to. To have confined the import and export duties, to be laid by the States, to the simple purpose of executing their inspection laws, would have been extreme injustice. Congress had previously been prohibited, from promoting manufactures, excepting by patents; and as Congress could not, for this purpose, lay a protecting or prohi bitory duty, what would become of the States, desiring to encourage their manufactures, if they also, in no event, could keep foreign fabrics out of their limits, if it was their policy so to do, in order to protect their own. Such a provision then was indispensable, and the qualification, put upon the restraint on the power of the States to lay imposts, was most judicious, both for the States and for Congress. As the clause stands, the manufacturing States, may, at any time, ask for the permission of Congress, to lay duties to protect their fabrics but, they are properly excluded the power of imposing these duties at pleasure, and to take the 'roceeds, as under the pretext of protecting their manufactures, they might collect a réve nue, or otherwise interfere with the resources of the General Gov ernment. But there is an inference to be deduced from this clause which is irresistible and that is, that had the Convention believed; that in any of the enumerated powers, which it had immediately before conferred on Congress, there was included a general power to promote Manufactures, there never would have been held out to the States, that in any event, they could lay an import or export duty; except for the purpose of their inspection laws. On Mr. MARTIN'S urging the necessity that might arise at a future day, for the States to protect their Manufactures-and that a power ought to be at hand for such an emergency, the prompt answer would have been, the General Government is already provided with the power-and the Convention would have erased from the clause the words, " without the consent of Congress," and thus have restricted the power to the simple purposes of inspection. But the clause remaining with these words, I maintain, is conclusive to shew, that there was no idea; of any general power having been given to Congress, over Manufac tures.-Nothing but a necessity, which could not have been avoided, could ever have induced the Convention, to consent to the States imposing, in any event, duties on imports. The members of the Convention were nearly unanimous on this point; they were unis formly opposed to any concurrence of authority respecting this fruitful source of revenue. It was early decided, that the ENTIRE Custom-House should belong to the Congress.

The course prescribed by the Constitution, for the protection of Manufactures, being thus plainly marked, Congress is the more inexcusable for usurping the power in question. If, after the duties, which, previous to 1816, had been laid for revenue, and which, at the same time, encouraged Manufactures, it was found that the ins fant Manufactures of any one State, stood in need of any further protection, the Legislature of that particular State, ought to have applied to Congress, for leave to impose, in all its ports, the same duties on British goods, which are specified in the Tariffs of 1816, 1820, and 1824. To such an application, Congress might have as

sented, as the duties would still have been paid into the National Treasury; and I am certain, the Southern members of Congress in those three different years, would cheerfully have indulged these folks, and will still indulge them, with a protection in this way, as long as it will not too seriously affect the revenue. Whether Congress will now, or at any time hereafter, give up to the States the least atom of their power over imposts, I know not: But this I do know, that in refusing to give to the States, a chance now and then, of protecting their Manufactures in this way, (if the States choose to ask it,) Congress would not honestly execute the trust, reposed in it by the Constitution.-That, however, would not be our look out. I am not ignorant, of the difficulty that would arise in getting the majority of the people of any one State, New-York for instance, to join in any such application; for, whilst such a scheme would suit the Manufacturers, it would interfere with other important interests: All persons in such a State, connected with commerce, such as merchants and traders, shipwrights, cordwainers, sail-makers, &c. would be seriously injured. The importation of British goods into New-York would be diminished, on account of the high and double duties, and the Custom-Houses of Charleston, and other ports, where only the national duties were to be exacted, would be filled to overflowing, to say nothing of the ruinous effects upon the overgrown commerce of New-York, to be produced in various ways, and particularly by the British taxing their produce, and exempting ours.But the manufacturers will say, what then are we to do? Are we to have no protection, except we pay for it on these terms? The answer must be the same, as we would give to a man, who complains, that, whilst his neighbour, who carries on like himself, the wholesale trade in dry goods, has always all the retailers of the city dealing with him, he is without a single applicant. For this case, there is no remedy, but to quit the employment, or to bear the disappointment. It would not be just to say to the retailers, that they are to buy where they buy dearest. But to cease with familiar illustrations, there certainly does arise from this view of the subject, a posion which is impregnable, to-wit :-If in any one State, or any number of States, in which there is a clamor for protection, there can be such a diversity of opinion or of interest, that the manufac turers, cannot in any one instance, (which I do firmly believe to be the case) succeed in a Legislative application to Congress, for leave to lay imposts, and thus to avail themselves of that article in the Constitution, expressly provided to enable such State or States, to protect their fabrics, it would incontestibly prove, that in such State or States, the MANUFACTURING interest is not the predominant, or PARAMOUNT interest. If it were paramount, its influence would prevail. If then, manufactures, be not a paramount interest in any one State, where there is a cry for protection, and the promotion of them, would injure other interests in such State, fully as im, portant, A FORTIORI the promotion of manufactures, must injure in a greater degree, the interest of States, in which there are no mamufacturers. It is only on the ground, of its being a general inter

est in the United States, that a National protection can be advocated and maintained. What is not a general, or paramount interest in any one State of the Union, caunot, by any process of reasoning, be decided to be a general interest of the twenty-four States.

This provision of the Convention, to give the States an opportu nity, of protecting their own manufactures, is in exact accordance with the immutable principles of justice. To suffer Massachusetts, for instance, to promote the success of her manufacturing establishments, by means of a National Tariff, would be neither more nor less, than to give to her, greater advantages, and greater power too, than she could have had, if she had not entered into the Union. If Massachusetts were to separate from the Union to-morrow, and were to decide, that mauufactures was a general interest in the State, and ought to be promoted, what would be her course of policy? She would have to do, what all other nations have done before her. She would have to compel her citizens to wear the home made fabrics, by imposing high duties, so as to exclude the rival foreign articles. She could not think of demanding, that we in South-Carolina, who would be independent of her, should wear her fabrics, any more, than that England can demand of France, to use British manufactures. In England, the entire nation is enriched by manufactures, but who is it, that pays the cost and charges, by which the aggregate of British wealth, and prosperity is attained? Do not the English themselves, pay for these great advantages of protection? Upon what principle, is it then, that under a Government, which is not a consolidated one, but a confederacy of States, the Eastern man should not only have the protection, but have it without scarcely any cost to himself. What State is there, that would not rapidly acquire riches, if it could thus lay its neighbours under contribution, to support its various branches of internal industry. If Massachusetts then, will have manufactures, Massachusetts must be content to have them upon the usual terms. Her own citizens must pay the cost, whether it be, directly, by taxes for premiums, or pecuniary bounties, or indirectly, by a tax upon consumption of the home fabric. To suffer any other mode of encouragement, would be, to violate the Constitution, and to license a system of ROBBERY upon the South. If Massachusetts, is not content, to have the full power, to adopt the same measures, which she could take, were she sovereign and independent of the whole world, she has no right to complain. She must not be permitted to tax her neighbours. The interest she desires to have promoted at the expense of the nation, is a.LOCAL interest, not half so important, as the Cotton Planting interest of the South, in which there is a far greater capital embarked, than there is in manufactures. Congress cannot promote, the great Cotton Planting interest of South-Carolina, nor can it encourage the manufacturing interest of the North. And why? Because these are local interests of the States, and not the general interests of the Union. Congress can lay its imposts for revenue, and if in laying these imposts for revenue, it can at the same time encourage this, or that branch of local or internal indus

try, giving at one time a little advantage to the Sugar Planters of Louisiana, and at another time, aiding the manufacturers of the North, there is no harm in this. As the impost must be laid for revenue, there is no tax here imposed upon one section of the Union, more than upon another. On this principle, manufactures were judiciously encouraged, till 1812, inclusive. Commerce. thereby, was not shackled or interrupted. But, since 1812, all the Tariffs have béen gross usurpations of power by Congress.

NO. 16.

I proceed to say something on the subject of those general phrases in the Constitution, which constitute in the hands of the General Government, the great LEVER by which the State Sovereignties are ultimately to be subverted from their foundations. Congress it seems, has power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." It is from these words, "general welfare," that a power is claimed to open navigation between the States, to dig canals, to construct roads, and from time, to impose Tariffs, to the extent of a total prohibition of the valuable commerce of the Southern States. It is under cover of these words that the Colonization Society, with Judge WASHINGTON at its head, with the sanction of some State Legislatures, and with the prayers of many Societies and Conventions, is to march to the Capitol in December next, and to demand the aid of the Government for our flourishing and favorite Negro Colony at Liberia. It is under these same words, as the present President contends, that Congress can adopt any measure whatever, which it shall judge necessary to promote the general welfare. And also under this exposition is it, that the ultra fanatics and abolitionists of the North contend, that Congress can alter, whenever it pleases, the whole domestic policy of South-Carolina.

In this view of the subject, these words "general welfare are becoming every day more and more important to the folks, who are now so peaceably raising their cotton and rice, between the Little Pedee and the Savannah. The question, it must be recollected, is not simply, whether we are to have a foreign commerce. It is not whether we are to have splendid national works, in which we have no interest, executed chiefly at our cost, and with a view to circulate money in the North. It is not whether we are to be taxed without end. It is not whether we are to have our Northern brethren, as our task masters, and to make bricks for them without straw. But the still more interesting question is, whether the institutions of our forefathers, those institutions under which we have been born, and under which all of us, bondmen as well as free, have enjoyed in the whole, as much of happiness as generally falls to the lot of any one nation on earth, are to be preserved according to ancient usage, free from the rude hands of innovators and enthusiasts, and from the molestation or interference of any legislative power on earth but our own? Or whether, like the weak, the dependant, and the unfortunate colonists of the WestIndies, we are to drag on a miserable state of political existence, constantly vibrating between our hopes and our fears, as to what a Congress may do towards us, without any accurate knowledge of our probable fate, and without a hope of successful resistance ?

This, my fellow-citizens, is an awful question, but awful as it is, it is a question on which, sooner or later, we must all pass a final judgmentWe deceive ourselves if we think, that there can be any evasion. The time advances and advances apace, when we must either be content to go as supplicants, and prostrate ourselves before the Councils of the nation, soliciting their forbearance and their mercy, or we must there appear as freemen, demanding a recognition of our rights, with a firm and an unalterable resolution to maintain them. There is no middle course:

Let us examine the grounds upon which the enemies of the republic would impoverish and destroy our happy country. As far as manufactures are implicated, it is immaterial what construction is given to the words: "general welfare;" for, if I am correct in the position I took in the two preceding numbers, that Congress is prohibited from giving any protection excepting by patents for new inventions, the power, of course, cannot

be claimed under this clause.

No clause in the Constitution, in my view, has been more perverted in its meaning than this. But it is not surprising. When the Supreme Court of the United States solemnly adjudges that the power given to Congress to pass the " necessary and proper laws," to execute its enumerated powers, is an enlargement, and not a limitation of those powers, (the contrary of which. I have demonstated to be the fact, from the journals of the Convention,) is it to be wondered, that the same mistake, should occur in the interpretation of the clause in question? The term "general welfare," I contend, was inserted in this clause, to confine the appropriating power of Congress to the enumerated objects. Should I fail in my proof, I hope I shall have given as good reasons for my constructions, as those on the opposite side, can for theirs. If I adduce facts, which even render the interpretation either way, as not conclusive, I shall have rendered some service to my country. South-Carolina is not to pay tribute money, or have her domestics insubordinate, under a disputed, and doubtful construction of the Constitution.

When the draft of the Constitution was reported to the Convention, on the 6th of August, it was generally understood, as being in conformity with the outlines agreed upon in the amended resolutions of Mr. RANDOLPH, If the committee did deviate, from the letter or spirit of the outlines so given, it could only be, from misconception of their instructions. It does not, however, appear, that they did in any one instance, misunderstand them. In their enumeration of powers, they were, by their instructions, to provide inter alia, a special power for every subject of general interest. They did so as well as they could. What escaped their notice, was afterwards provided for, by additional enumerated powers. That this committe ever intended, that the legislation of Congress should extend over any subject, which was not particularly provided for in their enumeration of powers, is contradicted by the important fact, that they used, in their reported draft, no general phrases, under which might be concealed a single latent power. The words " common defence," or "general welfare," or any words of similar import, are not to be found in any part of the reported draft of the Constitution, not even in its preamble; and it appears further, that those words are not, up to that date, in any part of the journals, neither in Mr. PINCKNEY's draft, nor in Mr. RANDOLPH'S resolutions. In the Constitution reported by the committee of detail, the