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Opinion of the Court.

tions made by Captain Marcy, is not therefore a circumstance of serious moment, certainly not conclusive. The river itself, though unnamed on any map prior to 1852, was in fact delineated on maps for more than a quarter of a century before that officer entered the Red River country with his company. The character of the country through which the Prairie Dog Town River flowed and the bad quality of its water for drinking purposes, are also referred to by General Marcy as reasons why the North Fork should be regarded as the stream whose course was intended to be followed in establishing the boundary. We do not think that the evidence upon this point is entitled to very great weight. There is no reason to suppose that the negotiators of the treaty had any knowledge or information as to the relative qualities for drinking purposes of the waters of the two streams in question; and if they had, it is difficult to perceive why such facts would control the determination of a disputed question of boundary between two nations. The negotiators knew or believed that there was a Red River, whose source was not far from Sante Fé, and which, in its course, passed Natchitoches. Their purpose was to establish a line which would extend from the point where the line due north from Sabine River met Red River, thence along and up Red River" westward" to the 100th meridian of longitude, then due north to the Arkansas River. The reference in the treaty was to rivers and degrees of longitude and latitude. It was a question of territory without regard to a special trail, the location of which might have been affected by the quality of the waters of any particular stream.

Much significance is attached by the State to the fact that as early as 1860, by legislative enactment, it created the county of Greer with boundaries that include the whole of the territory in dispute, and that it has ever since asserted its jurisdiction over both that territory and the people who inhabit it. However important such facts might under some circumstances be deemed, it must be remembered that during the whole of the period referred to the constituted authorities of Texas have been aware that the United States regarded the territory in dispute as under its exclusive jurisdiction and as a part of what

Opinion of the Court.

is known as the Indian Territory. The government has always disputed the claim of Texas. The only qualification of this broad statement is that suggested by the language inadvertently used in the act of Congress creating the Northern Judicial District of Texas. But that language, we have held, was not intended to express the purpose of the United States to surrender its jurisdiction over the territory in dispute.

It is also said that many titles to land in the disputed territory are held under the State and that much confusion may follow, and injustice be done to individuals, if the claim of the United States be sustained. On the other hand, it is to be inferred that there are many settlers in the disputed territory who assert title to land under the United States. It appears in evidence that in 1873 and 1874 a part of that territory was sectionized under the authority of the General Government. We suppose that Governor Roberts referred to that fact when, in his message of 1883, he said that "the authorities of the United States had established an initial corner on the South Fork of Red River, on the line claimed to be the 100th degree of longitude, had sectionized the country east of that line, and protected it from settlement of white people as a part of the Indian Territory." He further said: "Application was made to me to know if I would sign the patents, if certificates were located and surveyed in Greer County. Under the then existing circumstances I felt it to be my duty to discourage such locations, as they might be to our prejudice in the settlement of our claim with the United States, when the merits of it could be more fully ascertained." But whatever may be the facts bearing upon this point, our duty is to determine the present issues according to the settled principles of law, without reference to considerations of inconvenience to individuals residing in the disputed territory. We cannot doubt that the Congress of the United States will do all that justice requires to be done in order to avoid any injury to individuals that ought not to be inflicted upon them.

It is further said that the State, since it assumed to create Greer County, has expended a large amount of money in pro

Opinion of the Court.

viding a public school system for the inhabitants of that locality. To what extent moneys have been so expended is not clearly shown. Whatever may be the facts, touching this point, we do not feel at liberty to give weight to them in this case. The question before us, we repeat, is one of law, and must be determined according to law. What may be fairly and justly demanded by the State, on account of moneys expended for the benefit of the inhabitants of the disputed territory, is a matter for the consideration of the legislative branch of the National Government.

In the argument it was suggested that this court ought not to forget how much was added to the power and wealth of this nation when Texas, with its imperial domain, came into the Union, and her people became a part of the political community for whom the Constitution of the United States was ordained and established. This fact cannot, of course, be forgotten by any American who takes pride in the prestige and greatness of the Republic. But the considerations which it suggests cannot affect the decision of legal questions, and must be addressed to another branch of the Government. The supposition is not to be indulged that that department of the Government will fail to recognize any duty imposed upon it by the circumstances arising out of this vexed controversy.

For the reasons stated the United States is entitled to the relief asked. And this court now renders the following

decree:

This cause having been submitted upon the pleadings, proofs and exhibits, and the court being fully advised, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the territory east of the 100th meridian of longitude, west and south of the river now known as the North Fork of Red River, and north of a line following westward, as prescribed by the treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, the course, and along the south bank, both of Red River and of the river now known as the Prairie Dog Town Fork or South Fork of Red River until such line meets the 100th meridian of longitude - which territory is sometimes

Syllabus.

called Greer County — constitutes no part of the territory properly included within or rightfully belonging to Texas at the time of the admission of that State into the Union, and is not within the limits nor under the jurisdiction of that State, but is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States of America. Each party will pay its own costs.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, not having been a member of the court when this case was argued, took no part in the decision.

CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. CALIFORNIA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 559. Argued January 15, 16, 1896.- Decided March 16, 1896.

The Central Pacific Railroad Company, being required by the laws of California to make returns of its property to the Board of Equalization for purposes of taxation, made a verified statement in which, among other things, it was said: "The value of the franchise and entire roadway, roadbed, and rails within this State is $12,273,785." The Board of Equalization determined that the actual value of the franchises, roadway, roadbed, rails, and rolling stock of the company within the State at that time was $18,000,000. The company not having paid the taxes assessed on this valuation, this action was brought by the State to recover them. Held,

(1) That the presumption was that the franchise included by the company in its return was a franchise which was not exempt under the laws of the United States, and that the board had acted upon property within its jurisdiction;

(2) That if the Board of Equalization had included what it had no authority to assess, the company might seek the remedies given under the law, to correct the assessment so far as such property was concerned, or recover back the tax thereon, or, if those remedies were not held exclusive, might defend against the attempt to enforce it;

(3) Where the property mentioned in the description could be assessed, and the assessment followed the return, the company ought to be

Statement of the Case.

held estopped from saying that the description was ambiguous, and this notwithstanding the fact that the statement was made on printed blanks, prepared by the board.

The decision of the Supreme Court of the State that the findings of the trial court on the question of whether the franchises taxed covered franchises derived from the United States was conclusive, and is binding on this court.

The fact that a court, after giving its decision upon an issue, gives its opinion upon the manner in which it would have decided the issue under other circumstances, does not constitute an error to be reviewed in this court.

The Central Pacific company is a corporation of California, recognized as such by the acts of Congress granting it aid and conferring upon it Federal franchises, and it was not the object of those acts to sever its allegiance to the State or transfer the powers and privileges derived from it; nor did those consequences result from the acceptance of the grant by the corporation.

The property of a corporation of the United States may be taxed by a State, but not through its franchise.

Although a corporation may be an agent of the United States a State may tax its property, subject to the limitation pointed out in Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.

It is immaterial in this case whether the railroad company operates its road under the franchise derived from the United States, or under that derived from the State.

When it is considered that the Central Pacific company returned its franchise for assessment, declined to resort to the remedy afforded by the state laws for the correction of the assessment as made if dissatisfied therewith, or to pay its tax and bring suit to recover back the whole or any part of the tax which it claimed to be illegal, its position is not one entitled to favorable consideration; but, without regard to that, the court holds, for reasons given, that the state courts rightly decided that the company had no valid defence to the causes of action proceeded on.

THIS was an action brought in the name of the People of the State of California against the Central Pacific Railroad Company in the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco, under section 3670 of the Political Code of that State, to recover a certain sum of money alleged to be due the State and various other sums of money alleged to be due eighteen counties of the State, for taxes for the fiscal year 1887 upon the assessment of the state Board of Equalization, judgment being demanded for the several sums of state and county taxes delinquent and unpaid as stated in the complaint, with

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