STATUS OF SAGE

Mr. FLOOD. A number of years ago the Air Force was trying to sell somebody the idea of hardening the SAGE centers.

Some sort of a presentation was made here showing a plan and a program and an estimate on the hardening of SAGE centers. This was in the very early days of the SAGE discussions. Then when we started getting SAGE hardware put together, actually seeing it, that talk was revived.

A second proposal was made and an estimate was made to harden the cost of SAGE centers. All of a sudden, that dropped off the boards and we heard nothing more about it.

Now, my spies report to me that it is in the air again, although I have heard nothing about it in your presentation so far. Is this merely barroom gossip in the Air Force again, or are you thinking about it, or talking about it down there?

General FRIEDMAN. In the Air Force headquarters itself, for reasons stated last year when we came over with our air defense reorientation plan, we dropped the idea of the so-called super SAGE program. We felt the emphasis was more on time-in light of things to come to get what we had in operation rather than to continue to modernize. I feel certain that the people at the Air Defense Command, or the commander of NORAD, would still like to proceed with the superSAGE program.

We feel, on the basis of allocation of resources in terms of priority from an overall viewpoint, that the money can be better spent in other

areas.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will it not be terrifically expensive to harden all your SAGE sites?

General FRIEDMAN. It would, sir.

As you know, a hardened facility comes a little higher. Sometimes, where you can burrow into a cave, and the geology is particularly adaptable to it, it may or may not be more expensive; however, there was more tied to this super SAGE program at the time it was initially envisaged than just the hardening. We were talking about solid state computers; we were talking about a great deal of refinement along with the hardening.

General AGEE. That is right.

I think the revival of talk that you indicated occurred somewhere in the middle of the period. It was tied directly to the transistor type of computer, which was coming into being at that time, which was a much smaller computer than the so-called soft one.

Now when that dropped out and the whole hardened complex dropped out, as General Friedman indicated

Mr. FLOOD. Did you abandon the so-called miniaturization of computers for this thing?

General AGEE. I think we abandoned it in the concept that General Friedman referred to a while ago. We could not go into SAGE further than what we now have in the program. The transistorized computer is still being developed, but not for air defense.

Mr. FLOOD. The last stage of the talk in the hardening of the SAGE centers is very recent, a matter of months. Have you heard that? General AGEE. I have not; no, sir.

67438-61-pt. 2- -54

General FRIEDMAN. Merely through conversation, I am aware of the fact the people at Colorado Springs would probably like to do this, but I can say this categorically, the Air Force does not intend to proceed with that program, and there are no funds allocated now or for the future for such purpose.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEM IN PACIFIC

Mr. FLOOD. You described the whole chain of the early warning system.

Do you know, or are you aware-I am sure you must—that the Navy have pulled out that segment on the surface between Hawaii and Alaska very recently? Certain types of their ships have been pulled out of that segment.

We made quite a to-do about that, both the Air Force and the Navy, over a period of several years, and on your charts and graphs and pictures much was made of our left flank which was put in very early and was very important and very essential and we were all very proud of that Hawaii-Alaska segment.

Now I understand the Navy have pulled out that segment, or their part of it.

General FRIEDMAN. I am aware that last year they did pull out some of their picket ships. This Alaska-Hawaii section, was that A.E.W. & C.?

General SPICER. The Navy was contributing aircraft similar to our Lockheed-RC-121 aircraft.

Mr. FLOOD. If it was a fact your presentation on the importance of the Alaska-Hawaii segment was as essential and important and good as you claimed it was over a period of 4 or 5 years, is it not any more? Is it not as important any more? If it is, is it being maintained equally?

General FRIEDMAN. Unless someone can speak authoritatively whether or not the Navy is pulling out and what the arrangement is, I would prefer to furnish you a statement for the record. I am not aware of this particular move. I was aware last year that there was a withdrawal of the picket ships, from the east coast operation. Mr. FLOOD. I am speaking of this specific segment.

General FRIEDMAN. I am sorry, I cannot speak factually to that particular move.

(The information requested is classified and was supplied separately.)

REORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIES

Mr. FLOOD. How many civil people will be in the Air Force Communication Service in 1963?

You talk about the number of bodies. I got the impression they were uniformed bodies you were talking about in the stations.

General FRIEDMAN. We have not worked out the details of the organization yet.

As I pointed out in my talk, we are starting this on a phased program over a period of 2 years. When the specifics of the organization are worked out, we will determine the manning for it, both civilian and military. I would not be prepared to state as of now what the percentage relationship will be.

I would say this: There will be a high percentage of civilian personnel employed at headquarters level, at least.

Mr. FLOOD. You made quite a point out of it, and the minute you make quite a point out of anything you ask for that kind of question

at once.

We are going to do this and that. I take for granted you are talking about uniformed bodies in a uniformed presentation, but I take it for granted there must be a lot of civilian people. It is clear there are going to be even in 1963 at your reduced point quite a high percentage of civilian people.

General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; that is right.

When we talked about a savings leveling off in 1963 of some 3,000 people, I am talking about a transfer and consolidation of functions. which are now carried on by operating commands and agencies.

Mr. FORD. Is this consolidation brought about by the establishment of the Defense Communication Agency?

General FRIEDMAN. We would like very much to comment on that, and Major Ewell is thoroughly conversant with this. I would like for him to respond.

Mr. ANDREWS. If the gentleman will yield, the major will make a statement with reference to communications immediately after this discussion.

Mr. FLOOD. Just to show you how we operate, I was going to wind up with that one. After all is said and done, does that mean

Mr. FORD. I apologize.

Mr. FLOOD. That is a tribute to your acumen, and you are to be credited. That is good indeed.

Mr. FORD. It seemed very unusual this was not done beforehand. If we could have saved 3,000 people, either civilian or military in a period of several years, why have we not done this before?

General FRIEDMAN. I think there is a logical explanation. We will be happy to give it now. It is up to the chairman.

Mr. FLOOD. One of the most frustrating things Mr. Ford and I experience, and the committee, with all Government agencies, but since the Department of Defense is our private pigeon, and quite a lusty bird, you people come up here, and by you people I mean your whole outfit, not just General Friedman, year after year with new presentations upon a new thing. After all these years, we are going to save so many bodies, and so much money and hardware and is not this wonderful, and you will sit back waiting for us all to come around and pat you on the head.

Of course, our first reaction is, What have you been waiting for? This has been going on for years. It suddenly dawns on you in the same shop with the same people, all of a sudden you are going to save X million dollars and Y bodies, is that not wonderful? It certainly is. But what in the world held you up all this time?

General FRIEDMAN. I think it can be explained, Mr. Flood, to your satisfaction.

Mr. FLOOD. I would not add that. You spoil the whole show if you do that.

Mr. ANDREWS. And each year the budget increases.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes. Even General Friedman gets a glint in his eye on occasion. It is like a little girl standing out on the end of the

diving board after all the big people have been diving and she says, "Oh, my, look at me, Mother." It is that kind of thing. It is a nice thing, but why 10 years late?

That goes through our minds here all the time.

General FRIEDMAN. I certainly can understand why the question would arise in your mind. There is an explanation.

F-106 FIRE-CONTROL SYSTEM

Mr. FLOOD. Period. This is something I did not know too much about.

You make a point about the F-106 fire-control emergency-and so on-what happened to the F-106 fire controls that makes an emergency? What accidents did it produce? What was the property damage? Any casualties?

What is this all about? The F-106-is something the matter with that one?

General AGEE. I do not think there is anything the matter with it we are not on the way to correcting. When it was initially introduced into the operational forces the fire-control system did give us some trouble. It is a very complex system, and it was necessary to devote considerable close attention to it to determine exactly what the fix should be.

General Bennett had traveling teams that visited each operational unit.

Mr. FLOOD. What I mean is this-we watched this Century class come in. I have flown in every one from the first Century right on up. Why would we have, with all our production and all our inspection and with all the Air Force know-how unequaled with these birds, a problem, with our production and inspection system turning these crates over to troops that there would be developed after all that procedure, which is fantastic, a major problem with the very reason for the existence of the system-fire control?

General AGEE. I think the only answer I can give you, Mr. Flood, is that the fire-control system on the F-106, which is allied with the navigation system, is a very, very complex thing.

Mr. FLOOD. I am sure of that. That is like the newspaper reporter that the Chicago paper sent to the fire at San Francisco. They heard nothing from him for 3 days. They got him on the phone and said "Where is the story?" He said, "Everything is confusion, and there is tremendous excitement." He forgot to write the story.

Mr. ANDREWS. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. FLOOD. Put something in about the F-106.

General FRIEDMAN. I would like to make one comment.

We would like to see everything work perfectly. I think until you get the thing out and used by troops under hard field conditions, you are going to have bugs in these things. This even happens in the automobile industry. They turn out some lemons, and they have

Mr. FLOOD. That is no analogy to a complex thing like F-106. General FRIEDMAN. I think it makes the point. We have been building automobiles for a long time, and you still have trouble. Mr. ANDREWS. You may comment for the record at this point. General FRIEDMAN. I will.

(The information to be supplied follows :)

F-106 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM

The F-106 configuration includes an airborne weapons control system to automatically integrate all aircraft responses without assistance from the pilot. The only system available for installation in the F-106 was the Hughes MA-1 AWICS (airborne weapons integrated control system). This system accomplishes and combines the following functions:

(a) Provides power for all subsystems.

(b) Provides communication, navigation, and landing information to pilot.

(c) Incorporates all radar.

(d) Prepares, sequences, and launches armament automatically.
(e) Links ground control intercept and SAGE with weapon system.

(f) Computer and flight control systems process all data, furnish climb rates, cruise, tracks, and guides system to attack without pilot assistance. Due to the urgency of the air defense requirement the MA-1 system was selected for installation in the F-106 prior to completion of the flight test program. The MA-1 was ordered into production and final test evaluations were completed. Testing revealed that system failures were unacceptable for an effective defense system. Reliability improvements were made as the MA-1 system production progressed. Upon completion of production several different configurations had been placed in operation within the Air Force. These different configurations created logistic problems especially in the areas of maintenance, supply, and ground support equipment. Earlier systems continued to fail at an unacceptable rate. To increase the effectiveness of the F-106 aircraft, a modification project known as "Wild Goose" was approved in February 1960. Following completion of engineering and work specifications the modification project began in September 1960. The work involves the modification of 190 "black boxes" per aircraft. The objective of this project is to bring about a gradual standardization in configuration and to improve performance reliability.

COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT, FLYING HOURS, AND FUEL COSTS,

JET AND CONVENTIONAL MISSION SUPPORT PROGRAMS

Mr. FLOOD. On these missions again, you devoted several pages to support missions and how you cut down from the conventional aircraft in the number of hours flown, the number of aircraft and everything, but then you make quite a point on the other page about the use of jets. Of course that means the whole thing is going to cost more anyhow. You did not give me any cost chart. All you talked about was hours and aircraft. You gave no tabulation on how the introduction of jets into mission support is appreciably costlier than the use of conventional aircraft, reciprocating engines in mission support. You say nothing about the cost of this change.

Mr. ANDREWs. Put a statement about that in the record.
General FRIEDMAN. I will.

(The information to be supplied follows:)

BUDGET PROGRAM 410-AIRCRAFT FUEL AND OIL COSTS OF JET AND CONVENTIONAL MISSION SUPPORT FLYING HOURS

Introduction of jet aircraft into the mission support aircraft inventory originally caused significant increases in the average per hour cost for mission support flying. However, as indicated in the accompanying table, these cost changes are not large during the fiscal years 1960 and 1962 time period. It should be noted that the average costs shown for jet aircraft in fiscal years 1961 and 1962 would have been approximately 6 percent higher except for a jet fuel price reduction effective April 1, 1960.