China, the welfare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps shed some light.

Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on his walls, Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope that the missionaries would return.

In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich landlords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land. From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided among the peasants; all taxation and levies were abolished; democratic liberty was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their protection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the land, and develop consumer cooperatives.

"After the Sian incident when the united-front conversations had already begun, the redivision of land among the peasants was stopped in districts occupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is thinly populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The form of exploitation and, therefore, the main problem are usury and excessive interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."

Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most simply. He said: "It is not so much a question now of whether our land belongs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question of China as a whole. To all of them “it is not a question now of which general controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come under Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem disappears."

Life in the Special Administrative District.-Our visit, however, did not consist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with interest how much cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen on our trip, and how relatively well stocked they were. And the cheesecloth covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking. Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved gaunt dogs of China, too weak even to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of that.

Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yenan, the present capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers: Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study classes, reading rooms, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."

But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own delighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education, and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one

character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousandmile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao, Chu Teh, and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as anyone. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a scene from Gorki's Mother, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening celebrated in Yenan, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent out to the villages.

me.

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hundred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of "What is the position of woman in the U. S. A.? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's N. R. A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a SinoJapanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist coöperation.

This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reaction throughout China. These people have traditionally considered Americans as their friends and they do not want us to fail them now. A few days after our arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But from the viewpoint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply passionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you to know, came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. There has never been anything like this here before."

EXHIBIT No. 76

[From the Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

June 7, 1944]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

(Mr. Bisson is a member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations)

The recent Chinese victory helps to swell the tide of United Nations' military successes as the decisive summer of 1943 begins. It coincides with the first significant Anglo-American triumphs in Europe, and links together the two global fronts-East and West-more unmistakably and more prophetically than ever before. Already, as the Mediterranean is cleared for United Nations' merchant shipping, Japan girds herself for the sterner test which her military leaders see ahead.

The Chinese victory is playing an even more important role in the political field, for it tends to ease the serious friction which had developed between China and the other members of the United Nations. It was a victory won mainly by Chinese armed forces. As such, it gives the lie to the alarmists, both in and outside China, who were beginning to clamor that the economic situation had become so bad that the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan was threatened.

But the victory was also won in collaboration with the United States 14th Air Force Command. As such, it was a demonstration that some American aid— little enough in the face of the needs of the Chinese front, and pitifully meager when measured against the past contributions of China for the fight against Japanese aggression—was being practically effective in a current operation.

It is to be hoped that, in the wake of the recent Roosevelt-Churchill strategy conferences at Washington, further military aid of a similar practical nature has been scheduled for China. More than airplanes are needed. Preparations for a Burma campaign should be already well under way if operations are to begin this fall, as our military commentators have indicated.1

There are no sound reasons, moreover, for accepting the pessimistic conclusion that China is unable to help herself, pending the arrival of military or economic aid on a large scale. In a significant review of the Hupeh campaign, General Ch'en Ch'eng declared on June 9, from his headquarters at Enshih, that the initial Japanese penetration of difficult terrain "was due to our negligence." 2 He then went on to state that it was necessary for China "to coordinate the military, political and economic aspects" of the war, and "to intensify preparations for a counterattack."

From a Chinese commander in Ch'en Ch'eng's position, there are strong words. They are a double rebuke. They imply, in the first place, that the Kuomintang armies displayed a military passivity during the first phase of the Japanese advance. They suggest, in the second place, that a more comprehensive and energetic mobilization of China's war potential is required in order to pass to the attack. With both China and the other United Nations doing their full share in the coming months, it should be possible to make the situation much more difficult for the Japanese forces in China.

An easy attainment of these desirable ends should not be expected. They can be accomplished only if the changes in policy required by a united war in the Far East are made by China, as well as by the other members of the United Nations. The disunity which featured this past winter is the result of a long series of mistakes, omissions and failures, past and present, which have combined to weave a network of frustration around "the China problem." There have been legitimate grievances on the part of China. Some of these still exist and should be remedied. Others are mixed with a past which at this time might better be buried and forgotten.

FEARS ABOUT KUOMINTANG POLICY

There have been well-justified fears and apprehensions over the trend of Kuomintang policy within China, shared by some of the keenest and most discerning friends of the Chinese people in countries abroad. These apprehensions are based on a careful appraisal of conditions in China, as will be indicated in some detail later on in this article. They cannot be lightly dismissed. They affect not only the current prosecution of the war, but also the prospects for the postwar emergence of a stable, united and democratic China.

It is essential that the mistakes of the United Nations in dealing with China, as well as China's own shortcomings should be brought into the open and subjected to critical examination. Innuendoes and behind-the-scenes speculation and gossip, which have largely taken the place of frank and open statements in recent months, have a much more serious effect than forthright exchanges on the issues now uppermost. Frank appraisal of these issues becomes disruptive and harmful only if used in bitterness and with a desire to wound. Critical examination should rather be directed toward uncovering mistakes and unhealthy tendencies, and indicating the path to be taken to correct them.

MISTAKES IN UNITED NATIONS' POLICY

Present Chinese grievances are cast against an historical background in which China suffered greatly from policies followed by western nations now engaged in the common struggle against Axis aggression. It is unnecessary at this time to enter into a discussion of this background, including China's long and painful efforts to throw off the shackles imposed by the "unequal treaties." Fortunately, the treaties recently concluded with China by Great Britain and the United

1 See, for example, Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, June 16, 1943. China Daily News, June 19, 1943. General Ch'en Ch'eng had been previously transferred (probably in February) from this vital sector to the Yunnan front, but was recalled to command of the Hupeh operations after the Japanese offensive had developed.

States, which provide for the abolition of the extraterritorial system, promisea speedy termiantion of this long-standing injustice.

Proper appreciation of this historiacl factor should lead to somewhat more generous policies in working out arrangements already made and others which may prove necessary. It is advisable, for example, that agreements for the rendition of leaseholds, such as Kowloon and Kwangchowwan, and for the return to China of Hongkong be worked out now and announced as soon as possible. It is also necessary that the postwar restoration of Manchuria and Formosa to China be unequivocally indicated. A declaration that Korea shall obtain its freedom is required in more formal terms than hitherto stated. Exclusion laws on the United States' statute books are a standing affront to the Chinese. Finally, China is rightfully interested in the postwar future of India and the countries of Southern Asia. There can be no real independence for China in a Far East that remains largely colonial or semicolonial.

These are not the burning issues of the moment, but they are directly related to the task of winning the allegiance of all Far Eastern peoples, including the Chinese, and therefore to an efficient and effective prosecution of the war.

MILITARY AID NEEDED

The issue of more immediate concern to China is that of military aid and support. This question also has its historical setting. For some four years, nearly up to Pearl Harbor, China held the fort against Japanese aggression virtually alone. The aid rendered to her by the United States and Britain was almost purely economic; up to 1941, they had supplied little or no munitions of war to the Chinese armies. During this period, moreover, the economic aid to China was heavily outweighed by the stream of American and British strategic materials flowing across the Pacific to the Japanese war machine.

All this formed the background to Pearl Harbor. Immediately thereafter, China experienced a further series of chilling disillusionments. Within a few months, Japanese forces had swept the British and Americans out of their Far Eastern strongholds. Some of the circumstances attending this defeat which directly affected the Chinese cut more deeply than the defeat itself. At Hongkong, the local Chinese population was not permitted a share in the military operations, while in Malaya the attempt to enlist the Chinese in the defense of the peninsula was made too late to be effective. Negotiations attending the entry of Chinese troops into Burma were inexcusably protracted. When defeat came in Burma, too, China saw the last of her road-and-rail links to the Pacific cut for an indefinite period.

These factors reinforced the validity of China's demand for effective military aid. Yet at the moment when the validity of her demand stood at its highest point, and political barirers ("neutrality" or appeasement policies) had been removed, the facilities for satisfying that demand suddenly became most circumscribed.

Some assistance has been rendered during the past 18 months. On the economic front, the 500-million-dollar loan has been a positive psychological factor, even though its full utilization has been made impossible by the inability to send goods into China in large amounts. Small quantiiies of munitions and supplies have been flown in from India. The former devastating bombings of Chungking have ceased, as a result both of the appearance of an American air force in China and of Japan's preoccupation with other fronts in the Pacific war. In addition to their defense role, American planes have conducted modest bombing forays and participated in tactical operations supporting Chinese ground forces.

It still remains true that the sum total of this aid is lamentably small. More transport planes can be assigned to the India-China air route, both to increase the flow of war materials into China and to expand the Ameriacn air forces now operating from Chinese bases. It is probable that the increased emphasis on the Pacific war fronts, recorded in the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences, includes expansion of this air freight being carried into China.

The recent Burma campaign was thoroughly disappointing. Much larger air and naval forces must be employed in any operation meant to be decisive in this theater. To the Chinese, the effectiveness of military aid is measured by the quantity of weapons reaching China and by the seriousness of the effort made to reconquer Burma.

CHINA MISPLAYS HER HAND

Before

The strength of China's case is such that it requires no elaboration. Pearl Harbor, the western democracies were already heavily indebted to China; since then, the indebtedness has steadily increased. The importance of China's position in the Far East, both during and after the war, requires that this account be fully discharged in the shortest time possible.

There was no need to pass beyond the bounds of this argument. It rests on unassailable foundations. It is unanswerable, save by action on the part of the western democracies.

In the American forum of this past winter, nevertheless, the tragic fact is that China badly misplayed her hand. Instead of conducting the debate along the above lines, the representatives of Chungking called into question the basic strategy of the war. On more than one occasion, in private as well as in public, the demand was voiced that Japan rather than Germany should be made Enemy No. 1, or that forces comparable to those being utilized in Europe should be sent into the Pacific.

In choosing this ground for debate, China's representatives were committing three basic mistakes. They were demonstrably wrong, in the first place, on the point at issue. The consensus of expert military opinion is overwhelming on the fact that the German war machine is more formidable than the Japanese. United Nations' war potential-Russian, British, American-is predominantly concentrated in the European-Atlantic theater of operations. With logistics playing the great role which it does in this war, and in view of the acute shipping shortage, it was inevitable that the choice be made to eliminate the nearest enemy first.

Above all, this choice had been made early in 1942; by last winter, it had clearly become the settled strategy on which the war was to be waged. To reverse that strategy in the winter of 1942-43, after the North African campaign had begun, would obviously have been unwise and dangerous. The demand that relatively equal forces be dispatched to the Pacific is merely a variant of the same thesis, with similarly dangerous possibilities.

粤 APPEAL TO THE ISOLATIONISTS

In the second place, taking domestic politics in the United States into consideration, the appeal to reverse the strategy of the war represented a tactical blunder of the first importance. It brought under attack a policy to which President Roosevelt was thoroughly committed. More, it made its strongest domestic appeal to the political opponents of the administration. These were, at the same time, the isolationists who had supported appeasement of Japan, who had strongly opposed aid to China, in the pre-Pearl Harbor days. It was no accident, but a logical development, that these same elements should now be clamoring loudest of all for a policy "to defeat Hirohito first." Diversion of much of the United Nations' strength to the Far East, before Hitler was disposed of, would be the surest path to defeat on both sides of the globe. The appeal to these forces failed, as it was bound to fail, and China's cause thereby suffered a bad set-back in the United States.

In the third place, it was equally an error to lead the argument along lines which suggested that China was in danger of imminent collapse. This plea, strongly advanced by many Chinese in the United States this past winter, argued a weakness on China's part which the stubborn resistance of previous years belied. It verged on a propaganda claim which the best-informed students of Chinese conditions were not willing to accept at face value, despite the admittedly serious economic situation which prevailed.

The argument that "you must save us quickly or all is lost" had dangerously confusing implications. To some Americans it suggested that China might have to be written off as an effective ally in the immediate perspective of the war, and that she would have to be picked up again at a later stage when greater forces could be ranged against Japan. Much the sounder position for China would have been to put up a strong front, to dig in and fight even harder, at the moment of crisis. China's representatives could then have argued from strength and not from weakness.

DOUBTS RAISED IN THE UNITED STATES

The net results of this American forum on the position and prospects of China in the war have been confusing and, to some extent, disheartening. As the