who are inspired largely by the rapid and that the body so elected be in conspread of the commission form of gov- tinuous session, the commissioners deernment for cities (see VII, Munici- voting all their time to the service of pal Government, infra). The advo- the state. This proposal further procates of the establishment of the com- vides that the commission shall exermission form of government in the cise all powers of legislation and adstates argue that it has proved a ministration, including that of apgreat success in cities and that pointing to and removing from office, therefore it should prove a correspond- thus completely abandoning the traing success in the states. The second ditional American doctrine of the source of inspiration for those who division of powers. The advocates of would reform the governments of the the commission plan for states, like states is found in the example of Ore- the radical reformers generally, let it gon, the state which led the way in be distinctly understood that they be1902 in the adoption of the direct con- lieve the initiative, referendum, and stitutional initiative, and which fol- recall (including the recall of aplowed up its original lead by working pointive as well as elective officers) out the first thoroughgoing plans for to be absolutely essential parts of any the radical reconstruction of the whole successful system of popular governframe of state government. The point ment (see Equity, July, 1913, pp. of departure for this group of reform- 155-61). The movement to extend the ers lies in the plans for the reorgan- commission plan to states made its ization of the government of Oregon first official appearance in Kansas, submitted to the voters in 1910 and where Governor Hodge sent a special 1912 by the so-called People's Power message to the legislature of 1913, League (A. Y. B., 1910, pp. 153-5; urging the adoption of the commis1912, pp. 67-70). Third, there are the sion plan in that state. Governor conservative reformers, who distrust Hodge did not go so far as to propose the radical commission form and Ore- a complete amalgamation of the leggon plans, but who recognize the need islative and executive branches of govfor improving the forms of state government in a single small body to be ernment and believe the only way to defeat radical reform is to furnish an alternative plan, which shall hold forth the promise of better things without threatening the fundamental features of representative government in America. elected in the state at large. His proposal was, to leave the executive as it was, but to substitute for the bi-cameral legislature a smaller body, consisting of one house only, the members of which should be elected by congressional districts. This proposal failed of adoption in Kansas, and proposals to establish the commission form of government in other states have not yet reached the stage of commanding official support. (See also VII, Municipal Government.) State Government by Commission. -The advocates of the commission plan for the government of the states propose a radical reorganization of state governments along the lines marked out by the movement for city government by commission. In gen- The Oregon Plan.-The Oregon reeral, however, their inclination is not formers, whose plan has been outlined to follow too blindly in the wake of at length in previous issues of the the commission-governed cities. Thus YEAR BOOK (1910, pp.153-5; 1912, pp. one proposal is, that a single commis- 67-70), would abolish the Governor's sion be substituted for the state Gov- veto power, and substitute the power ernor and legislature; that this com- to fix the maximum of all items in the mission be a larger body than the state budget; they would abolish the typical municipal commission, but direct primary, and substitute sysmuch smaller than the present state tems of preferential voting for the legislatures; that it be elected by the election of the Governor and of provoters of the state at large, subject to | portional representation for the elecsome scheme of proportional represen- tion of other members of the legislatation affording each considerable fracture; they would abolish the popular tion of the people an opportunity to election of all administrative officers, secure a representative of their own; and substitute the appointment of ad ministrative officers by the Governor, subject to recall by the people; they would abolish the political isolation of the Governor and substitute an arrangement by which the Governor and the members of his Cabinet would have seats and a voice in the legislature, the whole body being subject to the popular initiative and referendum: in short, they would establish the parliamentary or Cabinet system of government, subject to the sovereignty of the people. The Oregon plan would vest much greater political authority in the hands of the Governor than is the case under any existing state constitution, and would secure the necessary separation between politics proper and administration by entrusting the actual management of state business to a state business manager or other administrative officers independent of ordinary political influences. Thus the executive organization would bear a certain resemblance to that provided under the socalled Sumter plan of city government (A. Y. B., 1912, p. 193), which was adopted in 1913 in Dayton, Ohio (see VII, Municipal Government). Schemes modeled more or less after the Oregon plan were discussed in various state legislatures in 1913, the discussion going farther perhaps in Colorado than elsewhere, but not leading anywhere to action. (For a further exposition of the Oregon plan, see letter of W. S. U'Ren, Equity, July, 1913, pp. 164-5.) the Law Academy of Philadelphia on Governor should be given the right, by (2) This plan of reform resembles the plans of the radical reformers in one important respect. It assumes the adoption of the proposals for reducing the number of elective officers, comprehended in the programme for the The Conservative Plan.-The con- short ballot. It differs from the radservative reformers, like the radical ical plans in another important rereformers of both groups, denounce spect: it requires no constitutional the irresponsibility and inefficiency of amendments in order to be put into modern legislatures and legislative effect. It locates the chief defects methods. They find the remedy, how of the state governments, not in the ever, for such legislative evils, not in constitutional frame of government, increasing the duties of the electorate but in the system which has come to by the introduction of direct legisla-prevail in practice as a mode of opertion and the recall, but in stimulating the initiative and strengthening the responsibility of the executive. proposals which they offer for the relief of these conditions are founded mainly on the proposition that more effective means should be provided for executive leadership and coöperation between executive and legislature. These proposals were formulated as follows by Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War, in an address before The ating the constitutional machinery. It would not alter the structure, but the procedure of the state governments. The conservative proposals have not yet been made a political issue in any state. In Massachusetts, however, the programme of the Progressive party for the reform of the state government consists substantially of a combination of the conservative programme for the reform of procedure with the radical proposals for the re form of the structure of state govern- | the failure of the people to become in ment to the extent of the adoption of the initiative, referendum, recall, and short ballot. terested in the regulation of the terms At Calls for State Constitutional Conventions. In some states the reformers prefer to introduce their proposals by the use of the constitutional initiative, or, where the constitutional initiative does not exist, to work for the introduction of that reform first. In others the demands for constitutional reform have crystallized in the shape of a demand for a constitutional convention. In 1913 the legislatures of three states made provision for taking a popular vote in 1914 upon the question of calling conventions to reform the constitution, namely, Indiana, New York, and South Dakota. In these states the conventions, if ordered by the people, will be held in 1915. The reason for calling a constitutional convention in Indiana is peculiar. The existing constitution of that state makes no provision for calling a convention, and the provision made for amend ment is so cumbersome as to be practically unworkable. The provision is that a proposed constitutional amendment must be adopted by two succes-ly. In New York the bill providing sive legislatures and then by the people by a clear majority of all votes cast at the election at which the measure is submitted to them. Only one measure may be proposed and adopted at a time, and the courts have decided that a measure, once proposed for submission to the people, remains pending until approved or rejected by a clear majority of all votes cast at an election. Now a comparatively unimportant amendment, authorizing the legislature to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar, was proposed for the first time by the legislature in 1897 and submitted to the people in 1900, 1906 and 1910, but each time there was no majority of votes either for or against it. The result of for the submission of the question in 1914 was one item of the remarkable programme of legislation passed in December (see I, American History). Besides the three states which provided for the submission to the people of the question of calling a constitutional convention, there are several others in which there is an insistent demand for such a convention. In both Massachusetts and New Jersey, the two states in which important campaigns took place in 1913, at least one of the chief parties included a demand for a convention in the state platform, and in several other states, notably Illinois and Pennsylvania, the issue is being brought to the front. III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CHARLES EDWARD ASNIS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GREAT BRITAIN The Panama Canal Tolls Controversy. While the Panama Canal Act of Aug. 24, 1912, was pending in Congress, Great Britain, in July, made an informal protest against the clause exempting American coastwise shipping from payment of tolls (4. Y. B., 1912, p. 83). The position of Great Britain was set forth at length in a formal statement by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, dated Nov. 14, but not presented to the Department of State until Dec. 9, 1912. The United States had already committed itself in its interpretation of of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty by the Panama Canal Act itself, by the memorandum of President Taft accompanying the Act at the time of its signature, and by President Taft's proclamation fixing the tolls on vessels navigating the Canal. At the time of Sir Edward Grey's note, the controversy was in its early stages and hinged on the interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Article III of the treaty was interpreted by President Taft as stipulating no discrimination against foreign vessels only, and as leaving it open to the United States to grant any privilege she likes to her own vessels, the phrase "all nations" being interpreted to mean "all other nations" or "all foreign nations." (A. Y. B., 1912, p. 83.) Sir Edward Grey's Note.-The British Foreign Secretary, in his note, continued the controversy along the lines laid down by President Taft, and set forth in full the British interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. He emphasized the doctrine of equality and his argument revolved around two main points: first, the intention of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in the light of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty; and second, the discrimination against British shipping in allowing American coasting vessels to pass free through the Canal, the effect of which would be to shift the burden of the upkeep of the Canal to British and foreign shipping. The methods of interpretation were different. Sir Edward Grey used the historical method, referring to instruments and events preceding the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty to show the intention thereof; whereas President Taft confined himself to the actual wording of the treaty, and, in interpreting phrases did not appear to go beyond the four corners of the treaty; or, in going beyond the treaty referred to subsequent events, such as American ownership of the Canal. "The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty does not stand alone," said Sir Edward Grey; "it was the corollary of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty of 1850." The two methods of interpretation brought in sharp contrast in construing the important provision that "the Canal shall be free and open to vessels of commerce and of war of all nations." Sir Edward Grey construed it in the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, particularly Article 8, which provided for equal treatment for both American and British ships, and he submitted that the principle of equality of treatment was guaranteed by the United States in consideration of the right to construct the canal independently and under its own auspices. were The intention of the Hay-Pauncefote the exemption of American vessels, Treaty was that the United States was coasting or otherwise, from the payto recover the right to construct the trans-Isthmian Canal upon the terms ment of tolls, would shift on foreign that the waterway was to be open to vessels using the Canal, more than British and United States ships on equal their "just and equitable” share in the terms. (Am. Jour. of Int. Law, VII, cost of maintenance. 48.) Secretary Knox's Rejoinder.—The President Taft, on the other hand, construed the disputed clause in the note of Secretary Knox in reply to light of the provisions of the treaty Sir Edward Grey, dated Jan. 17, gave itself, with particular reference to the a new turn to the controversy. He turned from interpretation and theoprovisions immediately preceding. retical grievances to facts and actual The phrase "free and open to the vessels... of all nations" was but the injury. The main contribution of first of several conditions stated by Secretary Knox to the controversy the United States in the declaration was the proposition that "suppositious immediately preceding it, and these injustice and inequality" should give conditions were adopted for a specific way to an inquiry into proved facts; purpose expressly stated in the treaty, that conjecture and hypothesis must namely, as a basis of the neutraliza-yield to an investigation of actual tion of the Canal, and for no other damage. By thus shifting the conpurpose. The conditions enumerated troversy, Secretary Knox hoped to in the treaty of which the disputed clause is the first, are merely a basis of the neutrality which the United States was willing should be characteristic of the Canal, and were not intended to limit or hamper the United States in the exercise of her sovereign power in dealing with her own commerce or in using her own Canal in whatsoever manner she saw fit. The disputed clause, therefore, was interpreted as being a conditional favored nation clause. With this difference of interpretation as to the treaty itself, it is natural that the two governments would differ as to the test or measure of discrimination. The American test is not the treatment that the United States gives to its own nationals but the treatment it extends to other nations. The British test is whether or not British ships would be compelled to bear more than their proportionate share of the cost of maintenance of the Canal. To show that this is the proper test of discrimination, Sir Edward Grey quoted Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty: "Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable." "The purpose of these words," he continued, "was to limit the tolls to the amount representing the fair value to the of the services rendered, i. e., interest on the capital expended and the cost of the operation and maintenance of the Canal." If charges of traffic are to be "just and equitable," clear the air and narrow down the Moreover, the gravamen of the com- The argument of Secretary Knox was more than a plea in abatement; it was an invitation to consider careunder fully all the circumstances |