Lapas attēli

dealers, one selling their own domestic wines, and another selling all
intoxicants except domestic wines. (Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U. S. 540, distinguished.) Cox v. Texas, 446.

Legislative power. See CONGRESS, B 2.
Personal rights. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4, 5.

5. States; prohibition against prejudice by Congress of claim of particular

As the act admitting Mississippi was passed five years after the act ad-

mitting Louisiana Congress could not take away any portion of Louisi-
ana, and give it to Mississippi. Section 3, Art. IV of the Constitution
does not permit the claims of any particular State to be prejudiced
by the exercise of the power of Congress therein conferred. Louisiana
v. Mississippi, 1.

Suits against · States. See ACTION, 2.


A. OF GRANTS OF FRANCHISES. See Constitutional Law, 2.
B. OF STATUTES. See Statutes, A.

1. Consideration; effect of, when contrary to public policy.
Every part of the consideration for a contract goes equally to the whole

promise, and if any part of it is contrary to public policy the whole
promise falls. Hazelton v. Sheckells, 71.

2. Against public policy where part of consideration the procurement of legis-

A contract to deliver property at an agreed price within the duration of a

specified session of Congress, it being understood that a part of the
consideration is that the person to whom the property is to be con-
veyed is to endeavor to sell it to the United States and to procure
legislation to that end-he not being under obligation to take and
pay for the property-is void as against public policy and specific
performance will not be enforced. Ib.

3. Government; reformation on ground of mutual mistake-Sufficiency of

evidence to justify reformationJurisdiction of Court of Claims.
A corporation having a contract with the Government to imprint revenue

stamps received notice as to renewal which, among other things, stated
that no application for such contracts would be considered from per-
sons not already having one; the corporation applied for and obtained
a renewal and the contract when delivered contained no provision for
not giving contracts to persons not then engaged in imprinting stamps;

during its life a similar contract was given to such a person and the
corporation sued in the Court of Claims for reformation of its contract
on ground that the omission was mutual mistake and also for loss of
profits on business diverted to such person. The Court of Claims took
jurisdiction and awarded damages. Held, by this court in reversing
the judgment on the merits, while reformation of the contract is not
an incident to an action at law, and can only be granted in equity
under $ 1 of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, the Court of Claims
has jurisdiction to reform a contract, and of the money claim under
the contract as it should have been drawn. On the evidence in this
case there was no mutual mistake justifying the reformation of the
contract. United States v. Milliken Imprinting Co., 168.

4. Specific performance, where party has conveyed property to one who is

free from equities.
A judgment for defendant in an action for specific performance based on a

finding of fact, among others, that defendant has conveyed the prop-
erty to an innocent purchaser for value cannot be reversed, as specific
performance is impossible where the party to the contract has con-
veyed the property to one who is free from equities. Halsell v. Ren-
frow, 287.


Local Law (OKLA.).




Incidents of power to mortgage franchises.
The power given under the state law to a corporation to mortgage its fran-

chises and privileges necessarily includes the power to bring them to
sale and make the mortgage effectual, and the purchaser acquires title
thereto although the corporate right to exist may not be sold. Vicks-
burg v. Waterworks Co., 453.

See Local Law (Miss.); STATES;


1. Allowance of costs in original actions between States.
This court has power to allow costs in original actions and in any actions

between States, the successful State may ask for costs or not as it sees
fit, and there is no absolute rule that in boundary cases the costs are
divided. Costs, therefore, are allowed to the defendant in this suit in

which the plaintiff alleged serious pecuniary damage, and framed its
bill like the ordinary bill of a private person to restrain a nuisance.
Missouri v. Illinois, 598.

2. Solicitor's fee for witnesses examined before examiner.
The solicitor's fee of $2.50 for each witness examined before the examiner

and admitted in evidence was properly allowed as fees for depositions
under $ 824, Rev. Stat. Ib.

1. Power to issue mandatory injunction.
Courts have no power to issue a mandatory injunction requiring a mu-

nicipality to construct a sewer, in a particular manner irrespective of
the exercise of discretion vested in the municipal authorities to deter-
mine the practicability of the sewer, the availability of taxation for
the purpose, and like matters. Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 453.

2. Discretion to permit withdrawal of original bill and strike out testimony.
As a general rule, and so held in this case, it is discretionary with, and

under the control of, the trial court to permit the withdrawal by an
intervenor of its original bill, and to strike out testimony taken con-
cerning the same. Ib.

3. Power to mitigate penalties imposed by Congress.
Where Congress has provided a specific penalty for failing to comply with

a statutory provision and obligation, it is not within the province of
courts of equity to mitigate the harshness of the penalty or forfeiture or
to grant relief running directly counter to the statutory requirements.

United States v. Dieckerhoff, 302.
4. Interference with administration of Land Department.
It is not the province of the courts to interfere with the administration

of the Land Department, and until the land is patented inquiry as to
equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the Department and
the courts will not anticipate its action. Oregon v. Hitchcock, 60.

5. Effect of absence of formal order of court to prevail over its essential action.
The absence of a formal order by the court need not necessarily prevail

over its essential action. Where appellant's only assignment of error
on an appeal from the Supreme Court of a Territory is that the court
had not acquired jurisdiction of the property in that suit because it
was in its custody in another suit in which a receiver had been ap
pointed, and the receivership had not been extended or the actions
consolidated, but the record clearly shows that the District Court
considered the cases as consolidated, and empowered the receiver
appointed in the first suit to sell the property and apply the proceeds
as directed in the second suit, and that such decree was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the Territory and by this court, the assignments
are without foundation and the decree will be affirmed. Gila Bend
Co. v. Water Co., 270.

6. Supreme Court of District of Columbia as a court of the United States.
Without deciding whether the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia

is or is not an inferior court of the United States within the meaning
of § 1 of Art. III of the Constitution of the United States, it is a court
of the United States within the meaning of g 714, Rev. Stat., the pro-
visions whereof apply to judges of that, and of any other, court of the
United States holding office by life tenure. In so deciding the court
follows the evidently correct construction given to the statute by the
legislative and executive departments of the Government since the
original enactment of the statute. James v. United States, 401.

7. Salary of justice of Supreme Court of District of Columbia during retire-

A justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, retiring during

the year ending June 30, 1893, is entitled to receive during his retire-
ment five thousand dollars per annum that being the salary of the office
as fixed by the appropriation act for the previous year, and the appro-
priation act for the year ending June 30, 1893, while only appropriating
a lump sum for all the justices of the court amounting to four thousand
dollars each will not be construed as reducing the salary to that amount
in view of the subsequent deficiency appropriation act appropriating an
amount sufficient to make the salaries for that year five thousand
dollars. Ib.

8. Power of Congress to retroactively fix salary of justices.
Congress has power wholly irrespective of prior legislation retroactively

to fix the salary payable to a justice of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and as the effect of the act of 1895 was a determina-
tion of Congress that the salary of the justices of that court for the
year ending June 30, 1893, was five thousand dollars this court cannot
disregard the retroactive effect of the statute. Ib.

Costs, 1;


CONGRESS, B 4; Local Law (Porto Rico);







1. Challenges; right of Government to.
The passage of the act of July 20, 1840, 5 Stat. 394, and of $ 800, Rev. Stat.,

granting peremptory challenges to the Government in criminal cases,
has not taken away the right to conditional or qualified challenges when
permitted in the State, and where it has been adopted by the Federal
court as a rule or by special order. The exercise of the right is under
supervision of the court which should not permit it to be used unreason-
ably or so as to prejudice defendant. It is not an unreasonable exercise
of the priviege where, notwithstanding its exercise, neither the Govern-
ment nor the defendant exhausted all of their peremptory challenges.
Sawyer v. United States, 150.

2. Trial; remarks by counsel; cure of impropriety.
While a remark by the District Attorney in summing up that “a man

under such circumstances who could drink a cup of coffee ought to be
hung on general principles,” is improper, if, on protest of defendant's
counsel, the court stops the District Attorney, who apologizes and
withdraws the remark, an exception by defendant is frivolous and
the court is not open to censure for so describing it. Ib.

3. Trial; statement by court constituting error.
There is no reversible error in the court stating in a trial for murder of

several persons that defendant was not charged with the murder of a
person whose name is stated in the bill as having been murdered, the
court also saying that if he was so charged there was no evidence to
support the charge. Ib.

4. Waiver by accused of privilege of silence.
Where defendant takes the stand in his own behalf he waives his constitu-

tional privilege of silence and the prosecution has the right to cross-
examine him upon his evidence in chief with the same latitude as though
he were an ordinary witness as to circumstances connecting him with
the crime, and even if, as claimed in this case, the subject matter of
the cross-examination has no tendency to connect the witness with
the crime if it is plain that there is no injury the exception is not avail-
able. Ib.

5. Indictment; sufficiency to acquaint accused with nature and cause of ac-

Where the indictment clearly discloses all the elements essential to the

commission of the offense charged, and the averments are sufficient in
the event of acquittal, to plead the judgment in lieu of a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense, the defendant is informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion and according to the rules of pleading;—and in this case the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify the case being sent to the jury and the
court below did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal, nor was

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