At the left of the table you see the average number of students in training for fiscal years 1960, 1961, and 1962. To the right you see the funds apportioned or requested for these 3 years. These figures are, of course, directly related. The downward trend in the total of average students in training reflects the downward trend in rated officer requirements due to our decreasing force structure of manned aircraft. This downward trend is matched by a corresponding decrease in dollar requirements.

The factors controlling the magnitude of the student training program for fiscal year 1962 are essentially the same as in prior years. The program is the product of straightforward computations involving number of students, flying hours for each student, and the POL cost per flying hour.

I will now discuss the mission support activity.

MISSION SUPPORT

In the past years, the mission support flying hour program for the Air Force has been subjected to close and critical scrutiny by the Air Force, DOD, BOB, GÃO, and by this committee. It has been discussed with you at some length during previous hearings. The fact that it represents less than 10 percent of the overall P-410 flying hour cost belies its importance and continued essentiality. Because of this importance, I will discuss it at some length.

EXPLANATION OF MISSION SUPPORT FLYING

Mission support flying is that flying done in aircraft assigned to major installations and major command headquarters against specific mission support requirements. These include: transportation of personnel and equipment in unit exercises, instrument training for fighter pilots, the movement of personnel and critical parts and supplies, target simulators for intercept training, missile site support, missile and rocket range surveillance, local search and rescue, flight checks of radar and navigation aids, mail and supply of outposts, accident investigations, inspections, staff supervision, conferences, pilot proficiency, navigator and observer proficiency, weather observation, humanitarian missions, courier missions, support of MAAG's, attachés and other Government agencies, and certain classified missions essential to national defense. Mission support flights provide the capability for filling unexpected gaps in supply and maintenance processes and finally for quick response to problems arising in performance of all basic command and management functions: planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and correcting. Any given flight, including proficiency flights, usually involves the accomplishment of several tasks pertaining to different functional areas, all of which insure performance of the primary mission of the base or unit of aircraft assignment.

MISSION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

In an earlier table, I showed that between fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1961 the mission support flying hour program decreased. There is no reduction programed between 1961 and 1962, even though decreases occur in the tactical and student training portions of the

program.

Overall mission support flying requirements will not decrease because of a decrease in the manned force structure. The increase in dispersed missile sites alone has already added to our mission support flying hour requirements and will generate additional requirements with the continued rapid expansion of our missile capability. During this fiscal year, the commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command has expressed concern at the lack of adequate mission support aircraft and flying hours to support his tactical units. In the first quarter SAC requested 43 additional mission support aircraft and 58,000 additional hours to accommodate increased requirements generated by unit dispersal and airlift support for missile site location, activation, and operation. We know that these requirements will increase in the future.

The Air Force is required to administer and support some 230 major installations, worldwide, plus an additional 3,600 minor installations and facilities such as missile sites, radar sites, relay stations, test sites, air attachés, and overseas MAAG's and missions. Many of these facilities are in remote areas and locations. All remote installations and facilities require supervision; troops stationed there must be paid; emergency logistics support and medical attention are required along with inspection trips and rotation of personnel. In brief, our base structure is large, complex, and dispersed. The administration, supervision, control, and support of this kind of complex are major reasons for maintaining the mission support flying hour program at the fiscal year 1961 level. We are making the maximum use practicable of all mission support aircraft and flying hours, including those allocated for proficiency flying, to meet these requirements. I should emphasize that none of the 3,600 minor installations I have mentioned are colocated with major installations. They are all separate facilities.

The MINUTEMAN missile complex at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., now under construction, is a good example of increasing current and future requirements. The missile wing commander at Malmstrom will be responsible for the 24-hour-a-day peak readiness status of a ballistics missile wing. His communications, administration, and supply problems will be difficult under the best conditions. He will rely on surface transportation to the maximum extent. But in order to avoid unacceptable delays in reaction time, he will have to have mission support aircraft and flying hours. It is imperative that he, or his staff, or his launch control center commanders, be able to get to the individual sites on short notice. The problems associated with nuclear safety, missile component malfunction, missile site security, rotation of personnel, emergency medical treatment, and emergency supply support will require the frequent unscheduled movement of people and things to and from the headquarters, launch control centers, and sites.

CRITICISM OF THE MISSION SUPPORT PROGRAM

Past criticism of the mission support program has been directed primarily toward the management and control of mission support flying and the number of pilots required to maintain flying proficiency. It has been said, for example, that flight records did not clearly specify the purpose of each flight; that management at base level did not insure economy and efficiency in the utilization of mission support aircraft; that on some occasions these aircraft were used

for what appeared to be personal convenience as opposed to valid mission support; and that many pilots are required to continue on flying status after their usefulness in rated skills apparently has passed.

I assure you and the members of this committee that the Air Force continues to take these criticisms to heart. The reduction in our inventory of rated personnel, without unacceptable adverse effects, has been, and is, one of our major problems. It has been frankly and openly discussed in past years by key Air Force officers before committees and subcommittees of the Congress. Let me tell you what is being done to improve the management and control of mission support aircraft and to reduce the rated personnel inventory.

IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF MISSION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

As you know, the Air Force has been steadily reducing the mission support aircraft inventory for the past several years. At the end of fiscal year 1958 for example, we had more than 3,800 mission support aircraft. By end fiscal year 1959 this had been reduced to 3,576 aircraft. In January 1960, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, a board of nine general officers was appointed for the specific purpose of reviewing each major command's stated minimum requirements for mission support aircraft and recommending further reductions. As a result of the board's recommendations the reduction of mission support aircraft was further accelerated. For example, in late calendar year 1959, when members of your staff looked closely at our mission support activities, we had 3,312 aircraft assigned to this activity. As you saw on an earlier table, this figure will be reduced by some 520 additional aircraft by the end of fiscal year 1962. These figures represent a reduction of nearly 1,000 mission support aircraft in a 4-year period. In fiscal year 1961, we began operating under a self-imposed ceiling of 1.6 million flying hours for mission support. This voluntary reduction in flying hours and aircraft was achieved through improved management and better utilization of the remaining aircraft assigned to these activities.

In the past 2 years we have fully implemented the single manager system at base level for virtually all mission support flying activities. This means that all mission support aircraft at any one base, regardless of the command to be supported, are pooled, scheduled, and dispatched by the host base. Tenant organizations of other commands no longer control mission support aircraft provided for their support. They must submit and justify their requirements to the single manager. The base commander, as the single manager, is charged with preventing abuses and assuring the most economical and efficient utilization of the aircraft. We are continuing inspection of flying installations to assure that current directives are being complied with and that good management practices are in effect.

New reporting procedures have been instituted which provide greater detail as to the exact use and primary purpose of each mission support flight. For instance, we formerly recorded only three broad categories of mission suport flying. Under our new procedures, we have broken these down into eight specific mission classifications. Each classification has been assigned a reporting code permitting us to determine the primary purpose of each mission support flight.

67438-61-pt. 2—51

Over a period of time they will provide data for accurately assessing our overall mission support activities. We will be able to monitor the program more closely and to evaluate new requirements and allocate mission support aircraft and flying hours with greater certainty than in the past.

PROFICIENCY FLYING

The final point I want to discuss in this area of mission support is proficiency flying.

You have already heard from General Ligon's testimony the actions taken by the Air Force to bring the rated inventory in alinement with changing requirements. He has discussed with you the Air Force intent to reduce the rated inventory further through existing authority and procedures and he has asked your support for legislation to provide appropriate financial relief for those removed from flying status. Assuming a reduction in the rated inventory, through some type of requital pay legislation, the skills of those remaining on full flight status must still be preserved.

As rated personnel rotate from cockpit jobs they will be capable of effectively monitoring, supervising, and controlling flying activities. Under these circumstances, they must be thoroughly familiar with the activities in which they are required to make decisions and plans. In general, they will provide us with a most valuable asset: strength in depth in our inventory of skilled rated personnel. The maintenance of such a reserve will continue to require the allocation of proficiency aircraft and flying hours.

It is my opinion that a further reduction in our overall mission support capability cannot be effected without denying essential support to our combined missile and aircraft combat units and to an essential reserve of rated personnel. The savings we achieve in fiscal year 1962 through the currently programed reduction in the rated inventory have been applied to the increasing hard core mission support requirements. It is for this reason that we are holding to the fiscal year 1961 level of 1.6 million mission support flying hours. In summary, then, I feel that the Air Force has been responsive to past criticisms of our mission support activities. We have effected sizable reductions in both aircraft and flying hours. Management of the mission support fleet has been tightened and improved. A revised reporting system assures us of more timely and detailed information on the utilization of these aircraft. The number of active rated personnel is being reduced. Approval of the requital pay legislation sponsored by the Department of Defense will allow us to make any required reductions in an orderly manner while minimizing the serious adverse effects of such action.

TACTICAL FORCES

I will turn now to the tactical portion of the flying hour program which provides for the flying activities of our combat or strike forces, and for the units providing direct support of these forces, such as troop carrier and tanker aircraft. These forces are employed in three primary mission areas: air defense, tactical, and stategic. I am happy to report that their overall progress has been most satisfactory. It

is essential that the personnel who man these tactical forces continue to maintain the highest possible state of readiness.

AIR DEFENSE

During calendar year 1960, despite overall force structure reductions, the readiness status of our fighter-interceptor units has continued to improve. The number of aircraft in the Zone of Interior on 5- and 15-minute alert status has increased by 18 percent. Increased capability to generate flying hours in our F-101B and F-102 aircraft has resulted in overall increased crew readiness and a 6 percent increase in the number of combat ready crews. Modernization of the manned air defense force is continuing. The number of F-101B squadrons has been increased by 112 percent and the number of F-106 squadrons by 180 percent. During the same period we phased out all F-86 and F-104 squadrons. There has also been a net reduction of two F-102 squadrons and the F-89 inventory has been reduced to a single squadron.

TACTICAL AIR FORCES

I will now discuss the area of our tactical flying requirements involving the combat and troop carrier units of the Tactical Air Command and our theater Air Forces in Europe and the Pacific.

Substantial progress has been made in tactical forces worldwide in the past year. We have begun conversion to the new F-105D aircraft. Individual units will be temporarily degraded for a short period of time, but the overall effectiveness of the tactical forces will be increased by the introduction of this aircraft. It will give the tactical fighter units an increase in speed and range over the aircraft they are replacing.

In addition to the increased capability of tactical fighter units, the introduction of the GAM-83 tactical air-to-ground missile will further increase the effectiveness of these units. This is a remarkably accurate weapon particularly suited to support of ground forces. In addition to this new weapon, we have developed new delivery techniques for nuclear weapons which will assure greater accuracy and increased effectiveness for a given yield. I am sure you realize that all our tactical fighters and bombers are capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear weapons. All are suitable for any size war. The flexibility of these forces is enhanced by increased mobility. All of our tactical fighter and support units are capable of rapid deployment to oversea areas. Intercontinental flights by fighter aircraft have become commonplace. Each month there is a rotation of one TAC Fighter Squadron to Europe. In addition, mobility exercises assure us of the capability for rapid oversea deployment of composite air strike forces (CASF). Last September, for example, TAC deployed 67 combat and support aircraft to USAFE to participate in a joint NATO exercise. In November, a 120 aircraft task force deployed to USAFE in exercise "Jack High."

Flying time for exercise and mobility training of this type is included in our fiscal year 1962 program. A number of oversea deployment exercises are planned including "no notice" exercises. These will be in addition to the monthly rotation of a tactical squadron to Europe.