notes of a state bank, drawn on the credit of a particular fund set apart for the purpose. (b) Through all our colonial history, paper money was much in use; and from the era of our independence down to the date of the Constitution, bills of credit, issued under the authority of the confederation Congress, or of the individual states, and intended for circulation from hand to hand, were universally denominated paper money; and it was to bar the governmental issues of such a delusive and pernicious substitute for cash, that the constitutional prohibition was introduced. The issuing of such bills by the state of Missouri, under the denomination of certificates, was adjudged to be unconstitutional, though they were not made generally a legal tender, but they were, nevertheless, made receivable in payment of taxes, and by all civil and military officers in discharge of salaries and fees of office. Instruments, however, issued by or on behalf of a state, binding it to pay money at a future day, for services actually received, or for money borrowed for present use, were declared not to be bills of credit, within the meaning of the Constitution. (c) 1

small sums from twenty dollars to one dollar, drawing interest, and receivable in payment of debts due to the state; and that the legislature were pledged to redeem the bills, and creditors were stayed from collecting their debts for three years, unless they would receive the bills in payment. The court held, that the analogy was so striking between that institution and the Missouri loan office, as to render the decision in Craig v. The State of Missouri in point, and binding on the states; and, consequently, it was adjudged that the act establishing the State Bank of Illinois was unconstitutional, and its notes void. And in the case of McFarland v. The State Bank, 4 Ark. 44, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held itself bound and concluded by the decision in Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky, though it was admitted to be inconsistent with the doctrine and decision in the prior case of Craig v. The State of Missouri. The court evidently regretted that the case of Craig had been overruled, as it contained the sound and true constitutional doctrine. The Bank of Arkansas stood on the same ground, and had the same essential qualities, and its notes were bills of credit within the decision of Craig, and not bills of credit within the decision of Briscoe, and the latter decision they held themselves bound to obey. (b) Billis ads. The State, 2 M'Cord, 12.

(c) Craig v. The State of Missouri, ub. sup. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, iii. p. 19, seems to be of opinion, that, independent of long continued practice from the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the states would not, upon a sound construction of the Constitution, if the question was res

Bank of Ala., 13 How. 12(same principle as Briscoe v. Bank of Ky.); as to what are, City N. Bank v. Mahan 2 La. An

1 See further, as to what are not bills of credit, McCoy v. Washington County, 3 Wall. Jr. 381; Bailey v. Milner, 1 Abbott U. S. 261; 35 Ga. 330; Darrington v. 751.

2. Ex post Facto Laws.-In Calder v. Bull, (d) the question on the meaning of an ex post facto law, within the prohibition of the Constitution, was extensively discussed.

The legislature of Connecticut had, by a resolution or law, set aside a decree of the court of probates, rejecting a will, and directed a new hearing before the court of probates, and the point was, whether that resolution was an ex post facto law prohibited by the Constitution of the United States.

It was held, that the words ex post facto laws were technical expressions, and meant every law that made an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when

* done, criminal; or which aggravated a crime, and made *409 it greater than it was when committed; or which changed the punishment, and inflicted a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; or which altered the legal rules of evidence, and received less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. The Supreme Court concluded that the law or resolution of Connecticut was not within the letter or intention of the prohibition, and was, therefore, lawful. (a) Afterwards, in Fletcher v. Peck, (b) it was observed that an ex post facto law integra, be authorized to incorporate banks, with a power to circulate bank paper as currency, inasmuch as they are expressly prohibited from coining money. He cites the opinions of Mr. Webster, of the Senate of the United States, and of Mr. Dexter, formerly Secretary of War, on the same side. But the equal, if not the greater authority of Mr. Hamilton, the earliest Secretary of the Treasury, may be cited in support of a different opinion, and the contemporary sense and uniform practice of the nation are decisive on the question. Bank paper, like checks and negotiable notes, circulates entirely upon private credit, and is not a coercive circulation. It is at every person's option to receive or reject it. The Constitution evidently had in view bills of credit issued by law, in the name and on the credit of the state, and intended for circulation from hand to hand as money, and of which our history furnished so many pernicious examples. The words of the Constitution are, that no state shall emit bills of credit. The prohibition does not extend to bills emitted by individuals, singly or collectively, whether associated under a private agreement for banking purposes, as was the case with the Bank of New York prior to its earliest charter, in the winter of 1791, or acting under a charter of incorporation, so long as the state lends not its credit, or obligation, or coercion, to sustain the circulation. In the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, this question was put at rest, by the opinion of the court that there was no limitation in the Constitution on the power of the states to incorporate banks, and their notes were not intended to be inhibited, nor were considered as bills of credit. 11 Peters, 257, 345, 349. (d) 3 Dallas, 386.

(a) Strong v. The State, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 193, s. p. (b) 6 Cranch, 138.

was one which rendered an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed. This definition is distinguished for its comprehensive brevity and precision, and it extends to laws passed after the act, and affecting a person by way of punishment of that act, either in his person or estate. Ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose punishments or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private rights retrospectively.1 Retrospective laws and state laws, devesting vested rights, unless ex post facto, or impairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within the prohibition

contained in the Constitution of the United States, however repugnant they may be to the principles of sound legislation. (c)

3. The States cannot control the Exercise of Federal Power.

The state legislatures cannot annul the judgments, nor determine the extent of the jurisdiction, of the courts of the Union. This was attempted by the legislature of Pennsylvania, and declared to be inoperative and void by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of The United States v. Peters. (d) Such a power, as we have heretofore seen, necessarily resides in the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation. It has also been 410 adjudged, that no state court has authority or jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the United States, or to stay proceedings under it. This was attempted by a state court in Kentucky, and declared to be of no validity by the Supreme Court of the United States, in M'Kim v. Voorhies. (a)1 No state tribunal can interfere with seizures of property made by

(c) Calder v. Bull, 8 Dallas, 386; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 413; Watson . Mercer, 8 id. 88.

(d) 5 Cranch, 115.

1 Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, stated ante, 322, n. 1; The Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409; Supervisors v. Durant, ib. 415; Amy v. The Supervisors of Des Moines, 11 Wall. 136; ante, 401, n. 1.

The last statement in the text of this page (*410) has been twice referred to and denied to be law by the Supreme Court. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 458; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 341.

The rule now laid down is, "that whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right to interfere with that possession, unless it be some court which may have a direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken possession, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises." Miller, J., in Buck v. Colbath, sup. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 196; Taylor . Carryl, 20 How. 583, 595. On this

(a) 7 Cranch, 279.

principle it was held that replevin did not lie in a state court against a marshal of the United States for property attached by him on mesne process from a United States court against a third person. Freeman v. Howe, sup. (reversing s. c. 14 Gray, 566); Munson v. Harroun, 34 Ill. 422. See also Taylor v. Carryl, sup. But on the other hand it has been decided, qualifying some expressions in Freeman v. Howe, that trespass does lie in a state court against a marshal for taking goods under a writ of attachment from a United States court, which did not belong to the defendant in the attachment suit. Buck v. Colbath, sup. ; Ward v. Henry, 19 Wis. 76; Booth v. Ableman, 18 Wis. 495.

Trover will lie in the state courts against a postmaster for improperly detaining a newspaper, although such detention is under color of the laws of the United States, and the regulations of the post-office department. Teall v. Felton, 12 How. 284; affirming s. c. 1 Comst. 587.

revenue officers, under the laws of the United States; nor interrupt, by process of replevin, injunction, or otherwise, the exercise of the authority of the federal officers; and any intervention of state authority for that purpose is unlawful. This was so declared by the Supreme Court in Slocum v. Mayberry. (b) Nor can a state court issue a mandamus to an officer of the United States. This decision was made in the case of M'Cluny v. Silliman, (c) and it arose in consequence of the Supreme Court in Ohio sustaining a jurisdiction over the register of the land office of the United States, in respect to his ministerial acts as register, and claiming a right to award a mandamus to that officer to compel him to issue a final certificate of purchase. The principle declared by the Supreme Court was, that the official conduct of an officer of the government of the United States can only be controlled by the power that created him.

If the officer of the United States who seizes, or the court which awards the process to seize, has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, then the inquiry into the validity of the seizure belongs exclusively to the federal courts. But if there be no jurisdiction in the instance in which it is asserted, as if a marshal of the United States, under an execution in favor of the United States against A, should seize the person or property of B, (d) then the state courts have jurisdiction to protect the person and the property so illegally invaded; and it is to be observed that the jurisdiction

of the state courts in Rhode Island was admitted by *411 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Slocum v. Mayberry, upon that very ground.

In the case of The United States v. Barney, (a) the district judge of Maryland carried to a great extent the exemption from state control of officers or persons in the service of the United States, and employed in the transportation of the mail. He held, that an innkeeper had no lien on the horses which he had fed, and which were employed in the transportation of the mail. The act of Congress of March, 1790, prohibited all wilful obstruction of

(b) 2 Wheaton, 1. Any restraint by state authority on state officers in the execu tion of the process of their courts is altogether inoperative upon the officers of the United States in the execution of the mandates which issue to them. Baldwin, J., in McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 17.

(c) 6 Wheaton, 598.

(d) Bruen v. Ogden, 6 Halst. 870; Dunn v. Vail, 7 Martin (La.), 416. (a) 3 Hall's Law Journal, 128.