York, when the judge thereof is disabled and so notifies the judge of the Southern District of New York, by the latter judge; " in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, when the judge thereof is disabled and so notifies the judge of the Eastern District, by the latter judge; 12 in the same court, by the judge of the Eastern District of New York, whenever the judge of the Southern District deems it desirable on account of the pressure of public business that the former shall perform judicial duties in his district, and has entered an order to that effect; 13 in one of the District Courts of Florida, by the judge of the other district, in a place where a term of such court is regularly held, when the judge of the district has filed in the clerk's office a certificate stating that he is disabled to hold a term of court there, and requesting the judge of the other district to hold the same. An order made by the district judge of another district in the same State who was not sitting nor designated to sit in the district where the suit was pending, the office of district judge of the latter district not being vacant, was held null and void.15 An order signed by a judge after his successor has been appointed and he has received notice thereof is void.16

clerk's office of the District, not of the Circuit Court, but a failure to file the same does not invalidate the judge's acts. National H. for D. V. S. v. Butler, 33 Fed. R. 374.

11 U. S. R. S., § 599.

12 U. S. R. S., § 599. 13 U. S. R. S., § 600.

14 U. S. R. S., § 598.

15 Am. L. & T. Co. v. East & West R. Co., 40 Fed. R. 182.

16 U. S. v. Alexander, 46 Fed. R. 728; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425. But see Manning v. Weeks, 139 U. S. 504; Ball v. U. S., 140 U. S. 118.

CHAPTER XVI.

INJUNCTIONS.

§ 205. Definition, classification, and objects of injunctions. An injunction is a writ issued from a court of equity commanding a person to do an act or acts other than the payment to the complainant of a sum of money, or not to do an act or acts specified therein. According to the different aspects from which they are considered, injunctions are classified as judicial writs, and writs remedial; as mandatory and prohibitory; as provisional and perpetual; or as common and special. Before describing the different characteristics of each of these classes, it may be well to refer briefly to the different occasions for the issue of the writ. Injunctions may be obtained to enforce a trust or other purely equitable right, to compel obedience to a covenant or other contract affecting land, to compel the obedience of corporations to their charters, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, generally to prevent an irreparable injury for which damages at law would be no adequate remedy, and also in cases in which they are expressly authorized by statute.

§ 206. Injunctions to enforce trusts and other purely equitable rights. As trusts and other purely equitable rights are not recognized in courts of law, equity will always interfere to protect them by injunction when they are threatened with infringement.1 On this account an injunction may be obtained to prevent the revelation or use of a secret of manufacture by a workman who has learned it under an express or implied promise of secrecy, or one to whom such a person has disclosed it; and to restrain the publication of lectures, man

§ 206. Scott v. Becher, 4 Price, 346; In re Chertsy Market, 6 Price, 261; Sloo v. Law, 3 Blatchf. 459; Draper v. Davis, 104 U., S. 347; Cowles v. Whitman, 10 Conn. 121; Bispham's Eq., § 425; Kerr on Injunctions, 172, 173.

2 Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & Walk. 394; Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452. But see Newbery v. James, 2 Meriv. 446.

3 Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209.

uscripts or works of art heard or obtained under an express or implied agreement not to publish or reproduce them. Whether or not the publication of private letters which have no value as literary productions can be restrained at the prayer of their writer, upon the ground that it would be a breach of an implied trust, is, under the authorities, an open question.

§ 207. Injunctions to restrain corporations from violating their charters.-The charters of corporations are considered "in the light of contracts made by the legislature on behalf of every person interested in anything to be done under them."1 On account of the irreparable injury that would otherwise ensue, and in the case of corporations to whom the State's right of eminent domain is delegated, because they are trustees, the disobedience of a corporation to its charter may be restrained by injunction, at the suit either of the attorney-general of the State to which it owes its existence, or of any individual who suffers special injury thereby. This rule applies whether the act complained of has been forbidden expressly, or merely by implication as not included within the powers expressly given to the corporation and those which are necessary for their proper exercise. "It is," said Lord Hatherley, "a principle of public policy that where Parliament has authorized a company to raise a large capital for a specified purpose, the privilege confers no right upon the company to employ their capital in competition with the general public upon speculations of a different character." "It is because these companies, being

4 Stapleton v. Foreign V. Ass'n, 12 W. R. 976; Scheile v. Brakell, 11 W. R. 796. See, however, Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 435.

5 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Macn. & G. 25, 42.

§ 207. 1 Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Nav., 1 Myl. & K. 154, 162. 2 M'Coy v. Chicago, L., St. L. & C. R. Co., 13 Fed. R. 3.

Atty. Gen. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 1 Dr. & Sm. 154; Atty. Gen. v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425. But see Atty. Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 371.

4 Bostock v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co., 3 Sm. & Giff. 283; Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 10 Beav. 1. 5 Atty. Gen. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 1 Dr. & Sm. 154.

6 Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 379, and Eyre v. Higbee, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 502, hold that they can, and Judge Story concurs in this view. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100, 109, 110; Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 946-948. But the opposite view is maintained in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402; Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 515; Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 p. 473. Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 24, 28.

6 Cited in Kerr on Injunctions,

armed with the power of raising large sums of money, if they were allowed to apply their funds to purposes other than those for which they were constituted, might acquire such a preponderating influence and command over some particular branch of trade or commerce, as would enable them to drive the ordinary private trader from the field, and create in their own favor a practical monopoly, whereby the interests of the public would be most seriously injured." When the corporation violates its charter by refusing to perform an act thereby expressly or impliedly commanded, it has been held that the attorney-general cannot compel its obedience by a mandatory injunction, but should in such a case apply for a mandamus. A private individual suing to enjoin a corporation from violating its charter must show some special damage caused to himself by the breach. A shareholder in a company is considered to incur special damage by its diverting its funds to other purposes than its charter authorizes, and can obtain an injunction to restrain it from so doing,10 even, it has been held, if he bought shares in the company for the very object of preventing it; " provided that he sues in good faith, and does not act as the mere puppet of a rival corporation; 12 and that the suit is not brought "against the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may properly be asserted by the corporation." 13 The holder of a lien to secure an indebtedness of a corporation is also, it seems, entitled to an injunction in a similar case. An unsecured creditor cannot bring such a suit,15

11

7 Atty. Gen. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 1 489; Robson v. Dodds, L. R. 8 Eq. Dr. & Sm. 154, 159, 160. 301; Rogers v. Oxford, W. & W. Ry. Co., 2 De G. & J. 662.

8 Atty. Gen. v. B. & O. J. Ry. Co., 15 Jur. 1024; People v. Albany & Vt. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261.

9 Chamberlaine v. Chester & B. Ry. Co., 1 Exch. 869, 877; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 173, 174.

10 Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 10 Beav. 1.

11 Colman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 10 Beav. 1; Atty. Gen. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 1 Dr. & Sm. 154; Bloxam v. Met. Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Ch. 337.

12 Forrest v. Manchester, S. & L. Ry. Co., 4 De G., F. & J. 126; Filder v. London, B. & S. C. Ry. Co., 1 H. & M.

13 Rule 94; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450. See supra, §§ 12, 76, 87.

14 Bagshaw v. Eastern U. Ry. Co., 2 Macn. & G. 389; Herrick v. Grand T. Ry. Co., 7 Up. Can. L. J. 240. And it has been held that such a bondholder need not show that the corporation is not in collusion with him. Mercantile T. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 51 Fed. R. 529, 536.

15 Syers v. Brighton B. Co., 11 L. T. (N. S.) 560; Mills v. Northern Ry. of Buenos Ayres Co., 23 L. T. (N. S.) 719.

except under very extraordinary circumstances.16 One whose land has been taken from him for the use of a corporation by the exercise of the State's right of eminent domain can obtain an injunction to restrain the use of the land for any other purpose than is allowed by the company's charter," provided at least that he can show that he is thereby injured.18 It is, however, no proper ground for complaint by an individual that a corporation by exercising powers not conferred upon it by its charter enters into competition with him, and thereby diminishes the profits of his trade or calling.19 An English judge. has said: "Where a statute prohibits the doing of a particular act affecting the public, no person has a right of action against another merely because he has done the prohibited act. It is incumbent on the party complaining to allege and prove, that the doing of the act prohibited has caused him some special damage, some peculiar injury, beyond that which he may be supposed to sustain in common with the rest of the Queen's subjects, by an infringement of the law. But where the act prohibited is obviously prohibited for the protection of a particular party, there it is not necessary to allege special damage." 20

§ 208. Injunctions to enforce the specific performance of covenants and other contracts affecting land.- As no two pieces of land are exactly alike, equity considers that in no case can damages in money be adequate compensation for the breach of a covenant or other contract affecting land. Accordingly, the specific performance of contracts for the purchase or sale of land and of covenants affecting the same, will be specifically enforced with the aid of an injunction, whenever they are mutual, certain,3 not unconscionable, and their

16 Evans v. Coventry, 5 De G., M. & 869, 877. See Blakemore v. GlamorG. 911. ganshire Canal Nav.,1 Mylne & Keen,

17 Bostock v. North S. Ry. Co., 3 154, 162. Sm. & Giff. 283.

18 East & W. India Docks & B. J. Ry. Co. v. Dawes, 11 Hare, 363; Lee v. Milner, 2 Y. & C. 611; Ware v. Regents Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212.

19 Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 173, 174.

20 Pollock, C. B., in Chamberlaine v. Chester & B. Ry. Co., 1 Exchequer,

§ 208. Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & Stu. 607; Bispham's Eq., § 375.

2 Dorsey v. Packwood, 12 How. 126; Bispham's Eq., § 377.

3 Colson v. Thompson, 3 Wheat. 336; Bispham's Eq., § 377.

4 Surget v. Byers, Hempst. 715; Roundtree v. McLain, Hempst. 245; Miss. & Mo. R. Co. v. Cromwell, 91