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extraordinary case, a bill to enjoin slanders or libels. Nor a bill to enjoin criminal proceedings.39 Nor a bill to enjoin the removal of an officer of the United States or of a State or a municipality," or the enactment of a municipal ordinance," except perhaps when the ordinance would impose a municipal indebtedness.42 Nor a bill to compel a public officer to perform a ministerial duty." Nor a bill by the assignee of a cause of action to enforce for his own use the legal right of his assignor, when he seeks the aid. of equity merely upon the ground that he cannot maintain an action at law in his own name." Nor a bill by a private citizen to set aside a land-patent of the United States, on account of fraud upon the government used in its procurement, although if fraud were then practiced upon the plaintiff he might have relief upon the ground of estoppel.46 Nor a bill filed by a creditor for himself alone to apply equitable assets to the payment of his debt, unless he has obtained a judgment for his claim in a court of the same State or judicial district, and had the return of an execution issued thereon unsatisfied; 7 not even, it has been held, when it is shown that the debtor is insolvent, and has no property which can be reached by legal process, 48 unless to enforce a trust or equitable right.49 Nor, in the absence of a State statute authorizing such a proceeding, a bill to set aside the probate of a will,50 or to cancel a will itself," on account of a mistake,

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38 Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 385; Baltimore Car Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 Fed. R. 95. Contra, Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. R. 46; Fougeres v. Murbarger, 44 Fed. R. 292. See § 223.

39 Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516.

40 In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, 376-378.

41 New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471. But see LosAngeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 177 U. S. 558; supra, § 11.

42 Murphy v. East Portland, 42 Fed. R. 308.

45 Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447.

46 Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 454.

47 Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119; Smith v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 398; Walser v. Seligman, 13 Fed. R. 415; Swan L. & C. Co. v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603; Hollins v. Brierfield C. & I. Co., 150 U. S. 371.

48 Walser v. Seligman, 13 Fed. R. 415. But see Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688, 690.

49 Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688, 690; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Chat

43 Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U. S. tanooga Constr. Co., 53 Fed. R. 314. 189.

44 Hayward v. Andrews. 106 U. S. 672; New York Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S. 205.

50 Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439.

51 Oakley v. Taylor, 64 Fed. R. 245.

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undue influence, forgery or other fraud; but a Federal court may enforce a bill for the construction of a will duly established.52 Nor to enjoin an action at law to which the complainant has a clear legal defense.53 Nor to set aside or enjoin proceedings to enforce a judgment at law because of fraud; unless the complainant had a defense to the action upon the merits, and either the fraud was extrinsic to the matter tried and not in issue in the former suit, nor then known to the complainant, or else some unconscientious advantage was taken of the successful judgment debtor during the progress of the suit without any fault or negligence upon his part.55 Nor to set aside a judgment at law 56 or a decree in equity" for an omission to serve a party to the same, except perhaps when the record shows an apparent service. It has been said that a receiver, assignee in bankruptcy, or assignee under a voluntary general assignment, each of whom represents creditors as well as the debtor, cannot maintain a bill to enforce a collateral obligation given to a creditor or to a body of creditors by a third person for the payment of the debts of the insolvent. A bill was dismissed which sought to enforce specific performance of a contract containing a power of revocation by the defendant.59 So was a bill to compel the transfer of corporate stock, which the complainant obtained for an inadequate consideration, and which he wished to use for purely speculative purposes and to gain thereby an unconscientious advantage. In the absence of statutory authority, a private

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52 Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. R. 807. 53 Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373; Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 385; Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226. See Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 241.

54 White v. Crow, 110 U. S. 183. Contra, Mills v. Scott, 43 Fed. R. 452. 55 Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 780, 782; Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U. S. 194. See Knox County v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152; Leavenworth County Com'rs v. Chicago, R. L. & P. Ry. Co., 134 U. S. 688.

56 Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466. 57 Yeatman v. Bradford, 44 Fed. R. 536.

A judgment creditor of a national bank cannot sue in equity to compel the receiver of the bank to recognize his judgment and to enjoin the receiver from refusing such recognition; because he has an adequate remedy by an action at law in the Federal court against the receiver upon the judgment of the State court against the bank. Denton v. Baker, 79 Fed. R. 189.

59 Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 191.

60 M. & M. R. Co. v. Cromwell, 91 U. S. 643. See Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 434; Randolph's Ex'r v. Quidnick 58 Jacobson v. Allen, 12 Fed. R. 454. Co., 135 U. S. 457, 459.

individual cannot file a bill to obtain the forfeiture of a corporate franchise," nor a stockholder a bill to dissolve a foreign corporation under a statute of the country which chartered it.62 Nor can a corporation be enjoined from acting beyond its legal powers at the suit of a business rival not one of its stockholders.63 Nor can a stockholder file a bill, founded upon rights which may properly be asserted by his corporation, against it and other parties, unless there exists, "as the foundation of the suit, some action or threatened action of the managing board of directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of organization; or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting managers, in connection with some other party, or among themselves, or with other shareholders, as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other shareholders; or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders; or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity. Possibly other cases may arise in which, to prevent irremediable injury or a total failure of justice, the court would be justified in exercising its powers; but the foregoing may be regarded as an outline of the principles which govern this class of cases. But in addition to the existence of grievances which call for this kind of relief, it is equally important that before the shareholder is permitted in his own name to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation, he should show to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or action in conformity to his wishes. He must make an earnest, not a simulated, effort with the managing body of the corporation to induce remedial ac

61 Gaylord v. Fort Wayne, M. & C. R. Co., 6 Biss. 286.

62 Republican Silver Mines v. Brown, 58 Fed. R. 644.

63 Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166.

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tion on their part, and this must be made apparent to the court. If time permits, or has permitted, he must show, if he fails with the directors, that he has made an honest effort to obtain action by the stockholders as a body, in the matter of which he complains. And he must show a case, if this is not done, where it could not be done or it was not reasonable to require it." It seems that this rule does not apply where the suit arises under the Constitution of the United States; 6 nor to a suit by a mortgagee." Analogous rules regulate a suit by a stockholder to set aside a contract by the corporation as beyond the powers conferred in its charter.67 It has been said that a court of equity has no power to seize a man's property, and through its officers complete a bridge in pursuance of a contract which he has made. Nor is it a sufficient ground for the interference of a court of equity that the evidence in a cause is voluminous and tedious.69 Nor, it has been said, upon the mere allegation of insolvency of the defendant.70 "To give a court of equity jurisdiction, the nature of the relief asked must be equitable, even when the suit is based on an equitable title." The inadequacy of the remedy at law which will justify relief in equity does not consist merely in its failure to produce the relief sought,- that is a not unusual result of all remedies, but that in its nature or character it is not fitted or adapted to the end in view.72

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§ 13. Federal courts which have jurisdiction in equity.— The equitable jurisdiction of the Federal courts, from which category the courts of the Territories and of the District of

64 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 460, 461, per Miller, J. See also Huntington v. Palmer, 104 U. S. 482; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537; Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 241; County of Tazewell v. Farmers' T. & Tr. Co., 12 Fed. R. 752; Symmes v. Union Trust Co. of N. Y., 60 Fed. R. 830, 858. See also Equity Rule 94, and infra, $$ 76, 87, 207.

65 Ball v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Fed. R. 513. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466.

67 Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 110 U. S. 209; Tazewell & Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 12 Fed. R. 752; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13.

68 Texas & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Rust, 17 Fed. R. 275.

69 Bowen v. Chase, 94 U. S. 812, 824. 70 Strang v. Richmond, P. & C. R. Co., 93 Fed. R. 71, 74.

71 Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550, 554, per Woods, J.

72 Miller, J., in Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550, 554. Cf. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S.

56 Consolidated Water Co. v. City 393, 405. of San Diego, 89 Fed. R. 272.

Columbia are here excluded,' is in the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Circuit Courts, the District Courts, the Court of Claims, the Court of Private Land Claims. The following courts also have, under statutes of the United States, jurisdiction at equity and common law, which is in some respects analogous to those of the Federal courts: the District Court of Alaska, the Supreme Court of Arizona," the Supreme and District Courts of Oklahoma, the United States court and the Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory,' the District Court of Porto Rico, the District Court of Hawaii," the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,10 and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia."

§ 13. See Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434; McAllister v. U. S., 141 U. S. 174. But see Cross v. U. S., 145 U. S. 571, 576.

2 The jurisdiction and practice of the Court of Claims is described infra, ch. XXXI.

3 The jurisdiction and practice of the Court of Private Land Claims is described infra, ch. XXXII.

423 St. at L. 24; 30 St. at L. 545; L. 1900, p. 322; infra, § 26a.

5 U. S. R. S., § 1908.

6 26 St. at L. 81.

of the district, except in the same way that non-residents were proceeded against in the General Court or the Supreme Court of Chancery of Maryland (May 3, 1802); and where such jurisdiction is conferred by special statutes. D. C. Code, §§ 105-112. For its jurisdiction to grant writs of mandamus, see infra, § 363a; prohibition, § 362; quo warranto, § 368a.

11 D. C. Code, § 226. "Any party aggrieved by any final order, judg ment or decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or of any

725 St. at L. 783; 28 St. at L. 693; justice thereof, including any final

30 St. at L. 83; St. 1900, p. 657.

8 St. 1900, p. 84; infra, § 26a.
9 St. 1900, p. 158; infra, § 26a.

10 The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has the same jurisdiction as the Circuit Courts of the United States. D. C. Code, § 61. It has the same jurisdiction in bankruptcy, when the bankrupt resides in the district, that is vested in the District Courts of the United States. R. S. D. C., § 765. It has jurisdiction of applications for divorce. D. C. Code, § 963. It has generally the same jurisdiction that was vested in the General Court or the Supreme Court of Chancery of Maryland, February 27, 1801. D. C. Code, § 61: 19 St. at L. 253. But it has no jurisdiction of suits against persons not inhabitants

order or judgment in any case heard on appeal from a justice of the peace, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, hereby created; and upon such appeal the Court of Appeals shall review such order, judgment or decree, and affirm, reverse or modify the same, as shall be just. Appeals shall also be allowed to said Court of Appeals from all interlocutory orders of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or by any justice thereof, whereby the possession of property is changed or affected, such as orders for the appointment of receivers, granting injunctions, dissolving writs of attachment, and the like, and also from any other interlocutory order, in the discretion of said Court of Appeals, whenever it is

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