Can it be said that the snowstorm which filled the ditch was an independent unforeseen cause? That such falls of snow were anticipated is shown by the testimony of the street commissioner, who testified as follows:

"Q. Any ditch that you would dig, or the city of Ironwood would dig, for the purpose you have mentioned, or for any other purpose, along about that time of year, would in all probability become filled with snow, or a snowstorm might come and fill it up; might it not? "A. Certainly.

"Q. You always had a crew of men on to go around and clean them out and open them up afterwards? "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. You would expect that there would be light snow that would cover up those ditches?

"A. We always cleaned them out when it was possible. We always had men for that purpose. We would expect that there would be falls of snow that would cover up the ditches, and we would have to go and clean them out afterwards."

In the case of Baker v. Railroad Co., 169 Mich. 609 (135 N. W. 937), this court said:

"To make such negligence the proximate cause of an injury, it must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, which, under the circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person ought reasonably to have foreseen might probably occur as the result of his negligent act. Where an act is negligent, to render it the proximate cause, it is not necessary that the one committing it might have foreseen the particular consequence or injury, or the particular manner in which it occurred, if by the exercise of reasonable care it might have been anticipated that some injury might

occur."

Viewing the testimony as to the construction of the ditch in the light most favorable to the plaintiff's claim, and taking into consideration the weather conditions prevalent in that part of the State at the time

of year the accident occurred, we are of the opinion that the fall of snow was not such an independent, unforeseen cause which intervened between the claimed negligent act of the city in constructing the ditch as it did and the time of the injury, that it can be said to be the proximate cause of the accident; and that the city should have anticipated the possibility of the fall of snow and that some injury might therefore result from having the ditch unprotected and uncovered. Detzur v. Brewing Co., 119 Mich. 282 (77 N. W. 948, 44 L. R. A. 500); Burrell v. City of Greenville, 133 Mich. 235 (94 N. W. 732). The street commissioner testified that he had instructed his men to always dig ditches in the gutter, as that is the place where people might expect to find a ditch, and that he would not consider a ditch with perpendicular sides a proper ditch to put across a sidewalk.

Being satisfied that it must be said that the construction of the ditch was the proximate cause of the accident, we are of the opinion that the question of whether the action of the city in constructing and maintaining the ditch uncovered and unguarded, in the condition disclosed by the record, left the crosswalk in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, should have been submitted to the jury.

We are therefore constrained to reverse the judgment of the court below and grant a new trial.

BROOKE, C. J., and PERSON, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

STORY & CLARK PIANO CO. v. HILDERINK.

1. TAXATION-INCREASE BY BOARD OF REVIEW-RECORD CLERK—

MEMORANDA.

In making changes increasing the amount of property taxed, or assessed valuations, the board of review of a city, in the absence of the clerk, substantially complied with the requirements of the statute by directing one of the members to keep minutes, which he preserved in the form of rough memoranda, later filed with the clerk and prepared in typewritten form for permanent record in his office by the clerk (1 Comp. Laws, § 3323; 2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5853), where the memoranda, considered with the tax rolls, showed the changes so made, and where the amount of increase could be ascertained by computation, although the records did not show item by item the several amounts that the board added to or deducted from the valuations as fixed by the supervisors.

2. SAME PREJUDICIAL ERRORS-STATUTES.

No sufficient prejudice resulted to the taxpayer who ascertained the amount of increase and the fact of change from the rolls and memoranda kept by the board, and who was sufficiently informed to be able to file a protest; the tax being presumed to be valid under 1 Comp. Laws, § 3922 (1 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 1870), and unless the irregularity was of a jurisdictional nature the statute cured the defect.

3. SAME ASSESSMENT-CITIES-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Only if the official action can be shown to have been fraud. ulent could the court hold the tax illegal, and the fraud must be clearly established. 3 Comp. Laws, § 3899.

4. SAME INTENT STATUTES.

Evidence considered and held not to establish the claim that the assessors or board of review had omitted any property from the tax roll intentionally.

Appeal from Ottawa; Cross, J. Submitted October 8, 1915. (Docket No. 29.) Decided December 21,

1915.

Bill by the Story & Clark Piano Company against G. J. Hilderink, one of the supervisors of the county of Ottawa, for an injunction. From a decree for defendant, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Lillie & Lillie, for complainant.

Louis H. Osterhous, for defendant.

STONE, J. In this case the bill of complaint was filed July 7, 1914, to obtain an injunction to restrain the defendant as the supervisor of the First ward of the city of Grand Haven, from spreading taxes upon the property of complainant on the valuations fixed by the board of review, or on a valuation in excess of that placed thereon by defendant as supervisor. The complainant is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of pianos and player pianos in said city-the same being a city of the fourth class-and having a factory in the First ward thereof. Defendant was, in the year 1914, supervisor of that ward, and as such assessed the real estate of the complainant at $72,000, and its personal property at $59,000, when he made up his assessment roll in the month of April. The board of review of the city met on the second Monday of May and remained in session 24 days thereafter, reviewing the rolls, examining the property throughout the city, and revising the tax rolls as prepared by the supervisors. At its session of June 11, 1914, the board of review, among other actions, increased the assessed valuation of complainant's real estate to $100,000, and the assessed valuation of its personal property to $100,000. On June 12th, the complainant filed with the board its protest against such increases, which protest was considered by the board on June 13th, and rejected. This protest is set forth in full in the bill of complaint. Thereafter this bill was filed.

We shall consider the claims of complainant in the

order in which they were treated by the court below. There are three principal propositions:

(1) The claim that the board of review did not keep a suitable record of its proceedings, and that its action was therefore without jurisdiction and void.

(2) The claim that the valuations placed on the real estate and the personal property by the board of review are excessive.

(3) The claim that the supervisors and the board of review omitted from the tax rolls more than $100,000 in assessable property in the form of household goods, furniture, etc., thereby causing complainant to bear more than its just share of the burden of taxation.

There is in the bill of complaint no express charge that the board acted fraudulently or with any improper intention or purpose. The bill does claim, however, that the action of the board of review under the second and third headings constituted a fraud on complainant and wrongfully and fraudulently would compel complainant to pay more than its just share of taxes in the said city; and, generally, that the action. of said board of review constituted a fraud in law against complainant, which, if not remedied, would compel complainant to pay more than its just share of the burden of taxation in said city. The case, being at issue, was heard, by the trial judge, upon the testimony taken in open court as in a suit at law. The hearing resulted in a decree dismissing the bill of complaint with costs to the defendant. The complainant has appealed.

The record is a voluminous one, for the reason that about 50 witnesses were sworn upon the question of the omission of personal property from the roll. We have read the record with care, and in disposing of the case shall not quote therefrom at any great length.

1. We will consider the claim that the board of review did not keep a sufficient and suitable record of its