485 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. foremen are for the Board, and the history of the issue in the Board shows the difficulty of the problem committed to its discretion. We are not at liberty to be governed by those policy considerations in deciding the naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this case, acting within the terms of the statute. It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization of foremen is from many points bad industrial policy, that it puts the union foreman in the position of serving two masters, divides his loyalty and makes generally for bad relations between management and labor. However we might appraise the force of these arguments as a policy matter, we are not authorized to base decision of a question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of the legislation; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions. The judgment of enforcement is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BURTON Concur, dissenting. First. Over thirty years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis, while still a private citizen, saw the need for narrowing the gap between management and labor, for allowing labor greater participation in policy decisions, for developing an industrial system in which cooperation rather than coercion was the dominant characteristic. J his view, these were 1 "The greater productivity of labor must not only be attainable, but attainable under conditions consistent with the conservation of health, the enjoyment of work, and the development of the individual. The facts in this regard have not been adequately established. In the task of ascertaining whether proposed conditions of work do conform to these requirements, the laborer should take part. He is indeed a necessary witness. Likewise in the task of DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 330,U.S. measures of therapeutic value in dealing with problems of industrial unrest or inefficiency. The present decision may be a step in that direction. It at least tends to obliterate the line between management and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating group on the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these two groups. The struggle for control or power between management and labor becomes secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership. I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the basic policy questions which underlie the present decision. For if foremen are "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the president; all who are commonly referred to as the management, with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see how we could deny it and yet allow the present application. But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in warring camps. Indeed, the thought of some determining whether in the distribution of the gain in productivity justice is being done to the worker, the participation of representatives of labor is indispensable for the inquiry which involves essentially the exercise of judgment." Brandeis, Business-A Profession (1933) pp. 52-53. 485 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. labor leaders that if those in the hierarchy above the workers are unionized, they will be more sympathetic with the claims of those below them, is a manifestation of the same idea.2 I mention these matters to indicate what tremendously important policy questions are involved in the present decision. My purpose is to suggest that if Congress, when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none. Second. "Employee" is defined to include "any" employee. § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U. S. C. § 152. If we stop there, foremen are included as are all employees from the president on down. But we are not warranted in stopping there. The term "employee" must be considered in the context of the Act. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 124; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 191. When it is so considered it does not appear to be used in an all-embracing sense. Rather, it is used in opposition to the term "employer." An "employer" is defined to include "any person acting in the interest of an employer." §2 (2). The term "employer" thus includes some employees. evidence that one personnel group may be both employers and employees within the meaning of the Act. Rather, the Act on its face seems to classify the operating group of industry into two classes; what is included in one group is excluded from the other. And I find no It is not an answer to say that the two statutory groups are not exclusive because every "employee" while on duty-whether driving a truck or stoking a furnace or 2 The Foreman Abdicates, XXXII Fortune, No. 3, p. 150, 152; Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow (1946) ch. VII. DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 330 U.S. operating a lathe-is "acting in the interest" of his employer and is then an "employer" in the statutory sense. The Act was not declaring a policy of vicarious responsibility of industry. It was dealing solely with labor relations. It put in the employer category all those who acted for management not only in formulating but also in executing its labor policies." Foremost among the latter were foremen. Trade union history shows that foremen were the arms and legs of management in executing labor policies. In industrial conflicts they were allied with management. Management indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair labor practices which the Act condemns. When we upheld the imposition of the sanctions of the Act against management, we frequently relied on the acts of foremen through whom management expressed its hostility to trade unionism." Third. The evil at which the Act was aimed was the failure, or refusal of industry to recognize the right of workingmen to bargain collectively. In § 1 of the Act, Congress noted that such an attitude on the part of industry led "to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" so as to burden or obstruct interstate commerce. We know from the history of that decade that the frustrated efforts of workingmen, of laborers, to organize led to strikes, strife, and unrest. But we are pointed to no instances where foremen were striking; nor 3 Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297; Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy (1940) pp. 54-56, 116-120; Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works (1942) pp. 512-514, 547, 557-558, 628, 780. * See cases collected in Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, pp. 298-299. 5 International Association of Machinists v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 311 U. S. 72, 79-80; Heinz Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 311 U. S. 514, 520-521. 485 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. are we advised that managers, superintendents, or vicepresidents were doing so. Indeed, the problems of those in the supervisory categories of management did not seem to have been in the consciousness of Congress. Section 1 of the Act refers to "wage rates," "wage earners," "workers." There is no phrase in the entire Act which is descriptive of those doing supervisory work. Section 2 (3) exempts from the term "employee" any "agricultural laborer." But if "employee" includes a foreman, it would be most strange to find Congress exempting "agricultural laborers," but not "agricultural foremen." The inference is strong that since it exempted only agricultural "laborers," it had no idea that agricultural "foremen" were under the Act. If foremen were to be included as employees under the Act, special problems would be raised-important problems relating to the unit in which the foremen might be represented. Foremen are also under the Act as employers. That dual status creates serious problems. An act of a foreman, if attributed to the management, constitutes an unfair labor practice; the same act may be part of the foreman's activity as an employee. In that event the employer can only interfere at his peril.' The com It is true that for many years some unions included supervisory employees, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Industrial Democracy (1902) p. 546, fn. 2; Union Membership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen, U. S. Dept. of Labor, B. L. S. Bull. No. 745 (1943); Report of Panel of War Labor Board in Disputes Involving Supervisors (1945) IX; Twentieth Century Fund, op. cit. supra, note 3, pp. 67, 216; Northrup, Unionization of Foremen, 21 Harv. Bus. Rev. 496. But organization of foremen on a broad scale is a development of the last few years. Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, p. 314; Rosenfarb, Foremen on the March, 7 Fed. Bar. J. 168; Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 606, 607; Comment, 55 Yale L. J. 754, 756; Foremen's Unions, IX Advanced Management Quarterly J. 110. 'Cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 146 F. 2d 833; Comment, 55 Yale L. J. 754, 767-774; Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra, note 6. |