Lapas attēli

Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

right to benefits and a single judgment for the award granted. See Tenn. Code $8 6880, 6881, 6890, 6891, 6893; Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 171 Tenn. 591, 106 S. W.2d 562.

Nor does the fact that it cannot be known as a matter of absolute certainty that the amount which may ultimately be paid, if respondent prevails, will exceed $3,000, mean that the jurisdictional amount is lacking. This Court has rejected such a restrictive interpretation of the statute creating diversity jurisdiction. It has held that a possibility that payments will terminate before the total reaches the jurisdictional minimum is immaterial if the right to all the payments is in issue. Brotherhood of LQcomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, supra; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551. Future payments are not in any proper sense contingent, although they may be decreased or cut off altogether by the operation of conditions subsequent. Thompson v. Thompson, supra, p. 560. And there is no suggestion that by reason of life expectancy or law of averages the maximum amount recoverable can be expected to fall below the jurisdictional minimum. Cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, supra, p. 101. Moreover, the computation of the maximum amount recoverable is not complicated by the necessity of determining the life expectancy of respondent. Cf. Thompson v. Thompson, supra, p. 559; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkston, supra, p. 100.

Third. Respondent, as is her right, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88, and cases cited, seeks to support the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals on other grounds. But those questions were not passed upon by that court nor adequately presented here. So we uèèm it more appropriate to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals so it may consider those questions. United States v. Ballard, supra.


8 See note 1, supra.





No. 265. Argued January 10, 1947.-Decided March 10, 1947.

A resident of the District of Columbia was employed by a District

of Columbia employer, had previously worked in the District for six years, and was subject to assignment to work there, but had been working for over three years at Quantico, Virginia, and commuting daily between there and his home in the District, where his wife also resided. An agreement between the employer and the employee's union bound the employer to furnish "transportation ... for all work outside the District of Columbia.” A fixed sum per day was

greed upon as transportation expense to Quantico and was added to the employee's pay. Transportation actually was provided daily by cooperation of employees in a car pool, in which the employer acquiesced but over which he exercised no control. The employee was injured fatally in Virginia while driving his car home from work. Held:

1. A claim by the widow for compensation for the death of the employee was within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. Pp. 473-477.

2. As here applied, the District of Columbia Act satisfies any constitutional requirements of due process or full faith and credit. P. 476.

3. Upon the particular facts of this case, the Deputy Commissioner's finding that the death of the employee "arose out of and in the course of employment" was supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law; it was therefore conclusive and the compensation award must be sustained. Pp. 477–485.

(a) The Deputy Commissioner's conclusion in this case that the employer had agreed to furnish transportation to and from work and had paid the expense of transportation in lieu of actually supplying the transportation itself, and that the case therefore was within a recognized exception to the general rule that injuries received by an employee while traveling between home and work do Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

not "arise out of and in the course of employment," was not erroneous as a matter of law. Pp. 478_480.

(b) In determining whether an injury suffered by an employee while traveling between home and work is one "arising out of and in the course of employment,” the existence or absence of control by the employer over the acts and movements of the employee during the transportation is a factor to be considered but is not

decisive. Pp. 480-481. 81 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 154 F.2d 529, reversed.

An employer and its insurance carrier brought suit to set aside an order of the Deputy Commissioner awarding compensation to a claimant under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed. 81 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 154 F. 2d 529. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 698. Reversed, p. 485.

Philip Elman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Paul A. Sweeney and Joseph B. Goldman.

Arthur J. Phelan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nelson T. Hartson and Edward B. Williams.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, issued an order under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act' awarding compensation to the widow of one Clarence H. Ticer. It was specifically found that the injury which led to Ticer's death “arose out of and in the course of the employment.” The propriety and effect

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1 Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600, D. C. Code, 1940, 8 36-501


Opinion of the Court.

of that finding are the main focal points of our inquiry in this case.

Section 1 of the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act provides in part that “the provisions of the Act entitled 'Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,' . . . shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs.” The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act," § 2 (2), in turn defines the term "injury” to include "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, ...' A finding that the injury or death was one "arising out of and in the course of employment" is therefore essential to an award of compensation under the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act.

In support of his order in this case the Deputy Commissioner made various findings of fact. These may be summarized as follows:

Ticer and his wife were residents of the District of Columbia. He had been regularly employed since about 1934 ' as an electrician by E. C. Ernst, Inc., a contractor engaged in electrical construction work in the District of Columbia and surrounding areas. In November, 1940, Ticer was transferred by his employer from a project in the District of Columbia to a project at the Quantico Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia. His work at the Marine Base continued for over three years until the time of his injury in December, 1943.

There was in effect at all times an agreement between the electrical workers' union and the employer. Section 15 (b) of this agreement provided that “Transportation

2 Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. $ 901 et seq.

3 There was one exception. For a period of about 6 months in 1938 or 1939 he worked for the United States Government.

Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

and any necessary expense such as board and lodging shall be furnished [by the employer) for all work outside the District of Columbia.” The sum of $2 a day was fixed by the parties to this agreement as transportation expense and represented the approximate cost of travel from the District of Columbia to the Quantico Marine Base and return. This sum was paid to Ticer and others in addition to the regular hourly rate of pay. And it was paid in lieu of the employer's furnishing transportation.

Because the job site at the Marine Base was several miles away from the Quantico bus or train terminal, it was necessary for Ticer and his co-workers to drive their own automobiles to and from work. The employees formed a car pool. Each morning they started from their respective homes in their own automobiles and drove to a designated meeting place at Roaches Run, Virginia. From that point they would proceed in one car to the job site at the Marine Base. This procedure was repeated in reverse in the evening. The workers alternated in the use of the cars between Roaches Run and the job site. Non-members of the car pool each paid the car owner $1 for the round trip.

The employer was aware of the means of transportation being used and acquiesced therein. On December 13, 1943, Ticer was driving his car on a direct route from his place of employment to his home, following the close of the day's work. Four co-workers were riding with him, two of them being non-members of the car pool. As the car approached Fort Belvoir, Virginia, a large stone, which came from under the rear wheel of a passing truck, crashed through the windshield of the car. It struck Ticer's head, crushing his skull. Death resulted four days later.

Ticer's widow presented a claim for compensation. At the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, the employer and the insurance carrier contended that the Virginia Compensation Commission had sole jurisdiction over

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