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ably represents all that it was deemed safe to ask. Every consideration requires that the ambiguous language of the act should not be stretched beyond the exact and literal meaning of the words. In a literal sense they ratify only actions in accordance with the order construed as it would have been construed by this court had it come before us upon the day when it was made.
It is not a sufficient answer to say that the ratification was meaningless unless it embraced duties collected on imports from the United States after April 11, 1899, because the exactions before were legal. The instances are many where Congress out of abundant caution has ratified what did not need, or was afterwards found not to have needed, ratification. Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635.
It would be inadmissible to lay down as a general rule that a particular ratification covered what was not, in the judgment of the courts, included or intended to be, simply because it might be thought to have been otherwise unnecessary.
In these cases, however, the ratification act was not otherwise meaningless. Duties were collected under the order of July 12, 1898, as a military contribution while the war with Spain was in progress. The treaty was signed December 10, 1898, and the President on December 21 issued an order proclaiming the sovereignty of the United States in the islands and directing duties and taxes to be collected in future as public revenues for the support of the government. When the treaty was ratified the applicable laws of the United States became operative, but the President, nevertheless, continued in force the tariff created by the order of July 12, 1898, and by an order of April 21, 1899, established a collection district with Manila as the chief port of entry, and under these orders collections of duties were made. This involves the question whether after April 11, 1899, the President could have enforced any tariff other than such as existed under acts of Congress or might be sanctioned by Congress. And that question was put at rest by this ratification.
White and McKENNA, JJ., dissenting.
Much more might be said, but we think it would needlessly prolong this opinion.
Notwithstanding the able argument of the Attorney General, we adhere to the conclusion previously announced.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom concurs MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, dissenting.
Although I dissented in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, and Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176, nevertheless I agreed to the judgment of reversal as previously rendered in this case. 197 U. S. 429. I was constrained so to do because to me it seemed that the determination of the substantial issues in the case were foreclosed by the prior cases above mentioned, which were binding on me under the rule of stare decisis. It is true that in this case, as previously argued and decided, there was present the question of an alleged ratification by Congress of the imposition and collection of the taxes in controversy; but, on the former argument, my attention was not directed to public reports and documents throwing light upon the scope of the ratifying act, as was done on the present argument. Construing the act of Congress which is relied upon to establish the ratification, by the light of the public documents referred to, my mind sees no possible escape from the conclusion that that act was intended to and did ratify the collection of the charges complained of. Having no doubt of the power of Congress to ratify, to my mind it clearly results that I crred in giving my assent to the previous judgment of reversal, and I therefore dissent from the opinion and conclusion of the court now announced.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA concurs in this dissent.
Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
O'CONOR v. TEXAS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.
Argued April 19, 1906.-Decided May 28, 1906.
As subsection 1 of section 639, Rev. Stat., was repealed by the act of March 3,
1875, 18 Stat. 470, and, as the purpose of the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, was to limit the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, a petition for removal of an action brought by a State in its own courts against an alien was prop
erly denied. In an action to recover real estate, part of a grant from a former sovereign,
defenses based on adverse possession, estoppel, construction of state statutes, and the effect of judgments of the state court in other actions, neither the validity nor the construction of any treaty of the United States or the validity of the grant being challenged, do not present Federal questions which give this court jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. H. G. Dickinson for plaintiff in error:
This court has jurisdiction to review the judgment in this case on writ of error because the plaintiff in error claimed the land in controversy under a grant from the government of Spain to Joaquin Galan, made in 1767, or about that time and prior to the year 1804, the grant covering such land and being made at such time as to be within the protection guaranteed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and plaintiff in error connected his title with said grant by a regular chain of title, and none of the state courts which had this case under consideration found that plaintiff in error did not connect his title with said grant.
There was drawn in question a title claimed by plaintiff in error under a treaty of the United States and also under two statutes of the United States, one for annexing Texas to
Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
the United States, approved March 1, 1845, and the other for the admission of the State of Texas into the Union, approved December 29, 1845.
If this case is one in which there was drawn in question a title claimed under a treaty or the statutes of the United States, then the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas is reviewable by this court. Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 347; Smith v. Maryland, 6 Cranch, 286; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 359; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311.
An action at law brought in her own court by one of the States of the United States as plaintiff, against a non-resident alien, as defendant, is removable to the Circuit Court of the United States. Constitution of the United States, art. III, $2; Judiciary Act of 1789; Judiciary Act of 1875; Judiciary Act of 1887, 1888; Revised Statutes of the United States, $ 639; Texas v. Lewis, 14 Fed. Rep. 65; S. C., 12 Fed. Rep. 1.
The act of the legislature under which this suit was brought shows that this is a suit arising under the laws of the United States and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; and being such a suit the petition of plaintiff in error for removal to the Circuit Court of the United States should have been granted. Chadman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540; Lytle v. Arkansas, 22 How. 193; Marlin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 94; Covington & L. Co. v. Landford, 164 U. S. 578; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville, 166 U. S. 709; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Co., 166 U, S. 648.
The jurisdiction of a state court in so far as it is fixed by the constitution of the State is not subject to the regulation or control of the legislature. Ex parte Towles, 48 Texas, 414; Ex parte Whitelaw, 59 Texas, 273.
The judgment of the District Court of Webb County of March 13, 1872, in the cause entitled Ruggles v. State of Texas, is a valid judgment or at least an irregular and voidable judginent and the State of Texas is bound by it and cannot im
Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
peach it in this collateral proceeding. Gammel's Laws of Texas, vol. 4, p. 1471 and vol. 5, p. 568; Kenedy v. Jarvis 1 S. W. Rep. 191; Buchanan v. Bilger, 64 Texas, 589; Johnson v. Loop, 2 Texas, 331; Stephens v. Stephens, 62 Texas, 337; Murchison v. White, 54 Texas, 78; 1 Freeman on Judgments, $$ 96, 97, 100, 101; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 99, 100, 104, 212.
By the act of the legislature approved April 4, 1881, the State recognized the validity of the judgment in Ruggles v. Texas, and the act ratified and confirmed the judgment and operates as a grant from the State of the land in controversy to plaintiff in error or to those under whom he claims and further operates to estop the State from now claiming the land. Turner v. Rogers, 38 Texas, 582; Sanders v. Hart, 57 Texas, 8; May v. Ramsay, 46 Texas, 371; Alexander v. State, 56 Georgia, 486; Enfield v. Permit, 5 N. H. 285; Heirs of Andre v. Billou, 3 Pick. 224.
The judgment in Ruggles v. Texas was introduced in evidence and relied upon by both parties to this suit; the court in that case having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, the recital of the judgment of any fact essential to the rendition of the judgment or without the proof of which it could not have been rendered, is conclusive evidence against the parties to the judgment of the existence of such fact. Tex. Mex. Ry. Co. v. Jarvis, 80 Texas, 457; Watson v. Hopkins, 27 Texas, 637; Swearingen v. Glenn, 34 Texas, 243; Foster v. Wells, 4 Texas, 101; Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Texas, 68; Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Texas, 783; Hatch v. Garza, 22 Texas, 176; Cook v. Burnley, 45 Texas, 97; Burford v. Rosenfield, 37 Texas, 42; Fristoe v. Blum, 92 Texas, 76; State of Teras v. Ortiz, Tex. Sup. of Feb. 12, 1906.
The adverse and uninterrupted possession of plaintiff in error and those under whom he claims for such a great period of time, of the land in dispute, under claim of right and title, derived from the Spanish government and recognized by the Mexican government and Republic of Texas, raises a presump