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Courts of the United States as follows: "But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil action before a Circuit or District Court; and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant."1

2

This limitation as to the residence of the defendant does not apply to a suit against an alien, who may be sued in any district where he can be served with process; nor to the case of an alien corporation even where the State statute deprives its courts of jurisdiction. An alien cannot sue a citizen of the United States except in the district which the defendant inhabits, where the jurisdiction depends upon the alienage. The limitation does not apply to a suit for the infringement of a patent or of a copyright; nor, it has been said, to any case of which the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction." In all these cases the defendant may be sued wherever he can be served, except in a patent case, where the defendant can only be sued in the district where his infringement occurred, and he has a regularly established place of business; or else in the district of which he is an inhabitant.8 The rule is otherwise in trade-mark cases. Where the jurisdiction depends upon the existence of a Federal question and is concurrent with that of the State courts, the defendant must be sued in the district which he inhabits; 10 but where it depends upon citizenship

§ 22. 1 Act of March 3, 1887, sec. 1, 24 St. at L. 522; as amended, 25 St. at L. 433.

2 In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100. 3 Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100.

4 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496.

5 29 St. at L. 695; Smith v. Sargent Mfg. Co., 67 Fed. R. 801; In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 661.

"Lederer v. Rankin, 90 Fed. R. 449. Lederer v. Rankin, 90 Fed. R. 449,

450; In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 661;
In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160
U. S. 221, 230; Van Patten v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 74 Fed. R. 981.

8 29 St. at L., p. 695; Bowers v. Atlantic G. & P. Co. (S. D. N. Y., Coxe, J.), 104 Fed. R. 887.

9 In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221.

10 McCormick H. M. Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43; St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 33 Fed. R. 385, 386; In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221.

in different States, the suit may be brought in the district in which either the plaintiff or the defendant resides, provided the defendant can be duly served."

A corporation chartered by one of the United States cannot have a residence in another State, 12 even where it has, as a condition of doing business in the State, filed a stipulation authorizing service of process upon its agents within the State and agreeing not to remove a suit to the Federal court on the ground of difference of citizenship or non-residence.13 In the absence of any provision in the charter, the principal office and the domicile of a railroad company incorporated by Congress is where the meetings of its stockholders and directors are held, and the records thereof with the registry of its stock are kept, and not where the general administrative offices of the heads of its departments are located. When one of the plaintiffs was a resident of the district, and the other plaintiff and the defendant, who were citizens of different States, were non-residents, it was held that the court had no jurisdiction.15 It has been held at Circuit that the non-resident defendant alone can object because the suit is not brought in the proper district.16 The objection is usually waived by a general appearance without raising it," even when neither party is a resident of the district.18

11 McCormick H. M. Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41; Pitkin Min. Co. v. Markell, 33 Fed. R. 386; St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre Haute & L. R. Co., 33 Fed. R. 385, 386; Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 32 Fed. R. 673; Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 33 Fed. R. 114; Gavin v. Vance, 33 Fed. R. 84; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 32 Fed. R. 337.

12 Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444. 453; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496.

Fed. R. 76. It has been held that a Circuit Court has no jurisdiction, upon the ground of diverse citizenship, of a suit brought by residents of other districts than that for which the court sits, against several defendants, only one of whom is a resident of such district. Excelsior P. P. Co. v. Brown (C. C. A.), 74 Fed. R. 321.

16 Jewett v. Bradford Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 45 Fed. R. 801. But see Interior Const. & I. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 220; Elkhart Nat. Bank v.

13 Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 N. W. G. L. Co., 84 Fed. R. 76; infra, U. S. 202, 207.

14 Interstate Com. Com. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. R. 948, 955; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 162 U. S. 197, 204.

15 Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315; Elkhart Nat. Bank v. N. W. G. L. Co., 84

§ 101.

17 St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 603; Interior Const. & I. Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217. 18 Central Tr. Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129.

It has been held that the rule requires the suit to be brought in the district in which the plaintiff or defendant resides and is a citizen; and does not authorize a suit in a State of which neither is a citizen.19 "The word 'inhabitant' in that act was apparently used not in any larger meaning than 'citizen,' but to avoid the incongruity of speaking of a citizen of less than a State, when the intention was to cover not only a district which included a whole State, but also two districts in one State." 20 The word "inhabitant" seems, however, to be more limited than resident." The Judiciary Act of 1887 does not require the bringing of the suit in the division of the district in which one of the parties resides.22 An omission to allege the defendant's residence was held to be fatal upon a demurrer.23 The limitation as to residence does not apply to the defendants who are served in pursuance of the Revised Stat utes by publication or without the State or district," even when they are the only defendants.25

26

This statute does not affect the jurisdiction in admiralty. A special rule regulates proceedings under the Act to protect Trade and Commerce from unlawful Restraints and Monopolies.27

The Revised Statutes previously provided as follows: "When a State contains more than one district, every suit not of a local nature in the Circuit or District Courts thereof, against a single defendant, inhabitant of such State, must be brought in the district where he resides; but if there are two or more defendants, residing in different districts of the State, it may be brought in either district, and a duplicate writ may be issued

19 Bicycle Stepladder Co. v. Gordon, 57 Fed. R. 529; Shaw v. Quincy Min. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 447.

v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 63 Fed. R. 481; Wheelright v. St. Louis, N. O. & O. Canal Co., 50 Fed. R. 709; infra,

20 Gray, J., in Shaw v. Quincy Min. § 97. See Kuhn v. Morrison, 75 Fed. Co., 145 U. S. 444, 447.

21 For cases of residence, see King v. U. S., 59 Fed. R. 9; Rivers v. Bradley, 53 Fed. R. 305.

22 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Chattanooga Const. Co., 53 Fed. R. 314. 23 Laskey v. Newtown Mining Co., 50 Fed. R. 634; infra, § 66.

24 Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S. 58; Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404; Ames v. Holderbaum, 42 Fed. R. 341; U. S.

R. 81.

25 Dick v. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404; Wheelright v. St. Louis, N. O. & O. Canal Co., 50 Fed. R. 709; U. S. v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 63 Fed. R. 481; Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co., 55 Fed. R. 553; Spencer v. Kansas City S. Y. Co., 58 Fed. R. 741.

26 In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488.

27 26 St. at L. 209.

against the defendants, directed to the marshal of any other district in which any defendant resides. The clerk issuing the duplicate writ shall indorse thereon that it is a true copy of a writ sued out of the court of the proper district; and such original and duplicate writs, when executed and returned into the office from which they issue, shall constitute and be proceeded on as one suit; and upon any judgment or decree rendered therein, execution may be issued, directed to the marshal of any district in the same State." 28 "In suits of a local nature, where the defendant resides in a different district, in the same State, from that in which the suit is brought, the plaintiff may have original and final process against him, directed to the marshal of the district in which he resides." 29 "Any suit of a local nature, at law or in equity, where the land or other subject-matter of a fixed character lies partly in one district and partly in another, within the same State, may be brought in the Circuit or District Court of either district; and the court in which it is brought shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide it, and to cause mesne or final process to be issued and executed, as fully as if the said subject-matter were wholly within the district for which such court is constituted." 30

It has been held that these sections have not been repealed."1 The statutes which divide certain judicial districts into divisions usually provide that all suits, not of a local nature, against a single defendant, or when all the defendants reside in the same division of the district, shall be brought in the division in which the defendant or defendants reside; but that if there are two or more defendants residing in different divisions, the suit may be brought in either division; and further, that where cases are removed from the State courts, such removal shall be to the United States Circuit Courts in the division in which the county is situated from which the removal is made; and that prosecutions for crimes or offenses committed in either of the divisions shall be cognizable within such divisions.32

28 U. S. R. S., § 740.

29 U. S. R. S., § 741.

20 U. S. R. S., § 742.

31 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Atlanta & T. R. Co., 49 Fed. R. 608, 616; Goddard v. Mailler, 80 Fed. R. 422. See Greeley v. Lowe, 155 U. S.

58, 72. Contra, Lacombe, J., in N. J. Steel & I. Co. v. Chormann, 105 Fed. R. 532.

32 Alabama: 23 St. at L. 18, 19. Georgia: 21 St. at L. 62, 63; 25 St. at L. 671, which provides that "when the defendant is a non-resident of

It has been held that a suit in a Circuit Court of the United States in Iowa, against a defendant who is a resident of another State, need not be brought in the division of the district where the plaintiff resides.33

It has been held of the statute dividing the district of Washington that the exception of suits "of a local character" directs by implication that such a suit must be brought in the district where the thing or property proceeded against happens to be situated; and that a libel in admiralty is a suit of a local nature, which consequently must be prosecuted in the division where the vessel is seized, although her home port is in another division.34

The act dividing the district of Montana into two divisions omits the customary clause as to the criminal jurisdiction of the same, and consequently an indictment can be found in either for a crime committed in the other division. This provides as to the southern division that "where one or more defendants in any civil cause shall reside in said division, and one or more defendants in such cause shall reside out of said division but in said district, then the plaintiff may institute his action either in the court having jurisdiction of the latter or in the said division." 36 The section of the Revised Statutes which divides the district of South Carolina into "Eastern and Western Districts" makes geographical divisions of the same, not separate judicial districts; and indictments may be found and trials held in either for offenses committed anywhere in the State.37

either division, an action may, if plaintiff is a citizen of the district, be brought in that division where the defendant may be found." Idaho: 30 St. at L. 423. Iowa: U. S. R. S., § 744, 21 St. at L. 155. Kansas: 26 St. at L. 129; 27 St. at L. 24. Kentucky: U. S. R. S., § 745, 25 St. at L. 390. Louisi ana: 25 St. at L. 388, 438. Michigan: 20 St. at L. 175; 28 St. at L. 67, which provides that "actions in rem in admiralty may be brought in whatever division of the district service can be had upon the res." Minnesota: 26 St. at L. 72; 28 St. at L. 102. See Post v. U. S., 161 U. S. 583. Mis

souri: 20 St. at L 263; 24 St. at L. 424. North Dakota: 26 St. at L. 67. Ohio: 21 St. at L. 63. South Dakota: 26 St. at L. 14; 28 St. at L. 5. Tennessee: 20 St. at L. 206; 21 St. at L. 751. Utah: 29 St. at L. 620. Washington, 26 St. at L. 45. But see as to Arkansas, 29 St. at L. 590.

33 Dinzy v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 61 Fed. R. 49.

34 The Williamette, 53 Fed. R. 602. 35 27 St. at L. 252; Rosencrans v. U. S., 165 U. S. 257. 36 Ibid.

37 Barrett v. U. S., 169 U. S. 218; S. C., 169 U. S. 231.

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