New Hampshire made when Vermont was a part of that State, and the other under a grant from Vermont made after their separation, it was held that the controversy arose between persons claiming land under grants of different States. Where a controversy is founded upon conflicting grants of different States, the Federal courts have jurisdiction irrespective of the equitable title of the parties before either grant.3 § 21. Ancillary jurisdiction. After a Federal court has acquired jurisdiction, through the existence of the necessary difference of citizenship between the original parties, ancillary proceedings may be therein instituted, although parties upon the different sides of the controversy are citizens of the same State and there is no other ground of Federal jurisdiction. "The question is not whether the proceeding is supplemental and ancillary, or is independent and original, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading, but whether it is supplemental and ancillary, or is to be considered entirely new and original, in the sense which this court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal courts from that of the State courts." Thus, not only can a bill of revivor or a supplemental bill,' or a cross-bill, be maintained in a Federal court which had jurisdiction of the original litigation; but so can a bill to enjoin the prosecution of proceedings therein at law or in equity, or a bill to restrain or to regulate, or to set aside," 2 Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Colson v. Lewis, 2 Wheat. 377. 3 Colson v. Lewis, 2 Wheat. 377, 379. § 21. Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1; Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 163; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 460; Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276; Pacific R. of Mo. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 111 U. S. 505, 522; Dewey v. W. F. G. C. Co., 123 U. S. 329; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131; Seymour v. Phillips & C. Const. Co., 7 Biss. 460. But see Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69. 2 Miller, J., in Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633. 4 Morgan's La. & T. R. & St. Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 171. See infra, § 172; Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed. R. 753. 5 Bradshaw v. Miners' Bank (C. C. A.), 81 Fed. R. 902; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276. So can a bill for the appointment of a receiver of rents and profits pending an ejectment suit in the Federal court. Ulman v. Clark, 75 Fed. R. 868. 6 Dunn v. Clark, 8 Pet. 1; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 460; Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 327; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 376; Johnson v. Christian, 125 U. S. 642. 7 Pacific R. of Mo. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 'Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 164. 111 U. S. 505, 522; Foster v. Mansfield, 8 or to obtain a judicial construction, or to enforce by injunction, scire facias 10 or otherwise," a judgment or decree, or a bond 12 of a Federal court; even where other incidental relief is prayed. A bill for the reformation of a policy of insurance is ancillary to an action upon such policy. A creditor's bill between citizens of the same State founded upon a decree in admiralty has been held not within the jurisdiction of a Federal court.15 An original bill to foreclose a mortgage, or a mechanic's lien 17 or other lien 18 upon a railway or other property, or upon the proceeds of property in the possession of a receiver appointed by a Federal court in a prior suit, to foreclose a prior or subsequent mortgage, or otherwise in the possession of such court, can be brought in such Federal court C. & L. M. R. Co., 36 Fed. R. 627; s. c., 146 U. S. 88; Carey v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 115; Maitland v. Gibson, 79 Fed. R. 136; Lacanagrues v. Chapins, 144 U. S. 119; Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. R. 951; Ladd v. West, 55 Fed. R. 353; Hill v. Kuhlman (C. C. A.), 87 Fed. R. 498; McDonald v. Seligmans, 81 Fed. R. 753; Richardson v. Loree (C. C. A.), 94 Fed. R. 375. 8 Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall 609; Jenks v. Brewster, 96 Fed. R. 625. Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 6 Wall. 748; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401. So can a bill in aid of an execution or attachment. Lant v. Manley (C. C. A.), 75 Fed. R. 627. But where a railroad had been sold under a decree of foreclosure by a Federal court, it was held that such court had no jurisdiction over a subsequent suit to restrain the enforcement of a State judgment of ejectment obtained by a plaintiff who was not a party to the foreclosure. Central Trust Co. v. Grantham, 83 Fed. R. 540. 10 Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Washburn, 66 Fed. R. 790; s. c. in C. C. A., 76 Fed. R. 1005; Lafayette County v. Wonderly (C. C. A.), 92 Fed. R. 313. 11 Maitland v. Gibson, 79 Fed. R. 16 136. But see Central Trust Co. v. Grantham, 83 Fed. R. 540. 12 Lamb v. Ewing, 56 Fed. R. 269; Leslie v. Brown, 95 Fed. R. 171. 13 Hill v. Kuhlman (C. C. A.), 87 Fed. R. 498. 14 Rosenbaum v. Council B. Ins. Co., 37 Fed. R. 724; Abraham v. North G. F. Ins. Co., 37 Fed. R. 731. 15 Winter v. Swinburne, 8 Fed. R. 49. See Provident Savings Soc. v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586; supra, § 17. 16 Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co., 137 U. S. 171; Farmers' L. & Tr. Co. v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 44 Fed. R. 115; Carey v. Houston, T. & C. R. Co., 52 Fed. R. 671; Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. R. 263; Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Ry. Co. v. Continental T. R. Co. (C. C. A.), 95 Fed. R. 497. 17 Central Tr. Co. v. Bridges (C. C. A.), 57 Fed. R. 753. 18 Blake v. Pine M. I. & C. Co. (C. C. A.), 76 Fed. R. 624; Central Tr. Co. v. Benedict (C. C. A.), 78 Fed. R. 198; Central Tr. Co. v. Carter (C. C. A.), 78 Fed. R. 225. As to jurisdiction by cross-bill, see also Everett v. Independent School District, 102 Fed. R. 529; Brooks v. Laurent (C. C. A.), 98 Fed. R. 647; infra, §§ 170, 173. independent of the citizenship of the parties, even after sale in the former suit. After a Federal court has appointed a receiver, it has ancillary jurisdiction over all suits brought by him irrespective of the amount involved.19 He cannot, however, remove into such a court all suits brought against him.20 It has been held at Circuit that a suit pending against the corporation at the time of the receivership may, on the petition of the receiver, be removed into the Federal court, at least when the plaintiff has intervened there, although original jurisdiction over the same could not have been entertained.21 Where assets are in the course of administration, all persons entitled to participate may come in under the jurisdiction acquired between the parties by ancillary or supplemental pleading, even though jurisdiction would be lacking if said. proceedings had been originally and independently prosecuted.22 It has been held that a person, whose citizenship if an original party would have deprived the court of jurisdiction, cannot intervene when the court has possession of no fund or property in which he is interested.23 It has been held at Circuit that a bill cannot thus be sustained, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties, when filed to set aside for fraud, subsequent to its entry, the decree of the Federal court or a contract affecting such decree," nor when filed to set aside for fraud a stipulation and decree in a former suit, the defendants to the bill being neither parties to the former suit nor the personal representatives of such parties, but trustees created by a defendant to such suit after the decree, and where none of the property affected by the former suit was within the custody of the court; 25 nor when filed against defendants to a former decree and a third party to whom it was alleged that lands, the subject 19 White V. Ewing, 159 U. S. 53; Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 173 U. S. 573; Connor v. Alligator L. Co., 98 Fed. R. 155. 20 Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 335; Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S. 206; supra, §§ 15, 17. 22 Fuller, C. J., in Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 49. See note 18, supra; and Henderson v. Goode, 49 Fed. R. 887; infra, § 201. 23 Seligman v. Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. R. 524; United El. S. Co. v. La. El. L. Co., 68 Fed. R. 673. 24 Yeatman v. Bradford, 44 Fed. R. 21 Rice v. Durham Water Co., 91 536. Fed. R. 433. 25 Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. R. 702. matter of the former suit, were conveyed prior to the commencement of the same.26 Conversely, there is a similar limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. This is well explained in the following extract from an opinion by Bradley, J.: "The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, whether the proceeding to procure nullity of the former judgment in such a case as the present is or is not in its nature a separate suit, or whether it is a supplementary proceeding, so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a continuation of it. If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the common-law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review, or an appeal, it would belong to the latter category, and the United States court could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case.27 Otherwise, the Circuit Courts of the United States would become invested with power to control the proceedings in the State courts, or would have appellate jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of different States. Such a result would be totally inadmissible. On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and, according to the doctrine laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes,28 the case might be within the cognizance of the Federal courts. The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to exist. In the one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness of the judg 26 Anglo Florida P. H. Co. v. McKibben, 65 Fed. R. 529. After a final decree granting damages for the injury to a street railway by the construction of another railroad, where the jurisdiction had attached because a constitutional question was involved, Mr. Justice Brewer refused to take jurisdiction of a supplemental bill to enjoin the construction of the rival railroad upon other grounds, none of which presented a Federal question. Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cable T. W. Co., 33 Fed. 27 Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. R. 241; 28 92 U. S. 10. See Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86; Robb v. Vo, 155 U. S. 13; Hatch v. Ferguson, 52 Fed. R. 833; Davenport v. Moore, 74 Fed. R. 945. ments and decrees of the State courts, and in the other class the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, or the party's right to claim any benefit by reason thereof." 29 A suit to make the judgment or decree of a State court the judgment or decree of the Federal court, respectively, can be maintained at common law and in equity." Proceedings supplementary to execution under the judgment of a State court authorized by State statutes against a judg ment debtor or third persons cannot be instituted in or removed to the Federal courts, although a creditor's bill may be.32 A petition, after judgment in a State court, by plaintiff in ejectment to have the defendant's damages allowed to him, is a mere incident to the ejectment suit and the Federal courts can take no jurisdiction of it.". It has been held that a bill cannot be maintained to set aside or interfere with the enforce ment of an interlocutory decree in a cause pending in another court, when such decree is not a contempt of a Federal court.34 The dependence of an ancillary suit upon an original suit for purposes of jurisdiction does not throw both cases into hotchpot, and dispense with the ordinary rules of pleading and practice as to parties proper and necessary to each cause of action. The parties to the original bill have no more right to intervene in the dependent cause than if the court had independent jurisdiction of the same; and after jurisdiction has been acquired, the pleadings, practice and proceedings are pursued exactly as if it were an original suit. The court does not in the second suit take judicial notice of the pleadings or proceedings in the former litigation, unless they are formally put in evidence.36 § 22. Limitations upon jurisdiction by residence.- The Judiciary Act of 1887 limits the jurisdiction of the Circuit 29 Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 82. See Furnald v. Glenn, 56 Fed. R. 372. 30 Barr v. Simpson, Baldwin, 543. 31 See Davis v. Davis, 65 Fed. R. 380. 32 Webber v. Humphreys, 5 Dill. 223; Poole v. Thatcherdeft, 19 Fed. R. 49; Buford v. Strother, 3 McCrary, 253; s. C., 10 Fed. R. 406; Flash v. Dillon, 22 Fed. R. 1. 33 Chapman v. Barger, 4 Dillon, 587. 34 Furnald v. Glenn (C. C. A.), 64 Fed. R. 49. 35 Continental Tr. Co. v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co., 82 Fed. R. 642, 645, per Taft, J. 36 Richardson v. Loree, 94 Fed. R. 375. But see infra, § 264. |