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streets by a flood. Cloughessey v. Waterbury (1883) 51 Conn. 405, 50 Am. Rep. 38.

In Kaveny v. Troy (1888) 108 N. Y. 571, 15 N. E. 726, where the facts showed a month of severe weather, snowstorms, and freezing temperature which taxed householders and others to the utmost; slippery and dangerous sidewalks in every locality, caused by packed and frozen snow and the formation of ice; that the walk upon which plaintiff fell had been regularly cleaned of snow within a reasonable time, but was coated with ice from natural causes and the rigor of the climate, the court held the city not liable, as something more must be shown than the presence of ice, due to the results of a low temperature, to charge the city with negligence.

And in Ritter v. Toledo (1916) 6 Ohio App. 72, it was held that where the only complaint made against the walk was that it had an incline of 10 inches in 7 feet (held not to be a defect), and was covered with ice produced by natural causes, the petition did not state a cause of action.

An instruction to the effect that a city was required by law to use ordinary care to keep the sidewalk at the place of the accident in a reasonably safe condition for public travel is not erroneous upon the ground that it holds the city responsible for the unsafe condition of the sidewalk, even though such condition were caused by reason of climatic conditions, where the instruction as a whole advised the jury that ordinary care would not require a city to protect pedestrians against the dangers of snow and ice, resulting from mere climatic conditions, and advised them of the distinction between the natural conditions and the artificial conditions which might subsequently act upon them, and thus render them irregular and more dangerous. Rose v. Ft. Dodge (1915) 180 Iowa, 331, 155 N. W. 170.

It was held in Gaffney v. New York (1916) 218 N. Y. 225, 112 N. E. 725, that the evidence fell short of establishing such an unusual and exceptional condition as was necessary to charge a municipality with negligence

in cases of this character, where it appeared that about eight days before the accident there was a little bluster of snow, followed by a rain which turned the snow into slush that, by reason of travelers walking over it, became uneven; that the snow and slush on the sidewalk prior to the day before the accident had not become frozen, but the day before the accident, or on the day of the accident, there was a fall of temperature, and the uneven snow and slush on the sidewalk became frozen.

IV. Condition due to positive acts of municipality.

While the basis of an action against a municipality for injuries from snow or ice on a sidewalk is generally its negligence or nonfeasance, liability is sometimes predicated on its malfea


Thus, where a city, during or just after a storm, shoveled off a crosswalk and threw the snow upon an iron grating at a corner, which was designed to carry off the water from the street, and this grating became clogged so that it did not do its work, and the water was thrown onto the sidewalk and froze, and a passer-by slipped and fell upon it, the city is liable for the injury, the cause of the accident being due to the direct act of its servants. Bishop v. Goshen (1887) 10 N. Y. S.'R. 401, affirmed in (1890) 120 N. Y. 337, 24 N. E. 720.

There is a dictum in BERGER V. SALT LAKE CITY (reported herewith), ante, 5, to the effect that cities and towns may be held liable for injuries arising from accumulations of snow and ice upon the sidewalks, which are placed there by their own acts.

But it was held in Miklaszewski v. Chicago (1915) 194 Ill. App. 614, that it was error to deny the city's motion for a peremptory instruction in its favor, where it appeared that the snow and ice which caused the plaintiff's fall were not such as to amount to an obstruction, although it appeared that the condition of the sidewalk which caused the accident was due to the act of the city's servants in piling snow upon a vacant lot adjacent to the place

of the injury, from which, after the snow melted, water ran onto the sidewalk and by freezing caused the condition complained of, for the reason that such condition did not constitute a defect in the sidewalk such as to render the city liable.

V. Mere slipperiness.

The mere slipperiness of a sidewalk, occasioned by smooth or level ice or snow, is not sufficient to charge the municipality with liability for an injury resulting therefrom, where the walk itself is properly constructed, and there is no such accumulation of ice and snow as to constitute an obstruction.

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Illinois. Chicago v. McGiven (1875) 78 Ill. 347; Chicago v. Bixby (1876) 84 Ill. 82, 25 Am. Rep. 429; Gibson v. Johnson (1879) 4 Ill. App. 288; Aurora v. Parks (1886) 21 Ill. App. 459; Mareck v. Chicago (1900) 89 Ill. App. 358; Metzger v. Chicago (1902) 103 Ill. App. 605; Chicago v. McDonald (1903) 111 Ill. App. 436, 437; East Dubuque v. Brugger (1905) 118 Ill. App. 421; Chicago v. Hutchinson (1906) 129 Ill. App. 239.

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(1884) 63 Iowa, 523, 50 Am. Rep. 756, 19 N. W. 340; Hodges v. Waterloo (1899) 109 Iowa, 444, 80 N. W. 523; Templin v. Boone (1905) 127 Iowa, 91, 102 N. W. 789; Griffin v. Marion (1914) 163 Iowa, 435, 144 N. W. 1011; Finnane v. Perry (1914) 164 Iowa, 171, 145 N. W. 494, 5 N. C. C. A. 463.

Kentucky. - Jaegar v. New Port (1913) 155 Ky. 110, 159 S. W. 671; Varney v. Covington (1913) 155 Ky. 662, 160 S. W. 173.

Maine. Smyth v. Bangor (1881) 72 Me. 249.

Massachusetts.-Stanton v. Springfield (1866) 12 Allen, 566; Hutchins v. Boston (1866) 12 Allen, 571; Johnson v. Lowell (1866) 12 Allen, 572; Nason v. Boston (1867) 14 Allen, 508; Girbert v. Roxbury (1868) 100 Mass. 185;

McKean v. Salem (1888) 148 Mass. 109, 19 N. E. 21.

Minnesota.-Henkes v. Minneapolis (1890) 42 Minn. 530, 44 N. W. 1026; Anderson v. St. Cloud (1916) 133 Minn. 467, 158 N. W. 417.

Missouri. Jackson v. Kansas City (1914) 181 Mo. App. 178, 167 S. W. 1150; Albritton v. Kansas City (1916) 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S. W. 239; Gist v. St. Joseph (1920) Mo. App. 220 S. W. 722.

Nebraska.-Nebraska City v. Rathbone (1886) 20 Neb. 288, 29 N. W. 920; Foxworthy v. Hastings (1888) 23 Neb. 772, 37 N. W. 657; Bell v. York (1891) 31 Neb. 842, 48 N. W. 878. New York. Urquhart v. Ogdensburg (1883) 91 N. Y. 67, 43 Am. Rep. 655; Todd v. Troy (1875) 61 N. Y. 506; Taylor v. Yonkers (1887) 105 N. Y. 202, 59 Am. Rep. 492,. 11 N. E. 642; Kinney v. Troy (1888) 108 N. Y. 567, 15 N. E. 728, reversing (1885) 38 Hun, 285; Ayres v. Hammondsport (1891) 130 N. Y. 665, 29 N. E. 265; Blakely v. Troy (1879) 18 Hun, 167; Muller v. Newburgh (1884) 32 Hun, 24, affirmed in (1887) 105 N. Y. 668, 13 N. E. 929; Smith v. Brooklyn (1885) 36 Hun, 224, affirmed in (1887) .107 N. Y. 655, 14 N. E. 606; Tracey v. Poughkeepsie (1887) 46 Hun, 569; Tobey v. Hudson (1888) 49 Hun, 318, 2 N. Y. Supp. 180; Masters v. Troy (1888) 50 Hun, 485, 3 N. Y. Supp. 450; Corbett v. Troy (1889) 53 Hun, 228, 6 N. Y. Supp. 381; Kleng v. Buffalo (1893) 72 Hun, 541, 25 N. Y. Supp. 445, affirmed in (1898) 156 N. Y. 700, 51 N. E. 1091; Anthony v. Glens Falls (1896) 4 App. Div. 218, 38 N. Y. Supp. 536, affirmed in (1897) 153 N. Y. 682, 48 N. E. 1104; Buck v. Glens Falls (1896) 4 App. Div. 323, 38 N. Y. Supp. 582, appeal dismissed in (1898) 156 N. Y. 683, 50 N. E. 1115; O'Keeffe v. New York (1898) 29 App. Div. 524, 51 N. Y. Supp. 710; Haight v. Elmira (1899) 42 App. Div. 391, 59 N. Y. Supp. 193, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 624; Berger v. New York (1901) 65 App. Div. 394, 73 N. Y. Supp. 74; Kleyle v. Oswego (1905) 109 App. Div. 330, 95 N. Y. Supp. 879; Ballard v. Hamburg (1911) 143 App. Div. 719, 128 N. Y. Supp. 325; Mitchell v. Dannemora (1917) 178 App. Div. 239, 164

N. Y. Supp. 917; Brennan v. New York (1909) 130 App. Div. 267, 114 N. Y. Supp. 578, affirmed, without opinion, in (1910) 197 N. Y. 544, 91 N. E. 1110; Keane v. Waterford (1888) 17 N. Y. S. R. 658, 2 N. Y. Supp. 183; Gramm v. Greenbush (1888) 20 N. Y. S. R. 370, 3 N. Y. Supp. 76; Colburn v. Canandaigua (1888) 28 N. Y. Week. Dig. 441, 15 N. Y. S. R. 668; Kenney v. Cohoes (1883) 16 N. Y. Week. Dig. 206.

North Carolina. Cresler v. Asheville (1904) 134 N. C. 311, 46 S. E. 738.

North Dakota. Jackson v. Grand Forks (1913) 24 N. D. 601, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 75, 140 N. W. 718.

Ohio.-Chase v. Cleveland (1886) 44 Ohio St. 505, 58 Am. Rep. 843, 9 N. E. 225; Leipsic v. Gerdeman (1903) 68 Ohio St. 1, 67 N. E. 87; Norwalk v. Tuttle (1906) 73 Ohio St. 242, 76 N. E. 617, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 166; Vandyke v. Cincinnati (1857) 1 Disney, 532. Pennsylvania. McLaughlin v. Corry (1874) 77 Pa. 109, 18 Am. Rep. 432; Mauch Chunk v. Kline (1882) 100 Pa. 119, 45 Am. Rep. 364; Wyman v. Philadelphia (1896) 175 Pa. 117, 34 Atl. 621; Hendrickson v. Chester City (1908) 221 Pa. 120, 70 Atl. 552; Holbert v. Philadelphia (1908) 221 Pa. 266, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 201, 70 Atl. 746; Green v. Hollidaysburg (1912) 236 Pa. 430, 84 Atl. 785; Blaine v. Philadelphia (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 177; Ingram v. Philadelphia (1908) 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 305; Strayline v. Philadelphia (1905) 15 Pa. Dist. R. 387; Allegheny v. Gilliam (1883) 13 Pittsb. L. J. N. S. 461; Scott v. Scranton (1898) 5 Lack. Leg. News, 73.

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Cook v. Milwaukee (1869) 24 Wis. 270, 1 Am. Rep. 183; Grossenbach v. Milwaukee (1885) 65 Wis. 31, 56 Am. Rep. 614, 26 N. W. 182; Paulson v. Pelican (1891) 79 Wis. 445, 48 N. W. 715; Chamberlain v. Oshkosh (1893) 84 Wis. 289, 19 L.R.A. 513, 36 Am. St. Rep. 928, 54 N. W. 618; Hausmann v. Madison (1893) 85 Wis. 187,

21 L.R.A. 263, 39 Am. St. Rep. 834, 55 N. W. 167; Beaton v. Milwaukee (1897) 97 Wis. 416, 73 N. W. 53; Salzer v. Milwaukee (1897) 97 Wis. 471, 73 N. W. 20; Cooper v. Waterloo (1898) 98 Wis. 424, 74 N. W. 115; Hyer v. Janesville (1898) 101 Wis. 371, 77 N. W. 729, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 268; De Pere v. Hibbard (1899) 104 Wis. 666, 80 N. W. 933; Byington v. Merrill (1901) 112 Wis. 211, 88 N. W. 26; Griswold v. Camp (1912) 149 Wis. 399, 135 N. W. 754. Canada.

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Forward v. Toronto (1888) 15 Ont. Rep. 370; D'Estimonville v. Montreal (1900) Rap. Jud. Quebec 18 C. S. 470.

The two principal reasons given for the doctrine that municipalities are not liable for injuries caused by smooth, level ice are the impracticability of keeping sidewalks entirely free of snow and ice, and the fact that, where the walks are in a slippery condition as the result of climatic conditions, persons using them are put upon notice of the danger, and are bound to look out for their own safety. Thus, the court in Chase v. Cleveland (1886) 44 Ohio St. 505, 58 Am. Rep. 843, 9 N. E. 225, supra, says: "In all northern cities and towns storms of snow and sleet, producing ice and resulting in slippery walks, are of frequent and constant recurrence during the winter season, and accidents


also frequent. Such dangers are apt to exist in many places at the same time, and at points widely separated from one another. They appear at many points to-day, disappear to-morrow, and like dangers appear at other places the next day. They are affected by changes of weather which are likely to occur at any time, and frequently many times within a few hours.

To effectually provide against dangers from this source would require a large special force, involving enormous expense; for, to make the protection effective, constant activity and vigilance would be required as well in the ascertainment of the dangers as in their removal upon being known. . Slipperiness may arise from a variety of causes. A thin film of mud on the walk will often produce it, and yet

liability would hardly be claimed to arise from such cause. It is not clear on principle that an exception should necessarily be made in regard to slipperiness from accumulations of ice. ... The law .. is practicable and reasonable in regard to keeping streets open, in repair, and free from nuisance."

The justice of this doctrine is recognized, and the reasons therefor clearly stated, also, in Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Asso. (1901) 161 Mo. 523, 53 L.R.A. 805, 61 S. W. 859, where the court distinguishes between cases in which the ice results from natural causes, and those in which it is the result of artificial causes, and holds that, where a sidewalk is rendered dangerous because of slippery ice formed from incidental or accidental discharge of water, such not being the prevalent condition of sidewalks at the time, it is the duty of the city to cause the danger to be removed within a reasonable time after it has notice thereof, or by the exercise of ordinary care would have discovered the condition.

So, in Huston v. Council Bluffs (1897) 101 Iowa, 33, 36 L.R.A. 211, 69 N. W. 1030, the court instructed the jury that as a general rule the mere fact that snow or sleet has fallen upon a sidewalk from the clouds, and thereby rendered the sidewalk slippery and difficult to pass over, will not make the city liable therefor, even though such ice and snow so remain upon the walk for an unreasonable length of time after the officers of the city, whose duty requires them to look after such matters, has notice of its existence, or after they, in the exercise of reasonable care in performing their duties, ought to know of its existence; but that this rule relates only to the natural conditions resulting from rain or sleet falling and freezing upon the walk, or snow accumulating upon the walk from natural causes. In this case it appeared that the ice was rough and uneven, and the liability of the city was sustained.

This distinction between a slippery condition resulting from natural causes, and the same condition resulting from artificial causes, is denied in

many cases, and the city held not liable, although the condition of the walk may result from some artificial and local cause, such as a defective hydrant, or a conductor discharging on the sidewalk, etc. Thus, in Henkes v. Minneapolis (1890) 42 Minn. 530, 44 N. W. 1026, the court held that the fact that the ice was partially the result of artificial causes, and not wholly of natural causes, made no difference; that the liability of the city must rest upon some ground of fault or neglect on the part of its officers who have charge of the streets, and that such fault or neglect is no more involved in removing ice formed by water from houses than ice formed by rain from the clouds. It appeared in this case that there had been a fire in a building on the sidewalk where plaintiff fell, and water had escaped from the hose pipe, run on the sidewalk, and frozen, the result being thicker ice in that locality than elsewhere, and extra roughness.

That there is some difference of opinion as to what may be regarded as a natural cause is shown by the decision in Kannenberg v. Alpena (1893) 96 Mich. 53, 55 N. W. 614. In this case it was held that, where a street was paved so as to form a gutter outside of the sidewalk, and the catch basin in this gutter became filled up or stopped, so that the water did not run, and, the weather being warm, the water accumulated at that point and flowed upon the outer edge of the sidewalk, where it later froze, and a pedestrian slipped and was injured, the city was not liable, on the ground that there was no fault in the construction of the catch basin, and that from natural causes, without fault upon the part of the city authorities, the ice had formed from the snow which fell in the highway.

In Aurora v. Parks (1886) 21 Ill. App. 459, where a city was sued for damages for a gross violation of duty in permitting snow and ice to accumulate on its sidewalk so as to form an obstruction and be dangerous to travel, whereby the plaintiff sustained damage, the court held that mere slipperiness and unevenness caused by tramp

ling, thawing, and freezing, where ice and snow had not accumulated to such an extent as to make an obstruction, did not create a liability.

And in Wilson v. Idaho Falls (1909) 17 Idaho, 425, 105 Pac. 1057, it was held that 4 inches of snow on a sidewalk, traveled over and packed down, is not such an obstruction as will render a city liable for an accident occurring because of the slippery and uneven condition of the walk, due to trampling, thawing, and freezing.

A city is not liable for the fall of a pedestrian on an icy sidewalk, where the snow and ice extend over the full width of the sidewalk and continuously along it, with no ridges, bumps, or elevations except the roughness made by footprints in the snow when thawed, and his fall was merely the result of the generally icy, slippery condition of the walk. Gist v. St. Joseph (1920) Mo. App., 220 S. W. 722.

Where the charge alleged that the defendant, a city of the first class, suffered ice and frozen snow to accumulate, and to be beaten smooth and slippery by means of a slide, thereby rendering the same dangerous, although it might have informed itself thereof in time to have made it safe, the court in Chase v. Cleveland (1886) 44 Ohio St. 505, 58 Am. Rep. 843, 9 N. E. 225, held that the facts were not sufficient to show negligence, as no defect was proved to exist in the sidewalk, and that an exception should be made in regard to slipperiness from accumulations of ice, the place of the accident not being one much frequented.

A slight raised place in the sidewalk of a city, not sufficient itself to constitute a defect therein, does not render the city liable to a pedestrian who slips and falls thereon, when such place is rendered slippery by snow and ice and children coasting thereon. Holsberry v. Elkins (1920) - W. Va.

103 S. E. 271.

But the distinction generally made between smooth, level ice, and ice which has accumulated in a rough or uneven surface, is repudiated in Cloughessey v. Waterbury (1884) 51 Conn. 405, 50 Am. Rep. 38. In in

quiring into the reasons upon which the rule rests, the court says that it is obvious that it does not depend at all upon the fact that ice in ridges is dangerous, while smooth ice is not. And, as to the theory that expediency requires the making of such a rule, the court said it does not follow that, because the city might be held responsible under some circumstances for smooth ice on its sidewalks, it must logically be held responsible under all circumstances, as well for "the freezing mist of a single night," which glares its entire territory, as for a patch of ice of only a few feet in extent, which has existed in the same condition for weeks. The court said that, where ice is found on the sidewalks to a limited extent in a dangerous condition, whether smooth or otherwise, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the passage safe for travel, it ought to do it, and is responsible for the consequences if this duty is neglected; but that, if a sudden ice storm covers all the territory of a town, it would be impracticable to apply the remedy, and it should be considered and treated as would an extraordinary inundation of its streets by a flood. In this case it was therefore held that, where the place of injury was one of the principal business streets of the city, and the sidewalks on both sides were in good condition, except at the precise place of the accident, which was in a dangerous condition by reason of glary and smooth ice, and had existed in the same condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, and no sand or other substance had been put upon the ice to make it more safe, as might easily have been done, but it had been permitted to remain during all this time in the same dangerous condition, and the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary care, slipped and fell upon the ice and was injured, the city was liable. But the court added that the decision must be understood to refer only to the particular circumstances found by the court. The court also denied that the decisions in the case of Dooley v. Meriden (1876) 44 Conn. 117, 26 Am. Rep. 433,

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