procured for the Chinese government by Mr. Lay, which it was intended should be manned and officered by British sailors Anglo-Chinese fleet. under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn.

On the 28th of February, 1863, a letter was addressed to Mr. Lay, by Earl Russell's directions, requesting him to give the particulars of the vessels obtained by him for that purpose, and the information given by Mr. Lay was communicated to Mr. Adams, to whom it was likely to be of service in distinguishing the vessels really destined for the service of the Emperor of China from those reported to be so, as a pretext for other purposes connected with the confederate service.

On the arrival of the fleet in China, a difference arose with the Chinese government as to the terms on which the command of the fleet should be held, and Captain Osborn eventually declined the appointment.

Under these circumstances the British minister at Peking was of opinion-an opinion which was shared by his American colleaguesthat if the fleet was allowed to remain in the hands of the Chinese government, there was great danger of the vessels being bought for employment as confederate cruisers. It was therefore arranged that Captain Osborne should take back part of the fleet to Bombay and part to England, and there dispose of them for the Chinese government; and the vessels were brought back accordingly.

On hearing of this arrangement the British government gave orders that every precaution should be taken to prevent their passing into the hands of any belligerent power. The sale of one of the vessels at Bombay was stopped; but as she was merely an unarmed dispatchboat, the prohibition was subsequently removed. The other ships were held in the custody of the government, and the law-officers having advised that the sale within the British dominions of armed ships of war, already equipped for a different purpose, was not contrary to the foreign-enlistment act, the government determined upon taking upon themselves the responsibility of detaining them unsold. A committee was accordingly appointed to assess the values of the vessels, and the Chinese government were assured that they should not ultimately lose by any delay in the sale. Several overtures for the purchase of one or other of the ships fell through in consequence of the stringent nature of the guarantees required against their employment by belligerents, or from other causes; and they were in consequence not disposed of till after the close of the war. The delay and consequent deterioration of the vessels caused a loss of over £100,000, which was made good by the British government to that of China.

General result.

It thus appears that, during the whole course of the civil war, two ships only were built in Great Britain for, and actually employed in, the service of the confederates. Four others were intended to be built and equipped, but were arrested while in the course of construction. Four merchant-vessels, though not adapted for warlike purposes, were converted into vessels of war by having guns put on board, but out of the jurisdiction of the British government-two of them in confederate ports-and this by reason of the impossibility of getting ships of war built, owing to the active vigilance of the authorities. And it is upon this foundation that Great Britain is represented as having been "the navy-yard of the insurgent States," and that men who must be supposed to have a conscientious appreciation of what is just and right, accuse Earl Russell and Her Majesty's government of "a consistent course of partiality toward the insurgents," and of "a want of diligence bordering upon willful negligence."

Proceedings of

In the United States argument the proceedings of other governments are compared with those of Great Britain, to the other governments. disparagement of the latter. Thus, of Brazil, it is said: We beg leave to refer this high tribunal to the administrative regulations of the Brazilian Empire for the enforcement of neutrality in all the ports of the empire, in the amplest manner, by efficient action on the part of the imperial ministers, and of the provincial presidents.

Brazil.

In the American case, and the documents to which it refers, there is sufficient indication of the loyalty and efficiency with which the Brazilian government maintained its sovereignty against the aggressive efforts of the confederates.

After the correspondence which I have already inserted, I may very well say that not even with Her Majesty's government or officers did the correspondence of the United States Government assume so angry a tone as that which pervades the letters between the American minister and the Brazilian government.'

Portugal.

Portugal is referred to in the American argument in these terms: As to Portugal, we refer to the correspondence annexed to the American Counter Case, to show that she also never pretended that her neutral duty was confined to the execution of the provisions of her penal code. She also put forth the executive power of the Crown to prevent, repress, or repel aggressive acts of the confederates in violation of her hospitality, or in derogation of her sovereignty. Nay more, the government of Portugal, finding its own naval force inadequate to prevent the confederates from abusing the right of asylum in the Western Islands, expressly authorized the American Government to send a naval force there for the purpose of defeuding the sovereignty and executing the law of Portugal. On turning to the documents referred to, I find that Portugal did what, as a neutral power, it was bound to do, namely, interfere to prevent the Azores from being made a depot of munitions of war or coal for the confederate cruisers.

With reference to the authority given to the United States Government to send a naval force to the Azores, all that appears is, that when Mr. Harvey, the United States minister, informed the Viscount Sá da Bandeira, the minister for war, then acting as minister for foreign affairs, what was going on at the Azores, the minister said, "that the islands in question had been used and abused by corsairs and pirates during centuries; that they were exposed and unprotected, and therefore might be so employed again, and that the best plan would be to send a sufficient force there to protect American ships against threatened depredations, and to punish criminal offenders." In other words, the Americans were to take care of themselves. This is dignified by the name of "defending the sovereignty and executing the law of Portugal." I may add that when the confederate steamship Stonewall was at Lisbon she was allowed to supply herself with coal, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the American consul. In conformity with the general rule she was required to leave in twenty-four hours. The American argument informs us that

France.

When attempts were made by the confederates to construct and equip cruisers in the ports of France, on complaint being made by the minister of the United States, the construction of these vessels was arrested; and when a builder professed that vessels under construction, with suspicion of being intended for the confederates, were in fact intended for a neutral government, the French ministers required proof of such professed honest intention, and carefully watched these vessels to make sure that they should not go into the service of the confederates. On this point we quote the language of the minister of marine, as follows:

"The vesssels of war to which you have called our attention shall not leave the ports of France until it shall have been positively demonstrated that their destination does not affect the principles of neutrality, which the French government wishes to rigidly observe toward both belligerents."s

The documents annexed to the Counter Case of the United States do not contain more than a small selection of the correspondence relating to this subject, which is given in greater detail in the mémoire and documents submitted by the United States to the French courts of justice in the "Affaire Arman," documents which, to quote the words of the mémoire itself, "show most clearly the dangers to which M. Arman and his associates exposed the maintenance of peace between France and the United States."1

The suit in question was instituted in November, 1867, on the part of the United States against MM. Arman, Voruz, and others, for the recovery of moneys disbursed by Bullock, acting as agent of the Confederate States, for the construction of six vessels of war in France.

After explaining that the measures taken by the British government in respect of the seizure of both the Alexandra and Pampero, and the detention of the Birkenhead rams, had compelled the confederates “to seek in France the market they were losing on the other side of the channel," the mémoire proceeds to relate that their choice fell on M. Lucien Arman, (member for Bordeaux in the French legislative assembly,) "whose official position seemed calculated to secure greater freedom and certain impunity for the execution of these orders." An agreement was accordingly entered into with Arman by Bullock, who stated in the contract that with a view to establish regular communications by steam between Shanghai, Osaca, Yedo, and San Francisco, he wished to procure in France four steamers of great speed, fitted to carry from ten to twelve guns, for their protection in those distant parts."

Arman undertook to build two of these steamers in his own yards at Bordeaux, and sub-let the building of the other two to "another deputy of the corps législatif," M. Voruz, of Nantes. Besides these four steamers he further entered, on the 16th July, 1863, into a fresh agreement with Bullock "for two iron-clad steam-rams."

One difficulty had to be removed before the final ratification of these contracts, and that was the restriction placed by the royal ordinance of 1847 on the exportation of arms and munitions of war.

It has been already shown that this enactment had no reference to the special subject of neutrality, and simply formed part of that general legislation by which the state in France has frequently sought, in its own interest, to place restraints upon private commerce in articles of a warlike character. In the present instance, however, its practical effect was to interfere with the arming of the vessels. Accordingly, M. Arman applied to the government for permission to arm the four vessels, which were building ostensibly for service in the China Seas, and this was readily granted, on the faith of his assurance, by the Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, the minister of marine.

In the following September the knowledge of these facts was betrayed to Mr. Bigelow, then United States consul at Paris, by a clerk of M. Arman, who furnished him, at the same time, with the originals of the deeds drawn up between his employer and the confederate agent, Bullock, as well as of the correspondence exchanged between the parties, and other papers, which placed beyond possibility of doubt the existence of an intention on the part of Arman to violate the neutrality of France.

Mr. Dayton at once brought the matter under the notice of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, then minister for foreign affairs, and followed up his.

› Mémoire pour les États-Unis d'Amérique, p. 54.

Page 4.

Ibid., p. 6.

first representations with a formal demand, on the 22d September, that "the permission to arm the vessels should be withdrawn, the manufacture of the guns and shot suspended, and if already completed, that the delivery should be prevented." He called on the French government to take such steps as it might deem best calculated to stop the building or departure of the above-mentioned vessels."

Writing on the 9th October, to express his approval of the course adopted by Mr. Dayton, Mr. Secretary Seward says:

It is hardly necessary to inform you that the President awaits with much solicitude the decision of His Imperial Majesty's government upon the application you have made, and cannot but regard an adverse decision as pregnant with very serious consequences.

On the 1st of November Mr. Seward writes again to Mr. Dayton, expressing his disappointment at the indirect and inconclusive answer received from the French government, and relying on Mr. Dayton's endeavors to obtain a more satisfactory reply.

The minister of marine withdrew the permission to arm the vessels, but justified the course he had taken in granting it "on the builder's declaration." This measure, however, the memorial informs us, "did not put a stop to the construction or fitting out of the vessels," which Arman continued, possibly in the hope of disposing of them to the confederates; but this the measures taken by the French government prevented, except in the case of one of the steam rams building at Bordeaux.

The history of this vessel, originally known as the Sphinx may be thus summed up from the mémoire and correspondence annexed thereto :

The Stonewall.

On the 4th February, 1864, M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed Mr. Dayton that Arman had given him the most positive assurance that he had sold the two iron-clads, viz, the Sphinx and her sister-vessel, the Cheops, to the Danish government. Mr. Dayton made inquiries at Copenhagen, which resulted in a formal contradiction of the fact by the Danish minister for foreign affairs. M. Arman next represented to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had sold them to Sweden, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys repeated to Mr. Dayton, on the 7th of April, this new statement of Arman, (which, however, was almost immediately afterward contradicted by the Swedish foreign minister,) declaring himself "satisfied that the sale had been completed." Mr. Dayton did not place the same confidence in Arman's assertions, and continued, in obedience to the instructions of his Government, to make serious representations to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the rams. On the 8th June he writes to Mr. Seward:

I had already informed M. Dronyn de Lhuys of the very serious character of these questions, and the probable consequences which would result from the completion and delivery of these vessels to the confederates. I have, on all occasions, used strong language when applied to these questions. I told him to-day that, in expressing the views of the President on this subject, I could scarcely speak with the necessary earnestness and directness, without trenching on that respectful forbearance of language to which I desired at all times to limit myself in our official intercourse. I told him that should these vessels pass into the hands of the confederates, become armed and commence a system of depredation on our commerce, the exasperation would be such that the Government, if so disposed (which I did not intimate that it would be) could scarcely keep the peace between the two countries.

In the mean time, Arman had succeeded in defeating the vigilance of the French authorities in the following manner: In March, 1864, he

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward, April 7, 1864. 2 Mémoire, p. 28.

had concluded a contract of sale with the Danish government, then at war with the German Confederation, but the conditions of the contract not having been observed, the Danish officer, to whom the Sphinx was to have been handed over at Bordeaux, refused to receive her. Arman, however took advantage of this contract to get the vessel out of French waters under the name of the Stoerkodder, and sent her to Copenhagen under the pretence of again submitting her to inspection there. The Danish government having persisted in their refusal to purchase the vessel, he obtained permission to bring her back, rechristened as the Olinde, under Danish colors to Bordeaux. On arriving in French waters, off the island of Houat, on the coast of Brittany, she stopped to receive from another steamer, by a preconcerted arrangement, a crew, with an armament of artillery and munitions of war, hoisted the confederate flag, and, changing her name for the third time to that of the Stonewall, left the French waters for Ferrol, in Spain, where she obtained permission to remain and make some necessary repairs.

These proceedings were the subject of energetic remonstances at Paris and Madrid, and would, in all probability, have given rise to much more, had not the close of the civil war deprived the question of any practical interest it might otherwise have had, the Stonewall having been unable to commit any acts of warfare. The American Government wisely preferred to drop its grievances, as Mr. Seward explains in a letter to Mr. Bigelow, United States minister at Paris, dated 13th March, 1865:

Le gouvernement a déjà, contre les puissances maritimes impliquées dans cette affaire, des causes de plainte assez nombreuses et assez graves. Il préfère néanmoins entretenir la paix, l'harmonie et l'amitié avec ces puissances, plutôt que de rechercher de nouvelles occasions de querelle, et il s'estimera très-heureux si les appréhensions que l'affaire actuelle a soulevées ne sont pas justifiées. Les circonstances semblent d'ailleurs favoriser les vœux du gouvernement à cet endroit. Nos derniers avis télégraphiques nous affirment que le Stonewall est absolument hors d'état de tenir la mer, et que, pour cette raison et pour d'autres, les criminels qui le possèdent cherchent à s'en débar

rasser.

From this narrative it will be seen how very different was the view taken of these circumstances by the Government of the United States, at the time when they occurred, from the color now sought to be put upon them by the American argument.

The running of the blockade, as it is termed, by British vessels, and the use of the Bahamas and Bermuda and other islands, as Complaints of places by means of which the blockade-running might be blockade-running. facilitated, were, throughout the war, the cause of unceasing and loud complaint on the part of the United States Government. No doubt it was a very great annoyance to the United States; but it in reality afforded no legitimate cause of grievance.

That, when the arms and munitions of war necessary to the confederates had been purchased in Europe, means should be sought to convey them to the purchasers was in the nature of things. That the high rates of freight which, owing to the vital importance of obtaining these supplies, the confederate government were willing to pay, should have induced ship-owners to run the risk of capture and confiscation, and that the high premiums for insurance which the owners of ships and cargoes engaged in this traffic were willing to pay, should have tempted insurers to undertake the risk of insuring them, cannot, knowing as we do the boldness of mercantile speculation and enterprise, at all surprise us. Accordingly, from a very early period of the war, vessels were employed to run the blockade with cargoes of articles of warlike use. Before long a systematic traffic of this description became regularly established. As the nature of the southern coast and the local peculi