commencing the construction of a water- (2) That the consent of the village of Skaneateles to the organization of the plaintiff as a waterworks company, and the making of a contract by the village of Skaneateles with the plaintiff for the supply of pure and wholesome water, did not vest in plaintiff the exclusive right to furnish said village with water, or prevent the village from granting to another corporation the right to supply water within the said village, or the village from constructing and maintaining a waterworks system to supply itself with water. (3) That subsequently to February 1, 1896, no contractual relations existed be tween the plaintiff and the village of Skaneateles, and the village was not under legal the plaintiff after that date, or to continue to take water from the plaintiff; but was entitled to construct and maintain a waterworks system of its own. *(4) That the defendants were entitled to[358] judgment dismissing the complaint upon the merits with costs, and judgment was ordered accordingly. water upon the terms and conditions stated in the franchise. The plaintiff constructed the waterworks under this franchise and completed it about the year 1889 and put the same in operation; that the system was a complete and adequate one, no complaint having been made that the water furnished by the plaintiff was not pure and wholesome, or that it had been inadequate for the purposes for which the system was erected. Prior to this time the village of Skaneateles was not supplied with water by any company or corporation, nor did it possess any system of its own; that since its incorporation, and for the purpose of carrying on its works, the plaintiff had encumbered its property by mortgages to secure the payment of bonds issued by it, which bonds were outstanding at the time of the trial. After the erection and completion of the water-obligation to enter into any contract with works and on February 1, 1891, the plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract for the supply of water and the erection of hydrants and for the payment of certain compensation therefor by the defendants; that such contract was limited by its terms to the period of five years from February 1, 1891, and that it has not been renewed since the time of its expiration on February 1, 1896; Though not, perhaps, material upon the that after such time, without any proceed- legal rights of the parties, yet it is seen ing to vacate or annul the franchise of the from correspondence found in the record plaintiff, or to dissolve the corporation, the that prior to the expiration of the contract defendant Leslie, as president of the village, in February, 1896, the company gave notice appointed some of the other defendants to to the village that it intended to increase its be water commissioners of the village, hav-rents for hydrants, etc., to $50, which sum ing in contemplation the purpose of con- was $10 per hydrant more than it was entistructing for said village a waterworks sys-tled to under the franchise granted it, and tem of its own; that the persons so appointed commissioners entered upon the performance of their duties, called a meeting of the electors of the village, who voted in [357]favor of municipal *ownership of the water-chise the right to charge but $40 per hyworks, and after such election the water commissioners issued or caused to be issued bonds of the village to the amount of $30,000, which they sold for the purpose of obtaining money to construct a waterworks system of its own; that the board of water commissioners of the village have entered into a contract for the construction of waterworks for said village, and have expended thereon about the sum of $24,000, and the works are substantially completed; that all of the proceedings were taken without instituting any proceeding to condemn the prop- Mr. Charles A. Hawley argued the erty of the plaintiff herein, although the cause, and, with Mr. George Barrow, filed a plaintiff offered to participate in a proceed-brief for plaintiff in error: ing looking towards the condemnation of its property; that the works of the plaintiff were constructed at large expense and its property rights and franchise mortgaged to secure its bonds which had been issued, and the income of the plaintiff from the operation of its plant had been insufficient to meet its outgoing expenses, and will be insufficient to meet its outgoing expenses when it shall cease to furnish water to the village of Skaneateles. As conclusions of law the referee held: | $20 more than the sum named in the expiring contract. The village authorities refused to pay the increase, and the water company, on learning it had under its fran drant, reduced its demand, but the parties failed to agree, and the contract expired. After its expiration the company notified the village that the hydrants had been closed and that there must be no interference with them, even in case of fire. Both parties became somewhat excited, it would seem, and it resulted in the village taking proceedings under chapter 181 of the Laws of 1875, and its amendments, for erecting and operating waterworks of its own. The grantor of a franchise agrees that it will do nothing repugnant to its grant. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 25 L. ed. 496; Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 137, 3 L. ed. 162, 178; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 2 L. R. A. 255, 18 N. E. 692. In the grant of a franchise is the implied agreement on the part of the state that the grantee shall forever enjoy the rights granted, unless there are words of limitation. College V. Dartmouth Woodward, 4 184 U. S. Wheat. 518, L. ed. 629; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 137, 3 L. ed. 162, 178. All corporations, in the absence of express restrictions, have the implied power to do all acts that may be necessary to enable them to exercise the powers expressly conferred, and to accomplish the objects for which they were created. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keokuk II. Bridge Co. 131 U. S. 385, 33 L. ed. 161, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co. 151 U. S. 294, 38 L. ed. 167, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 339; Jackson ville, M. P. R. & Nav. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, 40 L. ed. 515, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; 7 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, p. 699; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. 161 U. S. 646, 40 L. ed. 838, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 705; People ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Deehan, 153 N. Y. 528, 47 N. E. 787. Contracts may be created without express words, i. e., by the acts of the parties; and these contracts are as much within the protection of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution as any other contracts. Fisk v. Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131, 29 L. ed. 587, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 329. Every valuable privilege given by the charter, and which conduced to an accept ance of it and an organization under it, is a contract. Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L. ed. 977. Franchises of the character under consid eration are contracts. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1. 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. When a municipality makes a contract, or enters into contractual relations with another, it may make itself liable upon im plied contracts, or covenants, just as individuals and private corporations may, if within the scope of their powers, to be deduced by inference from authorized corporate acts, without either vote, deed, or writing. Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 459; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 1081: New York v. Second Ave, R. Co. 32 N. Y. 261. When the government, possessing the power of choosing whether it will itself engage in the performance of a public duty, or contract with a private corporation, makes choice of the private corporation, it agrees with such private corporation to waive its own right. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341. 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77: White v. Meadville, 177 Pa. 643, 34 L. R. A. 567. 35 Atl. 693. The defendant municipality, as the own er and operator of a system of waterworks, is not in any sense the competitor or rival of the plaintiff. White v. Meadville, 177 Pa. 643, 34 L. R. A. 567, 35 Atl. 693. The reserved power of the legislature to alter or amend cannot be resorted to, to enable the grantor to take back for its own uses and purposes the rights and privileges which it granted. Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 24 L. ed. 357; Miller v. New York, 15 Wall. 478, 21 L. ed. 98; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 25 L. ed. 496. A repeal of the charter of a corporation does not carry with it the destruction of a franchise granted to the corporation. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 40, 2 L. R. A. 255, 18 N. E. 692; Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961. The prohibition of the 14th Amendment against depriving a person of his property without due process of law is a restriction on every branch of government, and applies to the acts of a political subdivision of the state under a delegation of the authority of its legislature. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 L. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. Corporations are protected equally with natural persons. Smyth v. Ames. 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198. The property of the plaintiff when, in 1896, under delegated authority, the defendant village organized a board of water commissioners, consisted first of its franchise. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 46 L. ed. 26, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26. Such franchise was not the exclusive privilege of supplying the village and its inhabitants with water, but it was the privilege of supplying the village and its inhabitants on equal terms with all other corporations and individuals. This right or privilege of equality in the service to be rendered was an "essential attribute" of the plaintiff's property; and to deprive one of an essential attribute of his property without due process of law is as much within the constitutional inhibition as depriving him of the property itself. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636: Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; Wynehamer v. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 People, 13 N. Y. 378; People ex rel. Manhat tan Sav. Inst. v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. See al257. 31 S. W. 781; Janesville v. Carpenter, So State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 29 L. R. A. 77 Wis. 288, 8 L. R. A. 808, 46 N. W. 128. The question turns in part upon a consideration of the question whether the laws operate on the plaintiff and defendant alike. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 38 L. ed. 485, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292; Story, Const. § 1935. And whether the plaintiff is exempted from the exercise of the unequal or arbitrary power of the government. Ibid.; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 34 L. ed. 816, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224. "Due process of law" does not mean merely an act of the legislature. Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws relates as well to corporations as to natural persons. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 33 L. ed. 1025, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. And it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to discriminate in legislation between different corporations and natural persons engaged in the same business. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 679; San Mateo County v. Southern P. R. Co. 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 733. Under this act the property taken under the guise of taxes is taken under the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and not under the power of taxation. People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266. By operation of the law which the village itself made "the law of the state," the plaintiff was deprived of its right to consid- | er the defendant even a possible patron. In other words, it was deprived of its franchise, the privilege which had been granted to it of supplying the defendant,-which was its property. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, ante, 86, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 26. Messrs. M. F. Dillon and William G. Tracy argued the cause and filed a brief for defendants in error: The rule is fully established that public grants are to be construed against the grantee: that acts granting franchises to corporations are to be construed strictly accord ing to their terms; that the party accept ing the franchise takes nothing by implica tion against the power making the grant, or | against other corporations or individuals; that the only contract on the part of the grantor is that it will not do any act, or refrain from doing any act, other than to allow the exercise of the franchise. Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 5 L. R. A. 516, 22 N. E. 381; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 26 L. R. A. 270, 38 N. E. 983, Affirmed in 166 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Warsaw Waterworks Co. v. Warsan, 16 App. Div. 502, 44 N. Y. Supp. 876, 161 N. Y. 176, 55 N. E. 486; Louis ville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gaslight Co. 115 U. S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 L. ed. 963, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90: Colby University v. Canandaigua, 69 Fed. 671; Auburn & C. Pl. Road Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444. A municipality cannot, without express legislative authority, grant exclusive rights. Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. §§ 692-696; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Cincinnati Gaslight & Coke Co. 18 Ohio St. 262; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gaslight & Coke Co. 66 Ind. 396; Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co. 25 Conn. 19. A municipal corporation can bind itself by contract only so far as it is authorized to do so by statute. It cannot enter into an agreement to take water forever from a water corporation, unless authorized to do so by the legislature. It cannot curtail by contract the right to exercise the powers vested in its legislative board. Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167, 5 L. R. A. 516, 22 N. E. 381. Municipal corporations have no power as parties to make contracts which shall control or embarrass their legislative powers and duties. New York v. Second Ave. R. Co. 32 N. Y. 261. The remedy against unwise or unjust modes of taxation is to be sought from the legislative department of the government, and not from the judiciary. People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266; People v. Home Ins. Co. 92 N. Y. 347. It is only where a tax law transcends the legislative power that the courts can interfere. People ex rel. Panama R. Co. v. New York Tax Comrs. 104 N. Y. 250, 10 N. E. 437. The power of the legislature over the subject of taxation, except as limited by constitutional restrictions, is unbounded. Re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 265. The two clauses of the Constitution which declare that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, have no application to the exercise of the taxing power. People ex rel. Crowell v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 140; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 270. It is a part of the legitimate exercise of the state power of taxation to ascertain, subject to no judicial review, the public burdens to be borne, and the persons or classes of persons who are to bear them. Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 118. The legislature has power to authorize the condemnation of any property for a public use. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 L. ed. 535. This includes franchises of every description, whether exclusive or not, and it is not apparent how the exercise of such power is unconstitutional upon the ground that it deprives water corporations of the equal protection of the laws. Cooley, Const. Lin. 5th ed. § 341. *Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the[358] above statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court: The power of this court to review the judgment of the New York court of appeals is limited to a consideration of the question [359] whether any right of the plaintiff's protected by the Federal Constitution has been denied by the judgment. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the facts disclosed in the record upon general principles of equitable jurisdiction is not a matter for us to inquire into so long as the question does not involve the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. *The claim is made that the ordinance adopted by the authorities of the village of Skaneateles in 1896, providing in substance for the erection and operation of a water system by the village, which ordinance was passed pursuant to an authority of the legislature under the act, chapter 181 of the Laws of 1875, and amendments (giving authority to cities and villages to build their own waterworks), impaired the obligations of the contract existing between the village and the company. The contract to which reference is made is not the one which was entered into in 1891 between these parties for the term of five years, because that contract was fully carried out and had expired by its own limitation in February, 1896, but it is the contract which the plaintiff in error claims was implied by reason of its organization and incorporation in 1887, in pursuance of an application made to, and with the consent of, the village authorities, and under the provisions of chapter 737 of the Laws of New York of 1873, and the acts amendatory thereof. It is said the village at the time of plaintiff's incorporation had the election to do the work itself under the above act of 1875, or to confer upon a private company like the plaintiff, under the act of 1873, the right to do it, and when with these two different methods for obtaining a supply of water the village chose that which called for a supply by a private company, it impliedly contracted that it would not itself thereafter take the other method for obtaining such supply, unless it bought the plant of the company or condemned it under the provisions of the act of 1875. This, it is said, was implied in the grant made by the village. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the act of 1873, under which the plaintiff was incorporated, are set forth in the margin.t Chap. 737, Laws of 1873. Sec. 1. Any number of persons not less than seven may hereafter organize in any town or village of this state a waterworks company, under the provisions of this act. Sec. 2. Whenever any persons to the number of seven or more shall organize for the purpose of forming a waterworks company in any of the towns or villages in this state, they shall present to the town or village authorities an application, setting forth the persons who propose to form said company, the proposed capital stock thereof, the proposed number and charac ter of the shares of such capital stock, and the name or names of the streams, ponds, springs, lakes, or other sources and their locations, from which water is to be supplied. Such applica-, tions shall be signed by the persons who propose to form said company, and shall contain a request that the said town or village authorities shall consider the application of said com such determination pany to supply said town or village of this state, or the inhabitants thereof, with pure and wholesome water. Upon the presentation of village, which authorities are for the purposes such application, the authorities of any town or of this act defined to consist for incorporated villages and towns, the board of trustees and supervisor, and for all other towns, the supervisor, justices of the peace, town clerk, and commissioner of highways. Said authorities shall within thirty days of the presentation of said application determine by a vote of a majority of the authorities of said town or village, whether said application shall be granted; and the authorities of any town or village in this state are hereby authorized and empowered to make such determination, and when the same shall be made, to sign a certificate to that effect, and immediately transmit the same to the persons making such application or either of them. shall be filed in the office of the clerk of said Duplicate certificates of town or village, and in the office of the county clerk of the county in which said town or vil lage granting such application shall be situated. The persons named in such application shall thereupon meet and organize as a waterworks company under such corporate name as they may select. They shall file in the office of the secretary of state a certificate of such organization. Said certificate shall contain the name of the corporation, the names of the members of said corporation and their residences. the amount of capital stock, the location of the of fice of said company. Such certificate shall be subscribed and sworn to by the president of said corporation, and shall be attested by the secretary thereof. Upon the filing of said certifi cate said waterworks company shall be known and deemed a body corporate, and shall be capable of suing and being sued by the corporate name which they shall have selected, in any of the courts of this state. The capital stock of said company shall be paid in the manner and within the time provided by the "Act to Authorize the Formation of Corporations for Manufacturing, Mechanical, or chemical Purposes," passed February 17th, 1848, and the several amendments thereto, and the stockholders of said companies shall be personally liable for the debts of said companies in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided by said act and the amendments thereto. take and hold real estate for the purpose of their corporation, and may have, hold, and occupy any of the waters of this state; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to infringe upon any private right which shall not have been the subject of an agreement and lease or purchase by said corporation. Provided, that said company shall have no power to take or use water from any of the canals of this state or any canal reservoirs as feeders or any streams which have been taken by the state for the purpose of supplying the canals with Sec. 3. Said corporation shall have power to waters. Sec. 4. Any corporation organized under the provisions of this act may, and they are hereby authorized and empowered, to lay their water pipes in any streets or avenues or public places, in any streets or avenues of an adjoining town or village, to the town or village where their aplication shall have been granted. Sec. 5. Said corporations are authorized and empowered to supply the authorities or inhabitants of any town or village where they may have organized with pure and wholesome water, at such rates and cost to consumers as they shall agree upon. [360] *Under the act of 1875, chap. 181, the village was authorized to erect and operate its own works. Provision was made in the act in detail for the organization of a board of water commissioners and the building of waterworks, the mode of paying for the same, and other matters connected with the supply of water. That part of the 22d sec[361]tion of the act, in *regard to the taking of the property of a private company, is set forth in the margin.† admits that the village, notwithstanding its grant to the plaintiff, possessed the power to grant to any other individual company the same kind of privilege it had already granted to plaintiff. But it denies the right of the village to avail itself of the authority to itself build and operate the works, given under the act of 1875, unless the plaintiff's plant be taken by purchase or condemnation. that "the state authorized the formation of waterworks companies in its towns and villages (Laws of 1877, chap. 171), but it does not require one so organized to supply water to the town or village, nor does it require the town or village to take its supply of water from the company so formed." Having before it the above act of 1873, Pursuant to the provisions of the act of amended in 1877, the court of appeals, in 1873, certain persons on July 5, 1887, ap- People, ex rel. Mills Waterworks Co. v. Forplied to the village authorities for permis-rest, 97 N. Y. 97, 100, decided in 1884, said sion to organize a water company to supply the village with pure and wholesome water, and on that day the authorities granted the request. On August 1, 1887, a certificate was duly filed in the office of the secretary of state at Albany, by which the corporation was formed under the name of the Skancateles Waterworks Company. Subsequently [362] to the incorporation of the plaintiff it built the waterworks and entered into a contract with the village authorities to supply water to the village for five years from February 1, 1891. It would seem to be clear, under the decisions of this court, that the plaintiff in applying to the village and filing its certificate with the secretary of state under the act of 1873 acquired no contract right, expressed or implied, to any exclusive privilege of using the streets of the village for supplying it with water. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L. ed. 773; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 696, 41 L. ed. 1165, 1168, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1. 13, 43 L. ed. 341, 347, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. The court of appeals of New York held to the same effect in regard to a provision in the charter of Syracuse relating to the rights of a water company, the provision being similar to the charter here involved. Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y 167, 5 L. R. A. 516, 22 N. E. 381, decided in 1889; also Re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596. 26 L. R. A. 270, 38 N. E. 983, affirmed in this court, 166 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718. Indeed, this proposition is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff, and it It is true that by chapter 566 of the Laws of 1890 it was provided that the water companies "shall supply the authorities or inhabitants of any town or village [through which the conduits or mains of such corporation may pass] with*pure and [363] wholesome water at reasonable rates and cost;" and the act provided that contracts might be made therefor. But there was no provision making it incumbent upon the musuch company. nicipal authorities to take water from any By virtue of its incorporation under this act of 1873 the plaintiff secured simply the right to be a corporation and the authority to lay its water pipes in any of the streets and avenues or public streets of the village of Skaneateles. The village, however, as stated, was under no obligation to take water from the company. That was a matter for subsequent contract between the parties. Admitting that in every grant there is an implication that the grantor will do nothing to detract from the full and complete operation of the grant itself, we cannot find any implication that, after the termination of the contract the plaintiff and defendant were empowered to make, there should be no right in the defendant to build its own system of waterworks under the statute of 1875, unless it purchased or condemned the property of the plaintiff. There is no implied contract in an ordinary grant of a franchise, such as this, that the grantor will never do any act by which the value of the franchise granted may in the future be reduced. Such a contract would be altogether too far reaching and important in its possible consequences in the way of limitation of the powers of a municipality, even in matters not immediately connected with water, to be left to implication. We think none such arises from the facts detailed. Part of Sec. 22, Chap. 181, Laws of 1875. Sec. 22. "Whenever any corporation shall have been organized under the laws of this state for the purpose of supplying the inhabitants of any village with water, and it shall be come or be deemed necessary by the board of water commissioners herein authorized to be created, that the rights, privileges, grants, and properties of such corporation shall be required for any of the purposes of this act, the comhave the power, and it shall be their duty, to make, or cause to be made, a thorough examination of the works, rights, privileges and properties owned or held by such corporations, or It is not amiss to here recall the situation any of them, and if such commissioners shall at the time plaintiff became incorporated, in determine that said works, rights, privileges, 1887, under the act of 1873. That act proand properties are necessary for the purposes missioners herein authorized to be created shall of this act, they shall have the right to make condemnation. vided for the organization and incorporation of water companies which might furnish water to cities, villages, and towns of the state. There was also the act of 1875 |