202 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

or appropriate demands made upon them as public serv

ants.

Allusion has been made to that part of the judgment declaring that the accused, by his conviction, "is rendered forever hereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust or profit under the Government of the United States." That judgment, it is argued, is inconsistent with the constitutional right of a Senator to hold his place for the full term for which he was elected, and operates of its own force to exclude a convicted Senator from the Senate, although that body alone has the power to expel its members. We answer that the above words, in the concluding part of the judgment of conviction, do nothing more than declare or recite what, in the opinion of the trial court, is the legal effect attending or following a conviction under the statute. They might well have been omitted from the judgment. By its own force, without the aid of such words in the judgment, the statute makes one convicted under it incapable forever thereafter of holding any office of honor, trust or profit under the Government of the United States. But the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judgment. The seat into which he was originally inducted as a Senator from Kansas could only become vacant by his death, or by expiration of his term of office, or by some direct action on the part of the Senate in the exercise of its constitutional powers. This must be so for the further reason that the declaration in section 1782, that any one convicted under its provisions shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust or profit "under the Government of the United States" refers only to officers created by or existing under the direct authority of the National Government as organized under the Constitution, and not to offices the appointments to which are made by the States, acting separately, albeit proceeding, in respect of such appointments, under the sanction of that instrument. While the Senate, as a branch of the Legislative Department, VOL. CCII-24

owes its existence to the Constitution, and participates in passing laws that concern the entire country, its members are chosen by state legislatures, and cannot properly be said to hold their places "under the Government of the United States." We are of opinion that section 1782 does not by its necessary operation impinge upon the authority or powers of the Senate of the United States, nor interfere with the legitimate functions, privileges or rights of Senators.

2. It is next contended that the indictment does not present the case of a proceeding, matter or thing in which, within the meaning of the statute, the United States was a party or interested, nor adequately state the facts constituting the offense. These objections are, we think, without merit. Our reading of the statute and the indictment leads to the opposite conclusion. The statute makes it an offense for a Senator, after his election, and during his continuance in office, to receive or agree to receive compensation, in any form, from any person, in relation to a proceeding, matter or thing before a Department, in which the United States is a party, or directly or indirectly interested. The scope of the statute is, in our judgment, most manifest, and the nature of the offense denounced cannot well be made clearer than it has been made by the words used to express the legislative intent. The business in respect of which the accused is charged to have both agreed to receive, and to have received, compensation, was plainly a proceeding or matter in which the United States was interested. That such proceeding or matter involved the pecuniary interests of the defendant's client is not denied. That it also involved the use of the property as well as postal facilities furnished by the United States for carrying and transporting mail matter must also be admitted. What the Post Office Department aimed to do in the execution of the acts of Congress and the regulations established under those acts was to protect the mails of the United States from being used, in violation of law, to promote schemes for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises.

That

statute has its sanction in the power of the United States, by legislation, to designate what may be carried in the mails and what must be excluded therefrom; such designation and exclusion to be, however, consistent with the rights of the people as reserved by the Constitution. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 732; In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110; School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 508. In the proceeding, matter and thing before the Department, with which the defendant was connected as an attorney for a corporation immediately concerned in the result, the Postmaster General represented the United States, and, in the discharge of his official duties, sought to enforce a law of the United States. The United States was the real party in interest on one side, while the Rialto Company was the real party in interest on the other side. If the Postmaster General did not represent the United States, whom did he represent? The word "interested" has different meanings, as can be readily ascertained by examining books and the adjudged cases. 4 Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, 3692; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 399. But its meaning here is to be ascertained by considering the subject matter of the statute in which the word appears. And it is, we think, a mistake to say that the United States was not interested, directly or indirectly, in protecting its property, that is, its mails and postal facilities, against improper and illegal use, and in the enforcement, through the agency of one of its Departments, of a statute regulating such use. It would give too narrow an interpretation to the statute to hold that the United States was not interested, directly or indirectly, in a proceeding in the Department having such objects in view. It is true the business before the Post Office Department in which the Rialto Company was concerned did not assume the form of a suit in which there were parties according to the technical rules of pleading. But it was, nevertheless, in a substantial sense, a proceeding, matter or thing before an executive Department in which both the United States and the Rialto Company were interested.

It is said that, within the meaning of the statute, the United States is not interested in any proceeding or matter pending before an executive Department, unless it has a direct moneyed or pecuniary interest in the result. Under this view, Senators, Representatives and Delegates in Congress, who are members of the bar, may regularly practice their profession for compensation before the executive Departments in proceedings, which if not directly involving the pecuniary interests of the United States, yet involve substantial pecuniary interests for their clients as well as the enforcement of the laws of the United States enacted for the protection of the rights of the public. Such a view rests upon an interpretation of the statute which is wholly inadmissible. In our opinion, section 1782 excludes the possibility of such a condition of things, and makes it illegal for Senators, Representatives or Delegates to receive or agree to receive compensation for such services. We may add that the judgment in Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, proceeded upon the ground that the case then made-and the present case, as to the facts, is much stronger against the defendant was embraced by the statute.

It is equally true that the accused was informed with reasonable certainty by the indictment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him-the two counts hereinbefore given at large, and upon which sentences were pronounced, being as full as any of the others. The averments of the indictment were sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare his defense, and in the event of acquittal or conviction the judgment could have been pleaded in bar of a second prosecution for the same offense. The accused was not entitled to more, nor could he demand that all the special or particular means employed in the commission of the offense should be more fully set out in the indictment. The words of the indictment directly and without ambiguity disclosed all the elements essential to the commission of the offense charged, and, therefore, within the meaning of the Constitution and according to the rules of pleading, the defendant was informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him. United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, 362; United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; Blitz v. United States, 153 U. S. 308, 315.

3. It is insisted, however, that the court below erred in not directing the jury to acquit the defendant; in other words, that the evidence in support of the indictment was so meager that the jury could not properly have found him guilty of any offense. We cannot assent to this view. There was beyond question evidence tending to establish on one side the defendant's guilt of the charges preferred against him; on the other side, his innocence of those charges. It will serve no useful purpose to set out all the testimony. It is sufficient to say that the whole evidence has been subjected to the most careful scrutiny, and our conclusion is that the trial court was not authorized to take the case from the jury and direct a verdict of not guilty. That course could not have been pursued consistently with the principles that underlie the system of trial by jury. The case was preeminently one for the determination of a jury. It was for the jury to pass upon the facts; and as there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, this court will not weigh the facts, and determine the guilt or innocence of the accused by the mere preponderance of evidence, but will limit its decision to questions of law. In its charge to the jury the Circuit Court held the scales of justice in even balance, saying all that was necessary to guard the rights of the accused. Nothing seems to have been omitted that ought to have been said- nor anything said that was not entirely appropriate. Upon the general question of guilt or innocence and as to the rules by which the jury should be guided in their consideration of the case, the Circuit Court, in substance, said that the indictment was not evidence in any sense, but only an accusation which it was incumbent upon the Government to sustain by proof establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the presumption of law was that he was innocent of the accusation as a whole and as to every material element of it, and that such presumption abided with him from the beginning to the end of