of same after six months.-Yours, etc., J.B." -is neither a bill of exchange nor a promissory note within the meaning of sections 69 and 70 of The Stamp Act, 1882."
The term letter of credit," in section 69, is used in its ordinary mercantile meaning only.
The intention of the Legislature in using the wide words of section 70 is merely to pre- vent an evasion of the duty with respect to documents which in substance are promissory
Mortgage Insurance Corporation v. Commis- sioners of Inland Revenue (20 Q.B.D. 645; on app. 21 Q.B.D. 352; 57 L.J. Q.B. 174, 630) and Dickinson v. Bower (14 T. L.R. 146) fol- lowed. MIERS v. BETT 367
the Superintendent and Provincial Council of any province to legislate authorising the Super- intendent (inter alia) to divert or stop up any river, stream, or creek, to build bridges, &c., and to sell the bed of any diverted or stopped-up river, stream, or creek, are sufficient to indicate an intention to retain the beds of rivers, streams, and creeks, in grants made subsequent to the Act, and therefore rebut the presumption.
Per Edwards. J. (Williams, J., dubitante; Stout, C.J., dissentiente).-Where a navigable river runs through Native lands, and such lands are confiscated by the Crown and granted to Europeans, there is no public right of naviga- tion arising by prescription or implied dedica- tion by the Crown, and a right of navigation by the public will not exist unless the bed of the
Semble (per Williams, J.): Where under such circumstances the river is the only practicable highway giving access to the land, it is a high- way of necessity, and there is an implied dedi-
RIPARIAN RIGHTS Drains and Water- courses — Control by County Councils — The Public Works Act, 1894," Sections 246 and 252 — Meaning of “ Control."] The control of drains conferred on County Councils by "The Public | cation. Works Act, 1894," is not an absolute or un- qualified control, but only such a control as en- titles the Council to interfere in case of injury done or about to be done. Such control does not, therefore, abrogate the common-law rights of riparian owners. THE CHAIRMAN, COUN- CILLORS, AND INHABITANTS OF THE TARANAKI COUNTY v. BROUGH -
Per Williams and Edwards, JJ. — In this colony no grant from the Crown of land bounded by a road passes the soil in the road ad medium filum viæ; and this consideration indirectly assists in rebutting the presumption as to rivers which are highways.
Lord v. The Commissioners for the City of Sydney (12 Moo. P.C.C. 473) considered and dis- tinguished. MUELLER V. THE TAUPIRI COAL- MINES (LIMITED). (C.A.)
RIVER · Navigable but non-tidal-Presumption that Bed of River ad medium filum aquæ passes by Grant of Adjoining Land· Grant from the ROAD DISTRICT. Crown - Public Right of Navigation - Rebutting Presumed Intention-Rights of Adjoining Owners in Soil of Roads.] The presumption that a grant of land described as bounded by a river passes the bed of the river ad medium filum aquæ is rebutted in the case of a grant from the Crown by the fact that the river is a public
navigable (though non-tidal) river, subject to a public right of passage, the Crown, as trustee for the public, having an interest in the bed remaining public property, and the presumed intention to pass the bed being therefore nega- tived. The fact that the grant is a military grant, made under an Act passed for the purpose of confiscating Native land and making military
settlements thereon, and that the river is the only practicable highway for military and other purposes, indicates that the Legislature, and therefore the Crown, in making the grant, had
no intention that the bed of the river should
be granted. So held by Williams, Edwards, Conolly, and Martin, JJ. (Stout, C.J., dissen tiente).
SALE OF GOODS-Contract for—Misrepresenta- - Rescission Rules of Common Law and Equity-"The Sale of Goods Act, 1895." Sec- of goods cannot be rescinded on the ground of an tion 61, Subsection 2.] A ccntract for the sale innocent misrepresentation inducing the con- tract unless the misrepresentation was of the Mail Company (L.R. 2 Q.B. 580)—unless, that nature defined in Kennedy v. The Panama, &c., is to say, it was such that there is a complete difference in substance between the thing bar- gained for and the thing obtained, so as to con-
stitute a failure of consideration.
The fusion of law and equity has not affected the law in regard to the effect of misrepresenta- tion upon contracts for the sale of goods, the rules of equity in regard to the effect of mis- representation upon contracts never having applied to contracts for the sale of goods. Subsection 2 of section 61 of "The Sale of Goods Act, 1895," recognises and continues this.
The common-law rule, as stated in the above case, continues, therefore, to be the rule in the case of a contract for the sale of goods. RIDDI- FORD 2. WARREN AND ANOTHER. (C.A.) 572 See CONTRACT. 2 and 4.
"Bills of Exchange Act, 1883," sections 73, 10, 11, 12, 13, 98.
"Chinese Immigrants Act Amendment Act, 1888," sections 8 and 5. See CHINESE IMMIGRANT.
"Counties Act, 1886," sections 124, 304, 303, 311.
SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-Transfer of Client's | STATUTES-continued. Property to Solicitor pending Litigation-Advan- tage to Solicitor from Litigation-Legal Fraud- Sale of Property to Innocent Purchaser-Appli- cation of Purchase money received by Solicitor.] A client, being indebted to a solicitor in the amount of a bill of costs, transferred certain property to a third person, in trust, after re- serving thereout 3 acres for her own use, to sell so much as was necessary to pay the solicitor's claim and incidental expenses; the balance of the land, or surplus moneys, to be held by the trustee for the client. Subsequently the solicitor undertook the conduct of certain litigation for the client on condition that the property in its entirety was absolutely trans- ferred to him. The trusts were revoked, and the trustee, in pursuance of the new arrange- ment, transferred the property to the solicitor, who then sold to an innocent purchaser.
Held, That the transfers from the trustee to the solicitor and from the solicitor to the pur- chaser were fraudulent as against the client and her administrators, and that the solicito: was a trustee of the purchase-money for his client, subject to the deduction thereout of the amount actually owing to him on his bills of costs. HENI MATEROA AND ANOTHER v. FINN AND ANOTHER - 67
STATUTE Application Construction Shall "-Imperative Duty.] Per Williams, J. -The word "shall" in section 4 of "The Road Boards Act, 1882," is imperative, and a County Council cannot refuse to constitute a new road district where the conditions prescribed by that section have been complied with.
Quære, Whether the word shall can ever be read as 66 may " in such a case. At any rate, if it ever can, there must be other language in the statute which renders the inference that it is to be so read overwhelming. TUCKER V. THE INHABITANTS OF THE KAITI ROAD DISTRICT. (C.A.) 607
sections 124, 304, 311 (subsection 3). See BY-LAW. 1. sections 127, 125.
Criminal Code Act, 1893," section 6. See CRIMINAL LAW. 1.
See CRIMINAL LAW. 2. section 220.
See CRIMINAL LAW. 6. section 416.
See CRIMINAL LAW. 3.
"Crown Suits Act, 1881," section 37, sub- section 1.
Dog Registration Act, 1880."
See DOG REGISTRATION.
Employers' Liability Act Amendment Act, 1891," section 5.
See MASTER AND SERVANT.
First Offenders' Probation Act, 1886." See CRIMINAL LAW. 5.
"Government Valuation of Land Act Amend- ment Act, 1900," section 2. See VALUATION OF LAND.
"Harbours Act, 1878," sections 69-73, 152-65, and 215.
"Indictable Offences Summary Jurisdiction Amendment Act, 1900." See CRIMINAL LAW. 4.
"Infants Guardianship and Contracts Act, 1887," sections 3 and 5.
"Land and Income Assessment Act, 1900," sections 55 and 68. 2.
"Land Transfer Act, 1885," section 57.
"Licensing Act, 1881," sections 38, 44 (sub- section 5), and 56.
See LICENSING. section 155.
See GAMING.
TESTATOR'S FAMILY MAINTENANCE-contd. if he were living, and such persons are entitled to preference over those who may possibly come within the statute, but who would have had no claim against the testator if he were living.
The position of a testator's widow differs from that of his adult children, both in morals and in law. During his lifetime he was bound to support his wife in a manner suitable to their station in life, and that although she might not be destitute; but he was not under any legal obligation to support his adult children unless they came within the provisions of "The Des- titute Persons Act, 1894."
A testator left an estate of at least £1,500 net. He left a widow, and six adult children by a former marriage, him surviving. Of the latter, the youngest was forty years of age; two were sons, and four daughters; three of the daughters were married, one a widow; several of them were in poor circumstances, but none were desti- tute. The testator's widow was sixty-one years of age, and there was medical evidence that she was not capable of carning her living by manual labour. She was possessed of about £95, but had no other property. The only provision made for her by the will was a legacy of £200. On an application by her under "The Testator's Family Maintenance Act, 1900,”
Held, that an order ought to be made that an annuity of £52 a year, payable to her during her life, be purchased out of the estate of the testator, she abandoning her claim to the legacy of £200. In re RUSH, RUSH v. RUSH AND OTHERS 249
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 2.
TITLE-Abstract of.
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 2. Vendor bound to show.
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 2.
TOLLS-Establishment-Resolution adopting Re- port of Committee Continuance Resolution to let Toll-gate-Public Notification-Signature -Authorisation-Clearance Notice - Mandatory Provision-" The Public Works Act, 1882," Sec- tions 105, 106, 117-"The Public Works Act, 1894," Sections 124, 143, 154.] Where the matter of the establishment of certain toll-gates had been referred by a local body to a com- mittee, and the committee brought up a report recommending their establishment and recom- mending a certain scale of tolls,-
Held. That a resolution of the local body that the report be adopted amounted to a resolution establishing the toll-gates and fixing the scale of tolls.
Held, therefore, That the scale might be notified by advertisement signed by the Chair- man without a separate resolution authorising the notification.
In November, 1889, a local body resolved that certain toll-gates be established for the term of three years, and the 1st of January, 1890, was afterwards fixed as the date for the commencement of the tolls. In December, 1892, the local body resolved, first, that tenders be called for leasing the gates from the 1st of January, 1893, and, afterwards, that a certain tender be accepted.. In Dece.nber, 1893, the local body by resolution accepted a tender for a lease of the gates for the twelve months ending the 31st of December, 1894. On the 5th of March, 1894, the lessee having apparently given up his lease, the local body resolved" that a "receiver be put in for the remainder of the "month, and that tenders be called for renting "the same from 1st April to end of year.' From the month of April, 1894, until the year ending the 31st of March, 1901, the local body each year by resolution let the toll-gates to different persons.
Held by the Court of Appeal (Stout, C.J., and Cooper, J.; Edwards. J., doubting as to the first and dissenting as to the second proposition), affirming the decision of Conolly, J.,-
1. That the resolutions referred to amounted to resolutions to continue the collection of the
tolls throughout the period covered.
2. That, the scale of tolls having been pub- licly notified in 1889, it did not require to be notified again on the occasion of each resolu- tion, the tolls not being new tolls each year, but the same tolls continued from year to year.
Section 143 of "The Public Works Act, 1894," provides that no toll shall be payable unless certain conditions are observed, one of the con- ditions being that the scale of tolls shall be painted in black letters not less than 2 in. in length on a white board placed in a conspicuous place on or near the toll-house. Section 154 provid that whenever any toll-gate clears any other toll-gate the words 66 Clears the gate shall be painted upon the board men- tioned in section 143.
Held (affirming the decision of Conolly, J.), That compliance with section 154 was not a condition precedent to the right to collect the tolls. HOOKER v. MORRIS. (C.A.) - 195
TORT-Excess of Powers.
See LOCAL BODY.
TOWN DISTRICT" The Town Districts Act, 1881 "The Municipal Corporation Act, A resolution of a local body authorising the 1886," Sections 2, 255, 256, and 257-Channel- collection of tolls impliedly authorises its exe-ling Proportion - Right to charge Owner or cutive officers to do all ministerial acts necessary Occupier-Resolution-Confirmation-Seal.] to carry the resolution into effect. Public noti- motion, duly seconded and carried at a meeting fication of the scale of tolls for fourteen days of a Town Board, That the minutes adopting being a condition precedent to the tolls becoming" by-laws be confirmed," is a confirm- payable,― ation of the resolution carried at a previous meet-
ing adopting such by-laws, and not merely a confirmation of the minutes of such meeting.
The common seal of the Board being in fact affixed to the by-laws as they appear in the minutes, it must be taken, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, that it was properly affixed. No resolution is necessary.
The effect of section 2 of "The Municipal Cor- porations Act, 1886," is to incorporate the whole of the provisions of Parts X. ("Powers of the "Council") and XI. ("By-laws ") of that Act with "The Town Districts Act, 1881," in place of Parts XI. and XII. of "The Municipal Cor- porations Act, 1876," repealed, the former Parts corresponding with the latter in substance and effect within the meaning of the said section 2.
The mere occurrence of the word "channels " in section 256 of "The Municipal Corporations Act, 1886," does not, considering the provisions of section 257, authorise reading that word into section 255; and a Town Board constructing channelling other than in the manner provided by section 257 cannot recover any portion of the cost from the owners or occupiers of pro- perty fronting on such channelling. THE TIN- WALD TOWN BOARD v. WATKINS 306
TRESPASS—Tenant in Common of Land-House built on the Land by one Co-tenant with the Con- sent of the Other-Removal of the House by Tres- passer-Measure of Damages-Land held in Fee- simple by Natives-" The Native Land Court Act, 1894."] A husband who erects a house on his wife's land has no right to remove it, and can be sued by his wife in trespass for such removal. The fact that the wife is a Maori makes no dif- ference if the Native title has been extinguished. HARPER V. HARPER AND ANOTHER
VALUATION OF LAND The Government Valuation of Land Act Amendment Act, 1900,’ Section 2- Unimproved Value "-Lessee's In- terest - Principle of Assessment.] The Govern- ment Valuation Department, in assessing the value of a lessee's interest in the unimproved value of land under the above Act, should take the lease, and, looking at all its provisions, ascer- tain what the unexpired term might be expected to realise by sale if there were no improvements whatever upon the land, and if such unexpired term were offered for sale on such reasonable
VALUATION OF LAND-continued. conditions as a bonâ fide seller might be expected to require.
To treat the annual value as being necessarily equal to 5 per cent. upon the capital value is to proceed upon an erroneous basis.
In dealing with the matter the existing im- provements must be completely put out of the question. It is fallacious and misleading, there- fore, to enter upon calculations as to the value of the existing buildings, and the amount required to provide for a sinking fund sufficient to recoup their cost, with a view to determining the value of the lessee's interest in both land and improve- ments, and then, by a process of deduction, arriving at the value of his interest in the land alone. DUTHIE v. THE VALUER-GENERAL - 585
VENDOR AND PURCHASER chase - Deposit Right to recover back.] The defendants agreed with the plaintiffs, as agents for a foreign syndicate, to grant to the syndicate a three-months option to purchase a tailings claim belonging to the defendants, in order to permit of an expert inspecting and reporting on the claim. In the event of a favourable report being received the defendants were to receive a cash payment of £500 and to be allotted one- sixth of the total shares in any company formed to work the tailings, such shares to be fully paid up; and it was stipulated by the defendants that they should receive £100 cash deposit. expert's report was unfavourable, and the op-
tion was never exercised.
Held, That the deposit paid could not be recovered back. SIEVWRIGHT AND ANOTHER v. THE CROMWELL PROPRIETARY GOLD-MINING COMPANY (LIMITED)
Time Whether of Essence Private Hotel Title When Vendor bound to show- Time for taking Possession-Time for Payment of Purchase-money—Refusal to procure Consents Rescission by Purchaser Abstract of Title.] Semble, That, on a sale of a private hotel (not licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquors) and of tea-gardens attached, as a going concern, time is of the essence of the contract just as much as on a sale of licensed premises.
A contract for the sale and purchase of build- ings and land, used as a private hotel and tea- gardens, provided for the payment of a deposit on the execution of the contract, that the pur- chase should be completed on a certain day, that the balance of the purchase-money should be paid, at the purchaser's option, either by a cash payment on the day for completion or by the execution of an agreement covenanting to pay the balance eighteen months thence, and that the purchaser should be entitled to posses- sion as from the day fixed for completion. The purchaser elected to execute an agreement, as provided, in lieu of paying cash on the day for completion.
1. That the vendor was bound to give the purchaser a complete title on his executing the agreement provided for.
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