Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 202 U.S. of their owner, is entirely immaterial in this case. The case of the barges here comes within Commonwealth v. American Dredge Co., 122 Pa. St. 386. These barges were exempt from enrollment or license under § 21, Rev. Stat. The statement does not allege that they ever were in Kentucky. The answer alleges that they were engaged in interstate commerce between ports of different States. Being unenrolled, they can only be taxed at the residence of the owner in Chicago, where their owner had them assessed and paid taxes on them. The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its conclusion is, that as Paducah is the home port of the steamers in question, therefore that place is their situs for assessment and taxation. The court does not find that Paducah is the actual situs of these vessels, but holds that Paducah is the home port of them because it is the place where they are enrolled and licensed, and because Paducah is painted on their sterns. This, their artificial situs, the court holds, is sufficient to subject the vessels to assessment and taxation there, regardless of the place of their ownership. If it should appear that these vessels were illegally enrolled and licensed at Paducah, and illegally had their names painted on the stern, then they had no legal situs at Paducah and it would follow that plaintiff in error could only be assessed at Chicago, or at the place of the actual situs of the vessels, and therefore it was right in paying taxes upon these vessels at Chicago, the place of its domicil. The steamers were subject to enrollment under the laws of the United States, and section 4141 of the Revised Statutes applies to them. Under this statute plaintiff in error could only register or enroll its steamers at a port nearest to that in which it resided. The steamers should have been enrolled at Chicago, where it resided, that being a port and at the same time the place of residence of the corporation. These vessels could 202 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. only be enrolled in compliance with sections 4313 and 4314. These steamers should have been enrolled and licensed in Chicago, and if, at the expiration of their licenses, they were found away from Chicago, should have been enrolled and licensed under section 4328. The vessels were illegally and improperly enrolled at Paducah, and having been so illegally and improperly enrolled there, it follows that painting the name "Paducah" on their sterns was also illegal and improper. The question of ownership and place of enrollment are, under the law, separate and distinct from the matter of the painting of the name on the stern. Before the passage of the act of 1884, the name to be painted on the stern was provided for by section 4334. The act of 1884 broadened the meaning of the word "port" under §§ 4178, 4334 as to painting the name on the stern. The steamers were not temporarily enrolled at Paducah under § 4323 and were illegally enrolled there by one who had no right to do so. This case is governed by Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. See also St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Company, 11 Wall. 423; Mayor v. Baldwin, 57 Alabama, 61; Yost v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 112 Fed. Rep. 746; The Lotus, 26 Fed. Rep. 637. The place of residence of the owners is to be considered the home port, even when the registration is in another State. The Jenny B. Gilkey, 19 Fed. Rep. 127; The Charlotte Vanderbilt, 19 Fed. Rep. 219; The Plymouth Rock, 14 Blatch. 505; The Mary Chilton, 4 Fed. Rep. 487; The E. A. Barnard, 2 Fed. Rep. 712; The Golden Gate, Newb. Ad. 308; The Martha Washington, 1 Cliff. 463; The Thos. Fletcher, 24 Fed. Rep. 375; The Chelmsford, 34 Fed. Rep. 399; The Marion G. Harriss, 81 Fed. Rep. 964; The Richard G. Garrett, 44 Fed. Rep. 379; The Havana, 64 Fed. Rep. 496. The plaintiff is not estopped from claiming an invalid enrollment against the State of Kentucky because the State is in no way a party to such enrollment. This is a proceeding Argument for Defendant in Error. 202 U.S. entirely between the Government of the United States and the Ayer and Lord Tie Co., which does not inure to the benefit of the State. The latter is a mere outsider, in no way interested in the matter of enrollment, was not benefited by it, and cannot be injured by its being held illegal. The steamboats had no actual situs. They were engaged in interstate commerce. They were engaged in trading between places in different States upon different waters. The State must show a situs of the property in question. Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 755; Marine Nat. Bank v. Fiske, 71 N. Y. 353; Myers v. Cronk, 113 N. Y. 608; Monson v. Tripp, 81 Maine, 24. Mr. N. B. Hays, Attorney General of Kentucky, with whom Mr. Charles H. Morris and Mr. J. H. Ralston were on the briefs, for defendant in error: If the actual situs and home port of the boats in question is Paducah, Kentucky, under the laws of the United States governing navigation, then these boats and barges are within the jurisdiction of the State of Kentucky, and the county of McCracken; are protected by the State's laws, and subject to state and county taxation; and if the tax is levied only at the home port, and said boats and barges are valued as other property, and without unfavorable discrimination, because of their employment, it is a valid power of the State. The situs of said boats for the purposes of taxation, is Paducah, Kentucky; and being a part of the property of this State, and said county, they are subject to taxation there, and not elsewhere. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; Pullman Pal. Car. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 36; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 75; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Judson on Taxation, § 186. While, for purposes of taxation, the general rule is that mobilia sequuntur personam, such is by no means the invariable rule, and in many cases tangible personal property acquires a 202 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. situs for taxation foreign to the residence of its owner. This was recently decided by this court in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194. See also Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341. Although assessed and taxed in Illinois, the same property is not exempt from taxation in Kentucky. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517. The taxation of the vessels in Kentucky is not an interference with interstate commerce. Their home port being in McCracken County, Kentucky, and the city of Paducah, and being constantly employed and used in the streams of Kentucky, and those adjacent thereto, and when not in use kept at Paducah, they are property within the jurisdiction of said city, county and State, for the purpose of taxation, and the right of the State to tax them should not be denied. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 36; American Refrigerator Trans. Co. v. Hall, 171 U. S. 68; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 302; Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis County, 87 Am. St. Rep. 747; National Dredging Co. v. State, 99 Alabama, 462; Norfolk and Western R. R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Works, 97 Virginia, 23; Minburn v. Hays, 56 Am. Dec. 366; Union Trust Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194. No State can lay any tonnage tax, or lay any tax on interstate commerce itself, but the principle has always been recognized that the instruments by which interstate commerce was carried on were subject to state taxation as property wherever they might be situated, provided only that they were not discriminated against because of their occupation. Louisville Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 446; C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 389; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471. VOL CCII-27 MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. As in the argument counsel for plaintiff in error has not discussed the alleged error in overruling the motion to remove, we treat that question as waived and pass to the merits. Notwithstanding, by the demurrer to the answer, it was conceded that the tie company was the owner of the alleged taxable property, that it was an Illinois corporation and that its main office was in Chicago, that it had paid taxes in Illinois upon such property, that the property was employed in interstate commerce between ports of different States, including the State of Illinois, that its steamboats were enrolled at Paducah, Kentucky, for convenience, Kentucky being the place of residence of one of its managing officers, and that its boats touched at Paducah only temporarily, never receiving or discharging cargo at that port, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the property in question was subject to the taxing power of the State of Kentucky. The existence of power in the State to tax the property in question was rested solely upon the proposition that as the steamboats were enrolled at Paducah, and the name Paducah was painted upon their sterns, it was to be conclusively presumed that the home port of the vessels was at Paducah, and that such home port was the situs of the property for taxation. The barges were brought within the principle announced, because they were treated as mere accessories of the steamboats. While in the opinion the steamboats were regarded as operated under a registry, the fact is they were engaged in the coastwise trade under an enrollment and license. But this is immaterial, since vessels in order to be enrolled must possess the qualifications and fulfill the requirements necessary for regis tration. To comprehend the question a chronological statement of the legislation of Congress as to the registration or enrollment of vessels, etc., is necessary. |