rights and self-determination, international cooperation in resolving economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems, and harmonizing national actions to realize these shared goals. The United States believes that the Charter constitutes for Member States the principal bond creating a worldwide community of nations despite the existence of widely differing views and philosophies of government. Consequently, any serious effort to reconsider or revise the Charter must be looked at with great care lest the basis for the sometimes fragile ties among Member States be weakened. We see no evidence of agreement now among the United Nations membership on even the broad objectives of overall review. The United States is not in principle opposed to changes in the Charter but considers that such changes can wisely be approached only on a case-by-case basis. Only when there is a reasonable prospect for the development of necessary agreement on the specific amendment concerned should such efforts be pursued. This was the case some time ago when we supported amendments involving the appropriate enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. If evidence emerges that agreement is possible on other specific changes that should be made in the Charter, the United States will explore them seriously. We believe that the United Nations overriding need at present is to function as a "center for harmonizing the actions of nations" as stipulated by the Charter itself. We believe that the rededication to this objective and the taking of practical steps to encourage respect for both assenting and dissenting views in the decisionmaking process is the most important contribution that could be made to move the United Nations toward the ideal of international cooperation that the Charter was designed to attain. U.N. Doc. A/10113, June 9, 1975. See also post, Ch. 13, § 1, p. 747, for a statement of U.S. position on Charter review. The Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations filed a report on the question of U.N. Charter Review on Nov. 26, 1975. It included the following conclusions and recommendations: The Subcommittee supports the basic position of the Department of State with regard to United Nations Charter review. Proposals for amending the Charter should be considered under the procedure of Article 108 which permits an amendment to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Also, to the greatest degree possible, changes in the operations of the U.N. should be sought through procedural means instead of the more lengthy process of amendment and ratification. The Subcommittee recognizes the shortcomings and frustrations of the present United Nations system, and agrees with the need for change. But the international consensus essential for productive Charter review-both generally and on specific issues-has not evolved. Until such agreement develops, an attempt at comprehensive Charter review would be risky and unwieldy. The United States should press . . for reforms similar to those suggested for economic activity in other critical areas such as pacific settlement of disputes, peacekeeping, and arms control. the U.S. should lend its support and even initiative to efforts aimed at greater policy planning, research and analysis of programs and projects in all areas of U.N. activity. B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES General International Organizations of Universal Character On March 14, 1975, the United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations adopted the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character. The final vote on adopting the text of the Convention was 57 to 1, with 15 abstentions. The United States abstained. The United Nations Conference was held pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2966 (XXVII), 3072 (XXVII), and 3247 (XXIX). It used as its basic working document the draft articles on the representation of states in their relations with international organizations adopted by the International Law Commission at its twenty-third session. The Convention was intended to codify the rights and obligations of international organizations, host states, and sending states and their personnel applicable in relations between states and international organizations. Work on the subject had been undertaken in order to solve legal problems not dealt with by many of the special conventions on the subject, and to serve as a basis for the progressive development of international law in the field. The Convention sets forth the privileges and immunities of member state permanent missions and observer missions to international organizations, also of delegations, including observer delegations, to organs and conferences in accordance with the rules of international organizations. In several respects its provisions deviate from current law and practice in that they expand the categories of those eligible to receive the equivalent of diplomatic privileges and immunities. They also, in some instances, increase the quantity and quality of privileges and immunities to be accorded by the host state to personnel assigned by states to international organizations or conferences convened by such organizations. In case of dispute arising from its application or interpretation, the Convention provides for consultations, in which an organization or conference may be invited to join, and, failing settlement within a month, referral by a state to a conciliation commission. On March 13, 1975, Frederick Smith, Jr., Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, and head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, gave a detailed explanation of the U.S. abstention, emphasizing both substantive objections and procedural difficulties, resulting in part from lack of adequate time for consultation and negotiation among delegations. He indicated that the provisions adopted placed many obligations upon host states, while establishing for them few rights and an inadequate degree of protection in the event of abuse by a person of his privileges and immunities. He noted that United States proposals to safeguard against abuse of privilege were rejected. The following are excerpts from Mr. Smith's statement: the atmosphere during most of the conference has been unhealthy and seriously out of balance. In contrast, earlier conventions drafted here and in New York contain, in their essence, a genuine balance of interests. Each state participating was both a receiver and a sender. Some tended to view issues in a different perspective than others. But few, if any, saw in those conventions a cornucopia of benefits without corresponding responsibilities. Unfortunately, this has not been the case at the present conference. Of course, our delegation represents a major host state. But our delegation also represents a major sending state, and we know that we came to Vienna prepared to negotiate. We can only conclude that many delegates did not-that they looked at the issues from one perspective and from one perspective alone. That is, they saw themselves only as sending state beneficiaries. . . . Too few took a broader view-that is, not only that their state might sometimes be a host state but also that to draft a meaningful convention, it would be necessary to seriously consider the reasonable requirements of the host state. . . . To our great regret, a willingness to amply reflect the needs of host states has not been expressed by the conference. The conference, rather, has decided to draft a document that, in its totality, expands the obligations of host states while decreasing their rights. as a principle, we adhere to the terms of Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, and Article 105 provides for such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of functions. We firmly believe that privileges and immunities must be accorded missions and delegations insofar as their duties and functions require them. To accord greater privileges and immunities than are required for the independent exercise of functions is to create a privileged class, a new aristocracy. Such action is, we submit, completely unacceptable in today's world-if it ever was appropriate. Unfortunately, a number of provisions have been adopted by this conference that do just that. Article 66, for example, is an expansion of current privileges and immunities for which no justification whatsoever has been given. Administrative and technical staff, who have no representational functions, are accorded virtually the same privileges and immunities for all intents and purposes as would be accorded, for example, the ambassador to the host state. Secondly, attempts on the part of delegations that were mindful of the needs of host states, to qualify in reasonable terms the most extreme formulations of certain so-called absolute principles have almost uniformly been rejected. Accordingly, . . . in view of such serious shortcomings of substance and form, my delegation has been compelled to abstain in the vote on the convention. The full text of Mr. Smith's statement may be found in Dept. of State file L/ UNA. The text of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character is at U.N. Doc. A/CONF.67/16, Mar. 14, 1975. The Final Act of the Conference, annexing resolutions adopted by it, is at U.N. Doc. A/CONF.67/15, Mar. 14, 1975. The text of the Convention reads as follows: Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations With International Organizations of a Universal Character The states parties to the present Convention, Recognizing the increasingly important role of multilateral diplomacy in relations between states and the responsibilities of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations of a universal character within the international community, Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the sovereign equality of states, the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among states, Recalling the work of codification and progressive development of international law applicable to bilateral relations between states which was achieved by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and the Convention on Special Missions of 1969, Believing that an international convention on the representation of states in their relations with international organizations of a universal character would contribute to the promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among states, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, Recalling the provisions of Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing that the purpose of privileges and immunities contained in the present Convention is not to benefit individuals but to sure the efficient performance of their functions in connection with organizations and conferences, Taking account of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 1947 and other agreements in force between states and between states and international organizations, Affirming that the rules of customary international law continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention, Have agreed as follows: PART I Article 1 1. For the purposes of the present Convention: (1) "international organization" means an intergovernmental organization; (2) "international organization of a universal character" means the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and any similar organization whose membership and responsibilities are on a worldwide scale; (3) "Organization” means the international organization in question; (4) "organ" means: (a) any principal or subsidiary organ of an international organization, or (b) any commission, committee or subgroup of any such organ, in which states are members; (5) "conference" means a conference of states convened by or under the auspices of an international organization; (6) "mission” means, as the case may be, the permanent mission or the permanent observer mission; (7) "permanent mission" means a mission of permanent character, representing the state, sent by a state member of an international organization to the Organization; (8) "permanent observer mission" means a mission of permanent character, representing the state, sent to an international organization by a state not a member of the Organization; (9) "delegation" means, as the case may be, the delegation to an organ or the delegation to a conference; (10) "delegation to an organ" means the delegation sent by a state to participate on its behalf in the proceedings of the organ; (11) "delegation to a conference" means the delegation sent by a state to participate on its behalf in the conference; (12) "observer delegation" means, as the case may be, the observer delegation to an organ or the observer delegation to a conference; (13) "observer delegation to an organ" means the delegation sent by a state to participate on its behalf as an observer in the proceedings of the organ; (14) "observer delegation to a conference" means the delegation sent by a state to participate on its behalf as an observer in the proceedings of the conference; (15) "host state" means the state in whose territory: (a) the Organization has its seat or an office, or (16) "sending state" means the state which sends: (a) a mission to the Organization at its seat or to an office of the Organization, or (b) a delegation to an organ or a delegation to a conference, or (c) an observer delegation to an organ or an observer delegation to a conference; (17) "head of mission" means, as the case may be, the permanent representative or the permanent observer; (18) "permanent representative" means the person charged by the sending state with the duty of acting as the head of the permanent mission; (19) "permanent observer" means the person charged by the sending state with the duty of acting as the head of the permanent observer mission; (20) "members of the mission" means the head of mission and the members of the staff; (21) "head of delegation" means the delegate charged by the sending state with the duty of acting in that capacity; |