the court granted and discharged the jury. Held that the plea of former jeopardy to another trial should be maintained. State v. Robinson, 46 La.

769, 15 So. 146.

After the jury had been sworn and the indictment read, the court found one of the jurors unfit to sit on the jury, and dismissed him. Another juror was selected and the trial continued. Held that the plea of former jeopardy would not be maintained. State v. Duvall, 135 La. 710, 65 So. 55.

Where a statute authorizes a court proceeding for the recovery of a penalty, and also criminal prosecution for the same act, the defendant in a suit to recover the penalty can not raise the issue of twice in jeopardy—no criminal proceeding having yet been instituted. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Charpentier, 140 La. 405, 73 So. 248.

One convicted of manslaughter appealed, and the conviction set aside for error in the proceeding. To an indictment for murder-the same homicidehe pleaded twice in jeopardy. Held the plea was not well taken, but that the state is estopped from prosecuting * on any other charge State v. Garrity, 140 La. 436, 73 So. 259. See 2 La. Dig. Criminal Law, p. 524.

than manslaughter.

Section 10. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; and when tried by jury shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to be fixed by law.

Sufficiency of Accusation. The essential averments in a bill of indictment required by the common law, have not been dispersed with by statute. State v. Cook, 20 La.Ann. 145.

The simplification of criminal pleadings was commanded by this state in her first criminal statute directing the common law forms to be divested of unnecessary prolixity. State v. Wolff, 34 La.Ann. 1153.

The charge in an indictment should be sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to prepare his defense. If merely following the words of a statute under which one is accused does not give the information, then the charge is not sufficient. State v. Schwartz, 137 La. 277, 68 So. 608.

The anti-trust acts of 1890 and 1915 sufficiently define a misdemeanor so that an accusation thereunder did not violate the constitutional provision that accused shall be informed of the nature of the accusation. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 138 La. 1005, 71 So. 137.

See 3 La. Dig. Indictment and Information, p. 911.

Section 11. No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject. him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel confession of crime; nor shall any confession be used against any person accused of crime unless freely and voluntarily made.

Self-Incrimination. Testimonial compulsion is the kernel of the privilege against self-incrimination, and bodily exhibition and muscular ex

ertion are not within its scope.

State v. Graham, 116 La. 779, 41 So. 90.

This immunity from self-incrimination is violated by a demand on defendant, in the presence of the jury, to produce a document containing incriminating evidence. McKnight v. United States, 97 Fed. 208. See also In re Feldstein, 103 Fed. 269.

A statute depriving persons of such immunity is void. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 146, 6 Sup. Ct. 524.

An exception is well taken where the accused was forced over the objection of counsel to give evidence against himself through a cross-examination by the state as to matters concerning which the witness had not given his testimony. State v. Underwood, 44 La. Ann. 852, 11 So. 277.

See infra, Art. 19, § 15.

See also 2 La. Dig. Criminal Law, pp. 550, 555, 569; 7 La. Dig. Witnesses, p. 389.

Section 12. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except the following: First, persons charged with capital offense where the proof is evident or the presumption great; second, persons convicted of felonies, provided that where a minimum sentence of less than three years at hard labor is actually imposed, bail shall be allowed pending appeal and until final judgment.

Bail. All persons, before conviction shall be bailable, save those charged with crimes specially excepted. State v. Judge, 48 La.Ann. 92, 18 So. 902.

Bail is allowed from considerations independent of the merits of the prosecution, as for instance, the long delay in bringing the case to trial, or the dangerous illness of the accused. Such cases are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In re State ex rel. Vickers, 47 La.Ann. 662, 17 So. 296.

Bail is never allowed in cases punishable by death, when the proof is strong and the presumption great. Territory v. Benoit, 1 Mart. (O. 8.) 141; Territory v. McFarlane, 1 Mart. (O. S.) 220, 5 Am. Dec. 706.

One convicted of crime not sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor is entitled to be released on bail during the rendering of an appeal. There is no such rule concerning notice of intention to apply for relief under Const. art. 94. In such cases the matter is within the discretion of the trial judge, and the Supreme Court will be greatly influenced by the views of the trial judge. State v. Hollingsworth, 137 La. 144, 68 So. 387. See Bail, 1 La. Dig. p. 800.

Section 13. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion, or invasion, the public safety may require it.

Nature of Habeas Corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is one of right, but not one of course. It rests in the exercise of the discretionary powers

of the court. State v. Langridge, 44 La.Ann. 1014, 11 So. 541.

The writ of habeas corpus is summary in character calling for prompt action, but that does not do away with all impediments in the way of immediate action and legal proceedings. Ex parte Ryan, 124 La. 356, 50 So. 385.

The writ of habeas corpus is one of right; but courts are bound to do in relation to it what is right between the prisoner and the public. There is no absolute right to immediate action thereon, without regard to circumstances. State v. Roger, 7 La.Ann. 382.

Our courts have not enlarged the functions of the writ of habeas corpus as interpreted under the common law. In re Courtney, 49 La. 685, 21 So. 729. The writ of habeas corpus is a highly privileged writ and has for its object the release by judicial decree, of persons who are restrained of their liberty, or retained from the control of those who are entitled to the custody of them. Prieto v. St. Alphonsus Convent, 52 La. 631, 27 So. 153, 47 L. R. A. 656.

A writ of habeas corpus is essentially a writ of inquiry in aid of right and liberty in respect to matters in which the state has an interest, though private rights may be involved. The writ simply brings the parties before the court for ascertainment of the facts; and the court is clothed with a sound discretion after hearing to grant or refuse the applicant the relief asked for. State v. Michel, 105 La. 741, 30 So. 122, 54 L. R. A. 927.

See 3 La. Dig. Habeas Corpus, pp. 808, 810.

Jurisdiction in Habeas Corpus. See infra, Art. 7, § 2. See also Art. 7. § 26 note.

Section 14. The military shall be in subordination to the civil power.

All military courts are under a constant subordination to the ordinary courts of law. Officers who have abused their powers though only in regard to their own soldiers, are liable to prosecution in a court of law, and compelled to make satisfaction. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. (O. S.) 530, 531, 6 Am. Dec. 675.

Militia Subject to Civil Courts. An act purporting to relieve members of the militia from civil or criminal liability, does not exempt a superior officer from suits for damages in the civil courts. O'Shee v. Stafford, 122 La. 444, 47 So. 764, 16 Ann. Cas. 1163.

Section 15. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or impair other rights of the people not herein expressed.

Unenumerated Rights. "The people of this state retain all the rights and exercise of which is not prohibited by the Constitution of the state or the United States." State v. McCarroll, 138 La. 454, 70 So. 448.

The right of voters to vote for more than one candidate at a primary election is not among the unenumerated rights guaranteed by this section. State V. Michel, 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.

Police Power. See infra, Art. 19, § 18. See also 2 La. Dig., p. 234. Ex Post Facto and Retrospective Laws. See infra, Art. 4, § 15. Obligation of Contracts and Vested Rights. See infra, Art. 4, § 15. Object and Title of Acts. See infra, Art. 3, § 16.

Equal Protection of Laws. The constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws means that every one is entitled to stand before the law

on equal terms with, to enjoy the same rights as belong to, and to bear the same burdens as are imposed upon, others in a like situation. Standard Oil Co., v. Police Jury, 140 La. 42, 72 So. 802.

To declare a statute unconstitutional, where a classification has been made, the court must find a manifest distinction or discrimination. State v. Cullom, 138 La. 395, 70 So. 338.

An ordinance which applies alike to all persons, firms or corporations engaged in business legislated against, is not discriminatory. Crowley v. Ellsworth, 114 La. 308, 30 So. 199, 69 L. R. A. 276, 108 Am. St. 348.

But any ordinance which violates equal rights is necessarily void. State ex rel. Galle v. City, 113 La. 371, 36 So. 999, 67 L. R. A. 70, 2 Ann. Cas. 69; De Blanc v. New Iberia, 106 La. 680, 31 So. 311, 56 L. R. A. 285; Crowley v. West, 52 La.Ann. 526, 27 So. 53, 47 L. R. A. 652; State v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 49 La.Ann. 1571, 22 So. 839, 39 L. R. A. 618n; State v. Kuntz, 47 La.Ann. 106, 16 So. 651; State v. Sarradat, 46 La. Ann. 700, 15 So. 87, 24 L. R. A. 584n; State v. Dubarry, 46 La.Ann. 33, 14 So. 298; State v. Deffes, 45 La.Ann. 658, 12 So. 841; State v. Dubarry, 44 La. Ann. 1117, 11 So. 718; State v. Dulaney, 43 La.Ann. 500, 9 So. 481; State v. Mahner, 43 La.Ann. 496, 9 So. 480; Baton Rouge v. Cremonini, 36 La.Ann. 247; Halloway v. Police Jury, 16 La.Ann. 203; DeBen v. Gerard, 4 La.Ann. 30; New Orleans v. Blineau, 3 La.Ann. 688. An ordinance purporting to confer upon any officer or tribunal the arbitrary control over all citizens, in exercise of a legitimate business or occupation, and depriving citizens in a like situation of equal protection, is not a valid law. New Orleans v. Palmisano, 146 La. 518, 83 So. 789.

An ordinance providing that no automobile shall be permitted to stand on the streets without a permit from the department of public safety, and designating their location, is unconstitutional, as it leaves the question of permits to the unregulated discretion of the department of public safety. New Orleans v. Badie, 146 La. 550, 83 So. 826.

The party assailing the classification of a statute enacted under the police power has the burden of proving it arbitrary. State v. Winehill, 147 La. 781, 86 So. 181.

Any reasonable basis of classification of laws enacted under the police power, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of equal protection, and mathematical nicety is not necessary. State v. Winehill, 147 La. 781, 86 So. 181.

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitution does not take from the state the power to classify its police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide discretion. State v. Winehill, 147 La. 781, 86 So. 181; City v. LeBlanc, 139 La. 117.

The act of 1886, which provided that in suits against railroads for the loss of stock killed or injured by them, it should be sufficient to prove the killing or injury unless defendant shows that it did not result from negligence or carelessness on its part, is not in contravention of U. S. Const. Amend. 14, § 1, as denying to railroads the equal protection of the laws. Learned v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 128 La. 430, 54 So. 931.

An act authorizing the recovery by the owner of a sheep or lamb killed by a dog from the owner of the dog of ten times the damages sustained, does not deprive the owner of the dog of equal protection of the law, and is not unconstitutional. Rausch v. Barrere, 109 La. 563, 33 So. 602.

See 2 La. Dig. p. 256.

ARTICLE II.

Distribution of Powers.

Section 1. The powers of the government of the State of Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments legislative, executive, and judicial.

Distribution of Powers. The state Constitution provides for the distribution of the powers of government to the three departments, and prohibits the exercise, by one department, of powers belonging to either of the others, except in instances expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution. New Orleans v. LeBlanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248.

Whether, if the question were left at large, it should be regarded as a legislative, or a judicial, function, to establish a basis for the adjustment of the rights and obligations of a newly created parish as against, and towards, the parish or the parishes from which it is taken, there can be no doubt, where the Constitution requires the new parish to institute a judicial proceeding in a particular court, in order to effect such adjustment, that the adjustment must be effected in that way. Fontenot v. Young, 128 La. 20, 54 80. 408.

Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers. See infra, Art. 2, § 2.

Section 2. No one of these departments, nor any person or collection of persons holding office in one of them, shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.

Legislative Encroachment on Judiciary. The Legislature can not take from a citizen rights acquired under a particular law, nor can it assume the duties and powers of the judicial department, and decree how the law shall be administered in relation to a particular right. Perry v. Clinton &c. R. Co., 11 Rob. 412, 414.

The Legislature can not confer the powers of a judicial office, constitutionally elective, on one whose office does not depend on the Constitution, and is in fact wholly unknown to it. Lafon v. Dufrocg, 9 La.Ann. 350.

The Legislature can not usurp the functions of the judiciary by pronouncing a forfeiture of the chartered rights of a corporation and taking possession of the corporate funds. Louisiana Trustees v. Dupuy, 37 La.Ann. 188, 104 U. S. 711, 29 L. ed. 902.

The Legislature can not adjust the rights of the creditors of an insolvent. Liquidator v. Lee, 22 La.Ann. 287.

An act on usurpation of office and giving the power to declare a forfeiture, does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the judiciary. It declares certain acts, which were in themselves wrong and in violation of law and civil order before the passage of the statute, to be crimes if done after the passage of the law. State v. McFarland, 25 La.Ann. 547.

The article of the Code fixing the character of security offered by a debtor, refers to judicial bonds, and not to mere private conventional bonds; and