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Opinion of the Court.

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part in political management. While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.

The Tenth Amendment does not forbid the exercise of this power in the way that Congress has proceeded in this case. As pointed out in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124, the Tenth Amendment has been consistently construed “as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political partisanship. So even though the action taken by Congress does have effect upon certain activities within the state, it has never been thought that such effect made the federal act invalid.19 As nothing in this record shows any attempt to suspend Mr. Paris from his duties as a member of the State Highway Commission, we are not called upon to deal with the assertion of Oklahoma that a state officer may be suspended by a federal court if § 12 is valid. There is an adequate separability clause. No penalty was imposed upon the state. A hearing was had, conformably to $ 12, and the conclusion was reached that Mr. Paris' active participation in politics justified his removal from membership on the Highway Commission. Oklahoma chose not to remove him. We do not see any violation of the state's sovereignty in the hearing or order. Oklahoma adopted the "simple expedient” of not yielding to what she urges is

19 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, S Wall. 533, 547; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12; Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218; Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 516; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 338.

Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

federal coercion. Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482. The offer of benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual.20

In order to give the Civil Service Commission adequate standards to measure active participation in political activities, Congress adopted § 15 of the Hatch Act, quoted above in note 1. By this section Congress made the test of political activity for state employees the same as the test then in effect for employees in the classified civil service. The Commission had at that time determined that "service on or for any political committee or similar organization is prohibited.”. This could only mean that service on such a committee was active participation in politics. Such determination was made a matter of record by Senator Hatch in charge of the bill during debate on the scope of political prohibition. Obviously the activities of Mr. Paris were covered by the purpose and language of § 12. The words of $ 12 (a) requiring Mr. Paris' abstention from “any active part in political management or political campaigns” are derived from-Rule I of the Civil Service Commission and have persisted there since 1907.22

Oklahoma also argues that the Civil Service Commission determination that the acts of Mr. Paris constitute such a violation of $ 12 (a) as to warrant his removal from his state office is not in accordance with law but arbitrary, unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The facts of Mr.



20 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301'U. S. 548, 593–98; United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 51–54. A review of grants-in-aid will be found in 8 American Law School Review, Corwin: National-State Cooperation, 687, 698. .

21 86 Cong. Rec. 2938, § 15 of exhibit.

22 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, ante, pp. 79–81, notes 4, 5 and 6.

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Paris' activities and his connection with the Democratic State Central Committee during his tenure of office as a member of the Highway Commission of Oklahoma have been stated. The Circuit Court of Appeals said, 153 F. 2d at 284, “Manifestly, the Commission had solid footing in the Act for the conclusion that removal of Paris from office was warranted." We agree.23

Finally, petitioner says that § 12 (c), note 1, supra, authorizes a review of "every minute detail of the case" to "determine whether sufficient facts exist to support the order of the Commission, decide whether the statute has been reasonably and justly applied, and independently resolve the entire question as though the federal court had been the forum in the first instance.”. The basis for this argument, in so far as it differs from that referred to in the preceding paragraph, is drawn from the language of § 12 (c) that “The review by the court shall be on the record entire, including all of the evidence taken on the hearing, and shall extend to questions of fact and questions of law. The court shall affirm the Commission's determination or order, or its modified determination or order, if the court determines that the same is in accordance with law.” As the facts were stipulated and no objection has been taken to the findings of fact, 61 F. Supp. 355, 357 (5); 153 F. 2d 280, 283, the attack, on this issue, is limited to an examination into whether or not the Commission abused its discretion in the order of removal. As heretofore stated, the provisions for review underwent changes during the passage of the Act. As finally

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23 See Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608.

24 See 86 Cong. Rec. 2468-2474; S. 3046 in the House of Representatives, Union Calendar No. 924, June 4, 1940, pp. 4 and 17; H. Rep. No. 2376, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 9. The amendment which resulted in the present form of the section appears at 86 Cong. Rec. 9448.

FRANKFURTER, J., concurring.

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adopted, however, the reviewing court is directed to remand when it determines that the action of the Commission “is not in accordance with law.” § 12 (c).25 The question of "the removal of an officer or employee,” § 12 (b), note 1, supra, we think is a matter of administrative discretion. Since under Rule I of the Civil Service Commission the taking of “any active part in political management or political campaigns” had been determined by the Commission to include service on a political committee, see notes 37 and 38 of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, ante, p. 75, it is clear Mr. Paris' position violated § 15 of the Hatch Act. Note 1, supra. It could hardly be said that the determination of the Commission in ordering his removal was an abuse of its discretion. See 61 F. Supp. at 357 (6) and (7); 153 F. 2d at 283–84.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.



It is of course settled that this Court must consider, whenever the question is raised or even though not raised by counsel, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts as well as 'the jurisdiction of this Court. Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry..v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382. But whether a State has standing to urge a claim of constitutionality under a

23 The following also appears in the section: "The Commission may modify its findings of fact or its determination or order by reason of the additional evidence so taken and shall file with the court such modified findings, determination, or order, and any 'such modified findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 54 Stat. 767, 769.


FRANKFURTER, J., concurring.


Congressional grant-in-aid statute does not involve “jurisdiction” in the sense of a court's power but only the capacity of the State to be a litigant to invoke that power. In this litigation the Government did not challenge the standing of Oklahoma to question the constitutionality of the Act until the case came here. I think it is too late to raise that question at this stage. Assuming that it is here, it is my view that under the Hatch Act, in the legislative and judicial context in which it must be read, the State can question only the correctness of the procedure and the determination of the Civil Service Commission, not the validity of the Act. Section 12 (b), (c), 54 Stat. 767, amending 53 Stat. 1147, 18 U. S. C. $ 611. (b) and (c).

The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the present case. Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237, $ 12. That Act will, in due course, present problems for adjudication. We ought not to anticipate them when, being irrelevant, they are not before us. The Act ought not to be used even for illustrative purpose because illustrations depend on construction of the Act.

Apart from the foregoing, I agree with MR. JUSTICE REED's opinion.

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