Mr. FORD. When do you expect your negotiations to result in action?

General KELLY. Immediately. We had a meeting last week of the CRAF operators at Scott, a very successful meeting.

Mr. FORD. Will you please notify the committee when this is finalized so that we can be assured that you are operating under these new ground rules?

General KELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Last year Mr. Ford developed this at some length, and that is all right. But what about the next part of it?

about the crews, what about Reserve commissions, organized labor contracts, and fiscal expenses? What about running this Air Force? Mr. Ford, or someone, spent a lot of time on that.

Do you not want to talk about that?

General KELLY. Yes, sir; I would love to talk about that, Mr. Flood.

Mr. FORD. First, may I ask this: Has the Department submitted the legislation that General Tunner said he thought was necessary in order to accomplish this?

General KELLY. I am not aware of the legislation having been submitted. I have talked with the General Counsel of the Air Force concerning this. We need legislation to make CRAF responsive. In our emergency in Lebanon and in our emergency in Formosa in 1958, they happened to come right during the tourist season. We had to operate emergency airlift and it had to be done without public knowledge, but we could not buy a seat because it was during the tourist season.

During this last exercise, we had all of our airplanes tied up and we had bought additional airlift, but we had the flight engineers' strike. So, we did not have crews even if we had the airplanes. Only one of our CRAF operators-and we are urging all of themhave a contract with the union that they will not strike against a MATS contract. Pan American had that contract and, so, during this flight engineers' strike, Pan American continued to operate for us.

We definitely need to do something about the crews' responsiveness, not only to make them responsive, but to protect them. We cannot send a crew that has no rights under the Geneva Conference or no insurance, no pension and no nothing into a combat area.

Mr. FORD. If this is so essential and so vital to the proper operation of MATS and the CRAF fleet, it is beyond my comprehension as to why the Air Force has not come up with a legislative proposal that will remedy the situation.

General FRIEDMAN. I understand that the Office of the Secretary of Defense did submit legislation relative to expansion of the seizure power to the Bureau of the Budget. We are not aware of its status after that point.

Mr. MINSHALL. Would you need legislation? Why could you not make it mandatory in your agreement with the CRAF people that they will not strike against MATS?

General KELLY. It goes beyond their striking. We can grab the airplanes, but if the crews refuse to fly, you cannot order one of these crews to fly into Laos. If he is a Reserve officer or if he has some other responsibility, then you can; you can militarize them, but the minute I mention militarizing these crews, I am out of business. Mr. FORD. Just one more question:

CAB MILEAGE RATES

You indicated this morning that under the CAB regulation you had to pay 2.9 per passenger-mile. Is this across the board for any and all equipment for which you contract?

General KELLY. That is correct.

Mr. FORD. You are not given any flexibility as to the type of aircraft that you can get?

General KELLY. No, sir; none.

Mr. FORD. You pay the same price for a 707 as you do for a DC-4? General KELLY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FORD. What causes that? I mean do you not have authority legislatively speaking to make a different arrangement?

General KELLY. I have the authority to award the contract, and I have done it, at a price less than that, but the CAB refuses to allow that airline to fly. That airline must get an exemption from the CAB in order to fly at that rate.

Mr. FORD. Something is wrong. I do not know just what the solution is, but if you have authority

General KELLY. We have appealed to the CAB and we have written a series of letters, and I have met with everyone under the sun and it still stands.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Ford, why do we not ask that this Subcommittee of Defense Appropriations, and ask our chairman-because this is a silly situation-to address a communication to the CAB, since they got into this somehow and we have a right to talk to them and ask them what under the sun is the position here?

Mr. FORD. I am not opposed to your utilizing in fact, I think it makes some sense-commercial air services, but I do not see how it can be justified that you pay the same price for a DC-4 that you pay for a 707.

General KELLY. I agree with you and could not agree with you more, but that is the situation I find myself in.

Mr. MAHON. Without objection, we will address a communication to the CAB and ask for an explanation of this matter and, if necessary, ask for a witness from the CAB to appear in connection with the problem.

Mr. FORD. These rates do not make sense.

Mr. FLOOD. And, Mr. Chairman, if you would be good enough to send a copy of that, or a similar original communication, to Mr. Thomas of Texas, who fortunately, is chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices and has jurisdiction over CAB, it would be helpful.

Mr. MAHON. That will be done.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I have just one or two questions:

AIRCRAFT TRANSFERRED TO RESERVE FORCES

General, you are transferring some C-121's to the Reserve, I understand. Do you know how many there are?

General KELLY. They are C-124's.

Mr. MINSHALL. Are not they the Lockheed Constellations?
General KELLY. No, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. You are not transferring any C-121's?

General KELLY. Not at the present time.

Mr. MINSHALL. Do you have such transfer contemplated for the future?

General KELLY. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. MINSHALL. When is that going to take place?

General KELLY. That will start in fiscal 1963.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is a regular 66-passenger airliner configuration; is it not?

General KELLY. They are in a cargo configuration. We can put troops in them, but these are principally cargo aircraft.

Mr. MINSHALL. How are the Reserves going to use them? Will they use them as a subsidiary or domestic airline?

General KELLY. No, sir; they will use them in troop lift and also in augmentation of MATS in case of emergency.

Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to proceed some further. Because of the time limit this morning, I put most of my questions in the record, but I would like to wrap them up.

You remember what I said, generally this morning, and most of the questions specifically you will see, but you know generally my point of view.

PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON AIRLIFT

Now, I began with a statement-I read to you the statement of the President in his inaugural address on this airlift matter.

General KELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. It excited me more than the Lebanon operation did. I did not write it for him and could not have written it better myself. The thing I want you to understand is that I am not against any plans that the Air Force has for buying any of these planes that we are talking about for the Air Force; not at all-that you have announced. But, I am concerned about this insistence of the President and myself as to what we mean by "now." This is where the whole trouble is. That word "now" does not mean "mañana." They are different things. We have a problem, and so has he. I do not think this is going to be satisfied by the Air Force or the Department of Defense by putting out a press statement by the Secretary of the Air Force or by Mr. McNamara. That, actually, would not carry out what the President wants done anyway. These press statements are not going to do it, at least, not until the end of a second term, and that is no good.

Now, here is what I invite your comments about. I wrote these down during the lunch hour. When you were working, so was I. This is about what I mean, I think:

If the President is talking about insistence and I am talking about it-on this airlift now-"prompt results"-I want you to pry loose and convert at least 250 of these executive and special mission aircraft, if these are so important to national defense. I know where they are and you know where they are. They are four-motored jobs. Now, for you to tell me that these characters that have these fourmotored, executive-type aircraft have got to have them, is unadulterated bilge. It is nonsense. You need them a lot more than they do. Let us cut out this nonsense with these jokers. You need them,

and I want you to pry them loose, and I am sure when I get this information from the President, he will pry them loose, and I hope you will convert at least 250 of these executive aircraft and fix them up and make them available for yourself. That is a lot of airplanes when you need them. In view of what we have talked about today to make much more use of this civil fleet and the planes that are going to be delivered to the civil fleet, and of the inventory and information, do we have from all the civil commercial airlines a sufficient production? Do we know how many aircraft are going to be produced in the categories, types and kinds for all civil production? I am sure we have that information; I know we do. I want that to be the special pigeon of General Kelly and not anybody else. This is something that belongs to you. I have that in my book and I want to be sure Mr. Kennedy and Mr. McNamara know that and that these pigeons belong to Kelly, if and when he needs them, as they come off any line and any kind and nobody else, but nobody else gets them first.

SEAPLANE AIRLIFT

I want you to get seaplanes. I tried to find out at 1 o'clock what kind of inventory of seaplanes I have, and I am just right where I was in the 1902 strike in the coalfields: No place.

General KELLY. We have 104 in the Air Force.

Mr. FLOOD. Those, I know about. Those huge crates apparently are cracking up. The Mars, I think, we sold to Brazil to spray goats with. The three Princesses, the British tell me, are tied up over in Britain. I want you to get those three Princesses and buy them and put American propulsion into them and see if we can develop these Princess aircraft. I understand they are about the best and most available and most sensible stuff in existence. I am not talking about R. & D. I want the Air Force or the Navy to do R. & D. on naval aircraft. We have got to have them if we are going to fight any kind of war. If you fellows have to fly over Leopoldville and go back to Wheelus, because you cannot land or get in, I want somebody to put them down on the river on the next flight, or an hour later. What they do after that, I do not know.

I want you to get this inventory of Navy stuff out and put it to work for MATS. I have no desire to try to put the Navy back in business. I told Admiral somebody, whose name I do not remember, "Suppose I gave you 50 seaplanes? Would you use them?" He said, "No." That is the state of mind of the Navy. They are in great shape. They are worse off mentally than the Army.

WHITE-LEMNITZER AGREEMENT

I would like something on the record about this White-Lemnitzer agreement to change the Key West articles. I have heard barroom gossip about this for a year. These two fellows went to West Point. They sit down and have a talk and the whole thing is solved. I would like to know more about what is in it, if we can ascertain it.

General KELLY. We have it available and will submit it to the committee.

(The information is classified and has been furnished to the committee.)

Mr. FLOOD. I think we should have that, because I really do not know, except based upon the scuttlebutt, as to what is in it, and what

they tell us when they get up here. But, I want to know about this and I want you to indicate, as far as your protocol permits and good manners permit, how many meetings you had with these Army opposite numbers. This is no aspersion on the Air Force. This is not your business, fighting this kind of war.

people for the Army.

You are the traffic

I want to know how much General Decker has to do with this, how many of his people met with you, and who is buying them and designing them?

Is the Army getting what it wants, or do you have the veto and they get whatever you buy for them or give them?

WHITE-DECKER AGREEMENT

General KELLY. Mr. Flood, I was authorized by General White this noon to tell this committee that he and General Decker have come to an agreement which, of course, is subject to the Department of Defense, that he has squadrons and he will allow General Decker to pick the airplane to go in them.

Mr. FLOOD. Does General Decker know anything about this? What does he know about airplanes?

General KELLY. He has people who are studying this and, of course, this will be a joint Air Force-Army project, but General Decker and the Army will have the final say as to what aircraft go into these squadrons.

Mr. FLOOD. That is wonderful. I have been waiting years to have somebody tell me this.

It is all right for the Air Force to think they are nothing but busdrivers for the Army, but that is the way it is in this particular part of the game. That is not a nice way to say it, but you know what I mean. These are the fellows who have to fly these things and you have to get them there, but they have to be what they want.

General KELLY. I never go any place without calling on the customers, as I call them, of MATS.

Mr. FLOOD. That is good.

General KELLY. That is the Army, Navy, and I visit every commander all over the Pacific

Mr. FLOOD. Do the Marines get into this act?

General KELLY. They surely do.

Mr. FLOOD. They are pretty good, too.

General KELLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. And, all this stuff we are talking about-you talked about VTOL, choppers, vertical planes, or whatever you can land troops with.

General KELLY. We are talking about what the Army thinks it needs.

TRISERVICE VERTICAL TAKEOFF AND LANDING AIRCRAFT

General FRIEDMAN. And there is a triservice VTOL program. Mr. FLOOD. I know that, and I have had nothing but the lowest opinion of it, because I know the Army cannot open its mouth. They have been afraid to open their mouths for the last several years, and any Army man who did open his mouth got his head cut off, beginning with Generals Ridgway and Gavin.