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on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and posted in the stations of said railway company, as required by the Interstate Commerce Act. There is no assignment challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the material allegations of appellees' pleadings.
The Supreme Court of Texas having answered that the railroad company was liable “for damages occasioned by the misrepresentation of the rate of freight as shown by the statement of facts,” 98 Texas, 352, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment against the railroad company. Thereupon this writ of error was prosecuted.
Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. Winslow S. Pierce, Mr. David D. Duncan and Mr. Thomas J. Freeman, for plaintiff in error:
There was no appearance for defendants in error.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is within the principle of and is ruled by the decision in Railroad Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. Upon the authority of that case the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the liability of a railroad company in a case of similar character to that under review. Southern Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Alabama, 539. The opinion of Chief Justice Brickell, so aptly reviewed and declared the effect of the decision in the Hefley case that we adopt the same in disposing of the present controversy. The Alabama court said:
“In Gulf &c. Railroad Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the refusal by the carrier to deliver goods consigned to him, after tender of payment of the stipulated charges named in the bill of lading. The goods, a lot of furniture, had been received by the carrier at St. Louis, Missouri, for transportation to Cameron, Texas, at a stipulated rate, specified in the bill of lading, of 69 cents per
hundred pounds, the charges amounting to $82.80, whereas the published schedule rate in force at the time was 84 cents, and the charges should have been $100.80; and the plaintiff, as in this case, was ignorant of the fact that the rate obtained was less than the schedule rate. It was held, in an opinion by Brewer, J., that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. It is true that the only question discussed in the opinion was, whether or not the interstate act superseded the Texas statute, which prohibited a common carrier from charging or collecting from the owner or consignee of freight a greater sum than that specified in the bill of lading, and this question was decided in the affirmative.
But this was not the only effect of the decision, and it is by its effect on the rights of the parties to such a contract, by whatever process of reasoning the decision may be reached, that the state courts are bound. The clear effect of the decision was to declare that one who has obtained from a common carrier transportation of goods from one State to another at a rate, specified in the bill of lading, less than the published schedule rates filed with and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in force at the time, whether or not he knew that the rate obtained was less than the schedule rate, is not entitled to recover the goods, or damages for their detention, upon the tender of payment of the amount of charges named in the bill of lading, or of any sum less than the schedule charges; in other words, that whatever may be the rate agreed upon, the carrier's lien on the goods is, by force of the act of Congress, for the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates and charges, and this lien can be discharged, and the consignee can become entitled to the goods, only by the payment, or tender of payment, of such amount. Such is now the supreme law, and by it this and the courts of all other States are bound, The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Su
preme Judicial District of Texas is reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
SECURITY MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v.
PREWITT, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
Nos. 178, 184. Argued January 16, 1906.--Dismissed February 19, 1906.-Petitions for
rehearing granted and cases decided May 14, 1906.
A writ of error having been dismissed, after full argument, as being a moot
case, on mistaken assumption of fact justified by the record, and the petitions for rehearing showing facts on which substantial relief can be granted the application for rehearing is allowed and the case decided
on the merits on the arguments already made. A State has the power to prevent a foreign corporation from doing business
at all within its borders unless such prohibition is so conditioned as to violate the Federal Constitution, and a state statute which, without requiring a foreign insurance company to enter into any agreement not to remove into the Federal courts cases commenced against it in the state court, provides that if the company does so remove such a case its license to do business within the State shall thereupon be revoked is not unconstitutional. Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, followed and held not to be overruled by Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, or any other decision of this court.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Wm. Marshall Bullitt, with whom Mr. F. W. Jenkins, Mr. Julien T. Davies and Mr. Charles S. Grubbs were on the brief, for the Security Mutual Life Insurance Co.
Mr. Edmund F. Trabue and Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. Wm. Bro. Smith, Mr. John C. Doolan and Mr. Attilla Cox, Jr., were on the brief, for the Travelers Insurance Co.
Mr. J. H. Hazelrigg, with whom Mr. N. B. Hays, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Mr. H. R. Prewitt were on the brief, for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court.
Motions for rehearing have been presented by plaintiffs in error. The cases were commenced in the proper state court in Kentucky, and were argued here on their merits in January of this term, and the writs of error were dismissed, 200 U. S. 446, because, as appeared from the record, only abstract questions remained to be decided, the licenses to do business within the State of Kentucky in both cases, which had been granted on July 1, 1904, for one year, having expired since issuing the writs of error.
In No. 178 the petition stated that the permission or authority to continue to do business in Kentucky had been renewed and extended from year to year by the State Insurance Commissioner, and that he had, on July 1, 1904, "continued the authority to the Security Mutual to transact the business of life insurance,” as evidenced by the permit "for a period of one year from July 1, 1904.” It was also averred that the permit had been revoked in September, 1904, and the company asked to have the revocation cancelled.
In No. 184 the petition stated that the company had been granted authority to transact business in the State of Kentucky for the period of one year then next ensuing, that is, from July 1, 1904. The petition showed that the permit had not then (October, 1904) been revoked, but it was alleged that the Superintendent of Insurance threatened to revoke it (on grounds substantially similar to those set forth in the Security case, in 200 U. S. supra, viz., the removal to a Federal court of a case commenced against the company in the state court), and an injunction was asked to prevent the revocation of the permit on that account.
On these motions for a rehearing it is now shown, what did
not appear in the records, that the permits in fact had been renewed for another year, from July 1, 1905, to July 1, 1906, for the purpose, as it would seem, of having the point involved reviewed by this court. Neither party adverted to this fact on the argument, and the cases were fully presented by counsel on both sides, on the merits, and the question treated as still existing.
As the dismissal was ordered on a mistaken assumption of fact, justified by the records, that the permits had expired by lapse of time and had not been renewed, the applications for rehearing are granted and the judgments of dismissal set aside, and the cases will be decided upon the arguments already made in full by counsel for both parties.
The facts upon the main question sufficiently appear in the report in 200 U. S. 446. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the statute valid. 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1239, dissenting opinion, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 77. See also 83 S. W. Rep. 611; 84 S. W. Rep. 527.
The matter to be now determined is whether a State has the right to provide that if a foreign insurance company shall remove a case to the Federal court, which has been commenced in a state court, the license of such company to do business within the State shall be thereupon revoked.
The statute under which the question arises is known as section 631 of the Kentucky Statutes, and reads as follows:
“Before authority is granted to any foreign insurance company to do business in the State, it must file with the Commissioner a resolution adopted by its board of directors, consenting that service of process upon any agent of such company in this State, or upon the Commissioner of Insurance of this State, in any action brought or pending in this State, shall be a valid service upon said company; and if process is served upon the Commissioner it shall be his duty to at once send it by mail, addressed to the company at its principal office; and if any company shall, without the consent of the other party to any suit or proceeding brought by or against it in any court