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General DUFF, Very well, Mr. Whitten.

Mr. FORD, I know earlier it was mentioned there had been a great delay in people being able to be served, et cetera. Include whatever justification along that line is pertinent for the record.

General DUFF. We will include it, Mr. Ford. (The information requested is as follows:) Headquarters, U.S. European Command, as the Joint U.S. Military Command Headquarters in Europe, is frequently visited by governmental and military dignitaries from the United States and other nations. Large luncheons, of ficial receptions, and ceremonial luncheon for those visits must be handled effectively. Probably more important, an attractive and efficient messing and social facility should be available to the resident officers, their families, and their guests. The only facility available at present for these activities is the old officers open mess building which is inadequate, poorly arranged, and has an absolutely unsanitary and inefficient kitchen, badly needing rehabilitation, This kitchen has a history of an unsatisfactory medical inspection report, indicating a most unacceptable kitchen from a health standpoint. The present facility has always been unsatisfactory, has been a frequent source of criticism and justified complaints, and has resulted in personnel seeking other places for their private social activities on the French economy. If this open mess had been renovated as it was planned, it is considered that an attractive, efficient, and economical mess would have provided the necessary facilities which would elicit much greater usage of this facility than is presently made of it. Such increased usage definitely would have assisted in working toward the Presidential goal of decreasing dollar expenditures on the economy.

Mr. FORD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Minshall?
Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


I should like to have justification pages 214–215, for project 2240, inserted in the record as pertains to the reserve industrial facilities.

Mr. Mahon. It will be inserted at this point if it is not already in the record. (The pages referred to follow :)


2240 Reserve industries facilities Direct obligations :

Actual fiscal year 1960----

Fiscal year 1961.
Fiscal year 1962_

$47, 463, 725

42, 464, 000 42, 464, 000


Project 2240 provides for the maintenance and protection of the inactive portion of the Army's production base and for some support to active industrial installations operating under the Army industrial fund. The inactive portion of the production base consists of complete industrial plants, idle portions of active industrial plants, separate production lines, and separate items of industrial equipment which are stored either in Government-owned storage sites or in the plants of contractors. These facilities are being retained for use in an emergency to produce items or perform services which private industry is unable to produce or perform with its own facilities, or because Government ownership is essential for reasons of military necessity, security, or safety. The support to active industrial installations operating under the Army industrial fund consists primarily in maintenance of public housing and acquisition of nonproduction capital equipment, neither of which chargeable to the industrial fund.

A small amount of funds is also utilized for production support costs at Gov. ernment-owned and operated industrial installations operating at rates substantially below practical capacity.

Obligations for the activities funded under this project are as follows:

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Workload data for plant and equipment maintenance are contained in the following tabulation:

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Mr. MINSHALL. I should like to ask the general if he would explain to us very briefly the reserve industrial facilities, the type of reserve facilities that you have. The number, of course, is included in the justification.

General DUFF. Yes. I will ask Colonel Tolliver to cover this project.

Colonel TOLLIVER. Sir, we have a total of some 80 reserve industrial facilities which are controlled by the Army. Of these a total of 58, as shown on page 215 of the budget presentation, require the expenditure of appropriated funds to maintain. The difference between the 58 we are supporting with the funds herein requested and our total, assets of 80 plants are made up of plants which are excess, being supported by GSA, and plants that are under lease to private concerns or to Government agencies, thus relieving us of the cost of maintaining.

Mr. MINSHALL. The total cost of maintenance of these reserve facilities as shown on the justification on page 214 is $42,464,000; is that correct?

Colonel TOLLIVER. Yes, sir.


Mr. MINSHALL. Of these 80 plants, how many of them are completely buttoned up and how many of them are in partial or full production?

Colonel TOLLIVER. Of the 80, sir, there are 30 active, 34 inactive, and 16 in the process of being disposed of.

67438—61-pt. 2-416

Mr. MINSHALL. By being in the process of being disposed of, what do you mean?

Colonel TOLLIVER. I mean, sir, that the Army has declared them excess and in the case of 13 of the 16, this excess status has been reported to GSA. Three of the 16 we are yet in the process

Mr. MINSHALL. Do those particular plants fall into the particular category as to the type of manufacturing equipment available?

Colonel TOLLIVER. I do not have, sir, a list of the specific 16 plants declared excess. I will supply that for the record.

(The information is as follows:)

The list of 16 plants declared excess and the type of product each produced is as follows:

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Mr. MINSHALL. One portion of these standby plants I understand are for the tracked vehicle family; is that correct?

Colonel TOLLIVER. The great majority of the plants, sir, some 75 or 80 percent are in the munitions and chemical production area.

Mr. MINSHALL. I asked you about tracked vehicles. What plants are set aside for tracked vehicles?

Colonel TOLLIVER. There are 1 or 2 plants in our total inventory of 80 that relate to the small vehicle and track vehicle family.

Mr. MINSHALL. Aren't there more than that? Don't you have three? I am speaking specifically of the Detroit-Cleveland-Lima complex.

Colonel TOLLIVER. I would have to furnish the details of that, sir, for the record. We do have the Cleveland Ordnance Plant, which is inactive and the Lima Ordnance Modification Center, which is inactive.

(The information requested is as follows:) The Army has three Government-owned facilities, i.e., land, buildings, and integral equipment for the production of the track vehicle family. These are the Detroit Arsenal, the Lima Ordnance Modification Center, and the Cleveland Ordnance Plant.


Mr. MINSHALL. The reason I put this background information in the record, Mr. Chairman, is that in Cleveland, Ohio, to be exact, 13.6 miles from the city, we have what is known as the Cleveland Tank Plant. For the history of it for the committee, and I think I should

take time to give it to you. This is a tremendous bomber plant built during World War II. It covers 258 land acres. It has over 2,265,000 square feet of manufacturing space under one roof. This plant is part of the so-called Cleveland-Detroit-Lima tracked vehicle complex.

My interest in this plant is not a new one. My interest, active interest in it has been carried on ever since I was first elected to the Congress and came here in 1955, but I direct particularly my attention and interest to it in this respect.

Back in 1959 this plant, then employing many thousands of people, received word to button it up.

Mr. Mahon. When was that?

Mr. MINSHALL. Early in 1959. At that time it was making M-56, self-propelled 90-mm. guns. I believe I am correct on that.

Colonel TOLLIVER. I do not know, sir.

(The information follows:) In 1959 the Cleveland Ordnance Plant was producing the M-56 self-propelled 90 mm. gun.

Mr. MINSHALL. I believe that is the correct identification.

Since that time there have been many many promises on the part of the Army and many promises on the part of the Department of Defense to reactivate this plant.

Mr. Mahon. And promises to the city of Cleveland ?

Mr. MINSHALL. Promises to the city of Cleveland. Yes to the effect that they would turn it back so the taxpayers would not be burdened with the tremendous cost of maintaining this plant.

I might state at that point and put into the record that the cost of maintaining this plant is tremendous_$660,000 a year—just to keep this plant buttoned up.

Mr. Mahon. Do you have a breakdown of that?
Mr. MINSHALL. Yes, sir.
I should like to offer that for the record.

(The information follows:) Cleveland ordnance plant- Estimated maintenance costs on austere shutdown basis

(no activity or tenants)

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Total labor
Employee benefits.
Other expense..

Factory cost. G. & A. and profit.

Estimated selling price...

$30, 84"

4, 802


$370, 140

57, 625 72.000 72,000

6,000 24, 000

50, 147

601, 765
58, 235


660, 000

Mr. MINSHALL. The heating bill alone is $6,000 a month.
Mr. THOMAS. What is the plant being used for now, Mr. Minshall!
Mr. MINSHALL. Nothing except several small R. & D. projects.

Mr. THOMAS. I was there last October and as I remember there is some slight activity.

Mr. MINSHALL. There is a slight amount of activity over a few R. & D. contracts only employing a few hundred people in it. So much for the history of it. Time will not permit me to document the many, many times that I have called the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the many letters that I have had, the telephone calls, et cetera.

Mr. MAHON. I think this committee well knows of your very great interest in this matter and of the fact that you have pursued this situation over a period of years in an effort to secure the proper action with respect to the problem.

Mr. MINSHALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That I have done.

I might point out in that regard, as you well know, at my request the committee sent a staff member out there who personally spent 2 days on the scene, for an on-the-spot inspection of the plant last summer. I personally went out there last summer with Secretary Courtney Johnson. At that time we were promised some relief, perhaps within a matter of months. To bring the matter up to date the Department of the Army made a recommendation to the Department of Defense early this year or late last year as to putting the plant back in production. That decision was turned down by the Department of Defense. This was for some items that are in the 1962 budget, some T-195 howitzers, some T-196 howitzers, and I might add, there are some other units contemplated of a secret nature. The Department of Defense rejected the Army's proposal, saying it was not practical. In effect, they said, “We will give you 30 days to reach a decision rapidly so the public knows that the facility will be either used by the military or transferred to the municipal ownership for the overall good of the local and national economy.

The directive further stated :

The recommendation of the Army, for the manufacture, as it is contained in our present budget, is incomplete and not sufficiently comprehensive in order to come to a proper decision but for the best utilization of the plant. The Army has been asked to prepare additional data involving the entire program on combat vehicles so that a sound decision can be made to the best use of the Cleveland tank plant.

The requirements are for a 30-day reply to the recent Department of Defense directive.

In fairness to the new administration, the new Secretaries, and so forth, this report was due the 1st of February. I did not again pursue my request until mid-February in an effort to determine the new and ambitious plans for the tank plant.

At this time I should like to point out that in the present 1962 budget I understand it is proposed to keep the plant open with a minimum production order. These orders will necessarily be at rates below economical operation of the facility and thus entail excess cost per unit produced. I know that the Army has recently come forward with a more ambitious proposal. Can you tell me the Army's recommendations as to the use of the plant, items to be produced, quantities to be produced, date procurement awards are to be made, date production and quantity to start, et cetera?

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Discussion appears beginning on page 284.)

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