however, it must appear that the period fixed by the foreign statute had fully run and the bar was complete before the defendant came within the jurisdiction of the State.

3. SAME.

Defendants owed plaintiff on a promissory note executed in Canada, where the parties resided, and defendants moved to Michigan, when the note had been due 3 years and a half. In neither place had the statute of limitations run so as to bar an action, at the time plaintiff brought suit in Michigan. Held, that the law would not be enforced as a matter of comity in a foreign country and that the two statutes could not be tacked together to bar the right of action.

4. SAME-BAR.

In an action begun in one State or jurisdiction upon a contract made in another, a plea of the statute of limitations existing in the place of the contract is not good as a bar to the action, but a plea of the statute existing in the country or State where the suit is in litigation is sufficient and as a universal rule, the statute operates merely upon the remedy; the law of the forum, not the law of the situs of the contract, controls.

5. BILLS AND NOTES-FOREIGN CONTRACT-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-FORUM.

A promissory note negotiated, dated, signed, indorsed and delivered in Ontario, where it was also made payable and where all the parties resided, was a foreign contract, and though the right of action was transitory, the contractual rights of the parties were governed by the law of the place of contract.

6. SAME HUSBAND AND WIFE-INDORSEMENT BY WIFE. Under the law of the place of execution the payor's wife was liable on her indorsement with the same force and effect as though she was unmarried and proof of her sig. nature, in the absence of evidence of duress or undue influence, made out a prima facie case. No presumption arose from the fact of coverture that shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff.1

'On the enforcement of a personal contract of a married woman capable of contracting according to the law of another state or country where the contract was made, see note in 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 774.

Error to Wayne; Mandell, J. Submitted October 18, 1915. (Docket No. 13.) Decided December 22, 1915.

Assumpsit by Charles Millar against Francis A. Hilton and I. G. Hilton upon a promissory note. Judgment for plaintiff against Francis A. Hilton and for defendant I. G. Hilton on a verdict directed by the court. Plaintiff and defendant F. A. Hilton bring error. Affirmed as to defendant, appellant. Reversed as to defendant I. G. Hilton.

Moore & Moore, for plaintiff.

Lodge & Brown, for defendant.

STEERE, J. This appeal involves a judgment, in an action begun in the Wayne county circuit court, May 9, 1912, upon a promissory note dated at Toronto, Ontario, November 20, 1902, due in three months, made and signed by defendant Francis A. Hilton, payable to the order of I. G. Hilton, his wife, at Molson's Bank, Toronto. Plaintiff became owner of the note when, or shortly after, it was made, and discounted it at Molson's Bank. When it became due the bank protested it for nonpayment, and, having indorsed the same, plaintiff was subsequently obliged to pay the amount due upon it to the bank, again becoming owner of the paper. The note fell due on February 23, 1903. Defendants moved from Toronto to Detroit, Mich., on December 1, 1906, and have resided in that city ever since. Plaintiff is still a resident of Ontario. Under a plea of the general issue, defendants gave notice in defense that the note was barred by the Michigan statute of limitations, and that defendant I. G. Hilton was a married woman when she indorsed the same. Upon the trial, the genuineness of the note and plaintiff's ownership for value were not questioned. It was also conceded that when said note was given defendants were,

and yet remained, husband and wife, and that nothing had been paid upon the same by defendants since it fell due. The statutes of Ontario were introduced in evidence, from which it appeared that the statute of limitations in that jurisdiction is the same as that of Michigan, as applied to actions upon negotiable paper of the kind involved here, and under the Ontario law in force when defendant I. G. Hilton indorsed the note no disability existed as to her by reason of coverture. No testimony was introduced by the defense beyond proving the Canadian statute of limitations. After both parties rested, each asked the court for a directed verdict. The court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff against defendant Francis A. Hilton for the amount of the note, but held that his wife, I. G. Hilton, was not liable, on the ground that she was under disability of coverture, and directed a verdict of no cause of action as to her. Defendant Francis A. Hilton and plaintiff each sued out a writ of

error.

This peculiar situation brings in juxtaposition the two principles involved in the general rule that, in determining whether a domestic or foreign law is applicable in a case under consideration, the validity and construction of a contract are controlled and to be determined by the laws of the situs, or place where the contract was entered into, while the remedy for enforcing a foreign contract is regulated by the laws of the forum, or country where such remedy is pursued.

At the time defendants left Canada and moved to Detroit, this note had been past due some three years and nine months. Six years had not expired since they established their residence in Detroit before this action was brought. The statute of limitations had not run in either country. Defendants seek to tack the running of the statutes of limitations in Canada and Michigan which, combined, would bar action upon the note. This cannot be done. The Michigan statute of limita

tions contains no special provisions recognizing the bar of limitations under the statute of a foreign jurisdiction, as is the case in some States, while even under such provisions to be effectual it must appear that the period fixed by the foreign statute had fully run and the bar there was complete before the defendant came within the jurisdiction of the State where the action was brought. 25 Cyc. p. 1241, and cases cited.

The Ontario statute of limitations forms no part of the contract here sued upon and out of which the right of action arises. The action is based on a common-law right entirely independent of the statute, which may or may not later act upon the remedy. The statute does not create the right itself, nor extinguish it, though it may through lapse of time bar, ex post facto, the remedy when pleaded. But laws relating to remedies on contracts are not a matter of comity. The rule is well settled by an abundant and long line of authority that remedies are governed and applied according to the law of the place where the action is instituted, rather than by the law of the place of the contract. The rule is clearly stated in Wood on Limitations (2d Ed.), vol. 1, § 8, and note, as follows:

"Where an action is brought in one country or State upon a contract made in another, a plea of the statute of limitations existing in the place of contracts is not a good bar, but a plea of the statute existing in the country or State where the action is brought is.' This rule is in conformity with the universal rule that, as the statute operates merely upon the remedy, the law of the forum, and not the law of the situs of the contract, controls."

In the early and leading case of Bulger v. Roche, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 36 (22 Am. Dec. 359), where the debt was barred between the parties in a foreign jurisdiction by the law of that country before either left it, Chief Justice Shaw, in the concluding paragraphs of his illuminating discussion of the subject, says:

"The plaintiff, having a right to sue in our courts, must conform to our law, as to the time of bringing his action, and all other particulars affecting his remedy. That remedy is not barred or taken away by our statute of limitations, until six years have elapsed after both the plaintiff and the defendant have been within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth. How does the existence of a foreign law of the like kind, which would merely affect the remedy within its own jurisdiction, control or affect the statute of limitations which regulates the remedy here? The statute itself makes no such distinction, and none can be implied either from its letter or spirit."

This case, with others to the same effect, is cited and recognized as controlling in Belden v. Blackman, 118 Mich. 448 (76 N. W. 979), where it is said:

"Our statute is like that of Massachusetts and New York. The statutes of those States have been construed as applying to causes of action which accrued without the State between nonresidents (citing cases). We think the last-named cases should be followed here."

This rule is also recognized in Blackburn v. Blackburn's Estate, 124 Mich. 190 (82 N. W. 835, 83 Am. St. Rep. 325).

Defendants' contention that the ruling of the trial court is "anomalous" and introduces a "strange doctrine," because it is elementary that the cause of action accrued when the note fell due and a cause of action can accrue but once, while the statute of limitations having once started to run will continue, demands, to give it point, recognition of the Ontario statute of limitations and its application in combination with the Michigan statute to the case under consideration. Eliminating the foreign remedial statute, the strange doctrine vanishes. The cause of action has accrued but once in this State, and since then the statutory period of limitations has not intervened. In the absence of special statutory provisions, the law upon