Court of the United States for Porto Rico in civil cases shall, in addition to that conferred by the act of April twelfth, nineteen hundred, extend to and embrace controversies where the parties, or either of them, are citizens of the United States, or citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States." The jurisdiction of the District Court, when the parties on both sides were the subjects of the King of Spain, has several times been sustained by this court, and we do not feel required in this case to make any other ruling. Writ of error dismissed. BURTON v. UNITED STATES. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. No. 539. Argued April 3, 4, 1906.-Decided May 21, 1906. Congress has power to make it an offense against the United States for a Senator or Representative, after his election and during his continuance in office, to agree to receive, or to receive, compensation for services before a Department of the Government, in relation to matters in which the United States is directly or indirectly interested, and § 1782, Rev. Stat., is not repugnant to the Constitution as interfering, nor does it by its necessary operation, interfere with the legitimate authority of the House of Congress over their respective members. Including in the sentence of a Senator convicted of an offense under § 1782, Rev. Stat., that he is rendered forever thereafter incapable of holding any office of trust or emolument of office under the Government of the United States is simply a recital of the effect of the conviction, and the conviction does not operate ipso facto to vacate his seat or compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as expelled. While the Senate, as a branch of the Legislative Department, owes its existence to the Constitution and passes laws that concern the entire country, its members are chosen by state legislatures and cannot properly be said to hold their places under the Government of the United States. The United States is interested, either directly or indirectly within the meaning of § 1782, Rev. Stat., in protecting its mails and postal facilities from improper and illegal use and in enforcing statutes regulating such use. Where the indictment clearly discloses all the elements essential to the commission of the offense charged, and the averments are sufficient in 202 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. the event of acquittal, to plead the judgment in lieu of a second prosecution for the same offense, the defendant is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him within the meaning of the Constitution and according to the rules of pleading;—and in this case the evidence was sufficient to justify the case being sent to the jury and the court below did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal, nor was there any error in the court's charge to the jury. Under § 1782, Rev. Stat., an agreement to receive compensation, whether received or not for the prohibited services, is made one offense, and the receiving of compensation, whether in pursuance of a previous agreement or not, is made a separate and distinct offense. The intention of the legislature must govern in the interpretation of a statute. It is the legislature and not the court which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. A plea of autrefois acquit must be upon a prosecution for the same identical offense, and where defendant on a former trial was acquitted of having received compensation forbidden by § 1782, Rev. Stat., from an individual described as an officer of a certain corporation, and at the same time was found guilty of having received such compensation from the company, he cannot plead the former acquittal as a bar to a further prosecution of the charge that he had received such compensation from the company. The Federal court at the place where the agreement was made for compensation to perform services forbidden by § 1782, Rev. Stat., has jurisdiction to try the offense, and even if the agreement was negotiated or tentatively accepted at another place, the place of its final acceptance and ratification is where the agreement was made although defendant may not have been at that place at that time. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. Bailey P. Waggener and Mr. F. W. Lehmann, with whom Mr. Harry Hubbard, Mr. W. H. Rossington, Mr. W. Knox Haynes and Mr. W. P. Hackney were on the briefs, for plaintiff in error: The United States was not a party to nor interested in the proceedings set forth in the indictment. Inhabitants v. Smith, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 390; McGrath v. The People, 100 Illinois, 464; Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356; State v. Sutton, 74 Vermont, 12; Foreman v. Marianna, 43 Arkansas, 324; Taylor v. Commissioners, 88 Illinois, 526; Railroad Company v. Kellog, 54 Nebraska, 138; Sauls v. Freeman, 24 Florida, 209; Bowman's 76; Case, 67 Missouri, 146; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 202 U.S. United States v. Sheldon, 2 Wheat. 119; United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464; United States v. Clayton, 2 Dill. 218. The indictment states no facts showing the pendency of any proceeding in the Postal Department. United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483; Post v. United States, 161 U. S. 583; Virginia v. Paul, 148 U. S. 107; American School &c. v. McAnulty, 102 Fed. Rep. 565; Dauphin v. Key, 11 D. C. App. 203; Enterprise Savings Assn. v. Zumstein, 64 Fed. Rep. 837; aff'd S. C., 67 Fed. Rep. 1000; Bates & Guild v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211. There was a former indictment and trial for and acquittal of the offense. Placing the defendant on trial again for the offense alleged was in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Baldwin v. Bank, 1 Wall. 234; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank, 5 Wheat. 236; Ford v. Williams, 21 How. 289; Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 381; Commercial Bank v. French, 21 Pick. 486; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172. Cases in 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instr., 1st ed., §§ 1187-1189. State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. Law, 361; Hurst v. State, 86 Alabama, 604; Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 470; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386; Monroe v. State, 111 Alabama, 15; United States v. Lee, 4 Cranch C. C. 446; Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662; United States v. Nickerson, 17 How. 204; Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 384; Campbell v. State, 9 Yerger, 333; State v. Martin, 30 Wisconsin, 216; Stuart v. Comm., 28 Gratt. 950; Gunther v. People, 24 N. Y. 100; Morris v. State, 8 S. & M. 762; State v. Kattleman, 35 Missouri, 105; State v. Kibble, 2 Tyler, 471; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539. There was no evidence to go to the jury that Burton made any agreement to receive compensation for services to prevent the issuance of a fraud order. Whatever agreement was made to receive compensation from the Rialto Grain and Securities Company for services, such agreement was not made in the State of Missouri, and the defendant was deprived of his con 202 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. stitutional right to be tried in the State and District where the agreement was made, contrary to §2, art. III, of the Constitution and of the Sixth Amendment thereof. Tayloe v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411; 12 Ency. Law and Prac. 239, 240; Burr's Case, Marshall's Const. Dec. 82, 165; Palliser v. United States, 136 U. S. 256; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 212; Sands v. State, 26 Tex. App. 580; United States v. Fowkes, 53 Fed. Rep. 13; United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. Rep. 664; Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43; Railway Co. v. Rolling Mills, 119 U. S. 151; Chitty on Contracts, 11 Am. ed., p. 15, note f; Christian Co. v. Bienville Co., 106 Alabama, 124; Tennessee Co. v. Pierce, 81 Fed. Rep. 814; Seitz v. Brewers' &c. Co., 141 U. S. 510. The agreement of the defendant with the Rialto Company was for service by the month, and no service in the Department having been rendered during the period covered by the payment made March 26, there was no offense in the receipt of that payment. Davis v. Preston, 6 Alabama, 83; Matthews v. Jenkins, 80 Virginia, 463; La Coursier v. Russell, 82 Wisconsin, 265; Benedict v. United States, 176 U. S. 357; In re Hans Nielsen, 131 U. S. 188. The defendant was not subject to trial and punishment as for separate offenses in agreeing to receive and receiving compensation for the services charged in the indictment to have been rendered by him. 2 Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, §55; 1 Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, § 436; State v. Jones, 106 Missouri, 802. The juror William V. Jones was disqualified because he had formed and still retained an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, an opinion which was the result of reading the reports of the former trial, which reports he believed to be true, and the challenge to him should have been sustained. Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370; Williams v. United States, 93 Fed. Rep. 396. The letters of Houts, Evans, Allen, Warner and Fravel, Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 202 U.S. and the accompanying circulars and booklets, all of which were read in full, to the jury, were incompetent and irrelevant as against the defendant, as he had no knowledge of them whatever, and their contents were not necessary to show the fact that some matter was pending in the Department against the Rialto Grain and Securities Company. Tappan v. Beardsley, 10 Wall. 427. The endorsements on the jacket subsequent to March 26, 1903, the report of Inspectors Price and Piatt of August 20, 1903, and the letter of Assistant Attorney General Robb of September 9, 1903, were competent and material evidence for defendant to disprove the charges of the indictment that he had agreed to induce and had in fact induced the Postmaster General to issue no fraud order against the company and to stop investigation of it, and also to show that the investigation being made by the Department was with reference to the indictment and prosecution of the officers of the Rialto Company. The evidence of Francis C. Hubner should have been stricken out, as it established nothing and permitted the jury to conjecture that there had been an interview between the defendant and the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department relative to the affairs of the Rialto Company. The instruction of the court as to what would constitute service by the defendant in the Department is not responsive to the charge of the indictment, and authorizes a conviction on account of matters not alleged in the indictment, and said charge is erroneous in other respects. The court also erred in refusing to give instructions asked by defendant. Flachskamm v. United States, 127 Fed. Rep. 674. The court at St. Louis had no jurisdiction to try counts three and seven, nor is such jurisdiction conferred by § 731, Rev. Stat. The District of Columbia is not a "judicial circuit" or "judicial district" within the meaning of § 731. The act of 1864, Rev. Stat. § 1782, under which the indictment was found, is unconstitutional. It is in conflict with the fundamental idea on which our whole Federal Govern |