Argument for the State of Texas. Mexico, from the date of the treaty until the termination of her dominion. The record further abundantly attests, some of the evidence as to which has been cited already by us, that the United States by solemn acts of Congress had recognized this possession of Texas and had ripened it into a confirmed right, long anterior to the commencement of these proceedings. In Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 130, where an effort was made to avoid payment of taxes because of the alleged unlawful retrocession of Alexandria to Virginia, the court held that the party was estopped from questioning that. Greer County is fixed, and has been since its organization in 1860, in a senatorial district and in a legislative district, one of the legislative districts of Texas, and has been constantly represented. It has been, and is, in a judicial district of the United States by act of Congress. It has been, and is, in a Congressional district. All that time it has had its position in a state judicial district. Not till about seven years ago did the Post Office Department cease to fix post offices in Greer county, Texas, which it had done regularly before then. At that time it, for some reason, changed the description, but it was too late for any purpose touching the rights of Texas to this property. All this and much more that could be added, if need be, show that Greer County, Texas, has been recognized by people, private and public officials, both state and national, and by both state and national authorities, legislative, executive and judicial. Not more firmly fixed in their respective statehoods is Cook County in Illinois, or Bourbon County in Kentucky, or Bucks County in Pennsylvania. Nations are prescribed and estopped as individuals, so are we told in Phillips v. Payne, sup. In this discussion we stand alone upon acts open and undisguised, and say nothing upon propositions to settle or to compromise, after it was thought by some that the line should be away below where it is, as all such efforts are for peace and quiet, and the law commends them and does not draw any admission from them. Argument for the State of Texas. The facts disclose two real acts of estoppel against the United States, substantial in their character. (1.) The reimbursement of Texas for the disarmament of Snively's command was recommended by the President to Congress, and Congress in pursuance of such recommendation, promptly provided compensation. If Snively's command was not upon United States territory at the time of its disarmament by Captain Cooke, the Texans were there wrongfully and ought to have been disarmed, and their arms confiscated. There could be no claim for indemnity on the part of Texas for a wrongful act such as this. If it invaded the territory of a neighboring Republic in 1843 its troops should have been captured and their arms and supplies should have been confiscated; because for all intents and purposes they were acting as public enemies and by the law of nations were entitled to no grace. Yet, as is admitted, in 1847, the government of the United States made public reparation for the wrong done, practically confessing the wrong, and in effect declaring by the legislation, that the Texas troops were rightfully upon Texas territory at the time they were captured and their arms seized by Captain Cooke. This territory comprises the territory of Greer County, now in dispute, and it is too late now for the government to contend for a different finding. (2.) A governmental act of more potent significance is in the legislation by Congress of 1879 creating the Northern Judicial District of Texas. The force and effect of this legislation is attempted to be parried by complainant in this cause by the insertion of long extracts from the reports of House Committees and statements by Chairmen of House Committees that this legislation was inadvertent and had and done in ignorance by the members of the Congress and Senators as to the true status of the territory embraced within such legislation. The counsel for the government seems to misapprehend or to defiantly disregard the force and potency of his own suggestion. Notwithstanding these reports of committees and ex cathedra utterances of chairmen of committees, this statute of Congress so disposing of Greer County, Texas, as a part of the territory of Texas, has been upon the statute Opinion of the Court. book for fifteen years unrepealed, unqualified, and unaffected. Can this court disregard such legislation? Can this court, with all its powers, afford to say, and especially upon the faint intimations of the record, that Congress did wrong, either from ignorance or any other motive? Not so. The record is made up, and this court and every State in the Union and every citizen of every State, and the United States itself, must abide by the record as made. Greer County is a part of Texas, so conceded by the government of the United States, which stands in law estopped by such governmental act. IV. Should the court determine all questions submitted against the State of Texas, including that of estoppel, there certainly can be no doubt of the right of defendant to insist that the intersection of the 100th meridian with the river be accurately fixed. This has been done by Professor H. S. Pritchett against whose conclusion not a syllable of testimony has been adduced, and the line should be established as found by him, 3797.3 feet east of the initial monument placed by Messrs. Jones and Brown in 1858. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. By the act of Congress of May 2, 1890, c. 182, establishing a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma, and enlarging the jurisdiction of the United States court in the Indian Territory, it was declared that that act should not apply to "Greer County" until the title to the same had been adjudicated and determined to be in the United States. And that there might be a speedy judicial determination of that question the Attorney General of the United States was directed to institute in this court a suit in equity against the State of Texas, setting forth the title and claim of the United States "to the tract of land lying between the North and South Forks of the Red River where the Indian Territory and the State of Texas adjoin, east of the one hundredth degree of longitude, and claimed by the State of Texas as within its boundary and a part of its land, and designated on Opinion of the Court. its map as Greer County;" the court, on the trial of the case, in its discretion, and so far as the ends of justice would warrant, to consider any evidence taken and received by the Joint Boundary Commission under the act of Congress, approved January 31, 1885. 26 Stat. 81, 92, § 25. In order that the precise locality of this land may be indicated, and for convenience, we insert on page 22 an extract from a map of Texas and of the Indian Territory, published in 1892. The territory in dispute is marked on that map with the words "Unassigned Land." Unassigned Land." It contains about 1,511,576.17 acres, lies east of the 100th meridian of longitude and west and south of the river marked on that map as the North Fork of Red River and with the words. "Boundary claimed by the State of Texas." It is north of the line marked on that map with the words "Boundary claimed by U. S." The river on the south side is now commonly known as Prairie Dog Town Fork of Red River, (the Indian name of which is Kecheahquehono,) which has its source in the western part of Texas, and is the same river as the South Fork of Red River mentioned in the act of 1890. The present suit was instituted pursuant to that act. The State appeared, and demurred to the bill upon the following grounds: 1. The question of boundary raised by the suit was political in its character, and not susceptible of judicial determination by this court in the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 2. Under the Constitution it was not competent for the United States to sue, in its own courts, one of the States composing the Union. 3. This court, sitting as a court of equity, could not hear and determine the present controversy — the right asserted by the United States being in its nature legal and not equitable. Upon full consideration these several grounds of demurrer were overruled. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621. The reasons given for that conclusion need not be here repeated. The State answered the bill, controverting the claim of the United States and asserting that the lands within the boundary mentioned in the above act constitute a part of its terri |