claimer on the part of the applicants of to 1873, and by the expiration of the Engthe right to the exclusive use of those words, lish patent, in 1880, the right to that use except as part of the combination constitut- had become public. These various assigning the trademark. Prior to the English ors, therefore, did not convey by their aspatent, the respondent's predecessors or assignment a right to the exclusive use of signs had no valid trademark in England the words in the United States. The domesfor the same reason the Rahtjens had ac- tic trademark, which the respondent also quired none in the United States, viz., they claims gives it that right, was not used had no right to designate the composition until after the sale of the composition by [13] as a patented article when in fact there the petitioner in the United States under was no patent. From 1873 to 1880, while the name of "Rahtjen's Composition, Holzapthe patent was in life, they were entirely fel's Manufacture." We think the princijustified in calling it a patented article, and ple which prohibits the right to the exclu when that patent expired it seems clear sive use of a name descriptive of the article they had no right to retain the exclusive after the expiration of a patent covering its use of the only name which described the manufacture applies here. composition, and that no such right could be claimed by virtue of a valid trademark antedating the patent, for there was none, assuming even that such fact, if it had existed, would have justified the claim to the exclusive use of the descriptive words after the patent had expired.

In the manufacture and sale of the article, of course, no deceit would be tolerated, and the article described as "Rahtjen's Composition" would, when manufactured by defendant, have to be plainly described as its manufacture. The proof shows this has been done, and that the article has been sold The judgments in the Antwerp and Ham-under a totally different trademark from [12]burg courts simply *showed that in those any used by respondent, and it has been countries the use of the words "Rahtjen's plainly and fully described as manufactured Composition" or "Rahtjen's Patent Compo- by defendant or its assignors, the Holzapsition" had become descriptive of the article fels. itself, and did not in any way designate We are of opinion that no right to the exthe persons who manufactured it; but even without those judgments the record shows beyond question that when the English patent expired the use of the words became open to the world as descriptive of the article itself, and to manufacture an article under that name was a right open to the world. There was no trademark in that name in the United States.

The principles involved in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 163 U. S. 169, 41 L. ed. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002, apply here.

clusive use in the United States of the
words "Rahtjen's Composition" has been
shown by respondent, and that the decree
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit should be reversed, and that
of the Circuit Court for the Southern Dis
trict of New York affirmed.
And it is so ordered.

KNOXVILLE IRON COMPANY, Plff. in
Err.,

v.

SAMUEL HARBISON.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 13-22.)

Constitutionality of statute-redemption of store orders in money-interference with right of contract.

The provision for the redemption of store orders, scrip, etc., in money, which is made by Tenn. act March 17, 1899, requiring all persons who issue such orders to employees in payment of wages to redeem them in money on any regular pay day or at any time within thirty days after they are issued, if presented and payment in money demanded by such employees or by bona fide holders, is not unconstitutional as an arbitrary interference with the right of contract, but is a legitimate exercise of the general legislative power as well as of the police power.

It is said there is a distinction between the case at bar and the one cited, because in the latter the patent and the trademark were both domestic, while here the trademark is domestic and the patent foreign. The respondent claims the right to use these words by virtue of assignments from the Messrs. Rahtjen and also Suter, Hartmann, & Co. in England, and also by virtue of a domestic trademark which it or its predecessors had acquired from user and registration in the United States. The rights of Suter, Hartmann, & Co. to the exclusive use of these words had been disclaimed by thein in 1883, long before any assignment of their rights to the respondent, and we do not see why that disclaimer should be confined to England. It was a general disclaimer of any right whatever to the exclusive use of these words, and it was only upon the filing of that disclaimer that they obtained the trademark which they did in England. The disclaimer, however, was as broad as it could be made. When they assigned their rights the assignment did not include a right to an exclusive use which, in order to Argued and Submitted March 7, 1901. Deobtain the trademark registration, they had already disclaimed. The assignment of the Rahtjen firm could not convey the exclusive right to the use of such words, because they had no valid trademark in those words prior

[No. 22.]

cided October 21, 1901.

NOTE. On the validity and effect of statutes

requiring wages to be paid in lawful moneysee Avent-Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. (Ky.) 28 L. R. A. 273, and note.

'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

affirming a decree of the Chancery Court of Appeals which affirmed a decree of the Chancery Court of Knox County in favor of complainant in a bill to enforce the redemption in money of certain orders for coal issued to employees in payment of wages. Affirmed.

See same case below, 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955.

Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: [13] *In the chancery court of Knox county, Tennessee, Samuel Harbison, a citizen of said state, on June 2, 1899, filed a bill of complaint against the Knoxville Iron Company, a corporation organized under the [14]laws of the state of Tennessee, alleging *that he was the bona fide holder by purchase in due course of trade of certain specified accepted orders for coal that had been issued by the defendant company in payment of wages due to its employees; that he had made due demand for their redemption in cash according to law, which demand had been refused; and that he was entitled to a decree for the amount of said orders, with interest. The company filed an answer denying that the complainant was a bona fide holder of the orders in question, and alleging an agreement between the company and its employees that the latter would accept coal in payment of said orders, etc.

vor

Proof was taken and the case heard by the chancellor, who rendered a decree in faof the complainant for $1,702.66 as principal and interest of said orders, with costs. An appeal was taken by the defendant company to the court of chancery appeals of Tennessee, an intermediate court of reference in equity causes, where the decree of the chancery court of Knox county was affirmed.

The facts as found by the court of chancery appeals are as follows:

"The defendant is a corporation chartered under chapter 57, Acts of 1867-68. The following powers are given by § 4: "To purchase, hold, and dispose of such real estate, not to exceed 70,000 acres, leases, minerals, iron, coal, oil, salt, and personal property as they may desire, or as they may deem necessary for the legitimate transaction of their business; to mine, bore, forge, smelt, work, and manufacture, transport, refine, and vend the same. The company to have and enjoy and exercise all the rights, privileges, and powers belonging to or incidental to corporations, which may be convenient to carry out any business they are in this act authorized to engage in.'

"The defendant has its principal office at Knoxville, where it is engaged in the manufacture of iron. As an incident to this business it also mines and sells coal. Its mines are located in Anderson county. It works about 200 employees. It has now and has had for many years a regular pay day, being that Saturday in every month which is nearest the 20th day of the month. Upon [15]this pay day each employee is paid *in cash

the amount then due him, excepting what
from
up to said pay day; that is, the company
keeps in arrears with its employees all the
time to the extent of their wages for about
twenty days' time, so far as concerns the
matter of cash payments, but they may col-
lect this sum and all sums that may be
due them in coal orders, as stated below.
It does not and will not pay cash to its
employees for wages at any other time than
upon said regular pay days. Defendant,
however, nearly always has on hand in its
Knoxville yard a large amount of coal which
it sells to all persons who are willing to
purchase, whether such persons are its la-
borers or the public generally. For some
time prior to the filing of the bill and at
the time the bill was filed the defendant
was and had been accustomed to accept from
its laborers, after work had been performed,
orders for coal in the following form:
"Let bearer have
bushels of coal

and charge to my account.

66 6

accus

"The defendant's employees are
tomed to sign orders, and in this form they
are accepted by a stamp in these words:
''Accepted

1899.

"Knoxville Iron Company.' "Many of the defendant's employees have never drawn an order on the defendant, and many others have used them only in the purchase of coal for themselves; but the defendant in this way pays off about 75 per cent of the wages earned by its employees. Many of the employees who draw these orders get small wages, 90 cents to $1.20 per day, and sell these orders to get money to live on, but those who get the largest wages, $65 to $175 per month, draw more of such coal orders in proportion than do those who get small wages. Defendant has never insisted upon any of its laborers giving any such orders, but has been willing to accept such orders when any employee would draw them and ask their acceptance. Defendant, however, sets apart every Saturday afternoon, from 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock, for the acceptance of such orders. It makes some profit in accepting said orders in that, instead of paying the wages of its employees in cash, it pays them in coal at 12 cents[16] per bushel, and also, to some extent, its coal business is increased thereby. On the other hand, such orders are a convenience to the defendant's employees in the way of enabling them to realize on their wages before the reg ular monthly pay day and up to that pay day. When these orders are drawn by defendant's employees and accepted, defendant credits itself with said orders on its accounts with the persons so drawing them at the rate of 12 cents per bushel for the amount of coal called for by said orders. There is no proof of an express agreement between the defendant and its employees that the orders should be paid only in coal, unless the face of the order shall be construed as setting forth such an agreement. The only proof of any implied agreement to that effect is

183 U. S.

to be found in such inferences as may be | 28 L. cd. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Allgeyer drawn from the face of the orders and from v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 the custom of the company to issue them and Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. the employees to receive them on other than S. 391, 42 L. ed. 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; the regular cash pay days and the fact that Re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. no employee has ever presented one of such 506; Stockton Laundry Case, 11 Sawy. 472, orders for redemption in anything else than 26 Fed. 614; Re Grice, 79 Fed. 627; Re Jacoal. There is no proof of any compulsion cobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People on the part of the defendant upon its opera- v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. tives, except in so far as compulsion may E. 29. be implied from the fact that unless defend- Every interference by the state with the ant's operatives take their wages in coal rights of liberty and property, not coming orders they must always on each monthly within the legitimate exercise of the police pay day suffer the defendant to be in arrears power, is a deprivation of liberty and propabout twenty days; that is, that on the reg-erty without due process of law, and is unular pay day on that Saturday which is constitutional and void. the nearest the 20th of the month, the defendant will not pay wages except up to the last day of the preceding month, but will pay in coal orders the whole wages due at the end of each week, and that such is the course of business between the defendant and its employees. The complainant purchased 614 of said accepted orders from defendant's employees, and within thirty days from the issuance of each of said orders he presented each of them to the Knoxville Iron Company, defendant hereto, and demanded that it redeem them in cash, which was refused by defendant. Complainant is

Ibid.

Corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, and their property and liberties are protected by its provisions.

Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 24, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165.

Whenever the police power of the state is sought to be exercised in matters affecting the public interest, outside of those primary

a licensed dealer in securities, and sent his agents among the employees of the defendant to buy these coal orders. They had previously been selling at 75 cents on the dol-police duties of safety, health, and morals, lar.—that is, before the passage of chapter [17]11, act of 1899,-but he instructed his agents to give 85 cents on the dollar, and the orders now in suit were purchased at that price. They amount in dollars and cents to $1,678. There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the complainant in the purchase of said orders."

The orders sued on in this case were is sued after the passage of the act of March 17, 1899.

From the decree of the chancery court of appeals an appeal was taken by the company to the supreme court of Tennessee, by which court the decrees of the courts below were affirmed. The case was then brought to this court by a writ of error allowed by the chief justice of the supreme court of Tennessee.

Mr. Edward T. Sanford argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Cornelius E. Lucky and James A. Fowler, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

Among the rights of liberty and property protected by the provision of § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," are the right to the acquisition and disposition of property, the right to labor in any lawful employment, and the right to enter into any lawful contract in reference to property or labor.

and inseparably connected with that of every in which the public interest is intimately rights of property and liberty can only be individual, the impairment of individual justified when it is shown to be demanded by the public welfare and the interest and well being of the community at large, as distinguished from the well-being of a particular class only.

Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 32, 24 L. ed. 992.

The rights of property and liberty of one class of the community can never be taken away by the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, merely to secure financial advantage to another class of the community, however large and deserving such other class may be.

The right of contract and other rights of liberty and property may be more freely infringed when necessary to protect the public safety, health, or morals than they can for the indefinite purpose of promoting the public welfare in general. This arises from the paramount duty of the state to protect the life, health, and morals of its citizens, their preservation constituting an overruling necessity which often justifies interference with individual rights that would be exempt from infringement upon general and indefinite considerations of public benefit.

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 397, 42 L. ed. 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383.

The legislative justification for depriving U. S. Const. 14th Amend. § 1; Slaughter- any citizen of his life and property must be House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. ed. 425; based upon a public benefit that is reasonaButchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Cres-bly certain, and not merely upon conjectures cent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746,

and possibilities.

Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, | 74; Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 587, 58 Pac. 1071; People v. Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 9 Mich. 295.

While there is a presumption in favor of the validity of state legislation, yet the legislative determination is subject to revision by the courts, and the attempted exercise of | police powers will not be upheld if it bears no substantial relation to the welfare of the public at large, and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of individuals under the guise of protecting the public interest. The police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppression and unjust legislation.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064: Holden v. Har-1105; Short v. Bullion-Beck & C. Min. Co. dy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313; Guthrie, 14th Amend. p. 76.

20 Utah, 20, 45 L. R. A. 603, 57 Pac. 720; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 58 Pac. 1071; Re Considine, 83 Fed. 157; Cox This legislation cannot be sustained, even v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 1 Ohio though many contracts are embraced within N. P. 213; Skinner v. Garnett Gold-Min. Co. it which are legitimately the subject of leg-96 Fed. 735; Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co. islation, since, if it interferes with a single 127 Cal. 4, 47 L. R. A. 338, 59 Pac. 304; class of contracts which are proper in them- Whitcbreast Fuel Co. v. People, 175 Ill. 51, selves and are protected by the Constitution, 51 N. E. 853; Com. v. Brown, 43 W. N. C. the act must fall as a whole. 69. See also Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 178.

Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 8 Am. | 1028; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Dec. 323; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met. 522. ed. 77.