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tion of a grant; and the title of plaintiff in error is, consequently, such a title as is and ought to be protected by the courts of the United States under the terms of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Smith v. State of Maryland, 6 Cranch, 286; United States v. Chavez, 159 U. S. 452; Tex. Mex. Ry. Co. v. Locke, 74 Texas, 370; Haynes v. State of Texas, 11 Tex. Ct. Rep. 885; State v. Russell, 11 Tex. Ct. Rep. 435; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 435; Ortiz v. State of Texas, 12 Tex. Ct. Rep. 476; The State v. Ortiz, 14 Tex. Ct. Rep. 883; Baldwin v. Goldfrank, 88 Texas, 257; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.

Mr. Charles K. Bell, Mr. Robert V. Davidson, Attorney General of the State of Texas, and Mr. William E. Hawkins, for defendant in error, submitted:

In a suit in a District Court of the State of Texas for land lying within that State, wherein the State is plaintiff and the defendant is an alien and a subject of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and a resident of the State of Tamaulipas, Mexico, the defendant is not entitled to have the case removed to the United States Circuit Court. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482; Texas v. O'Conor, 96 Texas, 492; Garland & Ralston, Fed. Prac. § 156.

Although the defendant, by plea, claimed to be the owner of the land in controversy, which was embraced in a "grant emanating, or claimed to have emanated from the Spanish government, and having its origin at such a time as to be, and being within the protection guaranteed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," his case involves no Federal question, the state courts having found the fact to be that defendant did not connect his title with such grant, the validity of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not "drawn in question."

The question as to the effect to be given to the judgment in Ruggles v. Texas, and as to which of the recitals, and as to how far such recitals in said judgment are binding upon the State of Texas upon the issue of "outstanding title," are local or general questions, and the judgment of the Supreme Court

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of Texas thereon will not be reviewed by this court, no Federal question being involved. Thayer v. Spratt, 189 U. S. 346, and cases cited; Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. & Land Co., 194 U. S. 220, and cases cited; Semple v. Hagar, 4 Wall. 431; Mining Co. v. Boggs, 3 Wall. 309; Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 187 U. S. 569; Jacks v. Helena, 115 U. S. 288; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Frazier, 139 U. S. 288; White v. Leovy, 174 U. S. 91; Minder v. Georgia, 183 U. S. 559; McKinney v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 51; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368.

Whether the District Court of Travis County, or the District Court of the county in which the land in controversy is situated, alone, had authority to try and determine the question of title to said land, is a local or state question upon which the decision of the courts of the State of Texas are final, and not subject to review in this court, no Federal question being involved. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 219; Avery v. Popper, 179 U. S. 315; Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 187 U. S. 569; White v. Leovy, 174 U. S. 91.

The state courts having found and held that the judgment of March 13, 1872, in the case of Ruggles v. State of Texas, under which defendant claims the land in controversy, was void, said judgment cannot be held to have vested in him, or in the plaintiff Ruggles under whom he claims, any right to said land, and hence the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas in favor of the State of Texas did not divest defendant of any vested right or title, nor deprive him of his property without due process of law, nor take his private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The judgment of the state court upon the question having been a question of local or general law, involving no Federal question, will not be reviewed by this court. White v. Leovy, 174 U. S. 91; California v. Holladay, 159 U. S. 415; Telluride Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 187

U. S. 569; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183; Gulf & Ship Island R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 67; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 219; Quinby v. Boyd, 128 U. S. 489; Merced Min. Co. v. Boggs, 3 Wall. 310; Eastern B. & L. Assn. v. Ebaugh, 185 U. S. 114; Taylor on Jurisdiction and Procedure of the U. S. Supreme Court, $249, and cases cited.

The question as to the effect to be given to the judgment of January 8, 1862, in the case of Ruggles v. State of Texas, and as to which of the recitals, and as to how far such recitals in said judgment are binding upon the State of Texas upon the issue of "outstanding title," are local or state questions, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas thereon will not be reviewed by this court, no Federal question being involved. San Francisco v. Itsell, 133 U. S. 65, and authorities cited supra.

Whether a grant should be presumed is, primarily, a question of fact for a jury, or, in the absence of a jury, for the trial court. The trial court having found against the defendant upon that issue and its judgment having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas the question is not open for review by this court. Under the facts and circumstances of the case no grant should be presumed in favor of defendant. Crespin v. United States, 168 U. S. 218; Chavez v. United States, 175 U. S. 563; Hays v. United States, 175 U. S. 148; Paschal v. Daingerfield, 37 Texas, 305; 2 White's Recopilacion, 562.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

On July 5, 1901, the State of Texas, under the authority of an act of its legislature, filed its petition in the District Court of Travis County against Thomas O'Conor, to recover possession of a tract of over nineteen thousand acres, situated in Webb County.

The defendant appeared and filed a petition for removal to the Circuit Court of the United States, on the ground that he was an alien domiciled in the Republic of Mexico. The re

moval was claimed under subsection 1 of section 639, Revised Statutes, but, as said by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464, 467: "Subsections 1 and 2 of section 639 were repealed by the act of 1875; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 398; Holland v. Chambers, 110 U. S. 59; Ayres v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594."

Further, in Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459, 466, it was held that the purpose of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, was to restrict the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, and it was said (p. 468):

"The repealing clause in the act of 1887 does not specifically refer to these prior acts, but declares that 'all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby repealed.' The provisions relating to the subject matter under consideration are, however, so comprehensive, as well as so variant from those of the former acts, that we think the intention to substitute the one for the other is necessarily to be inferred and must prevail."

See also Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Company, 145 U. S. 444; Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U. S. 673; Tennessee v. Union &c. Bank, 152 U. S. 454; Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U. S. 192; Mexican National Railroad v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556; Wabash Western Railway v. Brow, 164 U. S. 271.

It is clear from these authorities that the petition for removal, which, as will appear, presented the only definite Federal question, was rightfully denied.

Thereupon the defendant filed an answer containing several defenses; a claim of title under and by virtue of a grant made in the year 1767, by the government of Spain to Joaquin Galan; a decree of the District Court of Webb County on March 13, 1872, in a suit for confirmation of title, wherein Daniel Ruggles, claiming to be the owner of the grant to

Galan, was plaintiff and the State of Texas defendant, prosecuted under and by virtue of an act of the legislature of Texas, approved February 11, 1860; a confirmation of this decree by an act of the legislature of Texas of April 4, 1881; title by adverse possession under claim of right and title for a period of more than ninety-six years; title by estoppel, in that the State of Texas was estopped by long acquiescence from questioning the decree of the District Court of Webb County of March 13, 1872; title under and by virtue of a decree of the District Court of Webb County, Texas, rendered on January 8, 1862; and a claim of outstanding title in the settlers of the town of Palafox, or their heirs or assigns, as shown by the recitals in the last-mentioned decree.

The case was tried by the court without a jury, which rendered a judgment in favor of the State. From this judgment the defendant prosecuted an appeal to the state Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered a judgment for the defendant. This judgment was taken to the Supreme Court of the State, which reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, and, sustaining the decision of the trial court, entered a judgment in favor of the State.

It is obvious that most of the questions raised by the defenses are of a purely local nature, involving no Federal right. Some explanation may, however, be proper in reference to the decrees of the Webb County District Court. The record is somewhat obscure, but we take the facts to be as stated in the opinions of the Court of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court. Under the law of 1860 Daniel Ruggles instituted two suits in the District Court of Webb County for confirmation of title to separate tracts of land, one designated as the Palafox and the other as the Balconcitas tract. One suit came to trial on January 8, 1862, and resulted in a decree in favor of Ruggles and a confirmation of his title to a large tract of land. In 1869 a motion was filed by him seeking a construction and modification of this decree of January 8, 1862, but it was