ject are extremely various, and the court in deciding them seems to have considered what was convenient in particular circumstances, rather than to have attempted to lay down any absolute rule." "The only way of reconciling the authorities upon the subject is by adverting to the fact that, although the books speak generally of demurrers for multifariousness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into two distinct kinds. Frequently the objection raised, though termed multifariousness, is in fact more properly misjoinder; that is to say, the cases or claims united in the bill are of so different a character that the court will not permit them to be litigated in one record. It may be that the plaintiffs and defendants are parties to the whole of the transactions which form the subject of the suit, and nevertheless these transactions may be so dissimilar that the court will not allow them to be joined together, but will require distinct records. But what is more familiarly understood by the term 'multifariousness,' as applied to a bill, is where a party is able to say he is brought as a defendant upon a record, with a large portion of which, and of the case made by which, he has no connection whatever." There is, however, little practicable good to be obtained from a maintenance of this distinction except as a means of elucidating some of the expressions in the earlier authorities. "The decisions on this subject are contradictory and unsatisfactory. The common-sense rule in such cases is that an individual shall not be called to maintain his title or shall not assert it in connection with others to which it has no analogy, and in the investigation of which the costs and complexity of the case will be increased."

2 Lord Cottenham in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 M. & Cr. 603, 618.

Lord Cottenham in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 M. & Cr. 603, 618. Approved in Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253, 259.

section 292, was quoted with ap proval by Judge Jenkins in Von Auw v. Chicago T. & F. G. Co., 69 Fed. R. 448: “To make a bill demurrable for multifariousness it must contain all of the following char

4 See Calvert on Parties, Book I, acteristics. First, two or more causes ch. vii.

5 McLean, J., in Turner v. Am. Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 344, 849.

The following rule laid down by Mr. Gibson in his Suits in Chancery,

of action must be joined against two or more defendants; second, these causes of action must have no connection or common origin, but must be separate and independent; third, the evidence pertinent to one or

§ 72. Multifariousness by misjoinder of plaintiffs.- Nopersons can unite as complainants in a bill in equity unless they have a joint or common interest in obtaining the same relief. Thus, if one of them has no interest in the relief claimed, the bill is demurrable. Those who claim the return of money paid by them severally on distinct promissory notes cannot join their claims in the same bill; nor can several creditors claiming under several obligations unite in a suit to attach the debts of an absent debtor. Persons who were defrauded of stock in a corporation by the same parties who promised it to them before the organization of the corporation cannot join in a bill to compel the issue of the stock to each of them. Persons who have been separately indicted for similar acts committed while acting as agents for the same principal cannot join in a bill to enjoin the further prosecution of the indictments. But in a bill to compel specific performance of a decree in a former suit, all the complainants in the first suit may join as plaintiffs, though the decree sought to be enforced orders the payment of specific sums severally to each of them;"

more of the causes must be wholly impertinent as to the other or others; fourth, one or more of the causes of action must be capable of being fully determined without bringing in other cause or causes to adjust any of the legal or equitable rights of the parties; fifth, the decree as to one or more of the separate or independent causes must be conclusive against one or more of the defendants, and the decree proper, as to the other cause or causes, must be conclusive against the other defendants or defendant; sixth, the relief proper against one or more of the defendants in one or more of the separate and independent causes of action must be distinct from the relief proper against the other defendant or defendants of the other cause of action; seventh, the satisfaction of the proper decree by any of the defendants to the extent of his alleged liability on any one or more of the distinct causes of action must not be a satisfaction of

a proper decree against the other defendant or defendants, or the other cause or causes of action; and eighth, the multifariousness must be apparent, and the misjoinder of distinct causes of action manifest."

$72. 1Story's Eq. Pl., § 279; Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 105, 110.

2 Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 249; Doggett v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 72.

3 Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123.

4 Ibid. But see Norris v. Hassler, 22 Fed. R. 401; Langdon v. Branch, 37 Fed. R. 449.

5 Summerlin v. Fronterizac S. M. & M. Co., 41 Fed. R. 249.

6 Woolstein v. Welch, 42 Fed. R. 566. 7 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253. It has been held that this rule does not extend to a bill for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate in which the complainants hold distinct rights to separate lots. Marselis v. Morris & L. Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 31, 39.

and several fire insurance companies were allowed to unite in a bill to set aside one award against them upon an arbitration of claims by the same person under several policies. Plaintiffs with conflicting interests cannot so join. Such are, in a suit for the construction of a will, persons, each of whom is interested in having a different construction put upon it.10 Nor can two join in a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of land, of whom one claims the land as a creditor of the person who has made the conveyance, and the other as the purchaser of the land upon a sheriff's sale to satisfy a judgment held by him." So, a bill was held to be multifarious which sought to enforce a trust in that land and also to give the title of one of the complainants to the same land.12 But the interests of the complainants need not be co-extensive. Thus, á tenant for life and the remaindermen of an estate, either legal or equitable, may join in a suit to protect the estate. 13 Although usually there must be some privity between the complainants in a bill, yet in certain cases those between whom there is no privity are allowed to sue together when they seek to avert an injury which will affect them all alike. Thus, several tenants or parishioners may unite in a bill of peace seeking to dispose of a disputed right claimed against them by the lord of the manor or the parson of the parish.15 And the owners of several lots of land claiming under a common source of title may unite in a bill of peace against several other claimants to the same lots, who also rely upon a common source of

8 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner, the sale on the ground of inadequacy 44 Fed. R. 151. of price. Peabody v. Westerly Waterworks (R. I, 1897), 37 Atl. R. 807.

9 Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245; Saumarez v. Saumarez, 4 Mylne & Cr. 331, 336; Parsons v. Lyman, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 432; Bell v. Cureton, 2 M. & K. 503; Stebbins v. St. Anne, 116 U. S. 386; Brown v. Bedford City L. & I. Co. (Va.), 20 S. E. R. 968. A bill was held multifarious where all the complainants sought as taxpayers to enjoin a defendant town from purchasing the plant of a defendant waterworks company, and one complainant further sought, as a stockholder in that company, to enjoin

10 Parsons v. Lyman, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 432; Saumarez v. Saumarez, 4 M. & Cr. 331, 336.

11 Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245. 12 Leslie v. Leslie, 84 Fed. R. 70. 13 Story's Eq. Pl., § 279a; Buckeridge v. Glasse, 1 Cr. & Phill. 126; Calvert on Parties (2d ed.),99; Rainey v. Herbert (C. C. A.), 55 Fed. R. 443.

14 Anon., 1 Chan. Cas. 269; Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 241. 15 Rudge v. Hopkins, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 70.

title adverse to that of the complainant.16 Several owners of different lots of land who have a common interest in an easement derived from the same source may unite in a suit to enjoin the obstruction of the easement." Several claimants in possession of several parcels of land whose rights depend upon the same question of fact or law may unite in a bill of peace against the same defendant who claims title to all the land by reason of the same disputed facts or legal proposition.18 The owners of adjacent property may join in a bill in equity to enjoin a defendant from erecting a livery-stable,19 an unauthorized street railroad 20 or other nuisance in their vicinity. But another case holds that different persons, each of whom will suffer a distinct injury from the levy of a tax, cannot unite in a bill to enjoin its levy on account of its alleged unconstitutionality. Several stockholders who had been compelled to pay corporate debts were allowed to join in a bill against another stockholder to compel him to contribute his proportion," and several persons who had been induced by identical fraudulent misrepresentations to subscribe to stock in a corporation were allowed in Virginia to join in a suit to cancel their subscriptions.23 It was held in New York, where the plaintiff prayed the same relief both individually and as executor upon the same cause of action, which appeared upon the face of his complaint to be for the benefit of the testator's estate, that there was no misjoinder of parties or of causes of action. It has

16 Crews v. Burcham, 1 Black, 352; Prentice v. Duluth S. & F. Co. (C. C. A.), 58 Fed. R. 437. It has been held that the pastor and some of the members of a religious association may unite in a suit to recover possession of the church and parsonage, to enjoin the trustees and the remainder of the congregation from interfering with each in his ecclesiastical rights; and also to compel an accounting for collections taken up, which are payable to the elder and pastor as alary. Fuchs v. Meisel, 113 Mich. 559; s. c., 60 N. W. R. 773. But see Douglass v. Boardman, 113 Mich. 618; & c., 71 N. W. R. 1100.

17 Springer v. Lawrence, 47 N. J. Eq.

24

461; s. c., 21 Atl. R. 41. See Union Mill & M. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. R. 73.

18 Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 43 Fed. R. 824. See Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; infra, § 73.

19 Flint v. Russell, 5 Dill. 151. See also Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341. Contra, Hudson v. Madison, 12 Simons, 416.

20 Rafferty v. Central Tr. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 23 Atl. R. 884.

21 Cutting v. Gilbert, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 259. See, however, Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; Union Pac. R. Co. v. McShane, 3 Dill. 303.

22 Allen v. Fairbanks, 45 Fed. R. 445, 23 Rader v. Bristol Land Co. (Va.), 27 S. E. R. 590.

24 Moss v. Cohen, 158 N. Y. 240.

been said that the fact that separate decrees may be requisite in order to afford complete relief does not necessarily make the bill multifarious.25

§ 73. Multifariousness by misjoinder of defendants.- No persons can be joined as defendants to a bill in equity who have not a joint or common interest in opposing the relief prayed.1 Different relief may, however, be obtained against different defendants when the bill seeks to prevent or annul the effect of acts in pursuance of a common scheme, or so connected with each other as to form part of the same transaction. The rule was thus stated by Sir John Leach: "In order to determine whether a suit is multifarious, or, in other words, contains distinct matters, the inquiry is not, as this defendant supposes, whether each defendant is connected with every branch of the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks relief in respect of matters which are in their nature separate and distinct. If the object of the suit be single, but it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise. out of that single object, it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the court, in order that the suit may conclude the whole object." "The entirety of the case against one defendant constitutes the connecting link." But a bill is multifarious, when the charge against one defendant is in no way connected with those against other defendants. A bill is multifarious which seeks both to foreclose a mortgage and to restrain another defendant from asserting a

25 Neal v. Rathell, 70 Md. 592; s. C., 843; Crickard v. Crouch's Adm❜rs, 41 17 Atl. R. 566.

§ 73. 1 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; U. S. v. Alexander, 4 Cranch, C. C. 311.

2 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; Manners v. Rowley, 10 Simons, 470. Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Maddock, 138,

146.

4 Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 98, quoting Sir John Leach in Turner v. Robinson, 1 Sim. & S. 313; and Lord Cottenham in Attorney-General v. Corporation of Poole, 4 M. & Cr. 17, 81; Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed. R. 25; Porter v. Robinson (Va.), 22 S. E. R.

W. Va. 503; s. c., 23 S. E. R. 727; Middletown Sav. Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513. But see Washington City Sav. Bank v. Thornton, 83 Va. 157; Buffalo v. Town of Pocahontas, 85 Va. 222; Sylvester v. Boyd, 166 Mass. 445; s. C., 44 N. E. R. 343; Staude v. Keck, 92 Va. 544; s. C., 24 S. E. R. 227. 5 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 200; Lewarne v. Mexican Int. 1. Co., 38 Fed. R. 620; Seales v. Pheiffer, 77 Ala. 278; Sumter County v. Mitchell, 85 Ala. 313; Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 46 N. J. Eq. 380.