son, or by reason of the intoxication of some person, or by reason of the unlawful selling of intoxicating liquor to some person. In Brooks v. Cook, 44 Mich. 617 (7 N. W. 216, 38 Am. Rep. 282), the plaintiff had his pocket picked while he was intoxicated. He was refused relief. In Heikkala v. Isaacson, 178 Mich. 176 (144 N. W. 508, 50 L. R. A. [N. S.] 857), the plaintiff, while drinking with another, or with others, and while himself somewhat intoxicated, was struck by an intoxicated person, who used a beer glass, and an eye was destroyed. There appears to have been some testimony tending to prove that the plaintiff may have aggravated-did aggravate-by conduct or language, or both, the person who struck him. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, and in affirming it the charge of the trial court was approved which advised the jury that if they found the conduct of plaintiff aggravated his assaulter, the fact would be no defense. There was an affirmative act of violence, committed by an intoxicated person upon the plaintiff. But in Rosecrants v. Shoemaker, 60 Mich. 4 (26 N. W. 794), where a wife brought her action under the statute for furnishing liquor to her husband, there was testimony tending to prove that she authorized defendants to furnish liquor to her husband, and that she herself procured it for him. A request to charge that:

"If the jury find that, for her husband's use, as a beverage, the plaintiff was in the habit of purchasing of defendants intoxicating liquor by the bottle, they may consider that as evidence for the purpose of determining whether she authorized them to sell her husband liquor or not"

—was refused, as well as the request that:

"If the jury find that defendants were authorized by plaintiff to furnish her husband liquors, she cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of defendants having furnished her husband liquor, unless he was intoxicated when such liquors were furnished."

This court, speaking through Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, said:

"As the wife sues solely in her own behalf, it is evident that she cannot complain of any evil which she has herself caused, and that, if she encouraged or requested the sale of liquor to her husband, she does not stand on the footing of an innocent injured party.”

In McDonald v. Casey, 84 Mich. 505 (47 N. W. 1104), the principle of Rosecrants v. Shoemaker is recognized. See the distinction made in Thomas v. Dansby, 74 Mich. 398 (41 N. W. 1088). The courts of other States have recognized the same principle. Reget v. Bell, 77 Ill. 593; Engleken v. Hilger, 43 Iowa, 563. It does not appear, affirmatively, in the opinion in the case last cited, that the action was founded on a statute. See, also, Black on Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 292, 307.

In the case at bar, there was no act of McMahonno affirmative act, like a blow or other trespasswhich caused plaintiff's injury. And plaintiff himself participated in furnishing liquor to McMahon, a minor. He paid for liquor which the minor drank, and drank with him. He was guilty of furnishing liquor to a minor and to an intoxicated minor. Both took the car of a third person, and, while McMahon drove the car, the adventure was a mutual one. Those who sold the liquor are undoubtedly responsible in a criminal action. But plaintiff is seeking to recoup himself, in a pecuniary way, for consequences for which he was directly and actively responsible. In my opinion, he is not an "other person" within the meaning of the statute sued upon, and the ruling and direction complained about were right.

The judgment is affirmed.

BROOKE, C. J., and PERSON, KUHN, STONE, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

STEVENS v. LAKEWOOD UTILITIES CO.

1. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT CONTRACTS-WORK AND LABOR. Plaintiff, who supplied defendant's ice house with ice, was not entitled to a directed verdict in his favor where he and defendant settled a dispute with regard to the manner in which he had packed the ice, by agreeing that defendant should pay a substantial part of the price agreed upon before March 24th and the balance on May 15th, if the ice was in good condition at the date named, and where the evidence was in conflict whether the ice was in good or in poor condition at the stipulated time, the issue raised was for the jury.

2. SAME-EVIDENCE-VALUE.

Evidence to show the value of the work done was therefore immaterial; if the ice was in fact in good condition at the date agreed upon, plaintiff should have been permitted to recover the deferred payment; if not, defendant was entitled to a verdict.

3. SAME ISSUES-DIRECTING VERDICT.

The trial court erred in excluding evidence relative to the condition of the ice at the time fixed by plaintiff and defendant according to the later contract; and it was also erroneous to advise the jury that plaintiff might, although they found he was in default, recover a part of the deferred payment.

4. SAME FORFEITURE—INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

There was reversible error at the trial in charging the jury that the settlement between the parties provided for a forfeiture and that the law abhors a forfeiture.

Error to Muskegon; Sullivan, J. Submitted October 13, 1915. (Docket No. 73.) (Docket No. 73.) Decided December

21, 1915.

Assumpsit by Samuel Stevens against the Lakewood Utilities Company for a balance claimed to be due on

a contract to fill defendant's ice houses. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Reversed.

Cross, Vanderwerp, Foote & Ross, for appellant.
Turner & Turner, for appellee.

The initial written evidence affecting the issue is the following:

"CHICAGO, January 21, 1914. "I, Samuel Stevens, agree to fill three icehouses belonging to the Lakewood Utilities Company and B. C. Mayo for the sum of two hundred and eighty dollars. This sum is to include all materials to be furnished without additional charge by me, except the materials for slide, which are to be furnished by the company, if possible, or if furnished by me, are to be paid extra for. "The services of Mr. Alex Ferguson as helper at two dollars a day are to be deducted from the amount of two hundred and eighty dollars for whatever time he puts in on this work.

"It is understood that this work should be done at whatever time the weather conditions permit"

-which was signed by the plaintiff. He filled the three icehouses and sent the defendant his bill, which the defendant received, and on March 4, 1914, wrote him that his bill would be honored after defendant had received a report. Under date March 7th, defendant wrote plaintiff that he had received a most unsatisfactory report in regard to the quality of the ice; that it was not 10 inches thick; a quantity of it had 3 or 4 inches of snow on top; that it was packed too close to the center walls on both sides; and that the inside wall (between two icehouses) had been cut through to allow the ice to be shifted back and forth. Later, under date March 16th, defendant wrote plaintiff, reaffirming the charges that the ice was of poor quality and improperly stored, and suggesting that plaintiff could remedy the conditions in part. Under date March 19th plaintiff wrote the manager of defendant the following letter:

"MR. MAYO,
"Chicago, Ill.

"Dear Sir:

"WHITEHALL, MICH., March 19, 1914.

"In reply to yours of March 16th, I have been to the icehouse and replaced the ties that were removed to get the ice in. I have also rearranged the packing on the ice but I surely will not molest the ice for there is no better ice to be had than that already in the house. Now I will tell you what I will do; you pay me $220.00 on or before March 24, 1914, and I will look after the ice and keep it packed and in good shape until May 15, 1914. If the ice is in good shape at that time (May 15, 1914) then I am to receive the remainder of my contract money, but if the ice is not in good keeping order then I forfeit the remainder of my contract money."

The subsequent correspondence is here set out in full:

"Dear Sir:

"CHICAGO, March 20, 1914.

"In re yours of the 19th, will say that the arrangement you propose seems satisfactory on the face of it. We will pay you $220.00 before April 1st, 1914, provided you look after the ice and keep it packed in good shape until May 15th, 1914. At that date you are to receive the remainder of your contract money, provided the ice is in good shape and satisfactory to us, but if the ice is not in satisfactory condition, you agree to forfeit the remainder of your contract money. Please confirm this letter."

"MR. G. G. MAYO,

"WHITEHALL, MICH., March 23, 1914.

"Chicago, Ill.

"Dear Sir:

"I have just received yours of March 20th, accepting my proposition of the 19th inst. Your acceptance is one-sided wherein it states the ice must be satisfactory to you upon May 15th. This gives me no voice in the matter whatever. However, I will pass it as it is, trusting you to do the square thing by me. I will expect the $220.00 before April 1st, 1914.”