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The decrease in CONAC costs from fiscal year 1961 to fiscal year 1962 is due to the closing of Mitchel Air Force Base.

The decrease in CONAC costs from the fiscal year 1961 budget to the current fiscal year 1961 financial plan is due to the transfer of various functions to other commands incident to the Reserve reorganization, i.e., supervision of Reserve training was transferred to using commands such as TAC and MATS; various non-Reserve functions were transferred to other commands.

The increase from fiscal year 1961 to fiscal year 1962 for depot maintenance of aircraft is due to the Reserves receipt of C-124 aircraft which are more expensive than the C-119 to maintain.

Mr. Sikes. Please answer this question for me.

Does not the new Air Force management sytem, which division is the Continental Air Command of the logistical support except for the Air Force Reserve, allow you now to effect a separate 0. & M. budget for this component similar to that for the Air National Guard ?

I ask the question because I have heard strong opinion voiced in favor of this type of action. Basically then my question is, does the Air Force Reserve get proper and firm support in the 0. & M. area?

General FRIEDMAN. Mr. Sikes, I believe the answer to your last question is “Yes,” in our opinion.

As I recall, there is something like $90 million-$90.5 millionwhich is allocated for support of the Air Force Reserve.

Now, in response to the previous question, can this be set aside, shall we say in a separate appropriation for purposes of financing the Reserve as we do in the Air National Guard ? The answer is obviously “Yes,” this can be done. However, I am not altogether too sure that this would serve to the best advantage of the Reserve.

I say this since that set-aside would represent, relatively speaking, in terms of a $1 billion 0. & M. appropriation, a small amount of appropriation which would preclude the kind of flexibility that you could get to meet new programs, expansions, requirements which could be provided under a $4 billion appropriation, but which could not be provided within an amount of $90 million.

Not that I would expect any major gyrations, but there you have the advantages and disadvantages.

I have gone through this with the Reserve people, the Reserve Board, and there is a feeling that if they were to have their own money it would generate a feeling of responsibility, and thus produce a better program. I am not going to argue against that. *All I say is, we should take a real hard look at this because it is not all yes and all no.

Mr. Flood. When General Wilson was up here, we got the impression the Regular Air Force was a mere appendage.

Mr. RHODES. In furtherance of General Friedman's statement, 1961 provides a good example.

During about the second quarter of the fiscal year, the Air Staff approved an increased ratio for Reserve troop carrier wings, and by reprograming we were able to accommodate them with the additional flying hours. I think that is what General Friedman was talking about.

If we had not had the flexibility, we might not have been able to do it.


Mr. SIKES. Tell me,I am interested in your funding for the Reserve troop carrier squadrons to be furnished with C-124 aircraft to replace the C-119's as announced in the Air Reserve's magazine recently.

Why are they being furnished only 8 planes per squadron whereas Regular units are assigned 12?

General FRIEDMAN. General Agee can provide the answer.

General Ages. The C-124 airplane, Mr. Sikes, has a cargo capacity, compared with the C-119, of about 3 to 1. We are using 2 to 1. So in actual fact, we come up with a cargo capacity that is at least equal to the C-119 capacity.

Mr. Sikes. Why are the Reserve units getting only 8 planes per squadron where the Regular units are getting 12?

General AGEE. I think the answer lies in the program requirement for that kind of airlift. We can satisfy it at the moment with this conversion rate,

Mr. Sikes. Is it primarily a matter of a lack of adequate number of aircraft?

Would you supply the Reserve units with the full quota of 12 if you had them?

General AGEE. We could. There are two things that are constant. One is the Air Force Reserve squadron program which remains at 45, 3 are C-123 squadrons at the moment.

Now, the number of C-124's available for the conversion, is also fixed. If

you convert at the rate of 12, you will convert less squadrons. The answer, however, is “Yes, we could.

Our plan is to convert initially at the rate of eight. When we consider the 1963 budget, we will take another look at the requirement and consider converting from then on at 12, and even going back to pick up the first ones already converted.


Mr. Sikes. If 12 C-124's were consigned to the Reserve squadrons, I would like to know what increase in appropriations would be required to do this, and also to maintain the current unit strength of the remaining C-119 squadrons. That answer you can provide for the record.

General AGEE. Yes.
(The information to be supplied follows:)

ADDITIONAL C-124 AIRCRAFT FOR AIR FORCE RESERVE SQUADRONS If 12 C-124's were consigned to the Air Force Reserve troop carrier squadrons, instead of 8 C-124's, and at the same time maintain the current unit strength of the remaining C-119 squadrons, the estimated added costs for aircraft fuel and oil, depot maintenance, and spare parts would be: Fiscal year 1962.

$1, 141, 000 Fiscal year 1963.

2, 640, 000 Fiscal year 1964.

2, 966, 000 Fiscal year 1965.

3, 625, 000 Fiscal year 1966.

4, 429, 000 There would also be possible cost increases for items such as ramp construction and pay of Reserve technicians, but the computation of these costs entails the selection of specific locations where augmentation of resources would be

required. However, all squadrons would be located, to the greatest extent possible, at installations having parking ramp facilities to accommodate 12 C-124 aircraft. The possible dollar impact generated by Reserve technicians can best be estimated after adequate operational experience has been accumulated.


Mr. Sikes. Will you tell me what is the aircraft inventory picture which you anticipate beyond 1962?

You have shown a rather substantial decrease in the number of aircraft in recent fiscal years. What is it going to look like in the period 1963, 1964, 1965, and on up to 1970 !

Is that decrease going to continue?
General FRIEDMAN. In manned squadrons, the answer is yes,

sir. Mr. Sikes. Do you have a projected picture of the number of aircraft and the number of squadrons we are going to have subsequent to fiscal year 1962?

General FRIEDMAN. I believe I can give you that.
Mr. Sikes. Will you provide it for the record ?
General FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. Sikes. Now, you are coming down in the number of aircraft and the number of squadrons.

General FRIEDMAN. I can give you that now.
I am talking about aircraft forces.

In 1962, aircraft squadrons, 264; 1963, 252; and 1964, 235; and 1965, 211.

That is the current plan. If there is any major change as regards more emphasis on the limited war aspects, this picture could change. That is generally our present thinking through 1965.

Mr. SIKES. Will you provide for the record something on the number of aircraft associated with that picture?

General FRIEDMAN. Yes.
(The information to be supplied follows:)


Listed below are the numbers of active combat aircraft associated with the programed number of squadrons under discussion and the numbers of aircraft for combat support units, training and mission support activities which also are included in the total active aircraft inventory.

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Mr. Sikes. What is going to be your base picture?

Will the number of bases that you operate continue to drop as the number of aircraft and the number of squadrons are reduced?

General FRIEDMAN. Not necessarily on the basis of the reductions in the combat units which I specified here because we would hope concurrently there would be a buildup in the missile area.

There is a special reappraisal being made of the base picture now under the cognizance of Secretary Morris, Office of Secretary of Defense, and I do not know what will evolve from that "look-see."

Mr. SIKES. Does that mean there is no firm picture at the moment?

General FRIEDMAN. If there is anything less firm in Air Force forecasting than the installations outlook, I really do not know what it is.


Mr. SIKES. What use do you have for the KC-97's when you are able to replace them in SAC units with the KC-135 jet tanker?

General AGEE. I believe the KC-97 would be available for increased airlift.

Mr. SIKES. It is not a very good plane for airlift requirements, but it is better than nothing, which means it will be very useful for a while.

Do you anticipate that most of them will be used for this purpose ?

General FRIEDMAN. I think a certain number of these are going to the guard.

General AGEE. A great number are in the Guard.

Mr. Sikes. Will be used for airlift cargo requirement; is that correct?

General FRIEDMAN. I believe that is correct.

Mr. SIKES. How many useful years are left in most of the KC-97's which will be phased out of SAC requirements !

General FRIEDMAN. That would be hard to predict, Mr. Sikes. We have had the C-47's for years, and as we pass them down into what we call the second-line usage, and as long as the requirement existed for that type of mission, they would remain there as such; or to the length of time that other aircraft would phase down from the firstline inventory, when we would replace them.

Mr. SIKES. Are the cost problems in connection with maintenance and operation of a KC-97 such that you would want to keep it in the inventory as long as you can find a use for it?

General FRIEDMAN. I think the answer would be "No." As the aircraft years stretch out, spares become a problem. You have to maintain a source for those spares. Unless


do increase the numbers and types of aircraft in the inventory, it can become an expensive proposition.

Mr. SIKES. I am thinking now of the C-47, one of the most useful planes ever built. I am wondering if in any sense the KC-97 would have a similar status in the Air Force than its capability to haul cargo or participate in airlift.

General AGEE. I think it would depend entirely on the requirement, Mr. Sikes.

General BENNETT. From a maintenance point of view, I do not believe we would have available to us the same magnitude of spare parts for the KC-97 as we have had for a commercial-type aircraft like the Gooney Bird or the C-47.

Mr. Sikes. This is not something we can anticipate is going to be with us years and years. It is going to have a place for the immediate future, but there is a feeling it is not the plane you want to keep in the inventory as long as you can keep them flying? General BENNETT. Yes, sir.

67438—61-pt. 2-53

General AGEE. You are aware that the Air National Guard has been provided with six squadrons of C-97's, and they are programed for additional?

Mr. SIKES. Yes.

General SPICER. To show the availability of aircraft, of the approximately 600 KC-97's, tanker configuration, in the regular estabÎishment, we are forecasting only about 150, not including command support, for use in the Guard. A few will be configured as tankers; the balance-the preponderance--in the cargo version.

Mr. Sikes. Thank you very much.

If there is anything you want to add to any of these responses, I wish you would see that we get a picture of the future.


I was interested in the fact, in your statement, the manned bomber force is going to be important a long time. You went a number of years into the future. I happen to share that feeling.

How far in advance do you project this feeling that the manned bomber force is going to be a very important part of our defense system?

General AGEE. I think into the indefinite future.
Mr. SIKES. Beyond 1970?
General AGEE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sikes. With current-type aircraft?

General AGEE. Well, I think the B-52 aircraft will surely be with us through the 1960's in any case, possibly longer than that, I do not know. The requirement for manned bombers goes beyond the lifespan of the B-52's.


Mr. Sikes. I hear a great deal about the difficulty of maintaining enough operational missiles to do the required job in case of an emergency. In other words, these missiles are ticklish birds; they have to be petted and pampered and groomed and babied.

If anybody pushes the panic button and we have to get a lot of missiles underway, are we going to find most of them balky and not in a position to be fired, or do you think most of them are going to be ready to go?

General FRIEDMAN. We are certainly attempting to build that kind of reliability into the missiles.

Mr. SIKES. Do you have any misgivings about it? I know you are attempting to do it.

General FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I think the people who are responsible for this program have a great deal of confidence in it.

Personally, I can only rest on their technical judgment. They must "work” because that is the direction we are going. I know of no reason why they should not.

Mr. Flood. I think Mr. Sikes, who is an old Army man, is afraid of the experience the Army has had in every war, and the Navy has had in every war, and we are thinking of what happened to the 16-inch Navy shells that just did not perform. There are long, sad stories of mortar shells and long-range 16-inch shells, shells of all kinds that when the pistol went off and the Navy fired them and the

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