provided by the wisdom of successive ages for the investigation, judicially, of the truth of the matter in controversy.

Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 457, 33 L. ed. 980, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 733, 24 L. ed. 572.

The notice, assessment, and levy of taxes and delivery of duplicate to the collecting officer, and a regular demand and sale, after the notice prescribed by law, fulfil all requirements of "due process of law" or "the law of the land."

159 U. S. 526, 40 L. ed. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. | tion under the form and with the machinery Rep. 83; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 153 U. S. 380, 38 L. ed. 751, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321. sub nom. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316, 35 L. ed. 419, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 825; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. ed. 335; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 33 L. ed. 772, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 38 L. ed. 1031, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1114; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N. E. 443; Murdock v. Cincinnati, 44 Fed. 726; Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 16 N. E. 826; Johnson v. Lewis, 115 Ind. 490, 18 N. E. 7; Kizer v. Winchester, 141 Ind. 694, 40 N. E. 265.

A revenue law of a state may be in harmony with the 14th Amendment, although such law does not furnish an opportunity to be present when the tax is assessed, nor that the tax shall be collected by suit. If the taxpayer has a right to enjoin collection this is due process of law.

McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. ed. 335.

Put the estate of William P. Gallup is not a nonresident estate. It is a resident

estate, hence nonresidence of the executor is of no possible moment where the court has control of the property.

Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N. E. 443; Schmidt v. Failey, 148 Ind. 150, 37 L. R. A. 442, 47 N. E. 326.

Laws are to be construed liberally in aid of the taxing power, and all taxes are presumed to be valid until the contrary is affirmatively shown, and no irregularities will invalidate them that do not affect the merits of the case.

Hunter Stone Co. v. Woodard, 152 Ind.

474, 53 N. E. 947; Reynolds v. Bowen, 138
Ind. 434, 36 N. E. 756; Saint v. Welsh, 141
Ind. 382, 40 N. E. 903; Buck v. Miller, 147
Ind. 586, 37 L. R. A. 384, 45 N. E. 647, 47

N. E. 8.

A statute that directs a tax officer to seize for taxes personal property in the hands of the court is unconstitutional and

error:

In general terms "due process of law" is synonymous with "law of the land."

Cooley, Const. Lim. chap. 11, p. 430; 2 Hare, Am. Const. Law, p. 836; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

"Due process of law" is an investigation machinery; a judicial investiga

h

French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 879, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625: Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. ed. 658; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 26 L. ed. 253; Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441, 25 L. ed. 327; De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U. S. 517, 25 L. ed. 174; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37, 24 L. ed. 335; Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372.

The legislature may prescribe the kind of notice and the mode in which it shall be given.

Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 2 L. R. A. 655, 19 N. E. 474; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 188, 30 Am. Rep. 289.

*Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion [303] of the court:

To answer the questions presented to us in this record requires an examination of two sections of the Indiana Revised Statutes, which read as follows:

"Sec. 8560. Whenever the county auditor shall discover or receive credible information, or if he shall have reason to believe that any real or personal property has, from any cause, been omitted, in whole or in part in the assessment of any year or number of years, from the assessment book or from the tax duplicate, he shall proceed to correct the tax duplicate, and add such property thereto, with the proper valuation, and charge such property and the owner thereof with the proper amount of taxes thereon, all the powers of assessor under this act. But before making such correction or addition, if the person claiming to own such Property, or occupying it, or in possession thereof, resides in the county and is not present, he shall give such person notice, in writing, of his intention to add such property to the tax duplicate, describing it in general terms, and requiring such person to appear before him at his office at a specified time, within five days after giving such notice, and to show cause, if any, why such property should not be added to the tax duplicate; and if the party so notified does not appear, or if he appears and fails to show any good and sufficient cause why such assessment *shall not be made, the same [304] shall be made, and the county auditor shall in all cases file in his office a statement of the facts or evidence on which he made such

to enable him to do which he is invested with

correction; but he shall in no case reduce | on the fact that Edward P. Gallup, though
the amount returned by the assessor, with-
out the written consent of the auditor of
state, given on the statement of facts sub-
mitted by the county auditor."

acting as executor of William P. Gallup, deceased, in the county of Marion, Indiana, was, at the time he was served with the auditor's notice, not a resident of that "Sec. 8587. It shall be the duty of every county, but was a resident of the state of administrator, executor, guardian, receiver. New Hampshire; and the contention is that, trustee, or person having the property of though he received such a notice, yet he was any decedent, infant, idiot, or insane per- not within the letter of the statute because son in charge, to pay the taxes due upon not a resident of the county in which the the property of such decedent, ward, or par- property was situated, and therefore the noty, and, in case of his neglecting to pay any tice actually given him was not a notice in instalment of taxes when due, when there point of law, and the auditor, in proceeding is money enough on hand to pay the same, with the duties of his office, acted without the county treasurer shall present to the jurisdiction, and that consequently the circuit or other proper court of the county, plaintiff in error has been deprived of his at its next term thereafter, a brief state-property without due process of law. ment in writing, signed by him as such county treasurer, setting forth the fact and amount of such delinquency, and such court shall at once issue an order directed to such delinquent, commanding him to show cause within five days thereafter why such tax and penalty and costs should not be paid, and, upon his failing to show good and sufficient cause for such nonpayment, the court shall order him to pay such tax out of the assets in his hands belonging to the estate of said decedent, ward, or other person; and such delinquent shall not be entitled to any credit, in any settlement of said trust, for the penalty, interest, and cost occasioned by such delinquency, or by the order to show cause, but the same shall be a personal charge against him, and he shall be liable, on his official bond, for such penalty, interest, and costs."

The Supreme Court of Indiana disposed of this contention by holding "that appellant [Edward P. Gallup] was an official resident of Marion county at the time the proceeding by the auditor was commenced, and therefore within the express terms of the section."

This construction of the section is criticized by the learned counsel of the plaintiff in error as novel, and unsupported by authority. However this may be, it is a construction or application of the statute to the case in hand, and is binding upon us.

It is strongly urged that whether the view of the Indiana supreme court be sound or not, in interpreting the section to *cover the [306] case of an official residence, the result is to deprive the plaintiff in error of rights and privileges secured to him by the Constitution of the United States; and numerous cases are cited to the effect that assessments and special burdens upon taxpayers are void unless the law provides for notice, and that notice in fact is not equivalent to notice in law. It is claimed that the plaintiff in error has been afforded no opportunity to be heard, and that because the section provides for notice to residents of the county, and for no notice whatever to nonresidents of the state and county, a case of discriminative legislation is created whereby nonresidents are denied the equal protection of the laws.

To these suggestions the supreme court of Indiana replied by saying:

Having alleged that he was and during all of his life had been a citizen of the United States, and that at no time during the year 1894 or since has he resided in Marion county, Indiana, but that during said year and ever since he has continually been and still was a resident and citizen of Lebanon, in the state of New Hampshire, Edward P. Gallup claimed, in the courts below, that in $8560, providing for the assessment of omitted property by the county auditor, no provision whatever is made for notice to any person not a resident of the county in which said omitted property is proposed to [305] be assessed, *but that the sole provision for such notice is to person or persons resident "He [Gallup] was in a situation to avail of such county, and that by reason of the himself of all the rights and privileges he premises said statute is in violation of the asserts are unjustly denied to nonresidents, 14th Amendment to the Constitution of and, while himself not aggrieved, he will not the United States, in that said statute de- be permitted to assail a revenue statute on prived him of his property without due pro- behalf of others who are making no comcess of law; denied to him the equal protec-plaint. The courts are open to those only tion of the laws; also denies to him, as a citizen of New Hampshire, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by a citizen of Marion county, Indiana, contrary to the 2d section of article 4 of the Constitution of the United States; and that said statute is further invalid in that it grants to a class of citizens, namely, residents of the particular county in which the property sought to be assessed is situate, privileges and immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens.

This arraignment of the statute is based

who are injured.

The as

Conceding all
that appellant affirms concerning his resi
dence and the absence of any provision in §
8560 for service of notice on nonresidents,
still he is not in a situation to complain
that he has had no day in court.
sessment by the auditor, right or wrong,
was not a final judgment. It was only
prinia facie correct. The courts were open
to appellant, even though a nonresident, to
challenge it by injunction. Failing thus to
seek relief against it, the treasurer appealed
to the circuit court for an order against

him to show cause why he did not pay the
taxes. The jurisdiction of the circuit court
over its executor will not be controverted,
even though his personal residence is in New
Hampshire He was ordered by the court
to show cause, if he had any, why he did not
pay the taxes. In response to the order any
defense he had or ever had was open to him.

"It is no longer an open question in this
state that if a party against whose prop-

ance rendering it void in case other Insurance had been or should be made upon the property unless by agreement Indorsed thereon or attached thereto, because its agent had notice or knowledge of the existence of other insurance in another company at the time he delivered the policy and received the premium, where such policy also provided that "no officer, agent, or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy, except such as by the terms of the policy may be the

erty an assessment has been made is, at subject of agreement indorsed hereon or added any time in the course of the proceeding be[307] fore a conclusive judgment, *afforded by law an opportunity to contest its correctness, he is accorded due process of law."

0

hereto; and as to such provisions or conditions no officer, agent, or representative shall have power or be deemed or held to have waived such provisions or conditions, unless such waiver, if any, shall be written upon or attached hereto: nor shall any privilege or permission affecting the insurance under this policy exist or be claimed by the insured unless so written or attached."

[No. 60.]

6, 1902.

It has frequently been held by this court, when asked to review tax proceedings in state courts, that due process of law is afforded litigants if they have an opportunity to question the validity or the amount of an assessment or charge before the amount is determined, or at any subsequent proceedings to enforce its collection, or at Argued October 28, 1901. Decided January any time before final judgment is entered. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 31 L. ed. 763, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138, 41 L. ed. 949, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, post, 196, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213. In the present case the plaintiff in error not only had an opportunity to appear and to set up any defense that he may have had, but actually did appear, and, after his demurrers and motion to dismiss had been overruled, answered, and was fully heard in the trial court. His objections to the findings and rulings of that court have been heard and considered by the supreme court

WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a decision which aflirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska in favor of plaintiff in an action on a policy of fire in

surance. Reversed.

See same case below, 41 C. C. A. 207, 101 Fed. 77.

Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: *In September, 1898, the Grand View [309] Building Association, a corporation organized under the laws of Nebraska, in the district court of Lancaster county of that state, brought an action against the Northern AsThe method followed by the auditor insurance Company of London, incorporated assessing the additional taxes was perhaps open to criticism, but was approved by the circuit and supreme courts, and presents no question over which we have jurisdiction.

of the state.

Failing to see that any rights or privileges secured to the plaintiff in error by the Constitution of the United States have been denied him, we are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana must be affirmed.

under the laws of the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, seeking to recover the sum of $2,500 as due under the terms of a policy of insurance that had been issued by the assurance company to the plaintiff company on December 31, 1896, on certain property situated in said Lancaster county, and which, on June 1, 1898, had been destroyed by fire.

Thereupon the defendant company filed in the said county court a petition and bond, in due form, and prayed for an order reinoving the cause to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska; and on September 29, 1898, the county court approved the bond, and entered an order granting the prayer of the petition for re moval.

Subsequently the case was put at issue on the petition, answer, and reply in the circuit court of the United States, and was so proceeded in that, on October 20, 1898, a special verdict was found by the jury empaneled in the case, and on January 14, 1899, a final judgment was entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant company

NOTE. On the effect of knowledge by insur On waiver of terms and conditions in an iner's agent of falsity of statements in applica-surance policy-see notes to Lamberton v. Contion-see note to Clemans v. Supreme Assembly necticut F. Ins. Co. (Minn.) 1 L. R. A. 222; R. S. of G. F. (N. Y.) 16 L. R. A. 33. McGurk v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (Conn.) 1 213

in the sum of $2,500, with interest and costs. | dence showing that he has a much larger The cause was then taken to the United authority than this, empowered to waive [310] States circuit court of appeals for the eighth conditions so important that parties have circuit, and that court, on March 26, 1900, seen fit to incorporate them into their conaffirmed the judgment of the circuit court. tract. 41 C. C. A. 207, 101 Fed. 77. Thereafter, on petition of the defendant company, a writ of certiorari was allowed, in response to which the record and proceedings in the cause were brought to this court.