2. Extent of court's recognition of rights of attachment creditors.
The extent to which the bankruptcy court shall recognize the rights ob-
tained by creditors upon property attached as property of the bank-
rupt, but which has been conveyed by unrecorded contract, and the
extent to which liens obtained by prior judicial proceedings shall be
recognized are wholly within the discretion of Congress. Ib.
1. Validity of bond given collector of customs under § 2899, Rev. Stat.
A bond given by an importer to a collector of customs and purporting to
be executed under cover of § 2899, Rev. Stat., conditioned in double
the value of packages delivered to the importer by the collector and
to be forfeited if such packages are opened without consent of the
collector and in presence of an inspector, or if not returned to collector
on his demand therefor, is a valid bond, for, although not conditioned
in express words of the statute, it does not run counter thereto and it
is within the authority of the collector to accept it. United States v.
Dieckerhoff, 302.
2. Recovery on such bond.
Under such a bond the obligation is fixed and the Government is not re-
quired to prove any actual loss or damage but is entitled to recover
the full amount specified in the bond-double the value of the package
ordered to be returned- -as a definite sum, to be paid by the importer
for nonfulfillment of his statutory duty; and this obligation is not
affected by anything contained in § 961, Rev. Stat., limiting recoveries
on forfeitures to amount due in equity. Ib.
1. Between States of Louisiana and Mississippi.
The real, certain and true boundary south of the State of Mississippi and
north of the southeast portion of the State of Louisiana, and separating
the two States in the waters of Lake Borgne, is the deep water channel
sailing line emerging from the most eastern mouth of Pearl river into
Lake Borgne and extending through the northeast corner of Lake
Borgne, north of Half Moon or Grand Island, thence east and south
through Mississippi Sound, through South Pass between Cat Island
and Isle à Pitre to the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 1.
2. Effect of long acquiescence and sovereignty.
As between the States of the Union long acquiescence in the assertion of a
particular boundary, and the exercise of sovereignty over the territory
within it, should be accepted as conclusive, whatever the international
rule may be in respect of the acquisition by prescription of large tracts
of country claimed by two States. Ib.
3. Meaning of term "thalweg."
The term thalweg is commonly used by writers on international law in
the definition of water boundaries between States, meaning the middle
or deepest or most navigable channel and while often styled “fairway”
or "midway" or "main channel,” the word has been taken over into
various languages and the doctrine of the thalweg is often applicable
in respect of water boundaries to sounds, bays, straits, gulfs, estuaries
and other arms of the sea, and also applies to boundary lakes
and land-locked seas whenever there is a deep water sailing channel
therein. Ib.
4. Between States of Iowa and Illinois.
The boundary line between the State of Iowa and the State of Illinois is
the middle of the main navigable channel of the Mississippi river at
the places where the nine bridges mentioned in the pleadings cross
said river. Iowa v. Illinois, 59.
BREACH OF PROMISE.
See LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO), 4.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 4.
Rates-Right of recovery by shipper obtaining less than published rates.
One obtaining from a common carrier transportation of goods from one
State to another at a rate specified in the bill of lading, less than the
schedule rates published and approved and in force at the time, whether
he does or does not know the rate is less than schedule rate, is not en-
titled to recover the goods, or damages for their detention, upon ten-
dering payment of the amount specified in the bill of lading, or of any
sum less than the published charges. Whatever may be the rate agreed
upon, the carrier's lien on the goods is, by force of the Interstate Com-
merce Law, the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates and
charges, and this lien can be discharged, and the consignee become
entitled to the goods, only by payment or tender of such amount.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 242.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, distinguished in Cox v.
Texas, 446.
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, distinguished in Naganab v. Hitch-
cock, 473.
Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, followed in Security Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 246.
First National Bank v. Staake, 202 U. S. 141, followed in McHarg v. Staake,
150.
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60, followed in Naganab v. Hitchcock, 473.
United States v. American Sugar Co. 202 U. S. 563, followed in Franklin
Sugar Co. v. United States, 580.
Lincoln v. United States, 197 U. S. 419, reaffirmed in 202 U. S. 484.
1. Constitutional power to make acts of its members offenses against United
States.
Congress has power to make it an offense against the United States for a
Senator or Representative, after his election and during his continu-
ance in office, to agree to receive, or to receive, compensation for services
before a Department of the Government, in relation to matters in which
the United States is directly or indirectly interested, and § 1782,
Rev. Stat., is not repugnant to the Constitution as interfering, nor
does it by its necessary operation, interfere with the legitimate au-
thority of the Houses of Congress over their respective members. Bur-
ton v. United States, 344.
2. Revenue bills; what deemed.
Revenue bills, within the meaning of the constitutional provision that they
must originate in the House of Representatives and not in the Senate
are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word and are not
bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue. Millard
v. Roberts, 429.
3. Validity of acts of 1901 and 1903 for railroad improvements in District
of Columbia; character as bills for raising revenue.
The acts of Congress of February 12, 1901, 31 Stat. 767, 774, and of Feb-
ruary 28, 1903, 32 Stat. 909, for eliminating grade crossings of railways
and erection of a union station in the District of Columbia and provid-
ing for part of the cost thereof by appropriations to be levied and
assessed on property in the District other than that of the United
States are not unconstitutional either because as bills for raising revenue
they should have originated in the House or Representatives and not
in the Senate, or because they appropriate moneys to be paid to the
railway companies for their exclusive use; and assuming but not de-
ciding that he can raise the question by suit, a taxpayer of the District
is not oppressed or deprived of his property without due process of
law by reason of the taxes imposed under said statutes. Ib.
4. Scope of ratification by.
A ratification by act of Congress, will not be extended to cover what was
not, in the judgment of the courts, intended to be covered, because
otherwise the ratification would be meaningless or unnecessary. Con-
gress out of abundant caution may ratify, and at times has ratified,
that which was subsequently found not to have needed ratification.
Lincoln v. United States, 484.
See BANKRUPTCY, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;
COURTS, 8.
C. INTENTION OF.
See LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO), 1.
CONSIDERATION.
See CONTRACTS, 1, 2.
CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS.
See COURTS, 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Commerce clause. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
1. Contracts; impairment of obligation by state statute.
Where complainant claims title to land in California under Mexican grants
confirmed by the Board of Land Commissioners as the State of Cali-
fornia is not in the line of such titles a statute of that State conferring
water rights on a city does not deprive complainants of their property
or impair the obligation of any contract as the State can only confer
whatever rights in such waters had vested in it. Devine v. Los Angeles,
313.
2. Contracts; grant of exclusive franchise constituting contract within impair-
ment clause.
While grants of franchises are to be strictly construed in favor of the public
and nothing is to be taken by implication, where the city has, as in this
case, by the terms of the contract given the grantee the exclusive right
to erect, maintain and operate waterworks for a definite period it can-
not, under the impairment clause of the Constitution, erect and operate,
under ordinances subsequently enacted, its own water system during
the life of the franchise and subject the company to that competition.
Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 453.
3. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Constitutionality of New
York franchise tax law.
The taxation of cars under the New York franchise tax law, belonging to
a New York corporation is not unconstitutional as depriving the owner
of its property without due process of law because the cars are at times
temporarily absent from the State-it appearing that no cars perma-
nently without the State are taxed. New York Central R. R. Co. v.
Miller, 584.
4. Equal protection of laws-Validity of Texas liquor tax law; effect of dis-
tinction as to wines produced from home grown grapes.
The provisions in the liquor tax law of 1895 of Texas in regard to the sale
of liquor to minors, and the liability of the licensee on the bond required
to be given in regard thereto, are not unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, by the terms
of the statute, they do not apply to wines produced from grapes grown
in the State while in the hands of the producers or manufacturers
thereof, it not appearing that there are any distinct classes of liquor
|