of the governing body of the corporation by the same name in which they were addressed to an application made to the corporation? I think not. According to the plaintiff's letter he was making a proposition by which the company were to guarantee him the amount of his salary for six months after he should leave their service. Looking at it alone there is nothing to shew that he desired the personal undertaking of the defendant or of the directors, nor is there any reason suggested for his so desiring it, except that the corporation by their proposed arrangement might be merged in another company. But by the memorandum put in by Mr. Whitney it seems that he was secretary and treasurer of the Grand Trunk Telegraph Company from August 1854 to May 1855, and up to that time it cannot be said the corporation was dissolved.

What is there to shew that the plaintiff ever contemplated making any arrangement with the defendant or the directors individually? The letter of the plaintiff put in does not shew it, and the reply thereto of the defendant would not of itself make a complete bargain on his individual behalf, so that it could have been enforced at once without some further act of the defendant. If the acceptance of the plaintiff's offer had been such as to bind the company (as if the act incorporating the company authorized the president and directors eo nomine without seal, and by the signature of the president alone to bind the company) then I apprehend the agreement was complete from the acceptance of the plaintiff's offer, and could, if in other respects legal, be enforced. But if the letter of the defendant is held to create an agreement by which he is to make himself personally liable, what does he undertake? In my judgment, no more than this-viz., that the company would hold themselves bound to pay his salary for six months after the 1st of January, 1855, in the event of his leaving their service on that day: the provision mentioned by plaintiff, which defendant undertakes to carry out, being "upon the company's guaranteeing him the continuation of his salary, &c.

The declaration sets out the agreement in the first count to the effect that the defendant promised the plaintiff that his

salary at the rate of £400 a year should be paid to him for six months after the 1st of January, 1855. In the second count the undertaking stated in effect that the defendant would pay plaintiff his salary for six months after the 1st of January. In the view I take of the contract as a personal one, the agreement of the plaintiff is not properly set out in the declaration, and the defendant's undertaking would not necessarily imply the same damages for a breach of it as that stated in the declaration. Of course an absolute undertaking to pay plaintiff's salary, or that his salary should be paid, implies that whatever is due for salary shall be given as damages for a breach of the undertaking; but if he merely undertook that the company would agree to continue his salary for six months after he left their employment, the measure of damages for a breach of such a contract might be very different from what should be given on a breach of the contract set out either in the first or second count of the declaration.

I have looked at all the authorities referred to which are within my reach, and have arrived at the conclusion that the proper construction to put on the agreement is, that all parties intended that the company should agree to continue the plaintiff his salary at the rate of £400 a year for six months after (1st of January, 1855,) he should leave their employment. The mere fact that such agreement cannot be enforced for want of a seal, or being signed by the secretary, does not shew that it was intended to create a personal liability on the part of the defendant. I consider that the circumstance of the company having paid the plaintiff £85 88. 4d. on account of his salary or allowance since the 1st of January, 1855, when he left the company, and for which he gave a receipt for so much money received from the company, is conclusive as to the view that all parties took of the agreement for more than two months after it was entered into.

On the whole I am of opinion that the verdict for the defendant should stand, as there was no undertaking entered into by the defendant under which he can be legally made liable for the plaintiff's claim; and even if there was any agreement by the plaintiff personally, it was not such as is

set out in the declaration.

And if a new trial should be had

it could only be on payment of costs.

I think much of the reasoning of the learned judges' of the court of Queen's Bench for Upper Canada in giving judgment in Johnson v. Hamilton (13 U. C. Q. B. 211), which will apply in this case.

Rule absolute.

THROOP V. THE COBOURG AND PETERBORO' RAILWAY

COMPANY.

Accretion of alluvial deposit-Ejectment.

This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff against the defendants for the recovery of a portion of ground known as lot No. 17 broken front in concession B. of the township of Hamilton, now in the town of Cobourg, adjoining lake Ontario. The defence was limited to a small portion bordering upon the lake, which had been formed by the waves washing up sand, gravel and alluvial deposit, and thereby extending the bank inwards upon the lake. The deeds under which the plaintiff claimed title conveyed to the "bank of lake Ontario, thence along the said bank the several courses thereof." It appeared in evidence that so much alluvial deposit had been washed upon the shore and even upon the bank of the lake that all traces of the former bank were now obliterated, and could only be discerned by digging through the surface or new soil. The question was, whether the owner of the land described as adjoining the lake and extending to the bank had shewn a good title to the new soil which had thus attached itself to the bank of the lake.

Held, that as the owner of the bank would, by the encroachment of the lake, be the loser (the owner of the shore, consisting of the part between high and low water-mark, always being able to claim the shore whether it shifted or not), so he should be entitled to the benefit of the extension of the bank seawards, upon the principle that whoever would sustain the injury should also be entitled to the benefit: McLean, J., dissentiente. Writ issued on the 28th of January, 1854. Ejectment for part of lot No. 17 broken front concession B. of the township of Hamilton now in the town of Cobourg, thus described:-commencing at the south-east angle of land now owned and occupied by John Coulter, on the west side of First-street in the town of Cobourg; then southerly along the west side of Firststreet, and on the course thereof to the north side of the pier or breakwater recently made and erected between the two piers of the harbor of the town of Cobourg; then westerly along the north side of the said pier or breakwater two chains fifteen links; then northerly, parallel with First-street, to the south-west angle of said land owned and occcupied by said John Coulter; then easterly along the southern boundary of

said Coulter's land two chains fifteen links, more or less, to the place of beginning.

On the 9th of March, 1854, defendants appeared, and limited their defence to the premises thus described:-commencing on the west side of First-street at a point seven chains and ninety-eight links south from King-street; then southerly in the same course as the west side of First-street to the north side of the pier or breakwater aforesaid; then westerly along the north side of the said pier or breakwater two chains fifteen links; then northerly, parallel with the said continuation of First-street as aforesaid until the same intersects a line from the place of beginning drawn south seventyfour degrees west; then easterly along the said last mentioned. line to the place of beginning.

The government grant is dated the 29th of January, 1855, to Nathaniel Herriman, all that, &c., containing by admeasurement 240 acres, with allowance for road, more or less, being lot No. 17 in the broken front of the township of Hamilton, thus described:-commencing in front upon lake Ontario at the south-east angle of the said lot; then north sixteen degrees west one hundred and twenty chains more or less, to the allowance for road in the front of the first concession; then south seventy-four degrees west twenty chains more or less to the limit between lots Nos. 17 and 18; then south sixteen degrees east to lake Ontario; then northeasterly along the water's edge to the place of beginning.

It appeared or was admitted at the trial that by deed of bargain and sale, dated the 16th of July, 1808, Nathaniel Herriman conveyed to Nathan Williams ninety acres more or less, composed of the front part of lot No. 17 in the broken concession, with the lands in front of the said lot, thus described commencing in front upon lake Ontario at the south-east angle of the said lot No. 17; then north sixteen degrees west forty-five chains, to the lands sold to Moses Ally; then south seventy-four degrees west twenty chains more or less, to the limits between lots Nos. 17 and 18; then south sixteen degrees east forty-five chains more or less, to lake Ontario; then north-easterly along the water's edge to the place of beginning.

Nathan Williams conveyed to John Ross on the 16th of

January, 1811. By deed of bargain and sale, dated the 11th of April, 1812, John Ross conveyed to Timothy Kittridge two acres and one rood, more or less, being all that certain parcel or tract of land lying and being situate in the township of Hamilton, containing by admeasurement two acres and one rood, be the same more or less, being composed of part of lot No. 17 in the broken front adjoining lake Ontario, which said parcel or tract of land is butted and bounded, or may be otherwise known as follows, being part of lot No. 17 in the broken front adjoining lake Ontario, thus described: beginning at the bank of lake Ontario at the south-east angle of the said broken front; then north sixteen degrees west two chains thirty-two links, more or less, to the south-east angle of Elijah Buck's land; then south seventy-four degrees west eighty-eight links; then north sixteen degrees west five chains and sixty-eight links; then south seventy-four degrees west one chain fifty links; then south one degree nine minutes east eight chains twenty links, to the bank of lake Ontario; thence along the said bank the several courses thereof to the place of beginning; and also all hereditaments and appurtenances unto the said parcel or tract of land belonging or in anywise appertaining.

By deed of bargain and sale, dated the 22nd of April, 1812, John Ross conveyed to Elijah Buck part (off the eastern side) of the land in front of lot No. 17 in the broken concession of said township of Hamilton, containing by admeasurement two roods more or less, thus described :-beginning at the north-east angle or corner of Timothy Kittridge's land, then south sixteen degrees east five chains sixty-eight links; then north seventy-four degrees east eighty-eight links to the road; then north sixteen degrees west five chains sixtyeight links; then south seventy-four degrees west eightyeight links to the place of beginning.

By deed of bargain and sale, dated the 22nd of March, 1813, John Ross conveyed to James Williams eighty-eight acres and a half, including three small parts already granted out of the said tract-namely, one to Elijah Buck, containing half an acre, one to Timothy Kittridge containing two acres and a quarter, and one to Jacob Fering containing one