Opinion of the Court

old; fifth, "a housing mounted on a wall of said receiver" was well known; and the final element, "means in said housing operatively connected with said sear for moving it in one direction" was but the use of the old and well-known elements consisting of a slide, a pivoted sear, or cammed surfaces, for transmitting motion in one direction to motion in a direction at an angle thereto (finding 30).

As all of the elements of these claims were old and had been used in various mechanical arts, as well as in the gunmaking art, they accomplished no more than the aggregate of the old results and their use, even for a new purpose, would not be invention. Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp., et al., v. Concrete Mixing and Conveying Co., 282 U. S. 175, 186; Mills v. United States, supra; and Curtiss, et al., v. United States, supra. Moreover as these claims read upon the Vickers gun, findings 6 and 23, and the Maxim gun, finding 25, which were preexisting structures in public use, they must be held invalid. As was said by the court in Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Fenton Metallic Mfg. Co., 174 U. S. 492, 498:

* *

Putting the * patent in its most favorable light, it is very little, if anything, more than an aggregation of prior well-known devices, each constituent of which aggregation performs its own appropriate function in the old way. Where a combination of old devices produces a new result such combination is doubtless patentable, but where the combination is not only of old elements, but of old results, and no new function is evolved from such combination, it falls within the rulings of this court in Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall, 353, 368; Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, 356; Phillips v. Detroit, 111 U. S. 604; Brinkerhoff v. Aloe, 146 U. S. 515, 517; Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342, 345; Richards v. Chase Elevator Co. 158 U. S. 299.

See, also, Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 247 U. S. 426, 433, in which the court said:

Applying the rule thus authoritatively settled by this court, we think no invention is shown in assembling these old elements for the purposes declared. No new function is "evolved from this combination"; the new

Opinion of the Court

result, so far as one is achieved, is only that which arises from the well-known operation of each one of the ele

ments.

Likewise the reasoning of the court in Railroad Supply Co. v. Elyria Iron & Steel Co., 244 U. S. 285, 292, 293, is applicable here. The court said:

With these facts before him the most that can be said for the patents in suit is that they gave a somewhat different form to three features which were perfectly familiar and were similarly grouped in prior forms of tie-plates but without giving to any of them any new function and without accomplishing by them any new result. This brings the patents within the principle so often declared that "a mere carrying forward of the original thought, a change only in form, proportions, or degree, doing the same thing in the same way, by substantially the same means, with better results, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent." Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. S. 150; Belding Mfg. Co. v. Challenge Corn Planter Co., 152 U. S. 100; Market Street Cable Ry. Co. v. Rowley, 155 U. S. 621, 629. *

* *

Clearly persuaded as we are that the slight variations claimed for the patents in suit from the plates which had gone before do not constitute patentable invention, we cannot consent to further extend this discussion by a minute comparison of them with earlier patents appearing in the record, but we content ourselves with adopting as comment not to be improved upon in such a case as we have here the following from a former decision of this court:

"The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all favor. It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real

Reporter's Statement of the Case

advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith." Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192, 200.

In view of our conclusion that plaintiff cannot recover under the first issue, further discussion of the other points made by the defendant is unnecessary. The petition is

dismissed. It is so ordered.

WHALEY, Judge; WILLIAMS, Judge; GREEN, Judge; and BOOTH, Chief Justice, concur.

THE CHOCTAW NATION v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. F-182. Decided April 6, 1936]

On the Proofs

Right of Mississippi Choctaws to share in communal funds of Chootaw Nation.-It is settled that under the Dancing Rabbit Creek Treaty of 1830 the Mississippi Choctaw Indians are entitled to a per capita share in the communal funds of the Choctaw Nation. Liability of United States for funds of Choctaw Nation advanced Mississippi Choctaws.-Where under authority of an act of Congress communal funds of the Choctaw Indian Nation were advanced by the Government to meet an obligation of the Mississippi Choctaws, repayment to the Nation to be made from per capita funds of the Mississippi Choctaws as they should accrue, which course is being followed, and inability on the part of the Mississippi Choctaws to so repay the balance of such funds yet unpaid is not shown, the Choctaw Nation is not entitled to recover such balance from the United States.

The Reporter's statement of the case:

Mr. W. F. Semple for the plaintiff. Messrs. W. B. Johnson, R. M. Rainey, and Streeter B. Flynn were on the brief. Mr. C. H. Small, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harry W. Blair, for the defendant. Mr. George T. Stormont was on the brief.

Reporter's Statement of the Case

The court made special findings of fact as follows:

1. The act of Congress approved June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 537, as modified by the Joint Resolution approved May 19, 1926, 44 Stat. 568, provided

That jurisdiction be, and is hereby, conferred upon the Court of Claims, notwithstanding the lapse of time or statutes of limitation, to hear, examine, and adjudicate and render judgment in any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of any treaty or agreement between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indian Nations or Tribes, or either of them, or arising under or growing out of any Act of Congress in relation to Indian affairs which said Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations or Tribes may have against the United States, which claims have not heretofore been determined and adjudicated on their merits by the Court of Claims or the Supreme Court of the United States.

SEC. 2. Any and all claims against the United States within the purview of this Act shall be forever barred unless suit be instituted or petition filed as herein provided in the Court of Claims within five years from the date of approval of this act. The claim or claims of each of said Indian nations shall be presented separately or jointly by petition in the Court of Claims, and such action shall make the petitioner party plaintiff or plaintiffs and the United States party defendant. The petition shall be verified by the attorney or attorneys employed to prosecute such claim or claims under contract approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, and said contract with such Indian tribe shall be executed in behalf of the tribe by the governor or principal chief thereof, or, if there be no governor or principal chief, by a committee chosen by the tribe under the direction and approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior: Provided, however, That the attorney or attorneys employed as herein provided may be assisted by the regular tribal attorney or attorneys employed under existing law under direction of the Secretary of the Interior, with such additional reasonable and necessary expenses for said tribal attorneys to be approved and paid from the funds of the respective tribes under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, as may be required for the proper conduct of such litigation. Official letters, papers, doc

Reporter's Statement of the Case

uments, and records, or certified copies thereof, may be used in evidence, and the departments of the Government shall give access to the attorney or attorneys of the above-named Indian nations to such treaties, papers correspondence, or records as may be needed by the attorney or attorneys of said Indian nations.

SEC. 3. In said suit the court shall also hear, examine, consider, and adjudicate any claims which the United States may have against said Indian nations, but any payment which may have been made by the United States upon any claim against the United States shall not operate as an estoppel, but may be pleaded as an offset in such suit.

SEC. 4. That from the decision of the Court of Claims in any suit prosecuted under the authority of this Act, an appeal may be taken by either party as in other cases to the Supreme Court of the United States.

SEC. 5. That upon the final determination of any suit instituted under this Act, the Court of Claims shall decree such amount or amounts as it may find reasonable to be paid any attorney or attorneys, other than the regular tribal attorney or attorneys employed under existing law, employed by said Indian nations for the services and expenses of said attorneys rendered or incurred subsequent to the date of approval of such contract: Provided, That in no case shall the aggregate amounts decreed by said Court of Claims for services and expenses be in excess of the amount or amounts stipulated in the contract of employment, or in excess of a sum equal to 10 per centum of the amount of recovery against the United States.

SEC. 6. The Court of Claims shall have full authority by proper orders and process to bring in and make parties to such suit any or all persons deemed by it necessary or proper to the final determination of the matters in controversy.

SEC. 7. A copy of the petition shall, in such case, be served upon the Attorney General of the United States, and he, or some attorney from the Department of Justice to be designated by him, is hereby directed to appear and defend the interests of the United States in such case.

2. Under the provisions of the act of June 7, 1924, plaintiff tribe filed its petition herein on July 7, 1926, and on July 29, 1931, filed its amended petition.