mode of executing the sentence. For such denials arising from judi-
cial action after a trial commenced, the remedy lies in the revisory
power of the higher courts of the State, and ultimately in the power
of review which this court may exercise over their judgments when-
ever rights, privileges or immunities claimed under the Constitution
or laws of the United States are withheld or violated. The denial or
inability to enforce in the judicial tribunals of the States rights se-
cured by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, to which section 641 refers, and on account of which a
criminal prosecution may be removed from a state court, is primarily,
if not exclusively, a denial of such rights or an inability to enforce
them resulting from the constitution or laws of the State, rather than
a denial first made manifest at or during the trial of the case.
v. Mississippi, 565.

Gibson

3. The fact that citizens of the African race had been excluded, because
of their race, from service on previous grand juries as well as from the
grand jury which returned the particular indictment in the case on
trial, will not authorize a removal of the prosecution under section
641 of the Revised Statutes, but is competent evidence only on a
motion to quash the indictment. Ib.

4. It is not every denial by a state enactment of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States that is embraced by section
641 of the Revised Statutes. The right of removal given by that sec-
tion exists only in the special cases mentioned in it. lb.

5. An affidavit to a petition for removal filed under section 641 of the Re-
vised Statutes, to the effect that the facts therein stated are true to
the best of the knowledge and belief of the accused, is not evidence in
support of a motion to quash the indictment, unless the prosecutor
agrees that it may be so used, or unless by the order of the trial court
it is treated as evidence. Charley Smith v. Mississippi, 592.
6. A motion to quash an indictment against a person of African descent
upon the ground that it was found by a grand jury from which were
excluded because of their race persons of the race to which the ac-
cused belongs can be sustained only by evidence independently of the
facts stated in the motion to quash. Ib.

1. In construing the terms of a statute, especially when the legislation is
experimental, courts must take notice of the history of the legislation,
and, out of different possible constructions, must select the one that
best comports with the genius of our institutions. Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 197.

2. The act of March 21, 1895, classifying the counties of the Territory of
Arizona, and fixing the compensation of the officers therein (Laws
1895, p. 68), purports on its face to be an act of that Territory, to
have been approved on the 21st of March, 1895; and the original is
filed with, and is in the custody of the Secretary of the Territory; is
signed by the Governor as approved by him; is signed by the Presi-
dent of the Territorial Legislative Council as duly passed by that
body; and is signed by the Speaker of the Territorial House of
Representatives as duly passed by that body. Held, that, having
been thus officially attested, and approved, and committed to the
custody of the Secretary of the Territory as an act passed by the
territorial legislature, that act is to be taken as having been enacted
in the mode required by law, and to be unimpeachable by recitals or
omissions of recitals in the journals of legislative proceedings which
are not required by the fundamental law of the Territory to be so
kept as to show everything done in both branches of the legislature
while engaged in the consideration of bills presented for their action.
Harwood v. Wentworth, 547.

3. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, considered, affirmed and applied to this
case as decisive of it. Ib.

4. That act is not a local or special act, within the meaning of the act of
Congress of July 30, 1886, c. 818, 24 Stat. 170. Ib.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 4, 5, 20, 27;
FRENCH SPOLIATION CLAIMS, 1;
INDIAN RESERVATIONS, 1, 3;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 8;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 7; C, 3; D;

REMOVAL OF Causes, 2, 4, 5;
STATUTE, A, 2, 4;

TAX AND TAXATION, 1;
TEXAS, 1.

C. STATUTES OF STATES AND TERRITORIES.

Arizona Territory. See STATUte, A, 2, 4.

California.

Georgia.
Mississippi.

New York.
Texas.

See CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; LOCAL LAW, 2, 3.
See JURISDICTION, A, 2; UNITED STATES, 5.
See LOCAL LAW, 1; Texas.

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. Since the passage of the act of July 10, 1886, c. 764, 24 Stat. 143, sur-
veyed but unpatented lands, on which the costs of survey have not
been paid, included within a railroad land grant, are subject to taxa-
tion by the State in which they are situated. Central Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Nevada, 512.

2. The nature of the taxable interest of a railroad company on such lands

so subjected to taxation, with the assent of Congress, does not present
a Federal question. Ib.

3. The possessory claim of the railroad company to such lands is taxable
under the laws of Nevada without reference to the fact that they may
be hereafter determined to be mineral lands, and so be excluded from
the operation of the grant. Ib.

See CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

TEXAS.

1 The treaty between the United States and Spain, made in 1819, and
ratified in 1821, provided that "the boundary line between the two
countries, west of the Mississippi, shall begin on the Gulf of Mexico,
at the mouth of the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north, along
the western bank of the river to the 32d degree of latitude; thence,
by a line due north, to the degree of latitude where it strikes the Rio
Roxo of Natchitoches, or Red River; then following the course of the
Rio Roxo, westward, to the degree of longitude 100 west from London
and 23 from Washington; then, crossing the said Red River, and
running thence, by a line due north, to the river Arkansas; thence,
following the course of the southern bank of the Arkansas, to its
source, in latitude 42 north; and thence, by that parallel of latitude,
to the South Sea. The whole being as laid down in Melish's map of
the United States, published at Philadelphia, improved to the first of
January, 1818." Held, (1) That the intention of the two governments,
as gathered from the words of the treaty, must control, and that the
map to which the contracting parties referred is to be given the same
effect as if it had been expressly made a part of the treaty; (2) But,
looking at the entire instrument, it is clear that, while the parties
took the Melish map, improved to 1818, as a basis for the final settle-
ment of the question of boundary, they contemplated, as shown by
the fourth article of the treaty, that the line was subsequently to be
fixed with more precision by commissioners and surveyors represent-
ing the respective countries; (3) That the reference in the treaty to
the 100th meridian was to that meridian astronomically located, and
not necessarily to the 100th meridian as located on the Melish map;
(4) That the Melish map located the 100th meridian far east of
where the true 100th meridian is, when properly delineated; (5)
That the Compromise Act of September 9, 1850, and the acceptance
of its provisions by Texas, together with the action of the two govern-
ments, require that, in the determination of the present question of
boundary between the United States and Texas, the direction in the
treaty, "following the course of the Rio Roxo westward to the degree
of longitude 100 west from London,” must be interpreted as referring
to the true 100th meridian, and, consequently, the line "westward”
must go to that meridian, and not stop at the Melish 100th meridian;

(6) That Prairie Dog Town Fork of Red River is the continuation,
going from east to west, of the Red River of the treaty, and the line,
going from east to west, extends up Red River and along the Prairie
Dog Town Fork of Red River to the 100th meridian, and not up the
North Fork of Red River; (7) That the act of Congress of February
24, 1879, c. 97, creating the Northern Judicial District of Texas, is
to be construed as placing Greer County in that district for judicial
purposes only, and not as ceding to Texas the territory embraced by
that county. United States v. Texas, 1.

2. The territory east of the 100th meridian of longitude, west and south
of the river now known as the North Fork of Red River, and north
of a line following westward, as prescribed by the treaty of 1819
between the United States and Spain, the course, and along the south
bank, both of Red River and the river now known as the Prairie Dog
Town Fork or South Fork of Red River until such line meets the
100th meridian of longitude- which territory is sometimes called
Greer County-constitutes no part of the territory properly included
within or rightfully belonging to Texas at the time of the admission
of that State into the Union, and is not within the limits nor under the
jurisdiction of that State, but is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States of America. Ib.

See DEED 4;

LOCAL LAW, 1;

UNITED STATES, 2.

TRESPASS.

See UNITED STATES, 2.

UNITED STATES.

1. Neither the Secretary of War, nor the Attorney General, nor any subor-
dinate of either, is authorized to waive the exemption of the United
States from judicial process, or to submit the United States, or their
property, to the jurisdiction of the court in a suit brought against their
officers. Stanley v. Schwalby, 255.

2. In an action of trespass to try title, under the statutes of Texas, brought
by one claiming title in an undivided third part of a parcel of land,
and possession of the whole, against officers of the United States, occu-
pying the land as a military station, and setting up title in the United
States, a judgment that the plaintiff recover the title in the third part,
and possession of the whole jointly with the defendants, is a judgment
against the United States and against their property. Ib.

3. The United States are not liable to judgment for costs. Ib.
4. An action to recover the title and possession of land against officers of
the United States setting up title in the United States, and defended
by the District Attorney of the United States, was dismissed by the

highest court of the State as against the United States; but judgment
was rendered against the officers, upon the ground that they could not
avail themselves of the statute of limitations. This court, on writ of
error, reversed that judgment, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. The highest court of the State thereupon held that the
United States were a party to the action, and decided, upon evidence
insufficient in law, that the United States had no valid title, because
they took with notice of a prior conveyance; and gave judgment
against the officers for title and possession, and against the United
States for costs. This court, upon a second writ of error, reverses
the judgment, and remands the case with instructions to dismiss the
action against the United States, and to enter judgment for the indi-
vidual defendants, with costs. Ib.

5. In view of the reservation of jurisdiction made by the State of New
York in the act of June 17, 1853, c. 355, ceding to the United States
jurisdiction over certain lands adjacent to the navy yard and hos-
pital in Brooklyn, the exclusive authority of the United States over
the land covered by the lease, the ouster from possession under which
is the subject of controversy in this action, was suspended while the
lease remained in force. Palmer v. Barrett, 399.

See DEED, 2, 4, 5;
TEXAS.

WILL.

On the trial of this case in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,
that court, after examination of the facts, held that: "(1) Where a will
relates only to personalty, and is in the handwriting of the testator
and signed by him, no other formality is required to render it valid”
in the District; and that " (2) Immaterial alterations in a will, though
made after the testator's death by one of the beneficiaries under it,
will not invalidate it" in the courts of the District, "when not fraudu-
lently made." This court, after passing upon the facts in detail, ar-
rives at substantially the same conclusions touching them as did the
Supreme Court of the District, and affirms its judgment. McIntire v.
McIntire, 383.

WRIT OF ERROR.

A writ of error is the proper form of bringing up to this court an order of
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia admitting a will to
probate. Camphell v. Porter, 478.