been in a defective condition for quite a while, and some of the city officers had their offices in the building on which it was fastened, and daily passed by it on their way to and from their offices.

And in Blake v. Lowell (1887) 143 Mass. 296, 9 N. E. 627, an entry by a policeman on the day before the injury, stating the icy condition of a

walk, in a book kept for recording complaints of defects in sidewalks for the use of the superintendent of streets, was held admissible upon the question of notice.

But knowledge of the principal janitor of a public school and an inspector of the board of education, of the icy condition of the sidewalk in front of the school, is not notice to the city, where they are neither officers nor employees of the city, but are appointed or employed by, and are under and subject to, the board of education, which is an independent corporation vested with the management and control of the funds of the municipality, provided for or appropriated for educational purposes, having exclusive authority to appoint and employ school principals, janitors, and other employees. Owen v. New York (1910) 141 App. Div. 217, 126 N. Y. Supp. 38.

And in Burns v. Toronto (1878) 42 U. C. Q. B. 560, holding a city not liable for the fall of a pedestrian on an icy sidewalk, there was evidence that the city commissioner, whose special duty it was to enforce the by-laws of the city for the removal of snow and ice from the sidewalks, had during the winter, and up to the time of the accident, frequently driven up and down the street and passed the dangerous part of the sidewalk where the accident happened, without doing anything to compel the removal of the snow and ice, but that no actual complaint was made about it. It was stated by one of the judges that this did not show notice on the part of the city.

IX. Duty to remove snow or ice. See also cases under XI. c. The duty resting upon municipal corporations to remove accumulations of ice and snow from their walks from time to time is a qualified one, and becomes imperative only when dangerous formations or obstacles have been created, and notice of their existence has been received by the corporations.

United States.-Clark v. Chicago (1868) 4 Biss. 486, Fed. Cas. No. 2,817.

Illinois.-Metzger v. Chicago (1902) 13 A.L.R.-4.

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Missouri.-Albritton v. Kansas City (1916) 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S. W. 239.

New York.-Harrington v. Buffalo (1890) 121 N. Y. 147; Anthony v. Glens Falls (1896) 4 App. Div. 218, 38 N. Y. Supp. 536; Hawkins v. New York (1900) 54 App. Div. 258, 66 N. Y. Supp. 623; Berger v. New York (1901) 65 App. Div. 394, 73 N. Y. Supp. 74; De Boulet v. New York (1920) 192 App. Div. 359, 182 N. Y. Supp. 697; Owen v. New York (1910) 141 App. Div. 217, 126 N. Y. Supp. 38.

North Carolina.-Cresler v. Asheville (1904) 134 N. C. 311, 46 S. E. 738.

Ohio. Vandyke V. Cincinnati (1857) 1 Disney (Ohio) 532.

The obligation imposed by law on a city to keep its streets in repair, and free from nuisance, does not extend to the removal of an ordinary fall of snow and ordinary formation of ice upon a sidewalk. Vandyke v. Cincinnati (1857) 1 Disney (Ohio) 532; Rolf v. Greenville (1894) 102 Mich. 544, 61 N. W. 3; Brennan v. New York (1909) 130 App. Div. 267, 114 N. Y. Supp. 578, affirmed, without opinion, in (1910) 197 N. Y. 544, 91 N. E. 1110.

Nor is there any duty resting on a city to remove snow and ice from its sidewalks, so long as they remain unchanged by the interference of man, or from other artificial causes by which they become ridged, uneven, or are made to assume some other form, or present some other danger, than they would have presented solely from natural causes. Finnane v. Perry (1914) 164 Iowa, 171, 145 N. W. 494, 5 N. C. C. A. 463; Gregg v. Springville (1919) Iowa, 174 N. W. 23.

And the duty of a city to exercise ordinary care to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition does not extend to removal of ice which constitutes no other defect than slipperiness. Broburg v. Des Moines (1884) 63 Iowa, 523, 50 Am. Rep. 756, 19 N.

W. 340; Varney v. Covington (1913) 155 Ky. 662, 160 S. W. 173; Henkes v. Minneapolis (1890) 42 Minn. 530, 44 N. W. 1026.

And when the ice on a sidewalk is the result of rain or snow which has made all the sidewalks slippery, it is not negligence on the part of the city to fail to remove it. Masters v. Troy (1888) 50 Hun, 485, 3 N. Y. Supp. 450; Anthony v. Glens Falls (1896) 4 App. Div. 218, 38 N. Y. Supp. 536; Haight v. Elmira (1899) 42 App. Div. 391, 59 N. Y. Supp. 193, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 624.

And a municipal corporation is not bound to remove smooth slippery ice from a sidewalk, where there are no hills or ridges which amount to an obstruction, unless the slippery condition is caused by the independent negligence of the municipality. Ingram v. Philadelphia (1908) 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 305.

Whether cities are liable for not removing ice from sidewalks depends on the circumstances of each case, and nothing can be required of them which a jury would say was unreasonable. Hall V. Lowell (1852) 10 Cush. (Mass.) 260.

It is not incumbent on a city to remove all the snow from a sidewalk, but all it is required to do is to make the sidewalk reasonably safe. Finnane v. Perry (1914) 164 Iowa, 171, 145 N. W. 494, 3 N. C. C. A. 463; Kaiser v. New York (1918) 184 App. Div. 866, 172 N. Y. Supp. 626.

And in Jefferson v. Sault Ste. Marie (1911) 166 Mich. 340, 130 N. W. 610, 1 N. C. C. A. 598, where the snow was removed from the sidewalks by the city by means of a plow, which removed nothing but the soft snow, the city was held not liable for injuries sustained by falling on a hard icy ridge of snow formed either by the tramping of pedestrians, or the drippings from adjacent buildings, which the plow failed to remove. The court stated: "This method [of removing snow] and this degree of efficiency are accepted and approved by the community, as appears from their general adoption, and it is reasonable to suppose that society has not understood that it is to be penalized for its ef

fort toward the ameliorations of the annoyance and inconvenience of snow, and that the effort to aid all carries with it the responsibility of removing ice as well as snow, to which the plow is not adapted, and which was not within the design. Neither has it the obligation of seeing to it that the snow, where undisturbed, shall not be removed below the level of the packed portion, where removal is not feasible or is too expensive. Nor need it remove all ice on one or both portions, which may result from the falling or dripping of water from buildings upon the walk. It seems to us more reasonable to say that we may take judicial notice of the everyday necessities and practices; that the removal of snow as it falls is for the welfare of all; that such removal down to as near the walk, at any or all points, as is reasonably feasible, is desirable and proper; that such inequalities as this, which are known to be inevitable, are the necessary accompaniment of this very necessary and commendable practice, and private misfortunes arising from the casualties of winter furnish little excuse for attempting to improve the burden resulting to individuals upon the community."

Where a natural cause of the accident existed, for which the city was not responsible, and a possible concurrent cause from dripping eaves might have joined in making the ice, but could not be said itself to have caused the injury, the court held that the city was no more bound to remove the new coating than the layers beneath. Kaveny v. Troy (1888) 108 N. Y. 571, 15 N. E. 726.

And where the street was considerably traveled, and at the place where the plaintiff fell the water from adjoining land overflowed the sidewalk and occasioned trouble, to remedy which an underdrain had been laid, but water still flowed on the walk and formed ice, upon which plaintiff fell, the sidewalk being in other respects safe and convenient, the court held that it was not the duty of the corporation to keep the sidewalks at all times absolutely free from ice, and that where the street commissioners

were doing their best to keep the sidewalks reasonably safe there was no liability. Landolt v. Norwich (1871) 37 Conn. 615.

There is an affirmative duty upon a municipality to keep its sidewalks reasonably free from accumulations of ice and snow, however, and the failure to do this after adequate notice, or after ample time has elapsed to justify the inference of knowledge of the defective condition, constitutes negligence upon the part of the city. Beck v. Buffalo (1900) 50 App. Div. 621, 63 N. Y. Supp. 499; Cuzner v. Calgary (1888) 1 Terr. L. R. (Can.) 162.

And where there are accumulations of snow and ice on the sidewalks, the city may be liable, if it has been guilty of negligence in not removing the same. Nebraska City v. Rathbone (1886) 20 Neb. 288, 29 N. W. 920; Foxworthy v. Hastings (1888) 23 Neb. 772, 37 N. W. 657; Chase v. Cleveland (1886) 44 Ohio St. 505, 58 Am. Rep. 843, 9 N. E. 225.

And where ice or snow on a walk became, by reason of travel thereon or other causes, rounded or in ridges, the court held that the city should be required to remove the same. Broburg v. Des Moines (1884) 63 Iowa, 523, 50 Am. Rep. 756, 19 N. W. 340.

The duty to repair requires a city to remove obstructions from the walks caused by deposits of snow and ice. Collins v. Council Bluffs (1871) 32 Iowa, 324, 7 Am. Rep. 200.

And where it is customary to treat the removal of snow and ice as a regular part of highway management, the failure to do so may become wrongful or negligent. Jaegar v. Newport (1913) 155 Ky. 110, 159 S. W. 671.

Where plaintiff fell on ice 1 or 2 inches thick, covered with a slight fall of snow, the sidewalk being broken and disordered, and the negligence alleged was the failure to remove the ice, and not the defect in the walk, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover because the sidewalk was not in repair, for the reason that the injury was not sustained by reason thereof, but because of the ice. Smith v. Brooklyn (1885) 36 Hun (N. Y.)

224, affirmed in (1887) 107 N. Y. 655, 14 N. E. 606.

And evidence that, at a place where an accident occurred, there was a slope or declivity in the sidewalk, occasioned by snow having been cleared off the walk opposite one lot and having been allowed to accumulate in front of an adjoining lot, su that at the point where the accident occurred there was a descent or declivity at an angle of 45 degrees, of the length of 10 or 12 inches extending the entire width of the sidewalk, justifies the jury, in an action for an injury resulting therefrom, in finding that the municipal corporation was negligent in not removing an accumulation of snow and ice from the sidewalk at the place where the accident occurred, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Goff v. Little Falls (1892) 47 N. Y. S. R. 729, 20 N. Y. Supp. 175.

And in Muncie v. Hey (1905) 164 Ind. 570, 74 N. E. 250, 18 Am. Neg. Rep. 51, where it appeared that a pedestrian fell and injured himself upon a sheet of ice extending across the sidewalk in an oval shape 6 feet wide, 5 inches thick in the center, and tapering to thin edges, formed from water collected upon the roof of an adjoining building and cast upon the walk by an overhanging and projecting conductor; that the ice had formed and remained upon the walk for two or three days prior to the injury; that it was hidden by a slight covering of snow, and that the projecting conductor had been in use for four months, it was held that the accumulation of ice in the manner shown constituted a nuisance which the city was bound to prevent or abate, and, negligently failing to perform this duty, it was liable for the natural consequences.

And in Barr v. Fairfax (1911) 156 Mo. App. 295, 137 S. W. 631, where, because of the freezing of a conductor pipe leading up from an adjoining building, for a number of days water flowed over the sidewalk and froze, of which condition the city had constructive notice, it was held to be the duty of the city to remove the cause that

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