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fact. There is no merit in the contention that there is a want of jurisdiction to entertain the writ of error.

2. We think the real object of the bill may properly be said to have been the restraining of illegal interferences with the property and interstate business of the railway company, the asserted right to interfere, which it was the object of the bill to enjoin, being based upon the assumed authority of a state statute, which the bill alleged to be in violation of rights of the railway company protected by the Constitution of the United States. In this aspect the suit was not in any proper sense one against the State. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 112; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 529, 530.

3. The cars of coal not having been delivered to the consignee, but remaining on the tracks of the railway company in the condition in which they had been originally brought into North Carolina from points outside of that State, it follows that the interstate transportation of the property had not been completed when the corporation commission made the order complained of. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412.

By section 1066 of the revisal of 1905 the general powers of the North Carolina Corporation Commission were thus defined:

“1066. General powers.—The corporation commission shall have such general control and supervision of all railroad, street railway, steamboat, canal, express and sleeping car companies or corporations and of all other companies or corporations engaged in the carrying of freight or passengers, of all telegraph and telephone companies, of all public and private banks and all loan and trust companies or corporations, and of all building and loan associations or companies, necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this chapter, and the laws regulating such companies. (1899, c. 164; 1901, c. 679.)”

By section 1100 it was provided as follows:

"1100. Demurrage; storage; placing and loading of cars.The commission shall make rules, regulations and rates governing demurrage and storage charges by railroad companies and other transportation companies; and shall make rules gov

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erning railroad companies in the placing of cars for loading and unloading and in fixing time limit for delivery of freights after the same have been received by the transportation companies for shipment. (1903, c. 342.)”

Under these circumstances it is undoubted that by a circular, numbered 36 and dated July 9, 1903, the corporation commission promulgated rules fully regulating the right of railway companies to exact and the amount of charges which might be made for storage, demurrage, etc. And the pleadings make it clear that the order of the corporation commission complained of was not made upon the assumption of any supposed contract right which the corporation commission as a judicial tribunal was enforcing as between the ice and coal company and the railway company, but was exclusively rested upon the general administrative authority which the corporation commission deemed it had power to exercise in virtue of the rights delegated to it by the statutes of North Carolina as above stated. Thus, in paragraph 12 of the answer, the corporation commission averred as follows:

“These defendants are advised that the orders made by them, hereinbefore referred to, do not constitute an interference with interstate commerce as alleged in said paragraph 12 (referring to bill of complaint); nor with the right of the complainant to conduct its business according to its reasonable rules and regulations, except so far as the corporation commission has the right and power to control its rules and regulations by virtue of said act creating the corporation commission, and the amendment thereto, contained in chapter 342, Public Laws, 1903, whereby the power is expressly conferred upon the North Carolina Corporation Commission, by subsection 26, 'to make rules governing railroad companies in the placing of cars for loading and unloading, and in fixing time limit for the delivery of freights after the same have been received by the transportation companies for shipment.' And these defendants further say that, having full power to provide for placing cars for unloading, and in conformity with the rules of the said North

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Carolina Corporation Commission, the orders complained of in the bill were in strict conformity to the law, and finally adjudged and made after the complainant company had full opportunity to make defense as to its alleged rights in the premises."

Without at all questioning the right of the State of North Carolina in the exercise of its police authority to confer upon an administrative agency the power to make many reasonable regulations concerning the place, manner and time of delivery of merchandise moving in the channels of interstate commerce, it is certain that any regulation of such subject made by the State or under its authority which directly burdens interstate commerce is a regulation of such commerce and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Houston & Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.

Not being called upon to do so, we do not pass upon all the general regulations formulated by the commission on the subject stated, but are clearly of opinion that the court below rightly held that the particular application of those regulations with which we are here concerned was a direct burden upon interstate commerce and void Viewing the order which is under consideration in this case as an assertion by the corporation commission of its general power to direct carriers engaged in interstate commerce to deliver all cars containing such commerce beyond their right of way and to a private siding, the order manifestly imposed a burden so direct and so onerous as to leave no room for question that it was a regulation of interstate commerce. On the other hand, treating the order as but the assertion of the power of the corporation commission to so direct in a particular case, in favor of a given person or corporation, the order not only was in its very nature a direct burden and regulation of interstate commerce, but also asserted a power concerning a subject directly covered by the act of Congress to regulate commerce and the amendments to that act, which forbid and provide remedies to prevent unjust dis

VOL. COII-36

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criminations and the subjecting to undue disadvantages by carriers engaged in interstate commerce.

The direct burden and resulting regulation of interstate commerce operated by an alleged assertion of state authority similar in character to the one here involved was passed upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 113. The court in that case was called upon to determine whether certain laws of Kentucky imposed a direct burden upon interstate commerce and were a regulation of such commerce, upon the assumption that those laws compelled a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce transportation to deliver cars of live stock moving in the channels of interstate commerce at a particular place beyond its own line different from the general place of delivery established by the railway company. In pointing out that if the legislation in question was entitled to the construction claimed for it, it would amount to a state regulation of interstate commerce, it was aptly and tersely said (p. 120):

“It is thoroughly well settled that a State may not regulate interstate commerce, using the terms in the sense of intercourse and the interchange of traffic between the States. In the case at bar we think the relief sought pertains to the transportation and delivery of interstate freight. It is not the means of making a physical connection with other railroads that is aimed at, but it is sought to compel the cars and freight received from one State to be delivered to another at a particular place and in a particular way. If the Kentucky constitution could be given any such construction, it would follow it could regulate interstate commerce. This it cannot do."

As we conclude that the court below rightly decreed that the order complained of was invalid because amounting to an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, we deem it unnecessary to consider the contentions made on the cross appeal of the railway company. And because we confine our decision to the issue which necessarily arises we do not intimate any

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opinion upon the question pressed at bar as to whether an order which was solely applicable to purely state business, directing a carrier to deliver property upon a private track beyond the line of the railway company, would be repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.

The final decree which the Circuit Court entered and the writ of perpetual injunction issued thereon were, however, much broader than the necessities of the case required, and should be limited so as to adjudge the invalidity of the order complained of, restrain the institution by the defendant of suits or actions for the recovery of penalties or damages founded upon the disobedience of such order, and forbid future interferences under like circumstances and conditions with the interstate commerce business of the railway company. As so modified, the decree below is

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COM

PANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 269. Argued April 27, 1906.- Decided May 28, 1906.

Under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11,

1902, and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903, imports from Cuba were not entitled to reduction of duties imposed by the tariff act of July 24, 1897, until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President of the United States and the President of Cuba for the com

mencement of the operation of the treaty. After the treaty was amended by the Senate and the amendment accepted

by Cuba the time of its going into effect was to be fixed by act of Congress and not as originally fixed by the treaty ten days after the exchange of ratifications.

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