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And the city was held liable for the injury in Abbott v. Springfield (1919)

Mo. App., 210 S. W. 443, where a pedestrian walking along a single beaten path on an uncleaned sidewalk, in order to pass another traveler, stepped out of the path onto a ridge of ice covered with snow, which had been formed from the freezing of water running out of a leaky down spout alongside an abutting building, and fell to her injury, and the down spout had been in a defective condition for quite a while, and some of the city officers had their offices in the building on which it was fastened, and daily passed by it on their way to and from their offices.

Evidence that a ridge of snow and ice extending along the center of a sidewalk was 5 or 6 inches high, and that it was formed of snow, part of which fell during a storm about sixteen days before the injury complained of, and part during another storm about four days previous to the injury, and that it was packed down and glazed with ice, and uneven and very slippery, and had been so about a week before the injury, is sufficient to warrant a verdict charging the village with negligence. Keane v. Waterford (1891) 130 N. Y. 188, 29 N. E. 130. And so is evidence that a person fell on a ridge of snow on a sidewalk, some 8 or 10 inches in height and 6 or 8 inches in width, running through the center of the walk for its entire length; and that, though the ridge of snow was the result of an unusually severe and prolonged storm, yet many other walks in the immediate locality were entirely cleared of fallen snow within a reasonable time after the storm had subsided, and this had been permitted to remain; and that it might have been removed with the exercise of a fair degree of care and diligence. Scanlon v. Weedsport (1903) 85 App. Div. 623, 82 N. Y. Supp. 577.

And a complaint in an action against a city, alleging that it negligently permitted snow and ice to accumulate on a sidewalk to the depth of several inches, at the point where the injury in question occurred, and that, by persons passing over it and other

causes, it became so uneven and rounded, and had such an angle from the level of the sidewalk, that a person could not walk over it without danger of falling; and that this condition was known to the city for a long time prior to the date of the plaintiff's injury, and that the accumulation constituted an obstruction which the city negligently permitted to remain without proper protection, and without light or signal to indicate danger, sufficiently shows actionable negligence upon the part of the city, in the absence of special demurrer. Storm v. Butte (1907) 35 Mont. 385, 89 Pac. 726.

So, a fall upon an icy sidewalk is attributable to the negligence of the city, where it appears that the walk where the accident occurred, and for a considérable distance on either side of that point, was covered with ice and snow some 4 or 5 inches in depth, and that the accumulation was higher in the center of the walk than upon either side, and the entire width of the walk was in an icy and slippery condition, and that it was difficult to pass over it without slipping and falling, and this condition had existed for such a time before the accident as to afford constructive notice to the city. Walsh v. Buffalo (1897) 17 App. Div. 112, 44 N. Y. Supp. 942, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 602.

Where a sidewalk had become uneven for use by the snow being more yielding in some places than in others, having sunk lower from the pressure of feet, leaving an uneven and frozen surface on which the traveler was liable to slip, the court held that such was not the natural surface left by the snow or by freezing, but was a defect or want of repair for which a recovery might be had, as it required time and use to make such a condition, such defect not being frequent or common, like that produced solely by snowstorms, or by freezing water, or by other natural causes, one condition being artificial, the other natural. Paulson v. Pelican (1891) 79 Wis. 445, 48 N. W. 715.

A recovery for injuries received from slipping and falling on an icy

sidewalk was upheld in Johnson v. Buffalo (1917) 178 App. Div. 295, 165 N. Y. Supp. 372, where the plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the ice at the place where he fell was from 1 to 2 inches in thickness, very hard, rough, and uneven, and that it had been in this condition for at least two weeks prior to the accident, and no witnesses were called by the city, except the government weather observer, upon whose record the city relied as showing that the icy condition of the walk on the morning of the accident was produced by the alternate rain, snow, thawing, and freezing on the two preceding days.

And where the plaintiff and three other witnesses in an action for damages against a city for a personal injury testified to the existence of hills and ridges of ice of a dangerous character on a sidewalk, continuing long enough to charge the city with constructive notice, a verdict and judgment for the person injured will be sustained, though three or four of the plaintiff's own witnesses contradicted him, and a large number of witnesses for the defendant testified that no such condition existed on the sidewalk in question, at the time of the accident and before it. McDevit v. Philadelphia (1908) 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 317.

In Finnane v. Perry (1914) 164 Iowa, 171, 145 N. W. 494, 5 N. C. C. A. 463, the trial court gave the following instruction: "The fact, if it be a fact, that ice and snow have been permitted to accumulate on the walks of a city from natural causes, and may have been permitted by the city to remain thereon for a considerable length of time, and though slippery because of the smoothness of the surface, does not constitute such a defect, alone, for which a city may be held responsible for an injury resulting to a pedestrian thereon. It is only where such snow and ice are allowed to remain upon the walk until, by its being trampled upon by pedestrians, freezing and thawing, or from other causes, the surface of such snow and ice becomes rough, ridged, rounded in such a manner that a person in the exercise of ordinary care could not pass over it 13 A.L.R.-3.

without danger of falling, that the defects are such as to render the city liable. There is no duty resting on the city to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk so long as the snow and ice remain unchanged by the interference of man, or from other artificial causes, by which the snow and ice become ridged, uneven, or are made to assume some other form, or present some other danger, than they would have presented solely from natural causes. And if you believe from the evidence produced upon the trial hereof that, at the time plaintiff fell upon the sidewalk in question, the sidewalk was covered with snow and ice, and that the same was unbroken and smooth and even, as it had fallen upon said sidewalk, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover in this action, and you should find for the defendant." It was held that such instruction was not open to the objection that it shifted the burden upon the defendant of showing that the snow and ice were unbroken, smooth, and

even.

And an instruction to the jury to the effect that the negligence of a city consisted in permitting snow and ice to accumulate and become packed by travel on the sidewalk, so as to render it unsafe and dangerous, is not open to the objection that the trial judge thereby changed the issues and submitted the case upon a theory not put forth in the plaintiff's petition, particular criticism being directed to the expression "packed by travel," whcre the petition alleges that, by reason of the traffic of pedestrians at the place of the injury, the snow and ice had become and were in a dangerous, rough, rounded, irregular, and uneven condition. Rose v. Ft. Dodge (1915) 180 Iowa, 331, 155 N. W. 170.

Where the plaintiff received his injuries by falling upon a plank sidewalk, the boards of which were old and slanting, the ends being bare, but in the center of which a ridge of ice and snow had formed, making it difficult and dangerous to walk upon, the court held that although the defendant could not prevent the general slipperiness of its streets, caused by snow

and ice, yet it could prevent such accumulations as ridges and hills, which rendered them dangerous. McLaughlin v. Corry (1874) 77 Pa. 109, 18 Am. Rep. 432.

Evidence that a sidewalk was icy, slanting, and uneven, with hills or hummocks of ice 2 or more inches high, and that it was upon one of these hills or hummocks that a person slipped when she fell and received injuries, and that the ice on the walk was 3 or 4 inches thick, and that this condition had existed practically all winter, and most of the ice had accumulated ten days before the accident, furnished proof of negligence upon the part of the city. Klaus v. Buffalo (1903) 86 App. Div. 221, 83 N. Y. Supp. 620.

Again, where the plaintiff fell in consequence of a ridge or mound of ice or hard snow from 4 to 6 inches high, extending from the outer edge of the street about 23 feet towards the buildings, the walk being properly constructed and the snow and ice well cleared off with the exception of the ridge, which was at the time covered with a slight snow that was then falling, the court held that the ridge was a defect for which the defendant was liable, even though the accident would not have happened but for the snow. Street v. Holyoke (1870) 105 Mass. 82, 7 Am. Rep. 500; Day v. Milford (1862) 5 Allen (Mass.) 98.

The proof was held sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff in Anderson v. St. Cloud (1916) 133 Minn. 467, 158 N. W. 417, where there was evidence to the effect that the part of the sidewalk in front of one half of a double house had been kept clear of snow, while on the other half the snow had been left all winter, that this snow had been packed down hard and icy, and sloped down at an angle of about 45 degrees to the part of the walk which had been kept clean, and that the plaintiff slipped on this slope and fell.

And where the plaintiff's evidence proved that the sidewalk had been dangerous for two weeks from snow and ice, the defendant contending that only on one day had it been dangerous, and then had been made so by

boys sliding thereon, the court held that the plaintiff's verdict could not be set aside, it being apparent that the obstruction from ice and snow was very dangerous. Smid v. New York (1883) 17 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 126.

And where, to the knowledge of a city, a sidewalk has become uneven and unsuitable for travel, and the public has on that account been induced to walk on the surface of the ground beside the walk, and a peg or other obstruction has been left in such traveled portion of the street set apart for sidewalk purposes, the city is negligent in allowing the obstruction to exist, and in allowing snow and ice to accumulate about it so as to render the traveled path unsafe. Rea v. Sioux City (1905) 127 Iowa, 615, 103 N. W. 949.

In Michigan, however, the court seems to be somewhat more lenient toward the municipality, and to hold that, even for injuries received because of the accumulation of ice and snow on the sidewalks or streets, which, because of traffic and the elements, have become rough and uneven, the city is not liable.

Thus, in Rolf v. Greenville (1894) 102 Mich. 544, 61 N. W. 3, the city was held not liable for injuries received by a fall on a sidewalk, occasioned by the accumulation, from natural causes, of ice and snow which, previous to the accident, had been trampled and beaten down, and, because of rain and warm weather melting the snow on the sides of the walk, had left the eenter uneven and irregular. This case is expressly governed by McKellar v. Detroit (1885) 57 Mich. 158, 58 Am. Rep. 357, 23 N. W. 621, where it was held that damages could not be recovered for injuries sustained by a mere accumulation of snow or ice, notwithstanding a statute giving damages for neglect to keep public highways, streets, bridges, crosswalks, and culverts in good repair, reasonably safe, and fit for travel, and making it a duty to keep the same in good repair, safe, and convenient for public travel at all times; the liability applying only where the corporation had had a reasonable time and opportunity

to repair, and due diligence had not been used.

And in Jefferson v. Sault Ste. Marie (1911) 166 Mich. 340, 130 N. W. 610, 1 N. C. C. A. 598, where the snow was removed from the sidewalks by the city by means of a plow which removed nothing but the soft snow, the city was held not liable for injuries sustained by falling on a hard icy ridge of snow, formed either by the tramping of pedestrians or the drippings from adjacent buildings, which the plow failed to remove.

In Wisconsin the question seems to be one of degree, rather than kind, i. e., liability depends on the degree of roughness, rather than on whether the ice is smooth or rough.. Thus, in Hyer v. Janesville (1898) 101 Wis. 371, 77 N. W. 729, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 268, it was held that a walk merely covered evenly with trampled snow 2 inches deep, which had been allowed to remain there since the commencement of the winter season, and then had been made rough by the passing of pedestrians over it when soft, a low temperature following, was not in such a defective condition as to hold the city liable to one who was injured by falling on such walk. The court said: "It was such an accumulation of snow as is usually found on walks in the resident portions of cities and villages in the winter season in this climate."

Similar cases, and holding to the same effect, are Dapper v. Milwaukee (1900) 107 Wis. 88, 82 N. W. 725, and Koepke v. Milwaukee (1901) 112 Wis. 475, 88 N. W. 238.

In the Dapper Case (Wis.) supra, it was held that, in the absence of structural defects which combined with the action of the elements in causing accumulations of ice and snow on a sidewalk, the condition of a sidewalk crossing an alley, which has become uneven by falling snow and the melting and freezing of the same while used by persons and teams, does not constitute an actionable defect.

And it was held in Mueller v. Milwaukee (1901) 110 Wis. 623, 86 N. W. 162, that proof that a considerable quantity of ice had formed on a side

walk near a watering trough, and that the ice was rough, and that a person fell upon it and was injured, but not tending to show that the roughness of the ice caused the fall, did not show that the fall was the result of any actionable defect in the street.

Where portions of a walk are covered with smooth ice, and upon other portions the snow and ice are in an uneven and dangerous condition, in the absence of evidence showing that the person injured fell upon the rough and uneven ice, the city cannot be held liable.

Thus, in Tobin v. Waterloo (1906) 131 Iowa, 75, 107 N. W. 1031, it was held that a verdict was properly directed in favor of the city, where the evidence failed to show whether the cause of the injury was the accumulated and rough and uneven ice, or whether the plaintiff slipped where the sidewalk was not defective,-that is, on smooth and level ice. To the same effect are Hyer v. Janesville and Dapper v. Milwaukee (Wis.) supra.

The negligence, if any, of a municipal corporation, in permitting snow and ice to remain on a sidewalk in rough and uneven surfaces, is immaterial, where the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff had, before falling, passed over the part of the walk where the ridges and rough surfaces were claimed to have been. Beirness v. Missouri Valley (1913) 162 Iowa, 720, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 218, 144 N. W. 628.

And a city is not liable for the fall of a pedestrian on an icy sidewalk, although there was a large ridge of ice on the walk, she having fallen before she reached the ridge, and at a point where the ice was smooth. Jaegar v. Newport (1913) 155 Ky. 110, 159 S. W. 671.

In Kelley v. St. Joseph (1913) 170 Mo. App. 358, 156 S. W. 804, where the evidence showed that space had been cleaned on a sidewalk sufficient for pedestrians, and that the sides of the walk were ridged up and uneven, that shortly before the accident a thin coat of slick ice had formed on the clear space as the result of a thaw and subsequent freezing, and that

plaintiff, believing the ridge to be safer walking than the slick ice, walked thereon and fell, the city was held not liable, as plaintiff was diverted from the safe way by a condition which the city could not reasonably have avoided.

A person who fell on a slippery sidewalk and received injury is not entitled to recover from the city therefor, where it appears that the irregularities of the surface of the ice where he fell were very slight. Ingram v. Philadelphia (1907) 35 Pa. Super. Ct.

305.

And a nonsuit is properly entered on the trial of an action for injuries caused by falling on an icy sidewalk, where it appears that the snow had not been cleaned from the walk, on which there was little travel, and that there was only a slight ridge of packed snow about a foot wide, that, on the day before the accident, the snow had been turned into slush, and, on the night before, had frozen, but that this condition had existed but a few hours before the accident, and the borough authorities had had no actual notice of it. Swan v. Indiana (1914) 242 Pa. 596, 89 Atl. 664.

And in Hatch v. Elmira (1911) 142 App. Div. 174, 126 N. Y. Supp. 863, holding a city not liable where the injury was due to a fall on a sidewalk, covered with humps of ice 2 inches in height, the court stated that a 2-inch hummock is not a ridge.

To render the defendant liable, the ice and snow must have accumulated to such an extent as to cause an obstruction. Aurora v. Parks (1886) 21 Ill. App. 459.

And a mere accumulation of snow and ice that does not form an obstruction to travelers, provided the sidewalk is in other respects properly constructed, will not render the city liable in damages. Macomb v. Smithers (1880) 6 Ill. App. 470.

Unevenness and roughness produced by travel through snow and slush, which afterwards freezes and presents no obstructive or dangerous features which are not common to the general condition of snow and ice, are not to be classed as actionable de

fects. Albritton v. Kansas City (1916) 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S. W. 239.

And where the sidewalk at the place of the accident was rough and uneven by reason of some brick being worn, over which ice had formed, the court held, the evidence showing that there was no such defect as would render the walk unsafe or dangerous, that the city was not liable, as defects or obstructions must be such as are dangerous and not easily apparent, so as to be avoided by ordinary care. Quincy v. Barker (1876) 81 Ill. 300, 25 Am. Rep. 278; Aurora v. Pulfer (1870) 56 Ill. 270, followed.

In McCabe v. Philadelphia (1907) 217 Pa. 140, 66 Atl. 247, where plaintiff was injured because of stepping into a hole filled with water, which, for some unknown reason, had formed in a very thick accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk, it was held that the city would not be liable, since the hole, and not the accumulation of ice, was the proximate cause of the injury, and because, the hole being covered with a coating of, ice, it was not so obvious that an officer exercising reasonable supervision of the highway should have observed it.

There was held to be no proof of such accumulation of snow as to indicate negligence on the part of the city in Bleakley v. Prescott (1886) 12 Ont. App. Rep. 637, where it appeared that the plaintiff, in the broad daylight of a winter day, was walking on a side path where there was not perhaps over an inch of snow on the level, that in the middle of the path was a ridge of caked snow or ice, and that she thought she would step over this ridge to the inner side, and in doing so slipped or stumbled, and was injured.

And it was held in Taylor v. Winnipeg (1898) 12 Manitoba R. 479, that a city which had built a number of public wells, as authorized by statute, is not liable for the fall of a pedestrian on a slippery mound of ice on the sidewalk caused by the freezing of water spilled from pails while being carried away from a well, upon the ground that a city could not reasonably be required, because it would be well-nigh impossible, to keep the sidewalks near

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