overlapping, I have no specific recommendations on increasing their authority or their independence.

Senator SASSER. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't believe I have any questions. I think Mr. Harding has answered the questions I did have.

Senator SASSER. One question occurs to me, and perhaps on observation, Mr. Harding. I would be interested in getting your reaction to this.

Mr. Nader, I thought, made a very strong and persuasive case that the Administrator coming in as head of an agency, who is appointed by the President, ought to have more latitude in selecting his immediate subordinates and ought to be strengthened in his effort to carry out the policy of the administration which appointed him and the administration which was indeed in the final analysis elected by the people. I thought that Mr. Nader made a very strong case for his point of view there. But one thing that troubles me is what happens when you perhaps get an irresponsible administration. We are still remembering what happened a few years ago in the Federal service and in the Civil Service and in some areas the protections of the Civil Service really stood between even greater abuses perpetrated on the American people. If the political appointees, in some instances, in a previous administration had been allowed full latitude to do precisely what they were directed to do, by the administration that appointed them, then we might have had an even more terrible problem visited upon the heads of the American people.

It is indeed a fine balance. Do you have any observations on that?

Mr. HARDING. Yes, sir. The problem is precisely as you have stated it, and it is one of getting balance between the objectives Mr. Nader stated and the objective of having Federal agencies staffed, particularly at the top, with competent people.

Mr. Nader referred to the FAA. I spent 3 years, myself, as an Associate Administrator of that Agency and I can testify that there is a great need for highly competent executives and technicians at the top of that Agency. A movement to sweep out the entire upper level of the Agency would be catastrophic, not only to air safety, but I think to a lot of other aspects of aviation in this country. And, therefore, I do not feel I would go as far as Mr. Nader would apparently go in that particular Agency. That, incidentally, is one of the reasons that there are so few of what we call schedule C's in the Federal Aviation Agency-because of the need for competence and experience in top jobs.

On the other hand, I would point out that in most of these positions, most of the relationships that exist between a newly appointed agency head, a political head, and the career people, the top level career people who report to that agency head, there is an understanding which few outside the bureaucracy understand. The career man will not stand in the way of a personality conflict or a policy conflict, or a managerial conflict between himself and the newly appointed agency head.

Haynes Johnson, in a recent article in the Washington Post, referred to a top level career man by the name of Stork who was at the top level of the Environmental Protection Agency. A new man

came into the top job, the supervisor of Mr. Stork, and it turned out that Mr. Stork and the new supervisor did not seem to be able to get together on Agency policy.

Mr. Stork submitted his resignation, purely voluntarily, with no acrimony and nothing but praise for the qualifications of the new political appointee.

This is a tradition in the higher levels of the Federal civil service, that this legislation really does not change, but to a great degree simply reflects the realities of the situation as they now are. So I don't think that when you are concerned about that sort of relationship between top level career people and political appointees, that the problem is not as acute as some people outside the Federal bureaucracy believe it to be.

Senator Sasser. Thank you very much, Mr. Harding, for your illuminating observations and testimony. I am sure that either myself or the staff will have additional questions to submit to you at a later date and we would appreciate very much your prompt response.

I am going to have to recess the committee for a short time while Senator Humphrey and I go to the Chamber to vote.

[Answers to questions submitted by Senator Ribicoff follow:]

NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE,

May 4, 1978.

Senator ABE RIBICOFF,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR RIBICOFF: I have your letters of March 30 and April 24, 1978 requesting answers to several questions on S. 2640. In addition, Mortimer Caplin, Chairman of the Board of the National Civil Service League, has asked me to respond to the letter addressed to him covering the same issues.

First, in regard to the March 30 letter, the NCSL through its Executive Committee has given considerable thought and attention to the Administration's Civil Service Reform proposals and is on record as strongly endorsing the President's recommendations. I so testified before your Committee on April 10. Specifically: 1. We feel that the proposals do strike an appropriate balance between protecting merit principles and achieving adequate management flexibility. The creation of the independent Merit System Protective Board is a major improvement in employee protection, while the simplification of adverse action procedures and the Senior Executive Service will strengthen the ability of Federal managers to manage.

2. It is highly appropriate to split the current conflicting roles of the Civil Service Commission. This is not a new idea, but one whose time we hope has come. 3. I regret that the League has not given any in-depth consideration to the relationship between the proposed Federal Labor Relations Authority and the OPM and MSPB. I would prefer not to comment on this item.

4. As indicated above, the League feels that the creation of the SES will contribute materially to the ability of Federal managers to organize and direct the operations for which they are responsible. In addition, we believe that the newly created incentives, both material and psychic, will attract and retain career executives with the vigor and risk-taking attitudes that are sorely needed. On the other hand, the option available to current careerists to remain out of the system is a reasonable approach to the problem of changing the rules in the middle of the game. Now to comment briefly on the questions raised in your April 24 letter:

1. The relationship between political and career executives is a complex one. In the first place it is a fundamental concept of our system of government that an incoming Administration have the ability to install new policies or change old ones. Why else hold national elections? To the extent that the inherited careerist cannot accept the new policy line, he should certainly be relieved of responsibility to carry it out. It is one of the great fictions of our time that senior career people do not have a role in policy formulation and, therefore, are not personally identified with any particular viewpoint.)

Conversely, careerists represent the institutional memory of agencies and programs, and their wholesale replacement early in a new administration would be catastrophic to a reasonable hope for successful management.

The provision in S. 2640 (3395-d) for a 120-day "cooling off" period attempts to deal with this problem. As we understand the provision, the 120 days would start to run after the appointment of an "Agency Head". As we further read the bill, "Agency Head" would include Departmental Secretaries. Normally such appointments are made early in a new administration with subordinate Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Chiefs, etc. designated at some later date. Since it is the purpose of the provision to give political appointees an opportunity to appraise the careerist, it would seem prudent to have the 120-day period start with the appointment of the official most directly involved with evaluation of the SES member.

2. It is our view that incentive pay proposals in the bill for both SES and GS 13-15 managers will attract more people to the Federal service who are willing to compete economically in the system. We believe that such "risk-takers" will bring a degree of energy and self-confidence that will be reflected in increased productivity and innovation.

3. The League recognizes the political reasons that the President proposes to create the OPM as an "independent agency" rather than as a part of the EOP. We deplore the fact that the campaign rhetoric has forced the Administration into this position and would strongly support placing the OPM where it logically belongs-in the EOP.

Whereas we agree that to some extent the single Director of OPM opens the door to increased danger of politicization of the Civil Service, we feel that the presence of the MSPB will effectively counteract that danger. Furthermore, we would argue that the value of a more dynamic and positive personnel program under a single Director more than compensates for the theoretical danger of politicization.

4. We in the League are of the view that the President's proposals on veterans' preference do not go nearly as far toward reform as we would prefer. We do not see employment in the Federal Service as an appropriate means of meeting the problems created for individuals because of previous military service. We are as concerned as any other citizen group with the obligation of our society to meet the legitimate needs of veterans, but as a group primarily involved in promoting merit and efficiency in the public service, we must conclude that attempting to meet those needs through public service employment is counter-productive. In the process of so doing, we necessarily introduce a factor (preference) completely unrelated to a determination as to which employee is the most meritorious in terms of past or potential performance. Obviously, female applicants or employees are the group most seriously discriminated against under current law.

On the other hand, we are realists and recognize that the long history of veterans' preference cannot be reversed in a single piece of legislation. Therefore, we support the effort in S. 2640 to deal with the most egregious aspects of the problem. 5. Rose Boyd, our Executive Director and expert on EEOC matters, is out of the city this week. Before replying to your question on "mixed cases”, I would want her advice. I am asking her to reply directly on this matter as soon as she returns. Sincerely yours,

BERTRAND M. HARDING, President.

Senator PERCY [presiding]. I think, in view of the time that has been lost to you already, that we will just go right ahead. I am certain Senator Sasser, our chairman today, will be right along.

Senator Ribicoff, unfortunately, just told me that he will be unable to be with us, but we certainly welcome you very much, indeed. We are looking forward to your testimony. I notice that some of your statements-I have gone through the testimony-I notice one of them is 35 pages.

We would be here through dinnertime, I am afraid, unless you could limit yourselves to a maximum of 10 minutes apiece. That would give us time then for questions and other members of the committee will be here by then.

I think, Mr. Hartnett, if we could start with you.

TESTIMONY OF NORMAN B. HARTNETT, NATIONAL SERVICE DIRECTOR, DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS, ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD H. SCHWAB, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES; AUSTIN E. KERBY, DIRECTOR FOR ECONOMICS; AND EDWARD J. LORD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. HARTNETT. Senator Percy, with your permission, I would like to submit my prepared statement for the record.

Senator PERCY. Without objection, so ordered. It will be entered at the conclusion of your testimony.

Mr. HARTNETT. I will have the opportunity to submit additional information for the record within a reasonable period of time.

The honorable service of millions of veterans and the sacrifices of those who died defending this Nation have already been demeaned by the pardoning of draft dodgers and deserters and further debased by the administration's attempt to upgrade discharges of 173,000 ex-servicemen with undesirable discharges or bad conduct discharges, and to confer upon them all veterans rights and benefits.

This attempt, I am pleased to report, was thwarted by the Congress.

Now we have a proposal which would further designate the honorable service of the Nation's 29 million veterans. Delegates from 2,500 chapters of the Disabled American Veterans representing 562,000 members at our last national convention in July 1977 unanimously adopted a resolution strongly opposing any administrative or legislative proposal which would weaken, eliminate or circumvent the Veterans Preference Act of 1944.

Chairman Campbell of the U.S. Civil Service Commission has testified that the proposed changes have two basic objectives: One, to focus the use of preference on the disabled and Vietnam veterans; and, two, to reduce the adverse impact of veterans preference on women and minorities.

Allow me to clarify these distortions and inaccuracies. This bill will not help disabled and Vietnam-era veterans. To the contrary, it will adversely affect them. Although unemployment and underemployment among Vietnam-era veterans is intolerably high, evidenced by 2,174,000 of them registered with 2,500 public job service offices in fiscal year 1977, this bill on October 1, 1980 would eliminate preference for more than 4 million Vietnam-era veterans, discharged between 1965 and 1970, unless they were disabled in service.

Paradoxically, the widows of most of these veterans would continue to be eligible for 10-point preference, should those veterans die.

Disabled veterans of all wars would find it more difficult to secure a Federal job as hiring officials would have greater flexibility to evade the application of veterans preference.

The following statistics belie the assertion that veterans preference has adversely impacted women and minorities. As to new

1See p. 463.

29-894 0-78-29

hires in the Federal Government, in 1975 there were 211,000 females; 156,981 veterans. In 1976: 215,000 females; 153,677 veterans. In fiscal year 1977: 215,000 females; 153,661 veterans.

In terms of veterans readjustment appointments, which is an excepted appointing authority for recently separated veterans of the Vietnam era, in 1975 there were 15,127 hires; 1976, 15,037; and in fiscal year 1977: 15,696.

The important point is that although these veterans were hired to obtain supposedly permanent jobs, the conversion rate to career or career-conditional positions approximated 35 percent.

As to minority employment, the Commission in a news release dated November 29, 1977, reported: "In the 7-year period 1969 through 1976 General Schedule, white-collar employment of minorities rose 37 percent, compared with a 5 percent increase for nonminorities.'

Programs such as the Commission's special emphasis program and noncompetitive conversion of students, authorized recently, enhance female and minority employment as do intensified and accelerated efforts to promote these groups of employees.

With regard to promotion, I must reemphasize that there is no preference for veterans in promotion in the Federal service, no preference in promotions and this is a myth which has great acceptability.

Any failure to advance females or minority Federal employees must be attributed to management and not to veterans preference. Mr. Chairman, today there is rampant evasion of veterans preference. Hiring officials return 44 percent of registers without appointment, and although preference eligibles top the registers 75 percent of the time, only about 32 percent of new hires in recent years have been veterans or preference eligibles.

Incidentally, all of these figures come from the Commission itself. We oppose the elimination of the veterans preference in the senior executive service and the proposed changes in preference in reductions-in-force.

It has been stated in the final staff report, page 122, of the President's reorganization project that:

After some experience has been gained in the operation of this recommendation, further consideration should be given to limiting the time period in which disabled veterans and certain wives and widows retain preference in reductions-in-force.

That tells us, Mr. Chairman, that the ultimate goal is total elimination of all veterans' preference regardless of sacrifices made in military service. Speaking about reductions in force, I think it is important to note even under existing law that agencies determine the kinds, the numbers, and locations of jobs to be eliminated or reduced, and the employees to be affected.

I think that was well demonstrated by Mr. Nader's statement when he talked about Mr. Fitzgerald. We do support the extension of the Vietnam veterans readjustment appointing authority beyond September 30, 1980, on the premise that that period of time would certainly not permit, given the statistics I quoted, an ample opportunity to employ a substantial number of job-seeking younger vet

erans.

As to the provision in the bill regarding excepted appointments of seriously disabled veterans, we would like to recommend that